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ABSTRACT
THE EVOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE
The Republican Study Committee (RSC) is an ideological faction
within the U.S. Congress which was formed in 1973 and consists of
conservative Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives. This
thesis analyzes the purposes for which the group was formed and the impact
which it has had in the Congress. The RSC was not formed before 1973
because the need for a distinct ideological faction was not recognized by
conservatives prior to that time. The RSC was patterned after the
Democratic Study Group (of liberal Democrats), and its importance quickly
surpassed the Wednesday Group (of liberal Republicans) in the structure of
the House.
The Republican Study Committee plays several roles in Congress, each
of which is examined in this thesis. It acts as a legislative coordinating and
strategy group providing staff resources to its members for joint activities.
This allows junior members of the House, who do not have access to other
forms of research staff assistance, to use policy staff on specific legislative
issues. It provides the opportunity for academic conservatives to participate
in the public policy process. It functions as the "inside" vehicle in the House
of Representatives where it works with "outside" organizations on legislative
activities, including its Senate counterpart, the Senate Steering Committee,
and the Executive Branch of the federal government. It performs an
electoral function, participates in national Republican party activities,
publishes works through its related RSC Campaign Fund, and it works as a
service bureau for conservative Republican congressmen who support the
staff of the RSC through their individual staff allocations.
The Republican Study Committee has become a recognized faction in
the U.S. House of Representatives. It has developed a larger membership
base in the party, and most recently, it has shifted from an "entrepreneurial"
organization to a "managerial" organization. The author of this thesis served
as the executive director of the Republican Study Committee during much of
its formative period. This position has allowed the author to interview the
principal participants in the RSC's formation, discuss their perspectives on
the RSC and consider a substantial body of literature pertaining to Congress
in this light. This thesis analyzes the RSC's development as a new body in
the institutional framework of the U.S. House of Representatives and
projects its future.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The House of Representatives in Political Theory
The U.S. House of Representatives has changed substantially in recent
years. This thesis will describe some of these changes and how they came
about, and it will then analyze the results of these changes. No description
or analysis of the modern Congress can be undertaken in a vacuum, but
instead must rely on the work of previous scholars who have studied the
Congress during the past century. Certain strands of thought have emerged
from these studies beginning with the pioneering work of Woodrow Wilson
published in 1885 entitled Congressional Government. ^ Wilson was concerned
with the structure of Congress and its principal actors. Wilson and other
early scholars concentrated on normative and biographical narratives of Con¬
gress as a political institution, and they often described the historical devel¬
opment of different congressional structures such as the committee system
or the party leadership.^
The second school of congressional studies evolved through quantitative
methods. These studies of Congress began with the publication of Professor
Stuart Rice's classic volume Quantitative Methods in Politics.-^ This work,
the first to give a quantitative framework to congressional scholarship,
represented an important move away from the institutionalist approach.
Professor Rice was a precursor of the behavioral school which emerged after
World War II in the United States focusing attention on the attributes of
individuals and the aspects of their behavior in social situations. This was a
different approach from the earlier theorists since the emphasis moved from
the institution per se to the behavior of individuals and the interaction of
different groups within the institution's structure. In essence, it represented
a change from the macro- to the micro-scopic, from the historical-narrative
to the socio-psychological.^
The behavioral school was further divided into "inside" and "outside"
theories. "Insiders" observed specific activities and frequently conducted
interviews for their basic data. "Outsiders," on the other hand, tended to
rely on the compilation of statistics which often took the form of studies
of" either the electoral process or theories about voting behavior. Thus,
generally, the insiders tended to employ qualitative and descriptive methods
while outsiders tended to use quantitative techniques more frequently. As
Kenneth Shepsle and David Rohde note,5 the distinction was not absolute,
and in fact, the two overlapped.
Another distinction between "inside" and "outside" has also developed.
Professors Jewell and Patterson state that much of the recent analytical
literature about legislatures has focused on its policy process.6 In this
regard, the analysis concerns not only the internal operations within the
legislature, but also the impact of "outside" forces on the legislative
decision-making process. This emphasis will play an important role in this
analysis of the Republican Study Committee.
From these diverse approaches, there has evolved what Shepsle and
Rohde describe as the "new institutionalism." This is an approach which
combines the institutional role and its effect on the behavior of the indiv¬
idual participant on the one side, and the effect of the individual on the
structure of the institution on the other. While combining an institutional
examination of this type with the observations of an active participant in
the process, this thesis considers a Sub-3 reap of the Congress, the Repub¬
lican Study Committee, using a case-study method. This thesis is not a
theoretical contribution to the literature about legislatures, but rather is
an examination of the evolution of an ideological faction within the House
of Representatives. While it is not theoretical, it is based on a set of
organizing concepts which permit certain conclusions to be made about the
Republican Study Committee. These concepts include the institutionalization
of a faction within the Congress,^ the role of specific members of the
Republican Study Committee as participants in the faction, the role of the
staff of the Republican Study Committee; and it then projects the evolution
of the RSC away from an "entrepreneurial" faction^ toward a "managerial"
one.
Combining interviews with role analysis, it is argued that from the per¬
spective of some congressmen, certain goals and objectives emerged which
were not being met within the existing institutional structure of the Congress.
Differences over policy questions, staff resources, and influence on legislative
strategy forced a number of Republican members to admit the inadequacy
of the existing formal structure. The Republican Study Committee grew to
meet needs which neither the existing structure within the House, nor the
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national Republican party was able to meet. The era of the 1970s-1980s
has been described as an era of special interests. The advocates of "single-
issue" viewpoints have advanced their views in the political process through
the vehicle of special interest pressure groups. The two primary American
political parties, which had earlier been responsive to many of the special
interest groups, are now only pale shadows of what they had been. The
Republican party's influence on the evolution of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee is discussed in this thesis.^
The Republican Study Committee is primarily a congressional institu¬
tion, rather than a party-related organization. As a conservative congres¬
sional organization, the RSC was not the first of its type, but it was dif¬
ferent from its predecessors.
The primary difference between the Republican Study Committee at
this time and earlier conservative coalitions was its emergence as a formal
institutional structure within the Congress. In effect, the RSC was the first
self-designated conservative congressional faction: it became a new element
within the traditional structure of the House of Representatives.
The crucial element within the RSC was its research staff capability.
The role of professional staff in the House has attracted considerable atten¬
tion from scholars.^ This dependence on staff has been an outgrowth of
the specialization throughout the legislative process in the Congress. Orig¬
inally staffs assisted the members of Congress in performing their duties,^
however, the U.S. Congress, unlike other national parliaments, has also devel¬
oped a policy analysis which plays a substantial role in the legislative process.
Michael Malbin considers the significance of this development when he says:
"Most other national legislatures do not give individual mem¬
bers similar staff resources; most depend on their cabinets for al¬
most all policy initiatives. Congress is not so passive today, thanks
largely to its staff." ^
In addition to its immediate role, the staff enables the member to
extend his own time horizon. As Shepsle and Rohde point out, the customary
behavior of the individual legislator is:
"myopic — he attempts to accomplish his goals within a fixed
set of institutional arrangements, has a selectively short time hori¬
zon (normally not much beyond his next election), and, therefore,
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heavily discounts long-term objectives and potential changes in
structural arrangements in calculating his behavioral practices."^
The development of an organization such as the Republican Study Committee,
which was established to overcome the short time horizon of the individual
legislator, altered the formal structure of the institution of the House of
Representatives. It altered, likewise, the role perceptions of individuals
with;n that structure.
The structure of the Congress is not unchanging; it evolves as differ¬
ent pressures are brought to bear and as different individuals change roles
in the Congress. Consequently, the relationships among Republican members
of the House, with the Republican Administration, and with the Democratic
majority, were ail affected by the evolution of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee. Additionally, the relationships of members in their own districts to
party officials, to local interest groups and to constituent concerns were
factors affecting the RSC's growth. Yet, the primary judgment of the RSC's
effectiveness was within the Congress of the United States.
As Shepsle and Rohde point out, there is an increased awareness that
"the realization that the minutiae of institutional structure should not be
relegated to the legalistic treatises on the Congress." Changes in the
institution are too important for such arid treatment. Furthermore, it is
not enough to study quantitatively the impact of elections or the analysis
of roll call votes. Analysts of the Congress must also describe the institu¬
tional framework as it evolves in different time periods, and that is what
this thesis does with respect to the Republican Study Committee.
A change in the institutional framework of the Congress can be
brought about by a number of factors. Changes throughout the congres¬
sional leadership and electorate, conflicts within the legislature, and the
emergence of new pressure groups within the Congress can ail lead to
changes in the institution of the House. For example, in 1975, votes in the
Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives overthrew 3 committee
chairmen. This change in chairmen not only altered the committee leader¬
ship, but more significantly the seniority system of selecting committee
chairmen. An electoral change occurred in the i980 U.S. Senate elections
which also altered the institutional framework of Congress: Republican
victories shifted the majority to the Republican party, and with that the
control of committee chairmanships. The legislative agendas were substan¬
tially shifted, committee staffs were reduced, and the past pressure to
amend Senate Rule XXII governing the use of the filibuster were abated.^
Legislative conflicts, such as the battle over federal land use which furthered
the evolution of the Republican Study Committee,^ have provided groups
with an opportunity to enter into the policymaking framework of Congress.
And, the pressure groups which have entered into these legislative conflicts
have proved to play an important part in the legislature, as shown in the
role of the Conservative Democratic Forum of the House of Representatives
in the passage of President Reagan's economic package of 1981.^^
Thus, the history of the Congress is one of change and adaptation.
The framework within which individual members are legislators, ombudsmen,
and candidates constantly changes. It is argued in this thesis that the
institutional acceptability of the Republican Study Committee has been a
response to the needs perceived by a substantial bloc within the Congress.
In other words, the existing institutional framework was inadequate to meet
the perceived needs of individual members, and in the case of the Repub¬
lican Study Committee, institutional change came in response to those needs.
The change was gradual and evolutionary. Trial and error shaped the RSC
with advances and setbacks characterizing its history. By late 1976, the
RSC had altered substantially the institutional framework of the U.S. House
of Representatives, and become a viable faction within that framework.
This is the first analysis of the Republican Study Committee as an
element within the House of Representatives. While analyzing the relation¬
ship of the goals of the RSC and behavior of individual members and staff
as well as the changing institutional organizations and their procedures, this
author describes critical events in the evolution of the RSC. This thesis
shows that members are more independent of the party leadership than in
earlier times, i.e., the established, traditional, formal leadership of the House
has been weakened, and ad hoc groups have been formed to help fill a per¬
ceived vacuum.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the organizations within Congress, particularly
among Republicans, tended to be social or fraternal. A "class" of congress¬
men, such as those elected in 1952, would form a group and maintain social
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contact with each other on a regular basis. Although these groups were
primarily social, sometimes policy actions would be taken as an indirect
result of members meeting socially. In the 1950s, the Democrats formed
a policy group designed specifically to bring the liberal Democratic members
together for legislative cooperation. This group, the Democratic Study Group
(DSG), was the first unofficial group within the House devoted to policy
matters. During the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, other groups were
formed which were mainly devoted to furthering the legislative interests
of a special interest group, such as environmentalists, blacks, women, or
farmers.I-* The Republican Study Committee is one such group and should
be understood in the context of this growing trend toward ad hoc special
interest groups which were formed by congressmen who were more and
more independent of traditional party leadership. These members were
seeking new ways to achieve their objectives in a changing environment.
In this thesis, the RSC is traced from its early beginnings through the
1976 election. The 1976 election is used as the terminal date for two
reasons:
1. By 1976, the Republican Study Committee had passed through
its early evolution and become part of the House's institutional
framework. And,
2. The Carter victory over Ford meant that the Republican Study
Committee's role in relation to the Executive Branch and to the
House Republican leadership would be altered substantially.
It should be noted that the author of this thesis served as the full-
time executive director of the Republican Study Committee from January
1974 through March 1977. Prior to 1974, he also served as the first part-
time executive director and as the full-time administrative assistant to
Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-Illinois). This perspective presents the
author with both advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages
are:
1. An intimate knowledge of the organization, its members and
staff.
2. Complete access to the written records of the RSC. And,
3. Access to current and past members of the RSC for personal
interviews.
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The principal disadvantages are:
1. The possibility that the author will not be objective in his
analysis of the organization and its personnel. And,
2. The need to chart a fine course between Scylla and
Charybdis: the danger of becoming immersed in minor details of only
peripheral interest and the temptation to gloss over the unsuccessful
activities of the RSC or give credit for greater influence than the
RSC legitimately earned.
The drafts of this thesis have been revised to minimize these drawbacks.
B. A Summary of the Development of the Republican Study Committee
The Republican Study Committee was organized in 1973. By 1981, it
has grown into a group of 150 dues-paying Republican members of the
House of Representatives. As the self-proclaimed "conservative conscience"
of the Republican party in the House, it has played a major role both in
responding to Democratic legislative proposals and in developing its own
legislative initiatives. The Republican Study Committee was not organized
until fourteen years after its counterpart among the liberal Democrats, the
Democratic Study Group, had been established. This delay was caused by
a number of factors:
1. The conservative Republicans were unwilling to band together for
coordinated action.
2. The conservative Republicans believed in "gut instincts" to come
out on the "right side" of issues; no need was perceived to coordin¬
ate activities or philosophy different from the broad outlines of the
Republican party. And,
3. The formal Republican leadership in the House shared the rank
and file members' perspectives on most major issues. This reduced
the need for an ideological faction to assist the members in expres¬
sing their views effectively.^
By the beginning of the second Nixon Administration in January 1973,
there was a perception among some Republican House members that the
current method of working with the Republican leadership and "voting right
by voting no" was inadequate. Frustrated by the Nixon Administration's
movement to the left on a number of issues, the conservative Republicans
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within the House of Representatives began to look for alternative ways to
express their views. The formal Republican House leadership was not a
viable outlet for these frustrations.
As allies of Nixon from their days together in the House of Repre¬
sentatives in the 1950s, Gerald Ford (R-Michigan), House Minority Leader;
Les Arends (R-Illinois), House Minority Whip; and John Rhodes (R-Arizona),
chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, carried Nixon's legislative
agenda to the Congress on Capitol Hill. John B. Anderson (R-Illinois),
chairman of the Republican Conference, sometimes disagreed with the Admin¬
istration, but when he did, his position was almost invariably more liberal
than Nixon's or the other members of the Republican leadership.
With the Republican President and a Democratic-controlled House,
compromises in policy had to be negotiated in the legislative arena. Because
of the substantial Democratic majorities in the Congress, these compromises
by Nixon were usually made with the most important ideological group
among the Democrats, i.e., the liberal majority in the House Democratic
party. The Republican President was proposing legislative objectives with
which a number of the conservative Republican members in the House
substantially disagreed.^ 1
Traditional analyses had maintained that conservatives did not need
"an elaborate organization to hold them together"^ as a counterpart to
the liberal Democrats with their Democratic Study Group. By 1972-1973,
the political balance made it more essential than ever for the group to be
formed. This was not only a change from earlier political circumstances, it
had also become a practical possibility. As Congressman Edward J. Derwinski
(R-Illinois), one of the founders of the Republican Study Committee, noted:
"A Republican Study Committee was not formed earlier
because we Republicans were united under [President Lyndon]
Johnson, largely tolerant during the first Nixon Administration,
the Democrats hadn't been radicalized by McGovern yet, and
Nixon was just starting to take nonconservative positions.' ^
The time was right for a major initiative among the House conservatives,
despite unsuccessful earlier attempts to form such a group either among
the Republicans or on a bi-partisan basis.^
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The eventual success of the group depended on a number of independent
factors coming together. In retrospect it is clear that these included:
1. The legislative initiatives from the Administration which were
strongly opposed by most conservative Republican members of the
House. For example, conservative Republicans were opposed to
President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development
Bill, as discussed in Chapter II.
2. The election of a large class of freshman Republicans in 1972,
including 30 identified conservatives, which provided a new base of
potential support for such a group. These freshmen owed no formal
allegiance to the Republican leadership in the House, and they could
act independently of any commitments to the leadership. The bring¬
ing together of the existing conservative Republicans who had battled
their own party's White House on issues such as the Family Assistance
Plan and the Child Development Bill, with the newly-elected Repub¬
licans to form the embryonic Republican Study Committee is examined
in Chapter IV below.
3. The cooperation of several senior Republican members with the
newly-elected members. Their commitment was critical because they
brought their experience to bear on the situation. As "cue-leaders"
to the freshmen,^ they provided a legitimacy for the freshmen to
become involved in a new activity.
4. A maturing relationship between the members and several key
staff aides who played an important role in the organization of the
group. The staff relationship to both the newly-elected members and
the senior members set the mood for staff-member relationships within
the Republican Study Committee in years to come.
The RSC staff served as a model of how members could employ staff
resources in the legislative arena more effectively than they had in the
past. The use of staff resources was usually reserved for Republicans who
held the senior position of ranking Republican member on a committee. In
addition, Republicans had fewer staff aides than the Democratic majority.
While the Republicans held approximately one-third of the seats in the House
from 1965-1973, they had unsuccessfully battled for proportional committee
staffing since the mid 1960s.^6 Consequently, on the House Banking and
Currency Committee where 52 professional staff members were apportioned
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with 49 chosen by the Democrats only 3 were allotted to the Republicans.
In addition, the 3 Republican staff aides "owed their allegiance to the
ranking minority member rather than to all Republicans....It was not unusual
to be arguing with the minority staff on your own committee.
The first major break with the Republican Administration of Richard
Nixon on a policy issue developed over welfare reform. The House Ways
and Means Committee was the legislative committee which considered
Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. In the battle over that bill in 1971 and
1972, Congressman John Byrnes (R-Wisconsin), the senior Republican on the
Ways and Means Committee, worked on a specific bill with President Nixon
and the White House staff as well as with Wilbur Mills (D-Arkansas), chair¬
man of the committee, and his senior Democratic aides from the Ways and
Means Committee. The junior Republicans on the Ways and Means Com¬
mittee had no access to the minority staff which reported directly to Byrnes.
Therefore, Byrnes and Mills were able to negotiate legislative compromises
with the Administration which were unsatisfactory to the junior Republican
members. Then, when conservatives wished to oppose the arguments of the
Administration/Miiis/Byrnes position, these other members on the Ways and
Means Committee found themselves without committee staff assistance,
no
relying on whatever resources they could find.
The senior Republican members had worked long and hard for the elec¬
tion of President Nixon. Some of them viewed his legislative deviations as
the necessary price of compromise with the Democrats in order to achieve
meaningful "reform" programs which would be acceptable to the Democratic
leadership but which would also improve the status quo. These arguments
were rejected by the more conservative members. As political analyst Paul
Weyrich noted:
"Nixon divided the Republican party in the House. He came
up with proposals which traditionally had been opposed by Repub¬
licans. It separated the real conservatives from the pragmatists."^
Thus, the need for an organization was evident: the timing was right,
and the key actors — incumbent members, members-elect, and staff aides —
were all in place to bring the organization together in early 1973. Yet, as
chapters IV and V show, it was not an easy or smooth process to convert
these ingredients into a functioning organization. As an embryonic organiza-
10
tion, the RSC achieved a number of legislative accomplishments in the 93rd
Congress. Additionally, its foundation was laid, its structure established,
and its role both in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the Repub¬
lican party affirmed.-^ The RSC did not involve itself in the most impor¬
tant issues of the 93rd Congress, which were the debate over U.S. involve¬
ment in Vietnam and the question of presidential involvement in the Water¬
gate scandal.^* Other significant legislative issues occupied the attention
of the RSC. Where common ground could be found, it managed to build
a base of support and establish an institutional role as the conservative
voice of the Republican party.
During this time, relations between the RSC and the Republican leader¬
ship in the House ranged from blatant hostility to grudging acceptance and
occasional cooperation with the RSC's legislative activities. Oftentimes
the cooperation was expressed only when the RSC's legislative activities
coincided with those of the leadership. These phases are described in detail
in the legislative case studies which appear in Chapter V. The activities of
the organization to establish an identity, to work as an effective voice for
conservatism among the House Republicans, and to fill an unique role, are
recounted in Chapter IV. The formation of the Republican Study Committee
preceded the formation of most of the single-issue caucuses by several
years.^ Because of the late arrival of single-issue caucuses and their
"single-issue" emphasis, these caucuses did not have a major impact on the
RSC.
The structure of the Republican Study Committee was patterned after
the Democratic Study Group^ because it had been a successful organization
for fifteen years. The DSG is the prototype for most of the factions in
the House because it has proven to be such an effective voice for its mem¬
bers, the liberal Democrats within the Congress.^ It was hoped that if the
RSC could become even partially as effective, it would have achieved its
basic objective. Thus, a staff structure was established which paralleled
that of the Democratic Study Group; a staff director was appointed; research
and clerical staff hired; and an office within the House Office Building Com¬
plex was secured.
Some changes from the DSG pattern were necessary. The DSG mem¬
bership was able to rely more heavily on formal committee staff input than
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was available to the RSC. Of the committee Democrats, many were liberals
who arranged to share their resources with the DSG since they were working
toward common objectives. Active members of the DSG included several
middle-level Democrats, like Morris Udail (D-Arizona) and Frank Thompson
(D-New Jersey), who had some influence in the Democratic Caucus and
later became committee or subcommittee chairmen. Because of these con¬
nections, these members were able to take DSG initiatives and ideas directly
into the formal committee process.
The RSC members tended to be junior members. These RSC members
belonged to the minority party and battled not only the Democratic majority,
but frequently their own senior members and the Republican Administration.
Unlike the DSG members, the RSC members had no effective access to the
committee agendas. Therefore, the need for effective staff resources was
crucial to the- embryonic RSC.
The means of building an RSC staff evolved during 1973-1974. Early
efforts to form a "shared staff" proved ineffective because of the conflicting
claims on the staff member from both the executive- director of the RSC
and from the member of Congress who shared his time.-^ It became
necessary for the key members to request additional support from their col¬
leagues for a professional staff which was working exclusively for the RSC.
This staff would owe its primary allegiance to the Executive Committee
and their delegate, the executive director of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee. This, however, proved to be a difficult problem.
The Republican members involved in the RSC had little experience in
the effective use of professional staff, especially research staff, and at the
same time were reluctant to place employees on their payroll for whom
they would be responsible, but over whom they would have little direct
control. The relationship of staff and members evolved from legislative
case to legislative case throughout the time of the RSC's development.
The staff's duties included: supplying information to the members, keeping
them informed of legislative initiatives, assisting the members in coordinating
their activities, and encouraging them to be more aggressive in legislative
battles. At the same time, the staff could not be perceived to be giving
direction on policy to the members. Professors Jewell and Patterson
describe the demeanor of the ideal congressional staff:
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"The norm of deference to congressmen is very strong and
is often reflected by staff comments about how staff members
must "be on tap, and not on top," that they must not "try to
run the show," or that "you must remember that staff is staff,
and members are members."
This complicated role which the staff was to play required not only
tact and diplomacy, but also a maturity which was not always evident in
the young staff aides who were hired by the RSC. A sense of legislative
timing was even more difficult to gauge since the Republicans did not
control the legislative agenda or the legislative schedule either on the House
floor or in the committees or subcommittees. The development and effec¬
tiveness of the Republican Study Committee staff are discussed in the case
studies in Chapters V and VII below.
By the end of 1976, the RSC had a research staff of eleven which
produced more than one hundred studies annually. But, in looking at the
example of the Democratic Study Group, this did not ensure that the staff
would maintain its value indefinitely. The staff of the Democratic Study
Group was less important in the late 1970s than it was in the 1960s for
several reasons. Firstly, through the process of seniority, activist members
of the Democratic Study Group who were formerly outside the power
structure of the Democratic party and the Democratic leadership, had been
able to use the resources which were available to the majority party, particu¬
larly in the case of chairmen of subcommittees or full committees. More
importantly, however, the members of the DSG in the late 1960s and early
1970s successfully promoted a series of reforms which helped individual
activist members of the Democratic Caucus, while at the same time, they
decreased the need for a formal organization such as the Democratic Study
Group.^
Ironically, while the legislative agenda of President Nixon caused con¬
servative Republicans in the House to become concerned about his conces¬
sions to the liberals, it also caused consternation on the part of the liberals.
As Michael Malbin, an astute observer of the Congress, noted:
"Members of the ten year old (sic) Democratic Study
Group (DSG), an organization of liberal Democrats in the
House, became concerned that unaccountable committee
chairmen would use their positions to cut policy deals with
the 'enemy'."^
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Because of this concern, further reforms were enacted following the 1976
elections, and as a result of these 1976 reforms, the number of subcom¬
mittee chairmanships which were allocated to junior members was increased.
This move assured each of these junior members access to their own legis¬
lative staff resources.
This shift created still more power centers within the structure of the
House of Representatives, and it also increased the individual Democratic
member's legislative capacity. The resulting increased number of power
centers within the House as an institution made it more difficult for
either the Executive Branch (with a President of either party) or the formal
leadership of the Democratic party to negotiate a legislative program which
was acceptable to the different blocs within the majority party. Morris
Fiorina summarized the situation as "Congress now has a surfeit of Chiefs
and a shortage of Indians.To carry this analogy further, it could also
be asserted that tribal loyalty is decreasing as the new chiefs try to lead
their warriors into battles.
Whether this could become a problem for the Republican Study Com¬
mittee is difficult to project. Clearly, it did not during the period under
review (through 1976). However, the Republican members of the House
have obtained additional staff resources in the subsequent period. By the
time these resources became available to the members, the Republican
Study Committee, as an established organization with expertise in specific
legislative areas, had carved out its own role as an independent faction
within the House.
C. Activities of the Republican Study Committee
The activity areas of the Republican Study Committee include:
• legislative activities;
• academic outreach;
• electoral involvement; and
. Executive Branch relationships.
Each activity is considered at various points throughout this thesis.
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Legislative Activities
The primary reason for the formation of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee was for conservatives to have a more timely and coordinated impact
on the legislative activities of the U.S. House of Representatives. As is
detailed in Chapters II, V, and VII, this impact included opposing initiatives
proposed by the Executive Branch, such as the Family Assistance Plan, the
Child Development Bill, the common situs picketing bill, and the Legal
Services Corporation. It also included opposing initiatives being proposed by
the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives. Thus, RSC
members opposed such bills as land use planning, the Consumer Protection
Agency and federal surface mining regulations. While these measures were
also opposed by the formal Republican leadership in the House of Repre¬
sentatives, as detailed below, it was the willingness of the activist members
of the RSC to take on these particular legislative battles which often
encouraged the Republican leadership to oppose the Democratic power
structure. This reaction meant that the Republican Study Committee issue
leaders would sometimes offer their own legisiative alternatives, and at
other times, would simply urge a "no" vote on the pending bill. A third
category of bills included those which the members of the RSC were pro¬
moting as their own initiatives. These included welfare reform and food
stamp reform.
The RSC members who led the legislative battles for the Republican
Study Committee were represented by members as diverse as Sam Steiger
(R-Arizona), Philip Crane (R-Illinois) and Edward Derwinski. Sam Steiger
led the battle for land use. Steiger, from a relatively safe Republican seat
with eight years seniority, was admittedly not a "team player." He was
impatient with the status quo. The principal House advocate of the private
ownership of gold was an ideological conservative activist, Phil Crane. The
RSC's spokesman on several foreign policy issues was Edward Derwinski. A
senior member of the House International Relations Committee, Derwinski
brought a pragmatic political dimension to his detailed understanding of
foreign policy issues. These three members represented the diversity of the
members who became active in the Republican Study Committee's legisla¬
tive projects. The role of the key member's leadership is discussed in
each of the case studies below.
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Not all of the information which the RSC staff provided to the mem¬
bers was directly related to legislative activities. The staff frequently pro¬
vided data to members' offices dealing with constituent inquiries or with
member legislative interests outside the RSC's agenda. These inquiries were
burdensome to the staff, but the staff's work on these matters was seen as
a part of maintaining good relations with the voluntary members who were
not only paying dues, but also staff salary allotments.
A discussion of the legislative role of the RSC necessarily involves the
RSC's relationship with the national news media. In this aspect of the
RSC's activities, and in others, the relationship was complicated. As is
shown in Chapter VI, the RSC's staff was more concerned with national
media attention than were most of the members. The staff pushed hard for
a more aggressive national media relations program, but the members
resisted, and this program never developed. The members' primary media
concern continued to be with outlets in their home districts, rather than
national media on major legislative issues.
Forecasts of the categories of future activities for the Republican Study
Committee are made in the concluding chapter VIII. But specific issues which
are likely to be encountered in the years ahead are not discussed in detail.
This author has learned the lesson from a 1964 study which projected future
issues to be confronted by the Democratic Study Group. In that study, Mark
Ferber discussed three: civil rights questions, automation and church-state
relations.^ While Ferber correctly foresaw that civil rights would sustain
the continuing interest and attention of the DSG, automation and church-
state relations did not. Thus, forecasts of coming issues are hazardous and
distracting — hazardous because they could be incorrect; distracting because
they tend to cloud the analysis of the group under consideration.
The final chapter includes projection of future activities across the
broad range of RSC involvement. The institution of the Congress has evolved
further since 1976. The future activities and influence of the Republican
Study Committee will be built on the early foundation of the organization
and its cumulative impact since then. Thus, the prospects for the future
are projected in this context.
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Academic Outreach
Because several staff members had scholarly backgrounds with ties to
the academic community, the Republican Study Committee staff aides also
developed academic relations. This was reinforced by the view of several
senior members of the RSC that the Republican Study Committee could
play a useful role in bringing academics and members of Congress together.
These members, particularly Phil Crane and Jack Kemp (R-New York),
believed that ideas work their way into the public policy arena and become
fashionable only after a lengthy process. This process involves not only
exposure to the ideas of academics, but also its popularization through con¬
stituency groups and then its eventual incorporation into the agenda of
Washington's policymakers. The members saw the need to be exposed to
these individuals and their ideas. On a practical and immediate level, this
exposure could give the members academic credibility and intellectual argu¬
ments for the positions which they espoused rather than just instinctive
opposition to new liberal programs.
Interaction with the academics also helped the embryonic organization
gain respectability within the institutional framework of the House. The
academics were pleased to participate in the RSC efforts because it pro¬
vided the opportunity to be a part of the Washington public policy process.
Meetings and forums with Nobel Laureates were held for members of the
Republican Study Committee and other invited members, both Republican
and Democrat. Staff briefings were held on a regular basis, and seminar
sessions were conducted on aspects of House procedure. All of these
educational meetings were in addition to the weekly legislative strategy
meetings. The role of the RSC in these educational efforts was not merely
one of good public relations, but it provided a useful and needed service.
As 1976 RSC Chairwoman Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland) said, "No one else was
doing it, so we decided to fill the vacuum.Chapter VI shows that the
transmission of these academic ideas to influence the legislative process was
a significant activity of the Republican Study Committee's staff.
Electoral Involvement
While the electoral involvement of the Republican Study Committee
was not its highest priority, it became an activity of the RSC, both directly
and indirectly. During its early stages, the RSC was cloaked in anonymity
which, according to Ed Derwinski, its initial chairman,, was caused by:
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"the skittishness of members who were reluctant to be
identified as upsetting the status quo in the House or with
their own Administration by joining rump organizations."^
That is to say, members did not want to be viewed as party mavericks by
the Republican leadership in the House, by party officials in their home
districts, or by the Nixon White House. The senior members who had
personal ties to the Republican leadership were unwilling to take high pro¬
files in the RSC. Congressman Derwinski noted that he was "the only
senior member who was willing to have the group meet in his office in
those early days.,,Zf^ Even though John Rhodes, then chairman of the House
Republican Policy Committee, admitted that "the dominant trend of the
GOP is more conservative,"^ this was not enough for him or his leadership
colleagues to welcome an unofficial group like the RSC.
Membership in the Republican Study Committee, at least in its early
days, would not necessarily be viewed as a positive activity in the home
district of most of the RSC's senior members. The interested constituents
were largely local party officials with a relatively unsophisticated view of
the legislative process. With a lack of understanding of the House Repub¬
lican relationship with the White House, these constituents found it difficult
to understand why members needed to join together to form a new organiza¬
tion outside the formal party structure.
This was not the case, however, with the younger members, particularly
those elected in 1972 who pledged to "do something about the mess in
Washington." These newly-elected members rejected the view which was
expressed by the formal Republican leadership that "Republicans are essen¬
tially without any congressional power.They also rejected the alternative:
to accept their status within the system and react to other power centers.
In earlier times, these new members might have been frustrated both because
of their Republican minority status and because of their status as freshmen.
However, as Professors 3eweli and Patterson note, the role of "apprentice¬
ship" in the Congress had diminished significantly by the late 1960s.^
These freshmen -were in a hurry. Their objective was to use the system
to form coalitions for legislative goals and to create issues which could be
used in future political campaigns. These members would convince their
local party officials that effective representation might involve new institu¬
tional arrangements such as the Republican Study Committee. Typical of
18
this new breed was Steve Symms (R-Idaho) who noted: "As long as the
RSC was viewed as an effective means of achieving legislative objectives,
it could be justified to my constituents."^
In its early years, the RSC played an active role in the congressional
elections. With help from outside the Republican Study Committee, the
RSC was able to build its conservative support. Larry Pratt, former Execu¬
tive Director of the American Conservative Union and the Conservative
Victory Fund, played an active role in the 1972 election effort of the RSC.
The American Conservative Union was a grass roots organization of con¬
servatives, and its related political action committee which provided conser¬
vative candidates with election support, was the Conservative Victory Fund.
At that time, Pratt was one of the handful of conservative activists who
was convinced of the desirability of forming an organization of conservative
House members to counteract the activities of the Democratic Study Group
and to steer House Republicans in a more conservative direction. Pratt
made campaign contributions from the Conservative Victory Fund in 1972
contingent upon the willingness of the prospective recipient to actively work
with the conservatives in coordinated legislative strategy if elected.^ This
commitment was an important factor in making these members receptive to
a conservative organization in the House after their election and arrival in
Washington.
The RSC's relationship with other elements in the Republican party
continued after the organization had been established. Following the RSC's
success in the legislative battle over federal land use planning in 1974,
members of the RSC admitted their involvement with the group, and the
RSC dropped its mantle of secrecy. The RSC's image was further enhanced
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in early 1975 when Bob Michel (R-Illinois) was elected Minority Whip in the
Republican leadership. Michel was also elected to the Executive Committee
of the Republican Study Committee at this time and announced that he was
financially supporting the RSC shared staff. These moves proved to
strengthen the position of the RSC within the House of Representatives.
Emulating the DSG, the members of the RSC established the RSC
Campaign Fund to help in the election of conservative Republicans. This
Fund also became the financing vehicle for the RSC's book The Case Against
the Reckless Congress which was designed to present conservative views on
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current legislative topics.The combination of descriptive essays together
with key votes for all incumbent members was never before attempted by a
group of congressmen. In addition, the Campaign Fund's resources were
used to mail information packets to key congressional candidates at regular
intervals.
It was realized from the beginning that neither The Case Against the
Reckless Congress nor the information packets could take the place of
direct financial assistance to candidates, but a financial aid program was
not implemented. Operating indirectly and within legal limitations, the staff
of the RSC did direct some contributions from various organizations, political
action committees, and individuals to both incumbents and non-incumbent
challengers on an ad hoc basis. The manner in which this was done required
tact and diplomacy on the part of the staff. Members who did not receive
assistance and others who disagreed with the RSC's selection of recipients
might resent this action. The lack of direct financial assistance on the
part of the RSC's Campaign Fund remains one of the weak points of the
RSC to this day.
Executive Branch Relations
The Republican Study Committee was not designed to fill an informa¬
tion or service role with regard to the Executive Branch "bureaucracy."
Instead, the RSC role included:
1. battling with the bureaucracy over waste,
2. cooperating with high-level political appointees under the
Nixon and Ford Administrations, and
3. presenting to the Republican President a conservative
legislative viewpoint.
For example, the first role led to meetings with middle-level bureau¬
crats from Health, Education and Welfare over civil rights regulations.-^
In the second case, the Republican Study Committee made frequent use of
Executive Branch officials. Meetings were arranged with members to give
guidance and discuss matters of mutual concern.^ While these meetings
permitted individual members to become more familiar with policy issues
and operations within certain departments, at the same time, they enabled
the Executive Branch spokesmen to build support from their logical base
within the Congress. These meetings also gave the RSC a measure of
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respectability within the party structure by allowing the group practical
impact on day-to-day affairs of the legislative process or the future direc¬
tion of the party. Meeting with the President gave the RSC members the
opportunity to press their own legislative initiatives and to express their
opposition to or support for the President's programs. These meetings
countered the pressures which were being applied to the President by the
liberal wing of the Republican party and by the Democrats, and it gave
the RSC institutional credibility within the House, in the members' districts,
and in the national news media.
These relationships are different from those expressed by Professor
Morris Fiorina.^ According to this prominent congressional scholar, the
Congress, the bureaucracy, and the constituency in the home district form
an integral and unique triangle which re-elects the Congress, perpetuates
the bureaucracy, and institutionalizes the service role of the member of
Congress, thus assuring his re-election. An individual member of the
Republican Study Committee may have a relationship such as Fiorina devel¬
ops, but it was not implemented through the mechanism of the RSC. The
RSC relationship with the Executive Branch was primarily policy related
rather than constituency related.
D. Conclusion
The Republican Study Committee's success can be measured in several
ways. Its existence through a tumultous political period was a healthy sign
for the organization. The RSC was carefully assembled from elements which
had not previously cooperated in activities of this type. Many of the key
members were defeated in the 1974 "Watergate" election, but the organiza¬
tion, itself, survived and maintained its position within the party structure
both in the House and in the national Republican party as evidenced in
its presence at the 1976 Republican National Convention.^ The RSC has
grown and prospered beyond the closing date of this thesis.This exist¬
ence has occurred at a time when other congressional factions — like the
Democratic Research Organization and the National Security Research
Group — have come into being, flourished briefly, and then passed from the
scene. These groups lacked the actively committed members, clear state¬
ment of purpose, and staff members who had the confidence of the members
themselves. The RSC, on the other hand, has these vital ingredients, and
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thus, its continued existence is a measure of success in a structured organ¬
ization like the U.S. House of Representatives.
Secondly, it should be noted that the organization increased its mem¬
bership, while simultaneously maintaining its principled position within the
party. About 80% of the Republican members of the House are now mem¬
bers, and its immediate past chairman, John Rousselot (R-California), has
been one of the leading conservative members of the House. The organiza¬
tion has managed to expand its base and to shed its image as a fringe
group, while at the same time, expound the conservative viewpoint on public
policy issues. The delicate balancing act of maintaining a viable relation¬
ship with such a broad membership has not led to any noticeable changes
in the conservative tone of the RSC publications. However, the broader
membership has had an effect on the operational emphasis of the RSC.
Because of this broader membership, the demands for specific research
products from individual members has increased substantially. This has
caused the research staff to spend a greater proportion of its time on
research projects for individual members. At the same time, both the
emphasis of the most recent executive director and the broader member¬
ship have also resulted in a reduced role for the RSC as an innovative
force in major conservative legislative initiatives. It will be shown in
Chapter VIII that the role of the RSC has shifted substantially toward a
service bureau, and away from a source of major legislative initiatives.
As Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) explains it: "the entrepren¬
eurial role isn't visible, but they turn out good papers.Congressman
Philip Crane, one of the founding members, expressed his view even more
blatantly: "The RSC just isn't at the cutting edge anymore."-^
Of the new members, some have joined the RSC because of the
information the organization provides. However, the majority have become
members because they view the RSC as being an advocate of conservative
principles within the mainstream of the Republican party. The Republican
Study Committee has become a part of the institutional framework of the
House in both its membership role and its acceptance by the House Repub¬
lican leadership.
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During the late 1970s, the political trend in the United States shifted
substantially to the right. Campaign rhetoric, public opinion surveys, legis¬
lative proposals and election returns all confirm this assertion. It is argued
in this thesis that the Republican Study Committee is a manifestation of
this shift in public sentiment. The issues which it helped to popularize,
the early members of the RSC who have gone on to other offices, and the
voting records which it helped to establish, have all been elements in this
ideological shift. Of course, the primary manifestation of it was the
presidential and senatorial elections of 1980 which saw Ronald Reagan
replace President Jimmy Carter and which saw the Republicans take con¬
trol of the Senate for the first time since 1952.
Having made this assertion, however, it is difficult to measure the
RSC's specific impact; measuring the impact of any political entity is
difficult with large numbers of variables involved.^ it will be shown that
the RSC had a major influence on a number of legislative issues during the
Nixon-Ford Presidencies. Its specific influence from 1977-1981 on the Dem¬
ocratic Administration was less noticeable. Because of its minority position
within the House, it had little to offer an Administration controlled by the
opposition party which also had control of both Houses of Congress. In
retrospect, the formation of the Republican Study Committee during the
Republican control of the White House was a fortunate move, its base was
then established before the Democrats took over the Executive Branch.
This is different from the Democratic Study Group which was organized
during the Eisenhower (Republican) Presidency. By the late 1970s, both
organizations were recognized as the primary factions which represented
the mainstream positions of liberal (DSG) and conservative (RSC) thought
within the House. During the period 1972-1976, the Republican Study Com¬
mittee functioned in many different ways. The RSC worked with the
Administration, in opposition to the Administration, and on other occasions,
the RSC took the lead on issues and was eventually followed by the Admin¬
istration.
Although the Republican Study Committee's direct influence on the
national Republican party has not been substantial, it has exerted a con¬
servative influence on the Republican leadership in the House. The RSC
has played the role of being a transmitter of conservative ideas into the
mainstream of the party. The Republican Study Committee was a vehicle
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for Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, Peter Bauer, Russell Kirk and others
to participate in sessions with Republican House members. It provided an
opportunity for conservative books, monographs and articles to be delivered
directly to member offices and to reach members' legislative staffs. The
RSC also provided an opportunity for academics who visit Washington to
testify formally before committees and also to meet informally with the
RSC staff and members and discuss key issues. In acting as this catalyst
for the transmission of ideas, the RSC is in a position to play an important
role — a role which is too often overlooked in the realm of legislative
battles. That is, while elected individuals might advocate certain positions,
unless they have adequate intellectual and institutional support, the effect of
their advocacy will be minimal. On some occasions this RSC support might
be merely clerical. On others, it might encompass sophisticated research
data and key operational roles for major legislative initiatives.
With regard to the members of the Republican Study Committee,
specific assistance from the RSC has been given to them for legislative
battles, re-election campaigns, recruitment of personal staffs, and other
member concerns. When a member is willing to become a leader on a
specific issue, the RSC support staff is ready to brief him, prepare sup¬
porting material, alert him to the pitfalls which he might face, notify his
colleagues of important votes, and help him to prepare arguments to answer
charges from his colleagues, interest groups or the Executive Branch. This
is particularly important because, as Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin), a liberal
member of the House of Representatives, has noted, "The Congressman is
painfully aware that the 'experts' (scientists, economists, generals) are
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working for the Executive Branch."77
In an economic sense, the RSC staff has proven to be an efficient
investment for the individual member. For example, fact sheets prepared
by RSC staff aides on pending bills provide the member's staff with much
needed information while the staff remains available to perform its other
tasks. This also does away with the member's need for an expert on every
subject.
To make a member into an instant expert on an issue involves more
than providing passing knowledge on a subject. He must be aware not
only of the arguments which support his point of view, but also of those
arguments which are likely to be marshalled against him by individuals
holding opposing views. All of these arguments are likely to be used against
him, and the research capability and support staff which the Republican
Study Committee can provide for those major issues in which it is involved
remains one of the key benefits for the members. The full ramifications
of the member's bill and the alternatives which might be offered must be
within his purview. Additionally, the numerous meetings, seminars and
other support activities which the RSC conducts help not only to assure
the continued viability of the RSC, but also to upgrade the staff competence
within the member offices.
The work that the staff has done through the RSC has also proven
beneficial to the staff members themselves. The opportunities for profes¬
sional growth by meeting experts in their own fields, and the close relation¬
ships which they develop with members of Congress have led a number of
these staff members to take more senior positions in the House and Senate,
elsewhere in the government, and in the private sector.^
The Republican Study Committee has been established as an institution.
From a model patterned after the Democratic Study Group, it has survived
and was adopted into the House's institutional framework. It is an impor¬
tant faction formed by a group of House members who have become more
independent of the traditional party leadership and who are seeking new
ways to achieve their objectives in a changing environment. As this analy¬
sis is developed it will be shown that the members of the RSC and the RSC
collectively behaved in certain ways in response to the political environment
in which they were operating:
1. They were more independent of party leadership.
2. They were more independent of White House pressure.
3. They effectively used a shared research staff.
4. They acted more effectively as a group to avoid being
individually discriminated against.
5. They worked on certain projects with their conserva¬
tive Democratic colleagues.
6. They coordinated activities with their conservative
Senate colleagues.
7. They increased their liaison with external pressure groups
to work on common legislative objectives.
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Of course, not every legislative case illustrates all of these changes in
behavior by members of the Republican Study Committee, and even when
the RSC caused a change in the members' behavior, it was not necessarily
successful in achieving its objectives. However, changed ways of inter¬
action are shown in this thesis. In summary, the RSC has changed the
operations of the Congress. The changes which it has affected within the
Congress and the Congress' relation to the Executive Branch may not be
apparent, but as Robert L. Peabody has noted, "Most important political
choices are made at the margins."^* The RSC was established in the House
at the ideological margin. It created its own unique niche in the House
structure as a service, research and strategy faction for conservative Repub¬
licans. Professors Rohde and Shepsle made a vital point:
"Policy change, for whatever purpose^ cannot be ensured
in a complex arena like the Congress by simple changes in rules,
personnel, or circumstances. Sometimes these factors may con¬
spire to produce change; sometimes they will fail....[P]olitical
change is a messy business; it is often difficult to understand
and almost always challenging to engineer.
This engineering provided a formidable challenge for the RSC's leaders.
The Republican Study Committee operated within the minority party
in only one House of Congress, with the political milieu overwhelmingly
against it. However, the Republican Study Committee caused changes in
the focus of debates, and more importantly in congressional voting, and it
has activated individuals both inside and outside of the legislative arena
to move in its conservative direction. The manner in which this movement
was directed is analyzed below, and the author's perspective on the Repub¬
lican Study Committee and its role into the 1980s are outlined in the con¬
cluding chapter.
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II. EARLY CASE STUDIES LEADING TO THE FORMATION
OF THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE
A. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the two major legislative
issues, the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Act, which
led to the formal establishment of a bloc of Republican conservatives in
the House of Representatives. In Chapter III the House itself is examined.
Its institutional resources are considered, and the alternative ideological and
non-ideological organizations are reviewed. As will be seen, nothing in
existence in 1972 met the requirements of the conservative Republicans in
the House. Therefore, as Chapter IV analyzes, several key members of the
House, together with several congressional staff aides, worked on the estab¬
lishment of a conservative Republican group patterned after the liberal
Democratic Study Group.
The early 1970s marked a new phase for conservative Republican House
members. On the major issues, they had either been pre-empted by the
Nixon Administration, or they were disenchanted with what they perceived
as Nixon's shift to the left. As Daniel Moynihan said, "From the right,
Nixon's record looked consistently left."!
In one broad category of positions, the Administration's call for party
regularity overcame ideological inhibitions. It was argued that Richard Nixon
had always been in the mainstream of the Republican party — clearly he
would not promote programs which were out of character for him. Thus,
the argument continued, if the Family Assistance Plan wasn't to the conser¬
vatives' liking, they could hardly blame Nixon. He had to work with the
Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. And, after all,
the conservatives had never understood welfare reform anyway. Perhaps
Moynihan and his allies were right — perhaps a radically different approach
to the problem was needed. Besides, one could hardly accuse Wilbur Mills
(D-Arkansas) and John Byrnes (R-Wisconsin) of being radicals or even liberals.
So what were the conservatives complaining about?
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The issue was more complex than this line of reasoning might indicate.
In fact, opposition to Nixon's Family Assistance Plan would become a major
rallying point for conservative Republicans in the House. Most of these
conservatives were junior members with no seniority and little influence in
the party; so they had little to lose if they opposed the leadership in their
own party. Under Lyndon Johnson's Democratic presidency, this factional
opposition had not been necessary. The Republicans in the House were
united in opposition to Johnson's Great Society. But now with their "own
man" in the White House, the conservatives were being ignored, or even
worse, they were expected to support programs which they would have out¬
spokenly opposed if advocated by a Democratic President. The most signifi¬
cant of these programs was the President's Family Assistance Plan which
would have federalized the welfare system and instituted a guaranteed annual
income for ail citizens. Conservatives also opposed the Child Development
Act. Both of these measures are discussed in detail in this chapter because
they played crucial roles in leading to the establishment of the Republican
Study Committee.
The battle over the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) has been told by
both its liberal and conservative White House adversaries.^ But, the perspec¬
tive of the congressional opponents to the FAP has not been assembled.
The conservative opposition in Congress began with this single legislative
issue, developed and extended to other policy issues, and led to further
joint House and Senate activity. The Child Development Act represented
a different kind of challenge to the House Republican conservatives. Again
the conservative members tended to have less seniority and a smaller stake
in the status quo. From their Family Assistance Plan activities, they had
learned how to cooperate within the House. The Child Development Act
taught them how to work with outside pressure groups. These conservatives
reasoned that if the liberals had cooperated with the anti-Vietnam War
activists, the conservatives should be able to work more closely with their
allies who were outside the Congress.
These two cases convinced several of the members and their key staff
aides that closer collaboration, and possibly even a formal organization,
could be useful in advancing their conservative legislative goals. As will
be shown in Chapter III, no organization existed within the House to fill
this role. It would be up to these members and their staff aides to form
such a group.
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B. The Family Assistance Plan
During the 1968 presidential campaign, "welfare reform" had achieved
the status of a major campaign issue. A candidate for President had to
be able to present a welfare reform package. As Martin Anderson commented:
"Second nature to Democrats, it was a somewhat treacherous
issue for a Republican candidate. Nixon knew this and decided to
confound his opponents — and the press. Rather than sidestepping
the issue, he made it one of his major campaign planks."-^
Anderson spoke with authority on the subject because he was candidate
Nixon's principal domestic policy adviser. As Anderson noted, as a candidate,
Nixon had not had an opportunity to devise a program for meaningful welfare
reform. Like most observers of the public policy process at that time, Nixon
was convinced that the existing arrangement of multiple programs with over¬
lapping jurisdictions, irrational benefit levels which varied from political
boundary to political boundary, and disincentives to join the productive sector
of the economy were issues which had to be dealt with. According to
Anderson, "Within weeks after taking office, he made it known that he was
willing to entertain radical thoughts about welfare reform."^ Moynihan and
others conceived that such a radical welfare reform proposal would replace
many of the categorical welfare programs with a uniform national level of
benefits to be paid on a need basis without a related work requirement.
Radical welfare proposals were not proposed by Anderson or his allies
on the White House staff, but rather by a former high-level Democratic
official, Daniel P. Moynihan. Moynihan's previous service in the Democratic
Administrations of Kennedy and Johnson had enabled him to build relations
with career civil servants in both the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare and the Department of Labor where he formerly served as an
assistant secretary. Based on these contacts, Moynihan was in an advanta¬
geous position to develop a welfare reform proposal shortly after he was
installed in the White House as a senior member of Nixon's presidential
staff.
At a White House meeting held on March 24, 1969, Moynihan unveiled
a radical welfare reform proposal. This was the first version of a guaranteed
annual income program. As Moynihan pointed out later:
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"If liberals outside the Administration could never quite
come to see the dimensions and the implications of the Family
Assistance Plan, conservatives within did so instantly. The
March 2k meeting had scarcely begun when Martin Anderson,
representing Arthur Burns, declared that the committee was
being presented with a negative income tax."''
The idea of a negative income tax was anathema not only to Anderson and
his colleague, Roger Freeman, who also worked under Presidential Counselor
Arthur Burns, but to Burns as well. As Anderson summarized later, "As
far as the general conservative public is concerned, there has been little
support for radical welfare reform."*' The strongest conservative argument
against a guaranteed annual income program was that it would formalize
the premise that individual citizens are entitled by right to receive federal
government support payments without a requirement to attempt to find
work. Part of this was later answered in FAP provisions which involved
"work fare,"'7 but still, this basic conservative objection was never fully met.
Additional conservative objections centered on the imposition of federal
payment levels, rather than permitting the states to set their own levels
based on a cost of living formula, and a substantial reduction in the local
controls which the states could exercise in this major area of public policy.
Despite the distaste with which conservatives viewed the program
from its announcement, it was enthusiastically endorsed by President Nixon
in a national television address on August 8, 1969. As Moynihan points out
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in his book, "The new President was not strident, and was not right wing."°
The enthusiasm with which Nixon endorsed the Family Assistance Plan was
proudly emphasized by Moynihan when he said:
"Whenever the matter was raised, he [Nixon] would assert
without reservation that FAP was his 'flagship,' the pride of his
legislative program, the warship from which his colors flew.
Yet, Moynihan's enthusiasm for the plan was probably greater than Nixon's.
A scholarly observer noted:
"His [Nixon's] embrace of FAP was partly an abberation
from his long-held welfare attitudes, attributable to the extra¬
ordinary persuasiveness of presidential adviser Daniel Patrick
Moynihan.
The Family Assistance Plan was basically a tax measure. Therefore,
when the bill was submitted to the Congress on August 11, 1969, as H.R.
16311, it was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee. The
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chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee was Wilbur D. Mills.
Most Washington observers, including Moynihan, noted that Mills was "generally
held the second most powerful man in Washington, following only the Pres¬
ident.The Ways and Means Committee was considered one of the most
important committees in the Congress. It was regarded as being a more
conservative committee than its counterpart in the Senate, the Finance
Committee. Nonetheless, it was not a citadel of conservatism, even under
Mills:
"Its Democrats were liberal, but not fervid; its Republicans
were conservative, but not unyielding; its Southerners were mod¬
erate by standards of the racially aroused South." ^
This membership pattern on the Ways and Means Committee followed an
established pattern. As Professors Hixitt and Peabody maintain in their
standard work on the Congress, when appointments of new committee
members are being considered for the major House committees the leader¬
ship looks "above all for Congressmen who are 'responsible,' that is, members
who have a respect for party leaders, fellow members, and the rules,
procedures, and customs of the legislative process."^
One of the unique aspects of the Ways and Means Committee at this
time was the partnership which had developed between the chairman, Mills,
and his ranking Republican colleague, John W. Byrnes. Byrnes was "an
experienced and humane man, a Catholic with six children and no fortune,
[he] was also very much of (sic) the center of his party and a legislator as
gifted as Mills.The Byrnes-Mills combination was considered by other
observers of the Congress as one of the "dual limited monarchies" of the
congressional committee system.^ It was to this committee that President
Nixon's Family Assistance Plan was referred.
While the committee had grappled with various welfare reform proposals
in the past, welfare remained an enormously complex subject:
"The committee members and the Administration officials
were united in the awareness that they both knew a great deal
more about, welfare than almost anyone else, and also that they
did not know much."^
The Ways and Means Committee began a long series of hearings on the
bill. Administration and special interest and academic witnesses were all
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called before the Ways and Means Committee to express their views. The
members of the committee realized the importance of these hearings.
Professor Dahl has noted:
"The American system is unlike England's, and more like
France's in the central importance given to the committee. It
is no exaggeration to say that in the United States effective
legislative power lies with the committees." '
The "effective legislative power" was particularly found in the members of
the Ways and Means Committee. Their capability was seldom challenged
on the House floor:
"In a legislative body 'capability' may include many things
besides familiarity with and understanding of the problems within
the committee's jurisdiction. But surely these are among the
more important qualities."^
To serve on the Ways and Means Committee was to be considered a serious
student of complex public policy issues.^ The capability of members in
dealing with welfare was established by these extensive hearings. After
this study period, the committee moved into closed sessions where the
pending bill was discussed among the members and where amendments could
be offered, negotiations would take place, and a final version of an accept¬
able bill would be hammered out. Mills and Byrnes took the Family Assist¬
ance Plan to such a mark-up session of their committee.
By this time, FAP had already been denounced by most conservative
commentators including James J. Kilpatrick and William F. Buckley. The
conservative Republican members of the House of Representatives who did
not serve on the committee were similarly disenchanted with the Nixon
Administration's approach toward welfare reform. John M. Ashbrook (R-
Ohio), the chairman of the American Conservative Union, was one of the
outspoken opponents of welfare reform throughout the debate.^ However,
Ashbrook lacked "credibility" on this issue. He had not become an expert,
as the Ways and Means Committee members had. Furthermore, Ashbrook
was considered an ideologue of the right and his opposition was expected.
Moynihan himself admitted that "The problem always was assumed to be
"* "J 1
that of keeping conservative support." Ashbrook was viewed as a maverick
who would not necessarily lead other conservatives automatically to his
position. Byrnes had carefully included all of the Ways and Means Repub¬
licans in the mark-up sessions in order to receive their ideas, include them
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when possible and hold their support for Nixon's program. Thus, there was
no Republican opposition within the Ways and Means Committee.
On March 5, 1970, the Ways and Means Committee passed H.R 16311
by a vote of 21-3. It had not been substantially altered during the com¬
mittee's deliberations. While many of the Republican members of the Ways
and Means Committee were unenthusiastic about the bill, the election of
Richard Nixon had limited their choices on this and on many other issues.
Bibby and Davidson noted how the 1968 election had changed the situation
in this regard:
"The options open to him LGerald Ford] and his minority party
were more restricted. As long as the Democrats had control of
both Congress and the Executive Branch, House Republicans had
enjoyed maximum flexibility in their strategy on every given issue.
The 1968 election had changed this situation.
The three dissenting votes in the Ways and Means Committee were
ail Democrats, two of them southern conservatives (Landrum of Georgia
and Burleson of Texas) and the third a senior Democrat from Oregon, Ai
Ullman, who was later to succeed Mills as the chairman of the committee.
Their main concern was the provision of a guaranteed annual income:
"It ultimately establishes the basis for a guaranteed annual
income through a negative tax formula. We do not concur that
the case incentive approach to welfare is either proven or sound,
or that it would ever attain its purported objective of reducing
the welfare rolls."
With this overwhelming vote of support from their own committee,
Byrnes and Mills prepared to take the bill to the floor. They were coming
to the floor in a powerful position. They had the base of the Nixon Admin¬
istration, and broad bi-partisan support in the House. Because of the
specialization of the committee process, it was assumed that the measure
would have a good opportunity for passage on the House floor. Many mem¬
bers would defer to their colleagues who served on Ways and Means to
lead them in this complicated area. In addition, the basic technique of log¬
rolling would help. As Froman describes, it is a "principle of reciprocity:"
"Reciprocity means that committees, and committee mem¬
bers tend not to interfere with the work of other committees....
If the committee is cohesive in its recommendations (especially
if it is bipartisanly cohesive), and if the bill does not involve
conflicting ideologies, then few amendments will be offered and
few will be successful.
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While the battle over FAP certainly did involve a conflicting ideology, it
was still assumed that the Ways and Mean s Committee's "bipartisan cohesive-
ness" would help to pass the measure. The hearings and mark-up sessions
had set the stage for the Ways and Means Committee's leaders to move the
bill through the Rules Committee and then to the House floor.
It was at this time that several conservative Republican members of
the House who did not serve on the Ways and Means Committee became
aware of the implications of the Family Assistance Plan. Philip Crane (R-
Illinois), who had been elected five months earlier, met with his personal
friend, Edward 3. Derwinski (R-Illinois), who had served in the House for
more than a decade. Crane expressed some of his concerns about the bill
to Derwinski who suggested that several conservative members get together
in his office and discuss the issue. Among those who participated in what
became a series of meetings were 3ohn Ashbrook, Del Clawson (R-California),
Barry Goldwater, 3r. (R-California), Bill Scherle (R-Iowa) and Floyd Spence
(R-South Carolina).
At the first of these meetings the consensus of the members was to
oppose the bill. Several legislative strategies were discussed which would
possibly lead to the bill's defeat on the House floor. One of the problems
facing these members was that none of them served on the Ways and Means
Committee. Therefore, none of them had access to minority or majority
staff aides who dealt with these kinds of technical issues. This was a
practical disadvantage as Michael Malbin points out:
"When the chairman and ranking minority member agree to
support a bill, the staff will defend their agreement, but no one
presents the other side to non-committee rqembers who might
want to hear it."2-'
Because of this deficiency, Crane asked several of the members if they had
any research staff aides who might perform specific research projects on
aspects of the bill. Goldwater volunteered his administrative assistant,
3ack Cox; Spence contributed his legislative assistant, 3erry James; and
Crane offered his administrative assistant, Ed Feulner. The three staff
aides held several meetings of their own and included Paul Weyrich who
worked for Senator Gordon Allott (R-Colorado) and Jim Lucier from the
staff of Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina). The House staff
aides had become acquainted with these Senate staff aides through the
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Conservative Luncheon Group which they had been attending for some months.
This small group entered the FAP battle at a late stage. Their analytical
resources were meager, and they lacked the specialized expertise of the
Administration/Byrnes-Mills forces. However, as Allen Schick has pointed out:
"The very fragmentation of Congress offers the analyst
multiple points of access. While all Members do not hold
equal power, the skillful use of evidence by even a junior
congressman can have an impact on the legislative outcome."^
Thus, even at this late stage, the members and staff aides began to outline
specific assignments which they would undertake.
Members of Congress met four times between March 5 and April 16, 1970.
Participation of staff aides Cox, dames and Feulner began with the second
meeting where specific research projects were assigned. Goldwater and Cox
contacted state welfare directors to find out what the impact of the Family
Assistance Plan would be on their state programs. In the House hearings and
report, this subject was not addressed. Cox pointed out that if damaging
quotations could be obtained, they could be used in the debate to oppose
the passage of the bill.^ Crane took it upon himself to work out a floor
statement which would discuss the level of prospective benefits to his own
personal situation. Admittedly, Crane's situation was exceptional in that
he and Mrs. Crane had seven children. Crane would have to earn more
than $7,400 a year in order to be better off working than receiving welfare
payments, including the proposed Family Assistance Plan.^ Crane stated:
"It is thus readily apparent that my family's income, on
welfare, would not only exceed the poverty level but the earned
income indeed, of nearly half of our population including a sizable
number of our postal workers. I submit that this nation for all
of its vast resources cannot and more importantly should not
afford such a standard of living for its 'poor' families.
However, these research projects were only one element of the strategy
which included a possible fight over the rule on the House floor. Also,
speeches in opposition to the FAP were written by Jerry James and provided
for the debate.
The House Rules Committee is the traffic warden for the House floor.
Virtually every significant piece of legislation has to come before the
Rules Committee for time allocations, as well as a decision as to what
amendments will be permitted. The Rules Committee had established the
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custom of granting "closed rules" to Ways and Means for tax, tariff, and
welfare bills. A closed rule prohibits floor amendments to the bill under
consideration. David Mayhew says that:
"A closed rule acts as a shield against the hundreds of
interest group demands that would be articulated if not ful¬
filled if the bill appeared naked on the floor."^0
The idea for a fight on the rule was put forward by Derwinski. He proposed
that the liberals should be encouraged to oppose the closed rule because the
benefit payment level was too low. The Democratic Study Group or the Black
Caucus might oppose the closed rule to achieve their own goal of attempting
to increase the level of benefits. If they won and the bill came to the
House floor under an open rule, the liberals could put forth an amendment
to increase the level of benefits. Derwinski and Crane also discussed their
plans with doe Waggoner (D-Louisiana), who was an unofficial spokesman
for the conservative Democrats in the House. Waggoner indicated that
many of his conservative. Democratic colleagues would be willing to vote
against the rule. As Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) said, "Procedural
votes, because they generalize issues, often make for surprising allies."^
Derwinski argued, if the liberals combined with the conservatives who were
opposed to the basic concept of a guaranteed annual income, the rule might
be defeated. If the closed rule were defeated, the bill would probably be
pulled off the House floor by Mills and Byrnes who did not want to see the
entire package opened up to amendments from either the left or the right.
In April of 1970, Philip Burton (D-California), as chairman of the Dem¬
ocratic Study Group's Task Force on Health and Welfare, issued a task force
report recommending approval of FAP as a "sound step toward the elimination
of poverty."-^2 Derwinski met with the representatives of the Black Caucus
and the DSG and found support among the DSG members for opposition to the
rule, despite Burton's earlier report. Similarly, the Black Caucus members
were generally opposed to the bill because of its "low level of benefits."^3
Derwinski also believed that the White House was ignoring the conserva¬
tive rank and file Republicans:
"There was- a communications gap, Nixon's White House staff
tended to tell us what they wanted us to do rather than consult
with us."-^
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It was generally thought that this attitude on the part of the White House
might lead to defections by conservative members to the rebels' position.
As Moynihan recounts, the role played by John Byrnes within the
Republican party was a key element to the House passage of the bill. It
was largely through his intervention that Ford and the members of the
Republican leadership became supporters of FAP. It was also through Byrnes'
intervention that the House Republican Policy Committee endorsed the
Family Assistance Plan on April 7.35 While "FAP aroused little enthusiasm
among some House Republicans and in many instances provoked outright
opposition, the Policy Committee was used to help gain support among more
conservative members of the President's party."36
Another component of the battle being waged by the conservatives was
a "Dear Colleague" letter which Paul Weyrich composed for 5am Devine's
(R-Ohio) signature. Devine, a senior Republican then serving as vice chair¬
man of the Republican Conference, asked his Republican colleagues to oppose
this rule. Derwinski had approached Devine for his support because he wanted
the most senior "establishment" individual he could find to be the opposition
spokesman on the issue when the FAP came to the House floor.
During the floor debate, Goldwater quoted extensively from the state
welfare directors of New York and Texas. Crane, Derwinski, Devine and
Ashbrook all participated in the debate on the rule. As another conservative
congressman noted about a different bill before the Rules Committee:
"I know some of the Members who voted for the legislation
in the [Rules] committee said they were going to oppose it on the
floor. Well, I do not happen to believe we should vote for legis¬
lation in committee which we cannot support on the floor. I vote
to kill bad legislation at every opportunity."37
Despite the support of the Democratic leadership and the Republican
leadership, with the exception of Devine, the motion to give the Family Assist¬
ance Plan a closed rule barely passed the House. The vote on April 15, 1970,
was 205 in favor to 183 opposed. Thus, FAP cleared the House, but the
margin in favor of the FAP rule was only 22 votes. Of the Republican mem¬
bers, 12 more opposed the rule than supported it. This was a substantial
rebuff to the Minority Leadership which had endorsed the bill and lobbied
actively for it.
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On April 16, 1970, the House passed the Family Assistance Plan by a
vote of 243-155. On the final passage of the bill, the Democrats delivered
one-third of the entire votes from the House. The remaining votes had come
from Republicans and only did so because of pressure from the leadership
supporting the President's measure.
Derwinski, Crane, Spence and Goidwater were convinced that their
coordinated activities had made an impact on the rule battle. Despite the
considerable pressures from the White House and the Republican leadership,
a majority of House Republicans voted against the Republican leadership and
the Administration's position on the rule. This was evidence that their
efforts to enlist conservative support had been successful. With so many
Republicans voting in opposition to the leadership position, it also became
clear that no sanctions could be applied to those members who had opposed
the Administration on this issue.^ Thus, if opposition could be solidified
and extended to a large number of members, the rebels could act with
virtual impunity.
Following the passage of the Family Assistance Plan in the House of
Representatives, it moved to the Senate for consideration. The assumption
from the outset in the White House had been that the Senate would be the
friendlier body. The question now was how to stop the bill. Because of the
staff contacts which had been made during the House battle, Crane and
Derwinski called Senator Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska) and suggested a meeting.
Curtis was a senior member of the Finance Committee, who had expressed
reservations to Weyrich and Lucier about the Family Assistance Plan. The
House members were willing to talk to their senate colleagues, because they
were learning how to directly affect the legislative process. One of these
points was made by 3ames Robinson who noted:
"Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic of the prescrip¬
tion stage of decisionmaking as practiced within Congress is that
it is easier to defeat a bill than to pass one. That is, of course,
a feature of any institution that makes decisions by recorded votes
and by complicated parliamentary procedures."-^
The members of the House were not willing to give up at this stage simply
because the bill had passed out of their own immediate domain. Rather,
they wanted to help defeat the measure by working with their Senate col¬
leagues. A meeting like this might not appear to be unusual. Actually,
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it was a remarkable achievement for conservatives. While the liberals long
had groups which coordinated legislation and public policy issues between
the two Houses, it was relatively unheard of for the conservatives to do the
same thing.™ In most cases, conservative members of one body would
assume that as soon as the bill had been completed in their chamber, their
job was over. Because of the seriousness with which these members viewed
FAP, they were willing to battle beyond the usual parameters on the Family
Assistance Plan.
Derwinski and Crane met with Curtis who suggested that an alternative
program to the Family Assistance Plan should be developed. Specifically,
he suggested a new approach to welfare reform which would give members
of the Senate an alternative to the Administration's bill. The primary
emphasis should be to curb the widespread abuses of the existing welfare
system rather than to adopt a radical new approach to welfare, such as a
guaranteed income. The House members agreed to assign Jerry James from
Congressman Spence's staff to work with Tom Nelson on Senator Curtis'
staff to draft a bill.^ At James' suggestion, Curtis agreed to invite Dr.
Roger Freeman to meet with members of the Senate Finance Committee.
Freeman, who had served on the staff of Arthur Burns in the White House,
and his colleague, Martin Anderson, had strongly opposed FAP. In fact,
Freeman had resigned from the White House staff over the issue and had
returned to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University where he was a
Senior Fellow. In addition to Freeman's formal testimony, Curtis arranged
for informal meetings with the Senate Finance Committee members. These
meetings took place in late 1970 in Curtis' office.At Curtis' suggestion,
Freeman was invited back to meet with the members again and he was com¬
missioned to write a rebuttal to the Family Assistance Plan and supporting
documentation for the concept of a block grant program for welfare reform.
Freeman wrote his study, which was later issued as a Senate Finance Com¬
mittee's "Committee Report."^ Freeman's role in the battle was critical.
As Allen Schick says, "Congress can more easily exploit work done by others
than carry the main burden of analysis by itself.Freeman was an expert,
and also a man of principle. He had given up the status and prestige of a
major White House position because of his strong beliefs on ths issue. Thus,
his credibility was great, and the members of the Senate Finance Committee
listened to him.
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In the meantime, the formal hearings before the Senate Finance Com¬
mittee began. The chairman of the committee, Russell Long (D-Louisiana),
had his own view of real welfare reform: "the term'reform' applied to
the subject of welfare had but one meaning: the curbing of abuse.Curtis,
working with Freeman and his staff aides, compiled a bill which would deal
with welfare reform from this approach. Senator John Williams (R-Delaware),
the committee's ranking Republican, emphasized the disincentives which FAP
would bring to the nation's welfare recipients and worked with Curtis to
show the extent of fraud and abuse under the current system.
On November 20, 1972, following months of inaction and delay, the
Family Assistance Plan was defeated in the Senate Finance Committee by a
vote of 10-7. Thus, with only modest staff resources, the conservatives,
under the leadership of John Williams and Carl Curtis, had delayed the "key¬
stone of the Nixon Administration's legislative agenda" for more than 18
months. The final vote reflected not only the work of Curtis and his staff
group, but also the leadership of John Williams.Yet, it was Curtis who
"was appalled by the FAP initiative, and determined to see it fail."^
By that time, enthusiasm within the Administration for the Family
Assistance Plan had been diffused, and the program was floundering. In
order to make sure, however, Weyrich and other staff aides who continued
to monitor the bill, knocked it down whenever the Administration attempted
to bring it up again. For example, more than a year later, on December
13, 1973, an article appeared in the Washington Post indicating that a new
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Family Assistance Plan would be presented to the Congress in 1974. At
this time, Jerry James, who had become a member of the shared staff of
the recently formed Republican Study Committee, worked with Weyrich to
make sure that the proposal was killed immediately. James prepared detailed
letters for the signatures of members of both the House and the Senate. The
Senate letters were passed to Weyrich to obtain signatures and were then sent
to Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and Roy
Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The letters indicated
that the signers Were dissatisfied that such a program would even be con¬
sidered again because
"It is a step backward rather than forward in the effort to
resolve the complex problems which have existed with the present
welfare program. It will cost more, cover more people, and pro¬
vide less incentive to work than the plans which Congress has
already rejected.
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The most important aspect of the Senate letters was that they were signed
by 9 of the 15 members of the Senate Finance Committee, including Chairman
Long and ranking minority member, Wallace Bennett (R-Utah). With a majority
of the Senate Finance Committee recorded against the bill, the Administration
was warned that it could not pass the measure successfully.
The Republican Study Committee eventually had the opportunity to
present a welfare reform program^ which they viewed as a viable alternative
to FAP. The issue of welfare reform remains an unsolved problem. Martin
Anderson wrote long after the FAP battle:
"The lesson that comes from 15 years of radical welfare
reform plans — from massive computer simulations of every
conceivable combination of welfare payment levels, tax rates,
and costs, from hundreds of hours of congressional testimony
and from countless academic studies -- is a gradually spreading
awareness that radical welfare reform cannot be accomplished
without incurring intolerable political costs.
Even Moynihan admitted that serious problems had developed in the
pilot FAP program. These pilot programs had been initiated with experimental
funds appropriated to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
The advocates of FAP had assumed that the experiment would provide a
positive test which would permit a FAP-type guaranteed annual income to
be introduced and passed later. The problems which Moynihan noted were
similar to the problems which conservatives had foreseen in the Family
Assistance Plan:
"I've had a week here, reading and fussing with a great
mound of research reports on the guaranteed income exper¬
iments which we started in the late 1960s in the expectation
that no government would propose one until the case was
proven....Were we wrong about a guaranteed income! Seem¬
ingly it is calamitous. It increases family dissolution by some
70%, decreases work, etc."-^
The tone of the Moynihan apologia in 1978 is very different from his views
in his book The Politics of a Guaranteed Income published in 1973. At
that time, he anticipated that a guaranteed income would be back and would
eventually receivd approval of the Congress.
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The House conservatives learned a number of lessons from the battle
over the Family Assistance Plan. Not only did they learn the value of
working together in coordinated action, knowing the procedures in both the
House and Senate, and working with their colleagues in both bodies, but
they also learned the basic law of politics — congressional style:
"The politics of a capital in which power is systematically
fractionated by the Constitution, and randomly diffused by a
party system that exerts a minimum of discipline, such that
majority coalitions in Congress are typically across rather than
within the parties."-^
Thus, by working with Democrats such as Joe Waggoner and his colleagues
in the House, and with Russell Long and others in the Senate, a handful of
Republican conservatives were able to stop their own Administration which
had the original support of the most powerful committee in the House of
Representatives as well as the formal leaderhsip of both parties in the House.
C. The Child Development Act
As a result of a promise he made at the 1970 White House Conference
on Children, Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minnesota) introduced a bill calling
for comprehensive child care in the United States. The bill was eventually
incorporated into the Office of Economic Opportunity Extension Act (S. 2007)
as Title X under the title "The Child Development and Child Advocacy Pro¬
grams." The bill, including Title X, passed the Senate on September 9, 1971,
by a vote of 49-12.^ Following passage of that bill with only limited
opposition led by Senators Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio) and James Buckley (R-Cons.-New
York), it was anticipated that the measure would pass the House with equal
ease.
On September 27, Daniel Joy, an attorney who served part-time on the
staff of Congressman Edward Derwinski, asked for a meeting with Congressman
Philip Crane and Ed Feuiner, Crane's administrative assistant. At that meeting,
Joy reviewed the proposed Child Development Act and the new ground which
would be broken by its enactment. Specifically, the program would extend
long-term federally designed and controlled programs for training, rehabilitation
and education to the entire school and pre-school age population. The day
care centers funded under the proposal could be private, public or non-profit
and would offer "comprehensive educational, nutritional and health services
to preschool children."56 Other programs would involve child advocacy, child
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rights programs, and other provisions which Joy and other conservatives
believed were incompatible with the traditional American educational and
family structure. For example, some of these provisions would permit
children to seek redress in the courts from corporal punishment administered
by their parents. "Children's rights" could be asserted against parents and
teachers in other areas as well. The earlier OEO extension bill in the House
did not have a child care provision in it. However, John Brademas (P-
Indiana), the chairman of the Select Subcommittee on Education of the House
Education and Labor Committee, had introduced a separate bill (H.R. 6748)
which dealt with child development. With the passage of the Senate bill,
Brademas and his colleagues on the Education and Labor Committee combined
the child development measure with the OEO extension bill.
In anticipation of the debate on the subject, Joy requested a memoran¬
dum on the current status of child care and the nature of the Senate-passed
bill as well as information on the House proposals from the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress. The Education and Public
Welfare Division of the CRS provided him with this memorandum on Septem¬
ber 27, 1971.57
These meetings of Joy, Feulner and several other staff aides did not
lead to any concrete activities by members. While Crane was opposed to
the bill, he was not a member of the appropriate committee to question
this program. In addition, the bill's opponents were hampered by a practical
problem. The floor manager of the bill did not make copies of the bill avail¬
able for analysis and review. Because neither the report nor the child care
amendment was available until the day before the debate on the issue, there
was no organized opposition to the amendment, and it passed by a vote of
203-181. A later vote on final passage resulted in the passage of the OEO
Extension Act by a vote of 186-183.-^ The closeness of this vote was due
not only to the child care provisions, but also to the other portions of the
OEO Extension Act, such as provisions for legal services, which were distasteful
to conservatives.-^ Thus, the child care measure passed both Houses with¬
out a coordinated opposition effort either in the House or the Senate.
Although the senior Republican members on the Education and Labor Com¬
mittee had opposed the bill, the conservative objections were not raised
in the floor debates. Their staff limitations, along with the unexpected
combination of the two measures, caught the Republican opposition off-guard.
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Following the passage of the bill in both Houses, an alternative strategy
was developed. Weyrich called a meeting of Jim Lucier, Dan Joy, and Ed
Feulner to discuss the issue. Feulner was enthusiastic about opposing the
measure because Crane had been outspokenly opposed to the bill. They decided
to mount an effort to secure a presidential veto. It was assumed that tech¬
nical differences between the two bills would be resolved among the House
and Senate conferees, and that the substantive issues could be used to mobilize
the White House, provided appropriate House and Senate spokesmen emphasized
the right issues.
These staff aides realized they needed a spokesman to act as the
opposition leader on the bill. He would have to inform his colleagues on the
details of the bill, as well as sway the White House. He would enter the
fray with the obvious advantage that the votes were present in the House
to kill the bill by sustaining a presidential veto.
These staff aides decided to form a separate committee to mobilize
outside opposition to the bill. This organization which became known as "The
Emergency Committee for Children" acted as the spokesmen arguing against
the proposal. The staff aides wanted leaders from the religious community
as well as professional educators to serve on the committee. The name was
chosen because "we didn't want to give up the moral high ground to the
liberals, and let them portray us as being opposed to children,"^according to
Weyrich. Feulner was assigned to enlist Crane's support for the effort.
Specifically, Crane was asked to hire a part-time staff aide to work solely
on this issue. Because of his contacts with academics, Crane was also asked
to enlist members for the new committee. Crane's third assignment was to
enlist enough House members who opposed the bill to pledge to sustain a
presidential veto. It was necessary to obtain these pledges because the Nixon
Administration was unwilling to even consider a veto if it was unlikely to be
supported in one House or the other. In this case, the prospects of sustaining
the veto were good since 183 members had voted against the bill on final
passage. Thus, Crane became the de facto leader of the opposition to the
Child Development Program.
Following these strategy meetings, Joy contacted the editor of Human
Events, the most broadly circulated conservative newspaper in the United
States,^* and enlisted their support for the campaign against the program.
The first results of that meeting occurred when the Human Events lead
story encouraged a presidential veto of the measure.1^2 The Emergency
Committee for Children distributed information packets to conservative
columnists around the country which resulted in syndicated columns by
Russel Kirk, William F. Buckley, and James J. Kilpatrick all opposing
the bill.
Joy assumed the role of executive director of The Emergency Com¬
mittee for Children. He quickly built a list of academics from throughout
the country as members of its council. Among these members were Philip
Crane's brother (Dr. David Crane, a psychiatrist) and Crane's father (Dr.
George Crane, psychologist, columnist and author). The other names on
the committee were identifiable conservatives, including columnists Kirk,
Stanton Evans, and Fulton Lewis, III. A handful of friendly academics
helped lend credibility to the effort. The committee published several anal¬
yses, "Child Development Summary Analysis,"Questions About the Child
Development Act,"6^ and "A Review and Report of the Proposed Federal
Program of Child Development.These reports were written by Joy and
Connaught Marshner who had joined Crane's staff for this battle. They
were sent to the news media, and to members of the House and Senate and
their key staff aides.
Joy wrote to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
expressing the committee's concern about the bill and its budget implications.
In a reply, dated December 6, 1971, the Deputy Director, Caspar Weinberger,
responded stating:
"I share, to a considerable extent, the views you express,
and you may be sure that the persuasive arguments you have
made in your letter will be taken into consideration when the
President considers this bill should it come before him with these
provisions about which you wrote.
Additionally, efforts were made to bring these concerns to the attention
of the President and the Vice President. Joy contacted his friend, David
Keene, who then served on the staff of Vice President Agnew. Keene talked
to Agnew and drafted a speech for him which criticized the child develop¬
ment proposals. Agnew delivered the speech before the Illinois Agricultural
Association on November 17, and in it he condemned the bill^ This state¬
ment by Agnew was taken as a signal that the Administration was seriously
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contemplating a veto. Weyrich contacted Pat Buchanan who worked as a
speech writer for President Nixon and informed him of the conservative
objections to the bill. Connaught Marshner also drafted a "Dear Colleague"
letter dated November 17 which was sent to every Republican and Democratic
member of the House over the joint signatures of Sam Devine and Joe
Waggoner- As Waggoner was a senior Southern Democrat and Devine was
a conservative Republican with close ties to the leadership, both were viewed
as more effective signers of that letter than Crane and Ashbrook.^ The
pressure now had shifted to the advocates of the Child Development Act to
explain the charges which Agnew and The Emergency Committee for Children
had been raising.
The conference report on the OEO bill, S. 2007, was completed during
the first week of December. At that time, Mondale spoke on the floor of
the Senate to rebut the conservative charges that the Child Development Act
would have the negative effect which the conservatives were alleging.
Similarly, Congressman Brademas spoke in support of the Conference Report
on the floor of the House on December 7. Brademas reiterated his support
of the bill and decried the charges of the conservatives as "thoroughly
irresponsible, even, indeed, absurd."70 By this time, four of the five House
Republican conferees opposed the Conference Report. Only Ogden Reid (R-
New York), the original advocate of the bill, remained in favor of it. The
switch of the four House Republican conferees had two causes: opposition to
the child development program, and dissatisfaction with the legal services
provision of the bill. The Child Development Act had been raised as a
partisan issue by Agnew, and by the majority of House Republican conserva¬
tives. Thus, Minority Leader Gerald Ford could say that the other four
conferees were:
"not opposed to a child development program — but they
cannot swallow this program and, therefore, I think we ought to
be guided by their observations and by their comments."^
Crane and other conservative members from both parties, such as Ashbrook,
LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee) and Edith Green (D-Oregon) took exception to
the Brademas viewpoint and opposed it during the floor debate on December
7. The Conference Report carried with a vote of 211 in favor and 187
opposed.72 Since only one-third plus one of the membership of either the
Senate or the House is required to sustain a veto, the stage was set for
such a response. With 186 members opposing the bill, it was likely that
the 1^6 votes required to sustain the veto could be obtained.
The pressures which were brought on the White House for President
Nixon to veto the bill came from conservatives in both the House and the
Senate, including John Ashbrook who was considering a race for the Repub¬
lican nomination for the presidency against Nixon. Ashbrook was the chair¬
man of the American Conservative Union at this time, and his race against
Nixon in the 1972 Republican primary became a factor in the White House's
decision not only to veto the measure, but to "veto the bill for the right
reasons."75 On December 9, the President sent his veto message to the
House and Senate criticizing all the aspects of the Economic Opportunity
Amendments with particular emphasis on the revised Title Five, the "Child
Development Programs." Nixon stated:
"The intent of Title Five is overshadowed by the fiscal
irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and family weak¬
ening implications of the system it envisions. We owe our
children something more than good intentions."7^
Because the legislation originated in the Senate, that body had the first
opportunity to either uphold or override the presidential veto. In a substantial
shift of Senate sentiment on the Child Development bill, caused partly by
dissatisfaction with the provisions of the bill, and partly by party loyalty,
the Senate voted to uphold Nixon's veto.
The veto was not the end of the battle, as Crane found out. At the
start of the Second Session of the 92nd Congress in 1972, Crane's staff
reviewed the revised OEO Extention Act (H.R. 12350). They drafted a letter
for Crane to write to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliott
Richardson that Project Head Start had a one billion dollar authorization
request, whereas in the prior fiscal year's budget, it was $376,317,000.
Crane and his staff believed that the $1 billion authorization was proposed by
Brademas and his colleagues to obtain a new funding authorization for a
child development program. Thus, if this one authorization bill were to pass,
the Head Start program would be tripled; and Crane argued that there might
be a back-door Child Development Act.75 In responding to Crane, Richardson
noted that:
"The administration is requesting for fiscal year 1973 the
sum of $393,642,000 for Project Head Start, an increase of
$17,325,000 over the amount actually appropriated by the Con¬
gress for fiscal year 1972.
Thus, Crane had the Administration oppose the committee members and
indicate that it was not their intention via the OEO Extension Bill in 1972
to advocate a new child development program. Despite this effort and the
Administration's opposition, on June 20, 1972, the Senate passed a new bill
for child development by a vote of 73-12. The bill's advocates argued
that the objections of the conservatives had been taken into account and
that the new bill was more carefully drafted. Crane and his staff aides
continued to monitor the bills and kept both his House colleagues and the
Administration alerted to the problems in the bill. With the 92nd Congress
coming to an end, and a Presidential election imminent, Child Development
never reached the House floor in 1972.
The conservatives in the House and Senate learned from their activities
on the Child Development battle not only that the Administration was sus¬
ceptible to pressures from the conservatives and that individual Republican
members, even those lacking leadership or committee positions, could affect
the flow of legislation, but more importantly the value of combining opera¬
tions within the Congress with pressure from outside lobbying groups. The
Emergency Committee for Children was a new approach for conservatives.
It was unusual for conservatives to build an outside constituency for their
position. But, it was not a new technique; liberals in the Congress had
employed it on a number of occasions, including their position on Vietnam.
In addition, the entire operation received virtually no assistance from
the traditional conservative allies, namely the organized business community
in Washington. Their assistance had been solicited in both legislative
efforts, but the business community responded that they could not become
involved in social issues such as these. Despite this lack of cooperation,
the members and their staff aides showed they could offset the legislative
agenda by reaching out to new allies, such as academic experts like Roger
Freeman, and by building outside coalitions.
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D. Conclusion
Dr. Frantzich makes the argument that "power is not identifiable
until it is manifested."^'7 Whether the conservative Republicans in the
House of Representatives could have exercised this power earlier or not,
is an interesting, but futile, question. The combination of circumstances
was right by the time the first Nixon Administration was in progress. The
first steps in combining into an effective faction within the party are shown
in these two case studies.
The two bills had originated in two very different committees. Ways
and Means had a reputation as a prestige committee which was seldom
challenged successfully on the floor of the House. On the other hand,
Education and Labor was considered to be a "breeding ground for extreme
liberal proposals,"'7^ which was occasionally rebuffed on the House floor.
Despite this distinction, in both cases, the opposition of the conservatives
could have been dismissed as a futile effort beforehand. John
Lees has noted the difficulties in challenging committee decisions on the
floor of the House:
"It is often difficult and unrewarding to challenge committee
decisions on the floor of the House even if attempted by a co¬
hesive group o|(JReg^esentatives. Such opposition conflicts with
the accepted^SehaViour in the House, is generally of moderate
electoral value, and can be costly in terms of time, as it is dif¬
ficult to get precise and accurate information on which to base
such challenges. It is much easier to go along with committee
recommendations in general. Not all committees, however, have
the same prestige and influence, and some can expect considerable
floor opposition."^
The conservative Republicans had challenged the committee decisions and
indirectly affected one issue, and led to the defeat of a second issue. The
members were not a part of an organized faction, which made their success
even more significant. Professors Milnor and Franklin note the difficulty
which confronted these House members:
"The actual internal structure of the Congress, however,
militates against the effectiveness of individual members, par¬
ticularly those who do not have either seniority or a key posi¬
tion of power with which to bargain effectively."^
In both cases, the conservative Republicans lacked these advantages.
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To an outside observer, the coordinated activities of the conservative
Republican House members might appear to be small steps. But to a group
of individuals who had always been Republican "team players" and "loyal
party men," they were giant strides in a new direction. The fact that
several staff aides were pushing them all the way, does not lessen the sig¬
nificance of their actions. They had broken with the traditional patterns of
activity in several ways:
1. They utilized staff resources for substantive legislative projects.
2. They allied themselves with outside academicians and journalists.
3. They had opposed their own Administration on a major legislative
initiative, thus putting ideology above party.
4. They had worked together, where the traditional pattern had been
either "go along" or "go alone." In other words, individualist conser¬
vatives were coordinating with each other and no retribution had been
applied to them because of their split with Nixon and the House
Republican leadership over FAP.
5. They had led the Administration to veto the Child Development
Act, despite the fact that they had no formal organization within
the House to provide a base.
6. They could claim some success since neither the Family Assistance
Plan nor the Child Development Act had become law.
All of this was out of character for these members. They had not been
legislative activists. They tended to resent too much staff involvement.
They didn't usually ally themselves with outside individuals, unless it
was on economic issues which were "safe" for their business constituents in
their home districts. They were team players, unaccustomed to opposing
their own President. Most importantly, they were unaccustomed to winning.
Admittedly, Ed Derwinski did marshal a Post Office Reorganization bill
through the 92nd Congress. But this was a bi-partisan effort of no particu¬
lar ideological or even partisan importance. To have succeeded on two
major issues with clear ideological dimensions was a new experience. It
was especially new because the issues were in the "social" category. They
were not national security questions or economic issues on which the Repub¬
licans had traditionally waged their battles.
Social battles would occupy a large portion of the attention of the
Republican Study Committee in the years ahead. These two conservative
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victories on Family Assistance and Child Development could be considered
the beginning of the end of the Johnson-type Great Society programs. Of
course, that a new trend was evolving in the American political process
was not apparent at that time. However, these victories with the opera¬
tional less ons which had been learned provided the basis for the formation
of the Republican Study Committee. The efforts of these members and
staff aides were not imposed on the House without alternative resources
being available.
In the formal structure of the Congress, there were research resources
available. In addition, there were also ideological groups already in existence
in the House. While none were adequate for the House Republican conser¬
vatives, the structure and resources within the House will be examined in
the next chapter.
III. THE SETTING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A. Introduction
The conservative Republican members who had fought their party's Pres¬
ident on the Family Assistance Plan, and then enlisted his support to veto
the Child Development Act, were not analyzing policy in a vacuum. In
theory, at least, they had a number of staff resources available to them.
Some of these were provided on a non-partisan basis within the House. Others
were external to the House, such as the Congressional Research Service of the
Library of Cuiigiess and the General Accounting Office.
In addition, the institutional framework of the Congress was not alien to
the establishment of ideological factions. An organization of liberal Democrats
had been in place for more than a decade, and even the liberal Republicans
had been organized into a formal group.
Neither the Republican committee staff, nor the Minority Leadership's
staff, nor the Executive Branch resources had been of any assistance to the
conservative Republicans in their FAP and Child Development battles. Yet,
their resources were considerable and worthy of note in relation to the forma¬
tion of a new group of conservative Republicans. These institutional structures
had proven to be inadequate to the conservative Republicans in the House. If
the Congress were to be viewed as a complex "law-making machine," all of
these component parts would offer at least a potential opportunity for conser¬
vative Republicans to have a major input and to utilize the various parts of
the machine. To understand why this did not happen, and why the conserva¬
tive Republicans in the House decided to create an entirely new cog in the
machine, we must review these components. Thus, at this point, we stop the
machine, at a definite time as it existed in the early 1970s, and we examine,
in turn, each of the parts which might be of help in meeting the specific re¬
search and legislative policy objectives of a number of conservative Republican
House members. .The activities of their colleagues in forming other complemen¬
tary and competitive ideological groups, for example the liberal Democratic
Study Group, are also examined. These other groups can also be labeled as
cogs in the "law-making machine" which interact, sometimes very directly,
with the new conservative Republican group.
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These are the patterns and pieces which are examined in Chapter III, with
the intention that they will give the proper perspective to subsequent events.
B. An Overview of the U.S. Congress
The American governmental system has been specifically designed around
a system of checks and balances which includes separate Executive and Legis¬
lative Branches. The President may be of the same party as the majority of
the Congress, but he is elected with a different constituency base than are
the individual members of the House and Senate. So, the discipline which can
be exerted by the party leadership on dissenting congressional members who
vote against the leadership is minimal.^-
The decline in voter participation and the increased mobility of the Amer¬
ican people have brought about a change in the nature of the political party.
Members of Congress have become less dependent on party organizations in
their congressional districts or states. Especially in the last decade, men and
women who have never held public office at a lower level before, and who may
not have even participated in party activities before, have run for federal office
and won. They have put together their own organizations, starting with their
friends and reaching out to various special interest groups. A liberal candidate,
for example, might put together a coalition consisting of labor unions, environ¬
mental groups, welfare groups and others. On the other side, the conservative
candidate would build a coalition of taxpayer groups, anti-abortion activists,
right-to-work people ^ and defense advocates such as veterans' groups. Typically,
these personal campaign committees raise the bulk of their own campaign funds,
and the candidates rely on the regular party for only a small share of their
campaign income. When these new members of Congress arrive in Congress via
this "amateur route," they have little reason to be grateful to, or feel depend-
3
ent upon, the formal leadership of their own parties.
With the weakening of the party's structure, rewards and punishments are
increasingly difficult to administer.^ The opportunity to reward regular party
members in the legislature is also minimal. On only a few occasions have the
party's campaign committees withheld funds from incumbent members' re¬
election bids because of their vote against the party line. Thus, some members
of the U.S. Congress are independent not only of the Executive, but also of
their formal party leadership.
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A second factor which has reinforced the independence of the individual
members of Congress is the growth of congressional staffs. Michael Malbin,
who has studied the Congress for many years, states that the power of the
Congress is directly related to the fact that it has a substantial staff of its
own. He notes that:
"Without its staff, Congress would quickly become the prisoner
of its outside sources of information in the executive branch and
interest groups."
In another way, Allen Schick comes to a similar conclusion:
"The present situation is distinctive in that Congress is moving
to match its independence with analytic independence from the exec¬
utive branch."
Malbin specifically refers to the influence of staff on the party process:
"Staff influence extends well beyond the housekeeping functions
familiar to most of us...the way staffs can substantially affect every
step in the legislative process may be less familiar."'
The policymaking function of Congress has been the subject of many major
studies. Some of these have examined the committee structure,^ while others
have looked into the leadership,^ the electoral relationship of members,^ the
11 19ad hoc coalitions,11 and the role of the two major parties in the Congress.
In addition, literature on congressional staffs has grown considerably.^
This growing literature has accompanied the growth of staffs themselves.
In 1960, most members of Congress had a staff of three or four people; they
now have 18 or more. Senate and House committee chairmen frequently have
a staff of fifty or more. Many of these staff aides are involved directly or
indirectly with promoting the re-election of their boss. These staff aides
include the "case workers" in Washington and in the district office who try to
assist constituents in resolving the problems they are having with the federal
bureaucracy. Additional "press aides" will publicize the member in his home
district media and deal with legislative inquiries on behalf of the member.
The contribution of additional staff resources makes incumbent congressmen
virtually invulnerable to electoral defeat^ and further reinforces the member's
independence from the party leadership.
The critical role of the staff in the legislative process is a recurring
theme throughout this thesis and one which is emphasized by economists
James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson. Bennett and Johnson assert that
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"the congressional staff is the medium through which the public will is either
actualized or thwarted."^ The effectiveness of the legislative policy groups
such as the Democratic Study Group (DSG) and the Republican Study Com¬
mittee (RSC) also depends largely on the effectiveness of their operating staff,
a point which is made by Mark F. Ferber in his study of the DSG^ ancj
examined in this thesis with regard to the RSC.
C. Differences Between the House and the Senate
The U.S. Congress is a bicameral institution made up of the complemen¬
tary House of Representatives and Senate. Each jealously guards its preroga¬
tives in relation to the other. While a major review of the differences between
the two Houses of the U.S. Congress is beyond the scope of this thesis, 17 some
basic differences should be noted.
The structures of these two congressional bodies differ. The Senate with
its smaller membership (2 from each state with a total of 100), less frequent
elections (every 6 years as opposed to every 2 years in the House of Repre¬
sentatives), broader constituency (representing up to House seats), and
staggered terms of office, experiences a greater continuity and acts as a more
generalist body than does the House. The House of Representatives is the
originating body for all tax and appropriations bills and provides "for a measure
of deliberation...because of its specialization and expertise" at the committee
and subcommittee level. 18
It is within this context of congressional activity that the Republican
Study Committee has come to play an important role. The House with its
more formal procedures, limited debate, germaneness requirements, and increased
specialization, encounters increased demands for specialized sources of informa¬
tion. The Senate also has a significant requirement for staffing. Because there
are fewer senators, each senator is assigned to more committees and consequently,
is more likely to become either a committee or subcommittee chairman if he
serves in the majority party, or a ranking minority member of a committee or
subcommittee if he serves in the minority party. Once in this role, the sen¬
ator can build a professional staff to serve his legislative needs and political
ambitions. This personal staff is more crucial to the senator's work because
he serves on more committees. As a result, the senator's ability to develop
his own expertise is more limited than that of his House colleague.
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The different roles of the House and Senate lead to different professional
staff needs in the two bodies. Both have established a strong reliance on
professional staff resources which have been provided by a number of sources,
including specialized agencies under the control of the Congress, committee
staffs within Congress, personal staffs of members, and the official party of
the member. Each is examined in turn in this chapter with particular emphasis
placed on their availability to conservative members of the Republican party
in the House of Representatives.
D. Specialized Agencies Serving the Congress
There are four specialized policy agencies of the Congress: the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) of the Library of Congress. The GAO, OTA, and CBO were specifically
designed to either monitor the Executive Branch or to offset the resource
capabilities of the Executive Branch. The CRS has a different background
because it was designed as a research arm for the Congress and never offset
any particular advantage which the Executive Branch was perceived to possess.^
The GAO and the CRS are evaluated in some detail at this point. The CBO
and OTA are considered briefly.
In early 1973, as the Republican Study Committee was being formed,
neither the CBO nor the OTA were institutional factors which might affect the
policy analysis capability of the conservative Republicans in the House. In fact,
the CBO's and the OTA's role in the Congress was just being established at that
time. The next two subsections consider the GAO and the CRS. A brief con¬
cluding section which discusses the OTA and CBO as they affected the Republican
Study Committee will follow.
The General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office, established in 1921, is directed by the
Comptroller General of the United States. Its basic purpose is to:
"assist the Congress, its committees, and its members in car¬
rying out their legislative and oversight responsibilities, consistent
with its role as an independent non-political agency in the legislative
branch; to carry out legal, accounting, auditing, and claim settlement
functions with respect to federal government programs in operation as
assigned by the Congress; and to make recommendations designed to
provide more efficient and effective government operations."
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The most important role of the General Accounting Office for the individual
member of Congress or the congressional committee is to respond to their
requests to investigate specific government programs. In addition, the GAO
is charged with supporting the Congressional Budget Office and providing over¬
sight assistance for specific committees in both the House and the Senate.
It is important to note that while the GAO is responsive to the majority party,
the facilities of the GAO are only available to members of the minority party
under unusual circumstances. Senior Republican members on an oversight sub¬
committee, for example, could direct the GAO to aid them in their duties to
review a specific program. In this case, however, the request is generally
made on a bi-partisan basis together with the Democratic subcommittee chair¬
man.
A traditional role of the General Accounting Office has been one of
auditing. The GAO audits most programs of federal government agencies. It
also provides accounting advisory services to different offices of the government.
When a government program is audited by the General Accounting Office, prior
to the release of the study to the Congress, a draft report is made available
for comment to the audited agency, and the agency's comments are included
in the final report. Thus, the GAO performs its function much like a com¬
mercial auditing firm would perform a "client review."
The General Accounting Office also provides legal advice to the Congress,
reviews reports from regulatory agencies, and attempts to verify data such as
energy reserves information in conjunction with the Department of Energy.
Some members of the staff of the General Accounting Office work closely with
professional staffs of House and Senate committees, especially the Appropriations
Committee, and are on loan to these committees. Such professional staff aides
are not available to individual members of the House, nor are they usually
available to the minority members on a committee.
In practice, the General Accounting Office receives mixed reviews from
its congressional critics:
"...while several congressional staff members, in conversation,
have waxed enthusiastic about the accuracy and care of GAO's
investigative reports to Congress, they have complained that these
reports were often so out of date as to be irrelevant to the mis¬
spent past of terminated programs."^*
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The GAO has been helpful in overseeing the performance of specific govern¬
ment programs, but it does not provide analysis on pending proposals or inde¬
pendent judgments on the policy successes of existing programs. In other words,
an efficiently run program is not necessarily successful in meeting the policy
objectives of its legislative authors.
The Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress, established in 1800, is one of the oldest arms
of the Legislative Branch. The head of this organization, the Librarian of
Congress, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The primary statutory obligation of the Library is to serve the
Congress in the form of the Congressional Research Service. The activity of
the Library of Congress has expanded far beyond service to the Congress and
the government and is considered the national library of record for the United
States. It is responsible for maintaining copyrights, and it provides numerous
other services to non-congressional users.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) at the Library of Congress is
the most important division of the Library of Congress in terms of policy
assistance for the Congress itself. The senior specialist department within
CRS provides individual staff personnel with particular expertise covering the
range of domestic and national security policy issues. The CRS assists specific
committees of the House and Senate. Their work can range from major
research projects which are eventually published by House or Senate committees
or private organizations, to advice on computer applications in the Congress.
CRS also .compiles specific bibliographic inquiries in response to member
requests and monitors legislation for congressional committees and individual
members of the House and Senate.
The senior specialists of the Congressional Research Service can be asked
to write speeches for members of Congress and otherwise act as if they were
an extension of the member's personal policymaking staff. However, service
such as this is not relied on by the majority of members except on the basis
of personal contacts who are known to members of Congress and/or their
senior staff aides.^2 Part of the inevitable problem is that with the limited
staff resources of the CRS and 535 members of Congress calling for assistance,
the backlog of pending assignments is large. However, senior specialists are
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often available for answering specific limited inquiries on relatively short
notice. As Malbin notes:
"CRS is now terribly overworked and understaffed. Although
it does good work for the most part, it cannot realistically be asked
to do more with its present staff."
The senior specialists in the CRS tend to have close working relationships
with civil servants whose policy areas coincide with their own. This closeness
of contact has tended to make many conservative Republican House members
suspicious of the political bias of the CRS personnel. While these professional
research personnel may have no ideological bias within their own work product,
the perception of the cunservative Republicans is that they do, which limits
their usefulness.
Other Specialized Agencies
The Office of Technology Assessment is a recent addition to the policy¬
making support organizations within the Legislative Branch. It began opera¬
tions in January 1974, following the passage of the Technology Assessment Act
of 1972. The 1972 Act was primarily advocated by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
Massachusetts) and his staff. The concept was developed in response to their
inadequacy in dealing with various counterpart agencies in the Executive Branch,
such as the Science Advisor to the President. Senator Kennedy has been the
Chairman of the Board of OTA since its inception and exercises the single most
pervasive influence over it. The OTA has been described as an extension of
his personal staff, full of his "political cronies.The basic function of
OTA is to provide congressional committees with:
"assessments or studies that identify the broad range of conse¬
quences, social as well as physical, which can be expected to accom¬
pany various policy choices affecting the use of technologies."^
While the role of OTA is supposedly limited to scientific matters, it has con¬
sidered many social issues as well. Because OTA was established at the same
time as the RSC, it did not provide a source for research analysis for conser¬
vative Republican members of the House.
The newest policy organization established within the Congress is the
Congressional Budget Office. It is designed to support the House and Senate
budget committees, and like many organizations, there were varied ideas about
the role of the CBO. Political scientist Thomas Cronin writes:
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"Some members of Congress hoped the CBO would provide hard,
practical economic data to guide the drafting of specific legislation.
Others viewed it as a potential 'think tank' that might provide Con¬
gress a more philosophical approach to spending and help restore
national priorities. In fact, the CBO is most frequently used to pro¬
vide routine cost estimates for spending and tax bills and to keep
track of the overall budget level.
Like the OTA, the CBO was a new institutionai component within the congres¬
sional complex of 1973-74. Because it was created in response to the Congres¬
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), it was not
fully operational until 1975, and by that time, the Republicans in the House
were becoming acquainted with the congressional budget process and how they
might use it to help biing the federal budget under control.The CBO has
evolved into an office which provides forecasts and analyses of economic trends
and alternative fiscal policies. Among the functions of the CBO is developing
five-year cost estimates for implementing bills reported by congressional com¬
mittees. These estimates give the CBO an opportunity to inject itself directly
into the policy process. But, because the CBO's economic projections are
based on Keynesian models, they are considered controversial by some scholars,^
and the conservative Republicans in Congress who support monetarist or "supply-
side" economic models cannot utilize the CBO for their policy work.
At the same time the establishment of the Republican Study Committee,
none of the four specialized policy agencies of the Congress were able to serve
as a legislative research arm for individual minority members of the Congress.
If they produced a study which reinforced the position of a conservative mem¬
ber, it would be useful supporting documentation. But, most conservative
members of the House were not in a position, through party or seniority, to
commission studies or to even capitalize on them when they were in the process
of completion. As Richard Cohen notes in reviewing the four support agencies'
performance on a specific project:
"In the end, the support agencies probably can hope to accom¬
plish little more than to provide information and analysis to buttress
opinions that Members of Congress already hold."^
Maibin makes the additional point that it is as difficult for the Congress to
evaluate the biases in the information from its own staff as from sources out¬
side the Congress.^ 1 While it is relatively easy for conservatives to criticize
Kennedy appointees at OTA, this criticism does not take the place of useful
analysis to buttress the conservative position, as Cohen points out.
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These four support agencies provide substantial analysis for Congress, but
as Samuel C. Patterson has noted: "Whether congressional leaders and com¬
mittees use policy analysis effectively is another question."32
Because of the perceived biases of the agencies and the limitations of
the requestor, these organizations do not fill the need for professional
research staff support for minority members. Even if the analysis were avail¬
able, the utilization of it would still require an institutional mechanism to get
the analysis directly into the legislative process. What is clear is that in 1973,
these organizations did not meet the needs of the conservative members of the
House.
E. The Staffs of Congressional Committees
The development of professional committee staffs for the Congress is
relatively recent. "By. the time of World War II only the two Appropriations
Committees and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation had well-
developed professional staffs."33 Under the terms of the Legislative Reorgan¬
ization Act of 194-6, the hiring of professional staff aides for all committees
was encouraged. The first steps under the Legislative Reorganization Act were
modest, and the effect was viewed as an experiment. As Professor Dahi said
at the time:
"The growth of committee staff has both dangers and possibil¬
ities. Until Congressmen learn the proper scope and the limitations
of the expert, there are two contrary dangers. One is the inability
to use the staff — a waste of the expertise, and a continued sub¬
stitution of amateurs for expert judgments on technical questions.
The other is that professional staff members will develop far more
policy influence than they ought to have. Nevertheless, there are
factors which guard against this danger: the professional staffs are
small (the Legislative Reorganization Act fixes the limit at four);
and they can be controlled, once the committee members understand
fully what ought and what ought not to be expected of the expert."3^
Since that time, the staff size has grown substantially, and has been substantially
directed away from a professional basis toward a partisan basis. The formal
authority for selecting committee staff members rests with the committee
chairman. Most chairmen jealously guard their appointment authority and in
some cases their approval is required even for the hiring of minority staff
who report directly to the ranking minority member.
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"In 1962, for example, out of a total of 50b staff persons for
all House committees (both standing and select), only b3 were
assigned to the minority; only 5b of 508 staff members for ail
Senate committees were assigned to the minority. The joint com¬
mittees had only 2 out of 72 assigned to the minority."
This approximate ratio was still in effect at the time of the establish¬
ment of the Republican Study Committee. As Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia), a
senior member of the House Banking and Currency Committee commented:
"A minority committee member couldn't ask the regular minor¬
ity committee staff to do anything for him. There were only three
minority committee staff professionals on the House Banking and
Currency Committee and they all owed their allegiance to the rank¬
ing minority member rather than to the whole minority membership.
The ranking minority member was a liberal Republican from New
Jersey. Besides, they were outnumbered by 52 professional staff
members reporting to the majority."^6
The problem of minority committee staff representation is one which has
been of long-standing concern to the formal Republican leadership. A book of
essays was edited by James Cleveland (R-New Hampshire) in 1966 entitled
We Propose: A Modern Congress.^7 One of the major recommendations made
in this book was for one-third minority staffing to represent the one-third of
the House which was Republican. Stephen Frantzich summarized the situation
expressed
well when he said: "The wailings of frustration(|by junior members and those
JO
from the minority party find manifold justification." Professor Robinson
points out the practical disadvantage under which the House Republicans were
laboring:
"The controversy over minority staffing is not surprising in view
of a Congressman's natural ambition for power. Information is a
source of power, and the majority understandably wishes to restrict
the minority's chances to acquire power, eyen though it knows that
it may itself someday be in the minority."
While the requirements for professional staff consultation vary from
member to member, there is a requirement for access to some professional
staff advice on the merits of legislation which is considered in the member's
committee and on- the House floor. As Professor Dechert notes, the needs
vary from member to member:
"Each Congressman has varying information requirements be¬
yond the common minimum needed to participate in corporate
decisions. His individual information needs vary according to his
particular constituencies, his interests, his committee assignment(s),
and his own personal expertise."^® .
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This review should make it clear that for a minority member who was not a
senior member on a committee, the opportunity for obtaining staff assistance
was severely limited:
1. because the number of minority staff aides was limited, and
2. because the minority staff was responsive to the ranking minority
member, rather than to all the minority members.
Thus, for aggressive junior members in the Republican party, the need for
"expert" advice was not provided by the committee staff. This limitation has
already been seen in the battle over President Nixon's Family Assistance
Plan' and will be seen in several later legislative case studies.^
A senior Republican House member said:
"The key guys [on a committee staff] reflect the chairman.
Therefore, I do my own work. You can't even use minority staff
if you want to do something which is against the ranking minority
committee member who controls it."
F. The Member's Personal Staff
Members of Congress have a number of perquisites available to handle
the affairs of their office and to serve their constituents. In addition to a
suite of offices in one of the House Office Buildings in Washington, the typical
member will have one or more constituent service offices in his congressional
district. He receives an official staff allotment of 18 individual employees,
the majority of whom are involved in constituent services. Because of the
growth of the service role, most of these personal staff employees are not
involved in legislative issues. Professor Robinson said more than a decade ago:
"Few Members of the House of Representatives have profes¬
sional staffs because the daily demands of answering mail, caring
for constituents' Washington problems, and managing ordinary office
duties exhaust most of the financial resources."^
The limitation of resources is not the only reason for this heavy emphasis
on district-related matters. Emphasizing the service role of the legislator
focuses attention away from his voting patterns. Morris Fiorina states that
"Policy voting displeases as many voters as it pleases in the district.
Therefore, according to Fiorina, members tend to place heavy emphasis on
their constituency service role.
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The policy input for members on issues coming from staff does not eman¬
ate from their own personal staffs. A survey conducted in the 89th Congress
showed the average office workload division as follows:
25% of its time in direct constituency service,
41% of its time in mail inquiries,
10% of its time in education and publicity, and
only 14% of its time on legislative support.
The direct policy staff available to a member of Congress usually consists
of his legislative assistant (LA). A legislative assistant, however, has a sub¬
stantial workload. In 1977, 28% of the offices surveyed by authors Harrison W.
Fox, 3r. and Susan Webb Hammond had no legislative assistants.^ They note
that:
"In most offices, one LA handles legislative matters in all
issue areas: briefing, drafting floor statements, researching data,
and drafting amendments. He often also handles legislative mail,
i.e., letters from constituents about pending legislation or current
issues.
As a consequence of this workload, most legislative assistants do not have the
opportunity to review their member's committee work, track major legislative
issues, or concentrate on legislative initiatives. Their primary workload almost
inevitably revolves around processing constituent mail dealing with legislative
issues. This workload leaves little time for even a creative LA to work with
his member or his colleague on major legislative initiatives.
G. Official Party Staff in the House
The official party staff reports to the party leadership. While the party
staff performs certain functions for all party members, these are limited. For
example, among House Republicans the Whip Notice is a useful service provided
by the office of the Minority Whip. It is published weekly and serves to notify
members and staff aides of forthcoming floor activity. Similarly, the Repub¬
lican Conference Legislative Digest reviews major bills for the next week, and
excerpts arguments from the official committee reports on them. The official
party staff helps the leadership set agendas, prepare for their press confer¬
ences, and negotiate with counterparts in the other party on floor schedules and
related logistical questions. But there is virtually no help provided to individual
members.
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Added to this is the ideologicai division within each party. As Fox and
Hammond note:
"The ideologicai split in the Republican Party has resulted in
perhaps more reliance on groups within the party, the (liberal) Wed¬
nesday Group, the (conservative) Study Group (sic), than on the
leadership."
Another potential source of Republican information is the ad hoc groups
of Republicans which gather weekly in a social environment to discuss legisla¬
tive or policy matters or other issues of potential concern, but their policy
influence is minimal.
The limitation is again apparent: party leadership staff is not available
to rank and file members for assistance on their legislative agendas.
H. Ideological Groups in the House
The context in which the Republican Study Committee was organized
included not only relationships, within its own party, both in the Administra¬
tion and in the Congress, but also with the dominant Democratic party.
The House Republicans, accustomed to working in the minority, lagged be¬
hind their Democratic colleagues in forming ideological factions within the
House. There are two reasons for this: 1) the House Democrats were more
diverse ideologically and they tended to be more divided in their political
perspectives than were the Republicans and 2) opposition status both within
the Congress and during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration tended to unite
the Republicans in negative positions which were acceptable to the over¬
whelming majority of Republican members of the House.
However, beginning with the Nixon Administration and the advocacy of
policies which were opposed to what many Republicans believed, Republican
conservatives felt the need for greater unity, especially since the senior
Republicans who had long been considered "regular conservatives" were now
in positions of influencing public policy decisions. They remained senior
members of the minority party, but as the ranking minority members on
committees, they became the chief contact points with high-level officials
in the Nixon Administration. Their views were being heard. As they met
and negotiated with the Nixon Administration spokesmen, they tended to
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accept the Administration's views as partiaiiy their own. They then altered
their legislative objectives to coincide with the Administration's. In effect,
they became spokesmen for Administration bills, relying on Administration
drafting, staff, witnesses and other resources to pass "their" new legislative
program. The Nixon Family Assistance Plan, which was discussed in Chapter
II, is a good example of this situation. This change was not well received
by some of the younger conservative Republican members, who were unhappy
with specific proposals emanating from the first Nixon Administration.
The effectiveness of ideological factions in the House of Representatives
had already been established. The Democratic Study Group had been formed
in 1959 and was a formidable force to be reckoned with, particularly since
the demise of the Conservative Coalition.50 It is argued in this section that
the DSG had become the dominant ideological faction within the House. This
was the result of the acceptance of the basic DSG-liberai legislation agenda
by the Democratic Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. Thus, the DSG pro¬
vided much of the impetus for these social welfare legislative proposals. At
this same time, the concept of conservatism was at its nadir. Barry
Goldwater, (R-Arizona) the personification of conservatism, had been trounced
in the 1964 presidential election, and the national mood was inclined to
accept a major new emphasis on social programs to fight the war on poverty
at home, along with the fight against Communism in Southeast Asia.
The Democratic Study Group has played a vital role in the legislative
process in the House of Representatives since its formation more than two
decades ago and has become the prototype for ideological factions in the
House of Representatives. Because of this important role, it is analyzed
in detail in this section. Other organizations and factions within the Con¬
gress are also reviewed. The Wednesday Group of Republican liberals, the
Democratic Research Organization of Democratic conservatives, the Senate
Steering Committee of conservative Senators, and other minor groups and
organizations all play a role in the modern Congress. An understanding of
their roles is essential for an understanding of the role of the Republican
Study Committee. Ideological groups have become very important in the
modern Congress, as Harvey Mansfield notes:
"Because effective action is usually group action, a number of
more or less durable though loosely knit blocs have emerged in Con¬
gress. The anti-New Deal Coalition...had negative goals and disinte-
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grated in defeat in the 1960s. More lately the Democratic Study
Group, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Women's Caucus...have
embodied efforts to consolidate strength for the advancement of
positive, if perhaps, parochial goals.
These are the groups which are reviewed in detail in this section.
The Democratic Study Group
The Democratic Study Group is considered to be the most important
prototype of all the ideological support organizations in the Congress. For
example, Michael J. Malbin writing in the National Journal has noted "the
success of the Democratic Study Group (DSG) has made it the organization
others try to copy."^ The DSG is an organization of liberal Democrats in
the House of Representatives. While it was officially formed in 1959, it
traces its origins to the election results of 1958, the off-year congressional
election in the second Eisenhower term. That election expanded the Dem¬
ocratic majority in the Congress to produce an overwhelming margin of
votes in opposition to Eisenhower's programs. On the day following the
election in 1958, Eisenhower attacked the congressional "budget busters,"
thus, setting a more conservative tone than the liberal Democrats hoped he
would follow.
The animosity that Eisenhower engendered came about during a period
of liberal activism and followed earlier attempts at coordination of liberal
legislative efforts. Immediately after the 1956 election and Eisenhower's
enormous win over Stevenson, a number of Democratic members of the House
agreed to return to Washington to discuss ways to improve communication
among liberal Democrats in the House and to advance their own legislative
goals in the 85th Congress. This took the form of a "Counter-State of the
Union Message" to be delivered in early 1957. The resulting statement was
promptly dubbed the "Liberal Manifesto" by the press. It covered a broad
range of issues, including foreign policy and national defense, immigration,
civil rights, civil services, education, health, housing, taxes, labor, business
and industry, agriculture, public works, resources, atomic energy, veterans'
5 ^benefits and governmental operations.
The primary author of this "Liberal Manifesto" was Congressman Eugene
McCarthy (D-Minnesota) who, with the cooperation of Congressmen Lee
Metcaif (D-Montana), Chet Holifield (D-Caiifornia) and 3ohn Blatnik (D-
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Minnesota), produced a draft which was widely circulated to House Dem¬
ocrats. The paper was originally released to the press on January 8, 1957,
prior to Eisenhower's State of the Union Message. In a short period of time,
more than 80 of the 435 members of the House had signed the program.
All of them were Democrats. The majority came from industrial states,
and approximately three-quarters of them represented heavily urban con¬
stituencies.-^ The authors of the Liberal Manifesto expected commitments
from the signers to support the comprehensive liberal program of legislation
rather than their more established system of trading votes on an issue-by-issue,
local or regional basis.
Shortly before the 1958 election, Frank Thompson (D-New Jersey), secre¬
tary of the ad hoc group of Democrats who advocated the Liberal Manifesto,
claimed on the floor of the House, "In my opinion, a statement that we have
accomplished about 90% of our program is not unrealistic."^ Despite
Thompson's claim, certain political realities were imposed on the liberal pro¬
gram. Some Democratic incumbents were unwilling to sign the program
despite the fact that they might have agreed with 90% of it. One or two
specific proposals might have been anathema to their constituents which pre¬
cluded their participation in the entire program. In addition, the Republicans
added the costs of the programs being advocated by their liberal Democratic
colleagues and accused them of profligacy with their excessive spending
proposals.
The publication of the Liberal Manifesto was accompanied by internal
attempts to improve communication among liberal House Democrats through
informal discussions, frequently held in McCarthy's office, and by a rudimen¬
tary whip system conducted by the leaders of this early bloc.This loosely
structured group of liberal activists took the name of "McCarthy's Marauders."
There were no formal officers, and participation in the ad hoc steering com¬
mittee depended almost exclusively on one's willingness to commit time and
effort to the activities. So, members who showed up routinely for meetings
or who volunteered for specific activities would find themselves becoming more
influential in the inner circle of the group.
The McCarthy group also held educational meetings with academics, small
dinner meetings to discuss issues of concern, and various other legislative
activities which would later be formalized by the Democratic Study Group and
eventually emulated by the Republican Study Committee.
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A major landmark occurred when the group hired George Frain as a
staff researcher on June 1, 1957, and provided him with clerical assistance
to handle the staff work. Frain's salary, paid out of the clerk-hire allow¬
ance allotted by the government, was jointly covered by Congressmen Metcaif,
McCarthy, George McGovern (D-South Dakota), John E. Moss (D-California)
and Frank Thompson. Frain worked for the group for one year until July
1958, when he returned to Thompson's office full-time but still continued
in an informal association with the McCarthy group.
McCarthy's leadership activity declined in late 1957 because of his 1958
campaign for the Senate from Minnesota, and the mantle of leadership then
fell on Metcaif and Thompson. In preparation for the 1958 elections, the ad
hoc group enlisted staff aides from member offices to prepare memoranda
rebutting Republican charges and lauding Democratic achievements in the
85th Congress. The group generally assisted the members of the liberal
bloc who had committed themselves to the Liberal Manifesto one and a half
years earlier.
In addition, research material was sent to other Democratic candidates
who were thought to be sympathetic to the liberal perspective. A letter
signed by 12 members was written on Metcalf's stationery. More than 50 of
the 90 candidates who received letters accepted the group's offer of informa¬
tion, and 35 of these were elected to the 86th Congress in 1958. Upon
election, a number of these new members of Congress visited with Metcaif
and Thompson and expressed their appreciation for the assistance offered by
the group. Thus, the groundwork was laid for substantial legislative efforts in
1959 with the start of the 86th Congress.
One of the most important of these early efforts was an attempt to
curb the power of the Rules Committee in the House. This committee acts
as the "traffic cop" for all legislation. That is, it plays the critical role of
scheduling legislation, deciding which amendments may or may not be offered,
if any, and occasionally pigeonholing legislation which had already passed a
substantive committee. The Rules Committee, long dominated by its con¬
servative chairman Howard "Judge" Smith (D-Virginia) and the equally con¬
servative ranking Democratic member William Colmer (D-Mississippi), had
thwarted action on many liberal measures during the 85th Congress. This
additional roadblock was frustrating to the liberals in the Democratic party.
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Also, recent changes in the makeup of the committee threatened to make
it even more conservative at the very time that the liberals had scored
major victories in the House. Consequently, the liberals decided that an
early joint effort in 1959 was needed. Changes in the House rules would
allow the majority to work its will by permitting the originating committees'
bills to reach the House floor.
The ad hoc group decided to consult with Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Texas)
about the Rules Committee problem. The results of the meeting on January 3,
1959, were not totally satisfactory although Rayburn did indicate that he was
sympathetic to the group's problem. Rayburn agreed to support procedural
steps to obtain consideration by the full House if bills reported by legislative
committees were delayed in the Rules Committee for an unreasonable length
of time. The Rayburn agreement was confirmed with then Minority Leader
Joe Martin (R-Massachusetts). Martin was subsequently displaced from his
Republican leadership position by Charles Halleck (R-Indiana), and as a
consequence, the Rayburn-Martin agreement was nullified. Further problems
arose for the embryonic organization.
As the new Congress began, the group continued to evolve. Attendance
at meetings increased, written notices for briefing sessions were used and
by April 1959, the group was called "The Congressional Study Group." This
name was adopted because it was considered noncontroversial. It was thought
that a more ideological name might constitute a threat of insurgency which
would be frowned upon in the higher policymaking circles of the Democratic
party.
Despite their election successes which gave them a majority of the
majority party in the Congress, the liberal Democrats were unable to mar¬
shal their forces in critical votes as the Congress progressed. The activist
liberal members were becoming increasingly convinced that action had to be
taken in order to assure the country that the constituencies which had
voted them into the Congress had not misplaced their confidence and that
positive legislative action would result. Their frustration stemmed from
several factors. The more senior Democrats tended to be more conservative.
While the liberals could outvote them in committees, the seniority system
assured the senior members of a disproportionate influence with the Speaker
of the House. There was also a belief that the senior members were not
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as concerned with meeting the demands of their constituencies as were the
newly-elected members. These factors combined with the conservative
position of the Rules Committee to thwart the liberals' action.
By the summer of 1959, there had been no substantive legislative meas¬
ures enacted, and it became apparent that Speaker Rayburn would not be in
a position to honor the commitment he had made earlier to push matters
through the Rules Committee.^7
The passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill to correct excesses of labor
union mismanagement was widely regarded as a rebuff to the liberals and a
conservative victory, again, despite the apparently powerful position of the
liberals in both the House and the Senate.With these and other legislative
setbacks, the ad hoc leaders of the group determined that they had to formal¬
ize their operations. The liberal leaders were frustrated by their lack of
performance:
"Yet what was especially grating was the failure of liberals
to marshall the potential forces that they did have. Many deci¬
sions simply did not reflect the numbers they perceived to be
sympathetic."-^
Organizational meetings were held on September 5, 7, and 9, 1959, resulting
in a letter of September 12 being sent to more than 150 Democrats inviting
them to join the Democratic Study Group.
These early meetings, recounted in detail by both Mark Ferber and
Kenneth Kofmehl, pointed out several major lessons the liberals had learned.
The newly-appointed Executive Committee selected a name which specifically
avoided words like "liberal" or "action" because of their adverse connotations.
Their party loyalty was stressed in order to avoid problems with the Dem¬
ocratic party leadership. By late December, a press statement was released
announcing the organization and stressing its willingness to "supplement and
assist the leadership to further our party's program."^ The Executive
Committee tried to minimize any impression of being mavericks or insurgents.
In early 1960, the formalization of the Democratic Study Group began.
An agenda was discussed and ratified which included major policy legislation
in virtually every area of concern, although the precise statement of these
legislative objectives was left intentionally vague in order to avoid the type
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of problem which the Liberal Manifesto had presented to some possible
recruits. The group established specific task forces in each broad area and
authorized the temporary chairman, Lee Metcalf, to appoint the task forces.
By May 1960, the Democratic Study Group hired a full-time staff director,
Bill Phillips. A press release was issued which noted that Phillips would be
hired for $780 a month and would serve on the clerk-hire payrolls of 8
members of the House.
With the assumption of the presidency by John Kennedy in 1961, the
Democratic Study Group changed its focus. The DSG began its role in
opposition to the Republican Administration of Eisenhower by proposing
liberal alternatives. During the 1960s, the DSG researched and promoted
efforts in civil rights legislation, increasing the minimum wage law, promoting
medicare, and establishing federal aid to education.
The DSG began its active fundraising efforts in the congressional cam¬
paigns of 1968. By 1970 with breaks coming in the Democratic party between
hawks and doves on Vietnam, the DSG chairman, James O'Hara (D-Michigan),
held the view that "it was more important to keep the DSG together on those
issues where we did agree than to break it up on issues where we differed."^*
So, O'Hara avoided divisive issues such as those relating to Vietnam.
By 1961, the published output of the DSG included dozens of issue papers
and fact sheets on major legislative issues, and its constantly evolving whip
system. The DSG publications were used to "provide the congressman with
'shortcuts' toward gaining the information he needs.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recount all of the major legisla¬
tive activities in which the Democratic Study Group engaged between its
formation in 1959 to the time of the founding of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee in 1973, however several of these activities are of particular interest.
During the Kennedy Administration, the DSG worked intensively on civil rights
legislation, and by the time of Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency
in 1963, the DSG was firmly in place as an established faction within the
House of Representatives. The 1964 Johnson landslide substantially increased
the Democratic majority in the Congress resulting in the "Great Society
Congress" of 1965-66. During this time, the DSG members worked closely
with the House Democratic leadership, particularly Speaker John McCormack
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(D-Massachusetts) and with its partisan colleagues in making discrimination
illegal, and substantially increasing federal governmental programs for educa¬
tion, health care, poverty elimination and other social projects. As the chief
ideological rallying point for the liberals, the DSG and its members were a
key element in promoting the passage of all of these programs.^
In addition to its emphasis on specific legislative policies, it is note¬
worthy that a continuing area of interest to the DSG staff and leadership
has been reform of the House rules of procedure. This included changes in
the House seniority system, which were eventually adopted by the early
1970s,^ the evolution of the House Democratic Policy and Steering Committee
and other House rules and policies. The seniority system was eventually
modified to require that every standing committee chairman be subject to
the approval of the Democratic Caucus in a recorded vote at the beginning
of every Congress. This changed the earlier policy of strict seniority deter¬
mining each chairman. This reform was adopted at the start of the 93rd
Congress in January 1973, largely due to DSG pressure. Besides reforming
the seniority system, the Democratic Study Group pushed reforms to open
to the public all committee hearings, empower the Democratic Steering
Committee to appoint members to vacancies on all the standing committees
and to elect Ways and Means Subcommittee chairmen, and to limit the num¬
ber of subcommittee chairmanships one individual could hold.
An interesting aspect of the DSG emphasis on reform should be noted.
As additional DSG members achieved the position of committee chairmen
within the House, the committee staff began to play a more important role
to the member. The reliance of these senior members on material from
the Democratic Study Group and, it could be said, the influence of the
Democratic Study Group on legislative issues, were reduced. As Washington
Post reporter Mary Russell noted:
"The reform era it was organized to initiate is largely over,
and some of the missionary zeal that infected its members is gone.
Its founding fathers, such as Reps. Morris K. Udall (Ariz.),
Frank Thompson, Jr. (N.J.), and Richard Boiling (Mo.), are now
part of the- power structure as committee chairmen. They need
the DSG less, and are less active in it. ^
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Although the DSG's initiatory legislative action decreased, the consistent
pattern of DSG support for House reforms is amply documented. In sup¬
porting the Democrats reforms the members of the DSG vote together on
the floor of the House. As Ripley noted:
"A study by the DSG staff of voting in the Ninetieth Congress
(1967-68) concluded that DSG members voted together 91% of the
time in support of Democratic programs and policies. An academic
study also reached the conclusion that DSG members voted quite co¬
hesively."66
He continues, however:
"This is hardly surprising since ideological agreement is the
basis for self-selected memberships." ^
The Democratic Study Group was recognized as part of the congressional
structure by the time of the formation of the Republican Study Committee.
Some of the circumstances surrounding the DSG's formation were
different from those of the Republican Study Committee. The Democratic
Study Group was formed primarily to advocate certain changes in domestic
policy.6^ At the time of the formation of the Democratic Study Group in
the late 1950s, there was a bi-partisan foreign policy. Some DSG members
eventually led the opposition to American involvement in Vietnam, but the
organization never became formally involved in the anti-war activism of
some of its key members. It should be noted, however, that by 1969, the
DSG cohesion on foreign affairs voting was substantially diminished. Stevens,
et. al., attribute this to internal dissension over U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia.6^ The Republican Study Committee, on the other hand, was formed
out of dissatisfaction with both domestic and foreign policy issues.
The Democratic Study Group was formed while the opposition party
occupied the White House. The DSG was attempting to exercise power in
the Congress while the Administration was controlled by the other party.
It was hoped that the formal Democratic party leadership would lead the
opposition to the Administration's policies but, largely because of the
liberal-conservative split within the Democratic party, it was unable to do so.
The Republican Study Committee was formed during a Republican
Administration largely to enable members of the President's own party,
particularly those who were without issue-oriented staff resources, to be
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heard in the public policy process. Mark Ferber notes that if Harry Truman
had been succeeded by another Democrat instead of Eisenhower, the DSG
would never have been formed/®
The DSG was formed while the Democrats were a majority in the
House. Because the majority party is the majority, and it controls the
committee activity and legislative agenda, the factions within the majority
party are more likely to have direct legislative influence. The RSC, on the
other hand, was described in its early days as being a "majority of a minority"
because the Republican party was in a minority position in the House of
Representatives. Partially offsetting the RSC's disadvantage was the pres¬
ence of a Republican Administration.
As Chapter II has stated, in the first Nixon Administration the House
Republicans were playing a major role in the legislative process. The formation
of the RSC was hastened because the members wanted to make certain that
their legislative input would not be limited solely to the leadership and senior
members.
The similarities between the Democratic Study Group and the Repub¬
lican Study Committee should also be noted.
By the time of the "institutionalization" of the Democratic Study
Group (the mid-1960s), the liberals were the predominant wing of the House
Democratic party. Similarly, at the time that the Republican Study Com¬
mittee was institutionalized within its party (1974), the conservative wing was
dominant in the Republican party in the House. The dominance of the RSC
and DSG was emphasized by the feeble counterpart ideological organizations.
These included the Democratic Research Organization of conservative Dem¬
ocrats, and the Wednesday Group of liberal Republicans. Both organizations
can be described as smaller, weaker, and less effective than the DSG in the
Democratic party or the RSC in the Republican party.
The basic'premise on which both organizations were formed remained
the same: the leaders of the organization were frustrated by the lack of
staff support and lack of cohesion and effectiveness in dealing with major




The Wednesday Group is the organization of liberal House Republicans.
It was established in 1963 and has its own staff and research capability. Like
the Democratic Study Group, the Wednesday Group was formed during an op¬
position presidency. The Wednesday Group was a part of the minority congres¬
sional party, however, and, the DSG was a faction of the majority party. As
one commentator described it, the Republicans in the House
seemed forced into the position of saying either 'no' or 'me
too' to Democratic initiatives, some of which came from the DSG.
In this situation there was a need for an entity to develop 'con¬
structive alternatives'."
The Wednesday Group leaders viewed themselves as the promoters of these
"constructive alternatives."
The organizers of the Wednesday Group were leaders of the liberal bloc
of the Republican membership in the House, including former New York City
Mayor John Lindsay, Senators Charles Mathias (R-Maryland) and Robert Stafford
(R-Vermont), and Congressman Stanley Tupper (R-Maine). During the 1964 pres¬
idential campaign of conservative Senator Barry Goldwater, the majority of the
members of the newly-formed Wednesday Group, numbering about 15, opposed
the Goldwater nomination.
Following Goldwater's defeat in November 1964, the House leadership
elections were hotly disputed in January 1965. While the main contest devel¬
oped between the incumbent Minority Leader Charles Halleck (R-Indiana) and
his insurgent opponent, Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan), members of the Wed¬
nesday Group were approached by all sides seeking support. However, Svend
Groennings has stated that their impact in that particular election was not
7?obvious.
Despite their divergent views on the Haileck-Ford race, most Wednes¬
day Group members believed that the leading candidate for the position of
chairman of the House Republican Conference, Melvin R. Laird (R-Wisconsin)
was unacceptable because he had served as chairman of the 1964 Republican
Platform Committee. However, it took some time for them to decide on a
candidate to oppose Laird. Their candidate did not emerge until the eve of
the election when they agreed to support Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen (R-New
Jersey). Frelinghuysen came from an old and distinguished Republican family.
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He was not widely known to be a member of the Wednesday Group, and it
would have been disadvantageous for Frelinghuysen to be so identified. The
conservatives would have attacked his liberal ties because of the outspoken
opposition of several Wednesday Group members to the Goldwater campaign.
Despite Frelinghuysen's late start, he came within seven votes of defeating
Laird, which proved, at least to the liberals' satisfaction, that they could be
serious contenders for leadership positions within the party.
By early 1965, several members of the Wednesday Group attempted to
hire a research staff person for the Wednesday Group to formulate position
papers for the members. Other members of the group believed that such an
activity might develop into an ideologically-divisive element within the Repub¬
lican party and this led to a dispute between the two factions. Those
favoring the hiring of the research person took it upon themselves to hire
their researcher from their own clerk-hire accounts. That person was Dr.
Douglas Bailey who was to play a major role in establishing the Wednesday
Group as the first Republican legislative faction with a research staff of its
own. Bailey's research activities eventually focused in two areas: short
critical papers which dealt with the Johnson Administration's programs, and
longer research papers which were often presented to the public through
major press conferences.
The hiring of Bailey in 1965 was considered divisive by many liberal
Republicans and not necessarily in the best interest of the party. However,
since the time of this hiring dispute, numerous ad hoc member coalitions
being formed on Capitol Hill found it necessary to hire their own staff per¬
sonnel. The staff was hired on a basis of a commonly-perceived need and
issues such as party loyalty were seldom raised.
The membership of the Wednesday Group expanded slowly. It grew
from 20 members in 1965, to 26 members by the end of 1967, and 28 mem¬
bers in 1970. This growth meant more members of Congress were being
contacted by the Wednesday Group and that the range of viewpoints pre¬
sented was slightly broader. From a practical viewpoint however, because
the Wednesday Group's staff was listed on House members' clerk-hire accounts,
it also meant that there was a greater potential base of support for the
salary of the research staff. Unlike the Republican Study Committee and
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the Democratic Study Group, the Wednesday Group adopted a policy to
expand its membership by invitation. The Wednesday Group decided in the
late 1960s that the group should not grow larger than about 30 members.
When additional vacancies occurred, candidates were considered by the group's
membership committee with the view toward broadening the geographic
base, and House committee base, while still assuming an ideological position
at the center or to the left within the Republican party.
The Wednesday Group also differed from other ideological groups
within the Congress because it had early problems with the funding of its
staff. Specifically, some of the members continued to view the Wednesday
Group as a discussion forum for members rather than as an organization to
promote an ideological position within the Republican party. Consequently,
the payroll support from the membership was erratic, and the payroll require¬
ments were not always met by congressional sources. Because of this short-
fail, the group established the Committee for Republican Research, largely
for the purpose of meeting Bailey's payroll. This newly established committee
raised several thousand dollars from outside individuals and from "Republicans
for Progress," an external organization which promoted the liberal wing of
the Republican party. The immediate financial crisis which arose in the
1965-66 period was met, and by 1967, an annual solicitation enclosing Wed¬
nesday Group research products which had appeared in the Congressional
Record was mailed. The Wednesday Group's financial resources have always
been limited, and until it began relying more heavily on clerk-hire contribu¬
tions in the early 1970s, employment by the Wednesday Group was somewhat
precarious, particularly since the organization ran deficits in both 1966 and
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The formation of the Republican party's official Republican Research
Committee in 1965 compelled Minority Leader Gerald Ford to request that
the Wednesday Group change the name for their outside funding committee
to avoid confusion. The Committee for Republican Research thereafter
became the Institute for Republican Studies.
The Wednesday Group has continued to meet over the years, usually
on Wednesday. Each member makes a brief statement on matters of con¬
cern, and the staff will occasionally present the results of research papers
78
which are compiled by an ad hoc task force of members. In recent years
these research areas have included Title IX Education Act Amendments,
racial discrimination, U.S.-Canadian relations, small business concerns,
congressional redistricting reform, and civil service reform. The Wednesday
Group's papers are usually longer and more detailed than those issued by
the Republican Study Committee. The topics dealt with in these papers
are those which are longer-range rather than those dealing with the day-
to-day legislative schedule. These long-range legislative objectives are
admittedly unrealistic. In the Wednesday Group's view, these objectives
provide jumping off points for further discussion rather than final legislative
solutions — appropriate concerns for an organization which has never viewed
itself as being a powerful force for affecting legislation on the House floor.
The Wednesday Group's primary means of communication has remained
the weekly member meetings. The group's former staff director, Patricia
Goldman, noted that the members of the Wednesday Group see the weekly
meetings as the most important part of the organization.^ In 1970, the
Wednesday Group began publication of a weekly legislative summary dis¬
cussing major points of forthcoming legislation for use by the members.^
Wednesday Group members tend to be involved in one or more of the
organization's projects. New projects are undertaken only if there is the
staff capability either from the regular staff of the Wednesday Group or
from the individual member staffs. According to Goldman, the Wednesday
Group would prefer to delve into a number of varied issue areas rather than
concentrate on two or three specific areas.^ This approach is counter to
the one followed by the legislatively-oriented factions which concentrate
their primary activities on a limited number of major issues rather than
scattering their attention among a larger number of issues.
The Wednesday Group has maintained a low profile similar to that of
their conservative Republican colleagues in the early stages of the Repub¬
lican Study Committee. Because the members of the Wednesday Group
considered their organization to be primarily a discussion group consisting
of members with a similar outlook, they did not see any advantage in
gathering publicity for the organization. Until recently, the Wednesday
Group's name did not even appear on the office door, and the telephone
was answered by the extension number rather than the organization's name.
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The Wednesday Group's legislative impact has been small, and its
impact on the House Republican party has been minimal. This was con¬
firmed by Professor Ripley who noted:
"The Club (sic) differs from the DSG in an important
sense: while the DSG represents a majority of the Democrats
and cooperates with the formal party leaders, the Wednesday
Club represents a relatively small minority of the Republicans
in the House and frequently disagrees with the Republican
leaders on a number of issues." '
In many ways it has functioned more as a social club for the minority of
Republicans who hold liberal viewpoints on the issues, and in this regard,
it is really closer to the SOS and the Chowder and Marching social groups
of House Republican members. The impact of the Wednesday Group should
then not only be measured in terms of its legislative record, but also in
terms of the social relationships which have been fostered by the contact
through the group.
By reinforcing the philosophical outlook of its members, who are in
the minority within the Republican party, the Wednesday Group provides a
comfortable haven for liberal congressmen. It has been the prototype Repub¬
lican ideological group, and it has helped to pave the way for the conserva¬
tive Republican Study Committee.
The Wednesday Group has also spawned a Senate counterpart organiza¬
tion, the Senate Wednesday Club. The Senate group, like the House, takes
no formal position on legislative matters but acts as a social or information-
sharing organization for its membership. Despite the liberals' minority posi¬
tion within the Republican party, there now exists a liberal Republican
organization in both Houses of the Congress, and the Wednesday Group is
largely responsible for this.
While both the Wednesday Group and the Republican Study Committee
are ideological factions within the Republican party, the Wednesday Group
differs from the RSC in a number of ways:
• The Wednesday Group considers itself a discussion group rather
than a legislatively-oriented faction. The RSC has taken the
opposite role as its primary mission.
• As a consequence of this, the Wednesday Group avoids publicity.
The RSC, on the other hand, attempts to attract as much pub¬
licity as possible.
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. The Wednesday Group's membership is from the ideological
minority within the Republican party. The RSC's conservatism
represents the dominant strand of thought within the party.
• The Wednesday Group's membership policy is exclusionary.
The RSC's membership policy is open.
There are, however, similarities between the two groups: both organizations
use a shared research staff, and both organizations have a formal counterpart
in the Senate. The Wednesday Group's counterpart is the Senate Wednesday
Club, and the RSC's Senate equivalent is the Senate Steering Committee.
The Democratic Research Organization
At the same time that the conservative Republican Study Committee
developed among the Republicans, a new group of conservative Democrats
was also organized. This organization evolved from the "Conservative
Coalition" dating back to the 1930s.^ The Southern Democrats or "Boll
Weevils" as they became known, had met since the end of World War II,^9
and then, in the late 1960s, references to a "Southern Caucus" led by Joe
Waggonner (D-Louisiana) and Jamie Whitten (D-Mississippi) began to appear
in the media. The Southern Caucus was concerned with the school desegre¬
gation issue and attempted to formalize the Southern conservative Democratic
House members in a formal organization.^ It was not until the early 1970s,
however, that conservative Democrats actually organized themselves in a
formal grouping around the leadership of Waggonner, a senior member of the
House Ways and Means Committee. In early 1972, the staffs of Waggoner,
Robert L.F. Sikes (D-Florida), David Satterfield (D-Virginia) and Republican
conservatives began meeting on an informal basis to consider issues of mutual
concern. The issues which brought them together included foreign policy and
domestic and social issues.^^
Until the Democratic Research Organization began its formal operations
on October 1, 1973, two staff aides, one in Waggonner's office and one in
Sikes' office, were contributed as members of the staff. In addition, Gray
Armistead, the administrative assistant to Satterfield, used his outside con¬
tacts with research organizations and business lobbyists to complete research
for the members. When the formal operations of the DRO began, an execu¬
tive director and one secretary were hired.
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In an interview with James Williams, policy analyst of the Democratic
Research Organization, it was noted:
"The DRO is out of the mainstream of Democratic party
thinking. It has the problem of being in opposition within the
majority party. This problem of being a minority within the
majority party also explains why the DRO is less aggressive in
pursuing issues than are the conservatives within the Republican
Study Committee."^2
The Democratic Research Organization began issuing research papers
in late 1973. These papers were written by Robert Pitner, the first staff
director; Williams, the DRO policy analyst; or outside experts, all of whom
contributed their time on a voluntary basis. Besides research papers, some
of the activities in which the Republican Study Committee and the Dem¬
ocratic Study Group had been routinely engaged were tried by the Democratic
Research Organization but without any success. Williams gave the example
of whip calls:
"Conservative Democrats resent whip calls from anyone,
and will not respond to the official Democratic Leadership whip
calls, let alone to an unofficial whip call to ask for support on
a particular amendment.
While the DRO was formally existent, its presence was not noticed in
the legislative process, and its impact was slight. A keen observer of the
Congress noted:
"In 1973 there was some discussion of reinvigorating the
southern conservative group by providing for regular meetings
and also by opening the meetings to conservative southern
Republicans, when numbers had grown considerably. But to
date [mid-1974] nothing has happened.
The DRO has chosen to maintain its formal structure. While it has an elected
Executive Committee, according to Williams, the Executive Committee "never
meets.The first DRO chairman, Joe Waggonner, was succeeded by David
Satterfield in February 1975. Satterfield served until October 1977 when he
was succeeded by Richard White (D-Texas).
According to Williams, the DRO's primary contribution to the legisla¬
tive process was the series of hearings which it held in 1976 and 1977 on
how the federal budget could be balanced.^ These hearings were called
by an ad hoc task force of the DRO headed by Richard Ichord (D-Missouri),
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and the staff aide for these hearings was Dr. Carl Knoller whose salary
was funded by Ichord. Among the witnesses which the ad hoc task force
called were former Treasury Secretary William Simon and various academic
economists. The hearings were transcribed and inserted in the Congressional
Record over a period of several months by Congressman Ichord. No legis¬
lation, however, was introduced on the basis of these hearings.
The DRO remained a loose organization throughout the period under
consideration without whip calls, formal meetings or legislative activities.
The staff has never grown beyond a total of four. It claims to have about
60 members within the Democratic party, some of whom admit they only
subscribe at the annual dues of $100 because of the publications which are
provided. The DRO is less formally structured than the RSC, and it has
had no noticeable direct impact on legislation during its formal existence.
The Senate Steering Committee
The beginnings of the Senate Steering Committee can be found in
two separate Senate staff groups. The first of these groups was the Con¬
servative Luncheon Club, a social organization which began meeting on a
monthly basis in the late 1960s to hear various conservative speakers. There
was no legislative business discussed or other action taken, and in most
respects, it was a social club rather than a substantive organization.^7 The
second organization was the Senate Whip Group. This group included key
staff aides from both Republican and Democratic Senate offices, as well as
a representative of the Republican Study Committee as liaison to the House.
Meetings of the Senate Whip Group began in mid-1973 on a weekly basis
when the Senate was in session.The core members of this organization
came from offices whose senators would later become active in the Senate
Steering Committee. These included staff aides of Senators James Allen
(D-Alabama), Dewey Bartlett (R-Oklahoma), James Buckley (R-Cons.-New
York), Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska), Bob Dole (R-Kansas), James McClure (R-
Idaho) and John Tower (R-Texas) and Vice President Spiro Agnew. The Whip
meetings dealt with the range of legislative issues of general interest to
conservative members of the Senate. In addition, the Republican Study
Committee reported to the Whip Group on House activities of specific
interest to the RSC membership.
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With the Whip Group in operation and with reguiar reports of the
RSC activity from the House side, two key Senate staff aides began dis¬
cussions with Ed Feuiner, the executive director of the Republican Study
Committee, regarding the formation of a comparable Senate group. These
two staff aides were Paul Weyrich, then special assistant to Carl Curtis
and Richard Thompson, administrative assistant to James McClure. Weyrich
was a long-time activist with both Curtis and Gordon Allott (R-Colorado).
Weyrich's particular area of expertise was mass transit on which he had
worked with Congressman Philip Crane (R-Illinois). It was while working on
this issue that he and the RSC's executive director became friends and
later worked together to establish the Republican Study Committee in the
House. Thompson had been the founder of the Senate Whip Group and had
worked with McClure in the House prior to McClure's election to the Senate
in 1972. After their meetings with Feuiner, Weyrich and Thompson talked
to their senators about the prospects of forming a group comparable to the
RSC in the Senate.
Thompson asked Weyrich to meet with Senator McClure on March 5,
1974. At that meeting, McClure asked Weyrich how the Republican Study
Committee had begun and why it had been effective in the House. Weyrich
answered a number of detailed questions about the new RSC, and he pointed
out the difficulties in funding such an organization on the Senate side.
Unlike the House, senators could not jointly hire the same individual. At
this meeting, Senator McClure suggested that a senior senator — such as
Carl Curtis — should take the lead in the formation of such a group, and
Weyrich reported this to Curtis. ' With Thompson and Weyrich working
closely together, a meeting was held on March 27, 1974, with Weyrich,
Thompson, Curtis and McClure in attendance.
The two staff aides had individually briefed their senators, and Weyrich
later recounted that the meeting "went like clockwork." McClure was
willing to organize the operation. But, because he was a junior member of
the Senate, it would be inappropriate for him to be the chairman of the
group. Curtis admitted he would like to be chairman, but someone should
be involved who was able to relate directly to the younger members. So,
Curtis and McClure appointed each other the chairman and vice chairman
respectively. They agreed to invite a number of other senators to a pri¬
vate luncheon in Senator Curtis' suite to tell them about the idea. The
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first members of the group were Senators Buckley, Cotton (R-New Hampshire),
Curtis, Dole, Dominick (R-Coiorado), Fannin (R-Arizona), Goldwater, Hansen
(R-Wyoming), Helms (North Carolina), Hruska (R-Nebraska), McClure, and
Thurmond (R-South Carolina). The original meetings took place during the
next several weeks and the first formal meeting was held on April 30, 1974.
At that meeting, Buckley, Cotton, Curtis, Fannin, Hansen, Helms, McClure
and Thurmond were present. The group adopted "Senate Steering Committee"
as its name in order to identify with the House Republican Steering Com¬
mittee and avoid identification with Republican in the hope that at least
one or two Democrats might occasionally participate in its activities. The
senators present agreed to meet on a weekly basis; elected Curtis as chair¬
man and McClure as vice chairman; and decided that the senators could
bring one staff aide to the regular weekly meetings.^ In addition, the
group "agreed not to publicize its formation, preferring to let people just
gradually find out it had been formed."^ This reticence was similar to
what the RSC had encountered among its members in the House.
Collaboration between the embryonic Senate Steering Committee and
the Republican Study Committee was close, as shown in a letter from
Senator McClure to the executive director of the RSC:
"It is my sincere hope that we in the Senate will one day
have a mechanism of our own for producing this kind of material
for our use [referring to a summary work on the Secondary Educa¬
tion Bill]. In the meantime, I hope you won't mind if Senate
Republicans take advantage of the splendid information coming out
of the House Steering (sic) Committee."^*
While a paper organization was created four days later, it was obviously
going to be some time before the Senate Steering Committee could play as
important a role as the Republican Study Committee played in the House.
At this point in time, the RSC already had a staff of 12 including 9 pro¬
fessionals, and had the ability to pool staff resources from different members.^
The Senate Steering Committee was publicized in conservative pub¬
lications beginning with a report in the June 3, 1974 Right Report which
commented on the formation of the organization and on the fact that:
"The birth of the Senate Steering Committee was un¬
doubtedly aided by the continuing success of the 70-member
Republican Steering (sic) Committee in the House presently
headed by Rep. LaMar Baker (R-Tenn.)."93
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This article was arranged by Weyrich who believed that the group should
be known to the public:
"There was nothing sinister about it, and once its exist-
tence was admitted the mystery, and hence, the news value
would disappear."94
The senators, on the other hand, had been apprehensive about unfavorable
media attention. Weyrich's analysis had been correct, no damaging stories
appeared.
Informal advice was also forthcoming from members of the Republican
Study Committee. Philip Crane, for example, wrote to McClure about the
characteristics of an executive director for a group such as the new Senate
Steering Committee. He cited the lesson that the Republican Study Com¬
mittee had learned: "we cannot fight every battle that comes along."95
He stressed the need for member involvement and direction but also indi¬
cated that the staff had to be given a free rein to carry out the directives
of the members. He went on to note:
"The Republican Steering (sic) Committee is no longer a
theoretical think tank, but rather the essential link between the
think tanks of our side, and the members and their individual
staffs who have to deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis."96
Curtis and McClure hired Tom Cantrell from the staff of Senator
Dewey Bartlett as the first executive director. The Senate Steering Com¬
mittee immediately became active in legislative battles on such subjects as
the Consumer Protection Agency, the Cargo Preference Act and other items
of legislative importance to the Senate in the remaining days of 1974. In
several of these legislative efforts, the Senate Steering Committee would
coordinate its activities closely with those of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee. This bicameral relationship was a new element in conservative
cooperative efforts.
Other Organizations
Other unofficial organizations of members of Congress may be multi-
or single-issue oriented. They are described at this point because they
indicate the wide-spread multiplication of ad hoc interest groups within the
structure of the House of Representatives.
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Members of Congress for Peace Through Law has 137 House and
Senate members and is funded partially by staff allowances through the
clerk-hire system and partially by outside contributions. Members of
Congress for Peace Through Law generally supports liberal foreign policy
positions on a broad range of subjects including foreign assistance, arms
control, defense spending, and general U.S. foreign policy issues.^7 A counter¬
part organization of conservatives which went through an embryonic stage
as the "National Security Research Group" has now been retitled "The Com¬
mittee for the Common Defense." This group is a bi-partisan organization
of conservatives and moderates who favor a strong national security policy.98
The only group in the Congress organized along racial lines is the
Congressional Black Caucus. This unofficial group consists of the entire
black membership of the House of Representatives, all of whom are from
the liberal wing of the Democratic party.99 On virtually every issue, the
Congressional Black Caucus membership votes with the liberal Democratic
bloc in the House. And, its early attempts at fact sheets and issue bul¬
letins were soon discarded because they duplicated the product of the DSG.
The Congressional Black Caucus has turned down membership applications
by non-blacks. 100 jiie primary role of the Congressional Black Caucus has
become that of a national voice on issues of concern to blacks. 101
The Environmental Study Conference is a single-issue organization
which began in 1975. It is bicameral and supported by both members' dues
and clerk-hire allocations by House members. The Environmental Study
Conference produces a weekly bulletin of environmental legislation, tracking
it from the introduction of bills through floor action. It also publishes fact
sheets with pro and con arguments on pending issues. 102
In 1973, a short-lived attempt was made to organize the moderate
Democrats in their own faction. A meeting was held under the leadership
of Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Oregon) to "organize a policy group of
those who represent the moderate position within the party." 103 According
to political analyst Kevin Phillips, the group included "a sizeable group of
Northern ethnic moderates." 1^ The group held several meetings, but dis¬
appeared within a year of its original meeting.
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The Congressional Rural Caucus consists of a single staff director and
secretary who are devoted to discussing rural development issues. The
organization is composed primarily of rural Democrats from the farm belt
of the Midwestern United States and the South, although several Republicans
who represent rural districts are members of it.
The Congressional Clearing House on the Future was the brainchild of
Congressman Charles Rose (D-North Carolina) and others. The CCHF was
an ad hoc organization interested in the longer-range issues which might
eventually demand the attention of the Congress. It has a staff of three.
Among other services, the Congressional Clearing House on the Future
annually holds a "futures fair" and has established a talent bank of volun¬
teers who might be available for meetings with members or comments on
legislation on a wide variety of social and foreign policy and economic
issues. 10-5
In addition, regional caucuses such as ones for the "Snow Belt," the
"Sun Belt," and another for the District of Columbia areas have been
established. These groups have a parochial purpose of interest to mem¬
bers from their particular geographic region.
The Steel Caucus is not bound to a particular ideology although its
membership tends to consist primarily of Democrats from steel-producing
districts. Its primary objective is to assist the U.S. domestic steel industry
by advocating higher tariffs for steel producers, easier pollution standards
for domestic steel producers, and tax benefits for the industry. Other
industry groups have been formed around major economic interests, for
example, the Textile Caucus, in the larger industries and the Mushroom
Caucus, in the smaller industries.
In addition, numerous special interest organizations have sprung up.
These include: the Blue Collar Caucus, the Port Caucus, the Irish Caucus,
the Congresswomen's Caucus, the Suburban Caucus, and the Vietnam-Era
Veterans Caucus". Some have only met once or twice, and are viewed as
advancing the political ambition of the chairmen rather than making an
impact on the legislative process. The minor special interest caucuses
are mentioned briefly at this point because of their potential implications
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on the structure of the House of Representatives, and because one or more
of them may become institutionalized factions within the House of Repre¬
sentatives. 107
I. Early Attempts at Organizing the Conservative Republicans
Conservatives by their nature are difficult to organize and coordinate
in the legislative arena. At least in the U.S. Congress, unlike their ideo¬
logical opposites, conservatives tend to resist both group activities of
Congress and pressure on them to conform to someone else's theory of
how to vote or what position to take on an issue.
Early informal groupings among the House Republicans centered on
social groups such as the Chowder and Marching Club (established in 1949),
SOS (established in 1953), ACORNS (established in 1957), and the Wednesday
Group (established in 1963). However, these organizations were primarily
social rather than ideological. Most conservatives in the 1960s had ample
opportunities to discuss pending issues with their colleagues on an informal
basis in the Congress.
Chowder and Marching, SOS and ACORNS tended to have substantial
membership from among the conservative members of the Republican party.
The Chowder and Marching group was probably the most elite of the three
because it included such members as Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Melvin
Laird and other members of the Republican establishment. SOS and ACORNS
are also elite groups of Republican members of the House. In all of these
cases, membership is by invitation; the meetings are informal, only the
members are present; staff resources are not available to be called upon;
meetings are held routinely in different offices; and no group legislative
action results from the meetings.
Because these groups did not include all of the Republican members
of the House, another group was established in the 1960s by Larry Winn
(R-Kansas). Known simply as the "Monday Luncheon Group," the members
routinely met in one of the private dining rooms in the Capitol on Mondays.
Attendance would range from 8 to 20 or more, and discussion would center
around the week's forthcoming legislative activities. There was no formal
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agenda, and members were congressmen who were not members of the
Chowder and Marching, SOS or the ACORNS.The membership of
the Monday Luncheon Group was flexible and often included other individuals
who might be invited on the spur of the moment by one of the regular
Winn participants. These ad hoc groups were by their nature more social
that* policy-oriented. With the Democratic Study Group leading the pro-
Johnson Administration forces in the House, and with the Republican mem¬
bers primarily united in opposition to the Democratic Administration/DSG
position, there was no need for an ideological organization of conservatives
since the formal Republican leadership played that role.
An additional constraint which a number of members expressed on regu¬
lar occasions over the years was their reluctance to commit staff funds
from "their" clerk hire allowance to the use of joint efforts by staff mem¬
bers on joint research projects. Without such resources, all of the major
groups including the DSG, DRO, Wednesday Group, the Congressional Black
Caucus and others, would be unable to function. The experience of borrowing
staff from members' individual offices had been unsatisfactory. 1 ^
Joint Republican and Democratic activities are usually traced back to
the Conservative Coalition. The Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House
of Representatives had its genesis in the anti-New Deal movement of the
1930s. Congressional Quarterly has recorded the Conservative Coalition's
voting impact for the last twenty years. Through the Nixon and Ford pres¬
idencies, it was present as a measurable factor on about 25% of the votes
in the House.HI But, the effectiveness of the coalition, and the formal
nature of the group has long been a subject of dispute:
"The basic reason behind the conflicting opinions on the
coalition is that the coalition is an informal organization which,
given its existence in the no-man's-land between the two major
parties, operates in subtle hard-to-observe ways."^ 2
The coalition was an effective but informal "group" of conservative members
of the House from both parties. But it had no organization, and, in fact,
denied the need for one:
"Sharing a common outlook on policy, they do not need an
elaborate organization to hold them together; as Joe Martin said,
the major task is finding issues on which they agree, and, once
this is accompiished, coalescence is to some extent automatic."113
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While an informal management without any structure might have been adequate
through the 1950s, the establishment of the DSG in 1959 provided a new
counterforce for the Conservative Coalition.
During the 1960s, several efforts were made at establishing coordinated
factions of conservatives in the House of Representatives. Occasional
or cdf-evup-b.
references appear in literature in the 1960s/to organize conservatives into
groups. Congressional observer Paul Weyrich noted that several attempts
were made to organize the conservatives in the House in the early 1960s:
"It was tried by Don Bruce (R-Indiana) in 1962-63, and by
John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) after the Goldwater loss in 1964. In
both cases they were unable to succeed because the leaders
pushing it were considered too hard right."! I**
Weyrich noted that these members were considered the most strident con¬
servatives among the House Republicans. Senator McClure added that the
"old timers (pre-1972 House and Senate Republicans) were pragmatic because
of the 1964 debacle."115 Later, an organization called "The Constitutional
Patriots" briefly appeared. This group led by Congressmen Durwood G. Hall
(R-Missouri) and Walter S. Baring (D-Nevada), consisted of conservative
members of both parties. When Congressional Quarterly inquired of Hall's
office about the organization, they were informed that the organization was
"defunct" and had not met for at least a year prior to the 1969 mention
of it.
Former Congressman Ben Blackburn, elected in 1966, summarized the
pre-Nixon situation as follows:
"The Republicans in the House united on an anti-Johnson plat¬
form and when then Minority Leader Jerry Ford would lead the
troops, he would get good support; but he didn't do it very often.
We Republicans found it easy to oppose the other guy's pro¬
grams and easier to unite in opposition to a program than in sup¬
port of a program."! 17
This unified opposition accounted for the lack of a formal organization of
conservative Republicans prior to the Nixon Administration.
In the early days of the Nixon Administration, attempts were made by
some senior members of the Republican establishment to keep the lines of
communication open among their colleagues in the House and the recently-
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elected Republican Administration. These attempts took the form of the
"Good Guys Dinner Group" headed by Sam Devine (R-Ohio). This group
was considered the direct forerunner of the more formalized Republican
Study Committee which was organized in 1973. Devine regularly invited
35-40 conservative members of the House to hear speakers such as
Vice President Agnew, Presidential Counselor Donald Rumsfeld, and other
Administration spokesmen. There was no legislative agenda discussed at
these meetings. They were seen as an opportunity for members to get
together and "reinforce their own spirits." The Administration also used
these meetings to gather support for its programs among what seemed a
logical constituency in the House. The dinner group served as an encour¬
agement to the members to meet together, albeit in an informal, unstruc¬
tured setting. The "Good Guys Dinner Group" ran concurrently for several
years with the Republican Study Committee, and many of the formal
members of the Republican Study Committee, including Devine, continued
their participation in the dinner group.
The success of the "Good Guys Dinner Group" can be attributed largely
to its informal nature and its chairman, Devine. Congressman Devine was
the vice chairman of the House Republican Conference and therefore, a
member of the Republican leadership. As chairman of the "Good Guys,"
Devine had considerable prestige not only with his conservative colleagues
in the House, but also with the leadership. When it came to substantial
issue questions, the Republicans with lesser seniority in the House had to
rely on these ad hoc resources, rather than the minority committee staff
or the Administration. Chapter V discusses several specific legislative cases
in this category.
J. Conclusion
As can be seen from this overview of specialized service agencies,
congressional staff resources, and ideological factions in the House of Repre¬
sentatives, not only were the conservative Republicans late in organizing,
but they also began without staff resources. The limitations which this
existing structure placed on the conservative Republican members of the
House can be summarized as follows:
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• The staff of the specialized poiicy agencies of the Congress
were not available to them.
• The Committee staff of the majority or minority party was
not of any practical assistance to them.
• Their personal staff was overworked in handling constituent
relations, and understaffed with regard to performing policy-
related functions on legislative issues.
• The official Republican party staff was basically responsive
to the leadership, not necessarily to the members. Particu¬
larly in situations where the leadership worked closely with
the Republican Administration, the official party could be at
odds with conservative Republican members.
Thus, there were no effective professional staff resources available to
conservative Republican members of the House. At the same time that
the independence of individual members from party structures was growing,
their availability to perform effectively in the policy arena was limited
by their lack of resources. The newer members among the House Repub¬
licans handled this situation differently from their senior colleagues. Charles
Mosher, a former senior Republican House member who later served as the
Chief of Staff of the House Committee on Science and Technology said:
"New members are much younger and better educated.
They're inclined to seek good advice and have the ability to
use it, skills that many older members haven't had."^^
The conservatives within the Republican party, through the early 1970s,
did not have research support to make an impact on the major public policy
issues. Although none of the formal service agencies had adequately pro¬
vided analytical resources to the conservative Republicans, and the com¬
mittee staff resources were not made available to these members, the lib¬
erals in both the majority party and within the Republican party, had organ¬
ized themselves into legislative factions. This time lag in organizing
conservative Republicans can be explained. The Conservative Coalition had
been a force into the 1960s. By the late 1960s, roles dramatically changed
with the Republicans having their man in the White House. When these
broad trends were combined with the natural disinclination of conservatives
to organize themselves, it was not surprising that the Republican Study Com-
93
mittee came into being only in 1973. By that time, other coalitions, such
as the Democratic Research Organization, were also being formed. It is
in this overall context that still another faction ~ the Republican Study
Committee — was formed. During this time, a myriad of groups was
organized. Some of these groups were transient, but others were perman¬
ent. Few, however, played a significant role in the legislative process.
The Republican Study Committee became both a permanent and significant
force in the legislative process.
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IV. CREATING A FACTION (1972-1974)
A. Introduction
The analysis in Chapter III of the staff resources available to conser¬
vative Republican House members shows the severe limitations under which
these members operated. Without access to the formal research facilities
of the Congress, the members had not developed any significant research
ability of a continuing nature. Chapter II explained the preliminary steps
which were taken in 1971-72 to bring conservative Republican House members
together for joint activities on specific issues like the Family Assistance
Plan and the Child Development Bill. These efforts were successful but
they did not occur through any formal mechanisms. The liberals in both
parties had their formal organizations, but the conservative Republicans
did not. The absence of such a group with appropriate staff resources to
specialize in particular issue areas was a noticeable deficiency. Several of
the members realized that specialization was one of the key ingredients to
waging a successful battle. As Stevens, Miller and Mann note:
"There is no argument among observers of Congress that
specialization is the defining characteristic of the manner in
which the House conducts its business.
Robinson goes even further in discussing the need for specific expertise:
"Effective and influential legislators who are successful in
obtaining passage of their bills are those who carve out for
themselves a particular subject on which they become expert.
While this refers to the positive process of passing legislation, similar rea¬
soning applies to the negative role of stopping bills. The conservatives
usually found themselves in this negative role. The members also realized
that their degree of specialization could only be increased with professional
staff resources. This was a major adjustment in the thinking of most
conservative members. Their perspective was similar to the one expressed
by former Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Oregon):
"When we formed the DSG in 1959, I only had four people
on my personal staff. They all worked on constituent relations.
We needed a research organization to provide us with information."-5
Thus, in her analysis, the DSG was established as a research aid to the
members. To either advocate positive proposals or defeat other initiatives,
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research specialization was required. The conservative Republicans had
none available to them.
John Rhodes (R-Arizona), the former Minority Leader in the House,
summarized the Republican problem when he said "The minority party has
no positive power. Its chief influence is negative.Whether negative or
positive, the House Republican conservatives had learned several lessons
from the Family Assistance Plan and Child Development Bill. They had
entered the legislative fray late; their staff research assistance was inad¬
equate; and no coordinating mechanism existed to provide an operations
base for their legislative activity.
The conservatives within the House functioned at a further disadvan¬
tage. The view of most senior Republican members was that the Nixon
Administration was advocating a conservative legislative agenda. Professor
Ripley states a common perception among House Republicans with regard
to staff resources:
"The Republican capture of the White House in 1969 had re¬
sulted in an increase of more sympathetic employees in the
executive branch for Republican congressmen to turn to, hence
their concern for minority staffing has lessened.
Congressman Edward Derwinski (R-IIlinois), an activist conservative Repub¬
lican, shared this view:
"A Republican Study Committee was not formed earlier because
we Republicans were united under (President Lyndon) Johnson,
largely tolerant during the first Nixon Administration, the Demo¬
crats had not yet been radicalized by McGovern, and Nixon was
just starting to take non-conservative positions."6
As a party loyalist, Derwinski was willing to give Nixon the benefit of the
doubt during his whole first term, despite the policy thrust of many of
Nixon's proposals. As Daniel Moynihan points out:
"When, as was inevitable, the record began to sink in, it
became clear to ideological conservatives that Nixon was not
going to be anything like the President they had hoped for."''
The Republican conservatives had been given short-shrift not only by the
Administration and by their own leadership, which "carried the Administra¬
tion's water to the Hill,"8 but also by the senior Republican members in
the House. A handful of them controlled the House Republican staff,
which made these resources unavailable for the less senior members in the
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party. This was a pattern which was to be repeated time after time.
Whether the battle was over a social issue — the Family Assistance Plan;
an economic issue — land use planning; or a national security issue — the
Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian chrome, the younger conservative members
within the House Republicans were frozen out of the minority's committee
staff resources. In effect, they had no research capability on which they
could rely.
The Democratic conservatives were in a declining state and not able
to offer any meaningful support to their Republican ideological colleagues.
The liberals were in the ascendanf :
"The power of the southern Democrats in the House and Senate
Democratic caucuses had been declining steadily for several years
....Further aggravating the southern Democratic decline, House lib¬
erals have become increasingly well organized (though still imper¬
fectly organized) through the Democratic Study Group."9
The answer to the quanc(ry was obvious to Philip M. Crane (R-Illinois).
The solution was to establish a faction among the House Republicans which
could do for the Republican conservatives what the Democratic Study Group
had done for the Democratic liberals. How the group was established is
described and analyzed in this chapter.
B. Preliminary Meetings
By late 1972, a small group of conservative Republican House members
was working together on issues such as welfare reform, and the child develop¬
ment bill. However, there was no institutional arrangement at the member
level to work in concert to achieve common objectives. At the staff level,
this was beginning to happen through groups such as the Conservative
Luncheon Club^ and the House Whip Group.
The House Whip Group was an informal gathering of staff aides from
Republican offices who shared a conservative perspective on legislation and
who realized that concerted action on specific legislation would more likely
lead to success than would their independent activities. The first meeting
of the House Whip Group was held in late 1971. By mid-1972, the meetings
were being held bi-weekly with legislative reports being offered by staff
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aides from different member offices. The key staff aides worked for
Philip Crane (R-Illinois), 3ohn Ashbrook (R-Ohio), Floyd Spence (R-South
Carolina) and Ross Adair (R-Indiana). The group also included the offices
of Senators Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina), Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska)
and Gordon Allott (R-Coiorado). At the second meeting, it was decided to
regularize the sessions and Fred Smith, the administrative assistant to
Ross Adair, was appointed the chairman. Smith's background was in national
security affairs, and his member was a senior Republican on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee.^ Among items which were frequently discussed
were Nixon's detente policy, including trading with the Soviet Union; the
situation in Vietnam and Southeast Asia; and the Administration's policy
toward Rhodesia.^
At the member level, legislative activity was initiated on an individual
basis. One of the most involved members was Philip Crane. Crane bridged
the gap between the younger newly-elected members of the class of 1970
on the one hand, and the more senior members. Additionally, Crane's role
as a member of the board of the American Conservative Union, combined
with his academic background, set him apart from his colleagues, most of
whom had come from the legal world. Crane's academic discipline had
been history. In 1962, he wrote a book entitled The Democrat's Dilemma.^
In it, Crane recounted the story of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the growth
of the Fabian Society and its American collateral organization, the League
for Industrial Democracy. His understanding of ideas and how they made
an eventual impact on the public policy scene — whether in Britain or the
United States — provided an unique perspective for a newly-elected member
of the House of Representatives.^
Crane reflected later that a conservative organization could not be
formed in the House without an unique combination of ingredients.^ It
required several activist younger members of the House, several senior
members with stature on the floor, and a staff capability to conduct
independent research. While there were a number of conservative House
members who could be catalysts, the right combination of ingredients had
not yet been put together.
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Red Fox I
In May 1971, Crane discussed his ideas with two key staff aides — Ed
Feulner, his administrative assistant, and Paul Weyrich of Senator Ailott's
staff. They agreed to meet for two days away from the Washington milieu
where the problems of organizing conservatives in the Congress could be
discussed and analyzed candidly. Among those invited to the meeting were
several senior staff aides on the Hill, the executive director of the Amer¬
ican Conservative Union, and several businessmen who had been political
supporters of Crane. The gathering was called the "Red Fox" meeting
because it was held at the Red Fox Inn in Middleburg, Virginia in July 1971.
Weyrich and Feulner drew up a carefully-constructed agenda for the
meeting. It included discussions of legislative issues, electoral politics, and
the structure of the House. The political discussion was led by Weyrich.
He advanced the argument that conservatives should concentrate their House
political activities not just on electing a large number of new conservatives,
but also on electing a handful of key Republican conservatives who would be
activist leaders in legislative issues once they came to Washington. This
became his concept of "Five and Thirty." Weyrich believed that five activist,
articulate leaders could be as valuable an addition to the conservative forces
as thirty more votes because these leaders could help set the legislative
agenda and could shift the focus of debate toward the conservative side of
the argument. Additionally, if the right five individuals were elected,
eventually they could move into positions of prominence in the formal
Republican structure. This would ensure that the party's leadership positions
were held by members with a conservative philosophical commitment.
Additionally, it would serve as a catalyst in the party structure toward pro¬
viding an alternative to the Democratic majority in the House. In effect,
Weyrich was unknowingly elaborating upon Randall Ripley's distinction between
passive and aggressive members of Congress: Passive members are interested
only in the work of their committee, while the aggressive member has inter¬
ests beyond his committee and is not willing to compromise on those issues
about which he feels strongly.^
If the group could agree on the "Five and Thirty" concept, it would
also provide opportunities for targeting staff and financial resources to key
districts by the conservative activists in the Congress and at the staff
level. Identification of the key electoral races would not be difficult.
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With the counsel of current members of the House and Senate, the candi¬
dates couid be pinpointed by the Red Fox group. This did not mean that
the Red Fox participants would involve themselves in the Republican pri¬
maries. Rather, it meant that the group would choose from among the
Republican candidates to direct their support more precisely. If the bus¬
iness representatives who were present could target their own financial
contributions and those of their friends to these key races, the pattern of
aid would be complemented. Their financial resources were not great but
even modest additional contributions frequently were of considerable signif¬
icance. Carrying the argument to its conclusion, Weyrich noted that newly-
elected members who had been assisted by the Red Fox group would feel
an obligation to participate in conservative activities after they came to
Washington. In effect, this plan could help tie the newly-elected members
into future conservative activities in the House. Weyrich's plan was dis¬
cussed in detail. The staff aides pointed out the impact which Crane had
already made because of his activist leadership. The dream of increasing
that effectiveness was an exhilarating one. The Red Fox group agreed to
this concept as a target for their 1972 election activities.
Among the key seats which were targeted for the 1972 general elec¬
tions was that of Trent Lott of Mississippi. Lott had been a member of
the Conservative Luncheon Group when he served as administrative assistant
to Congressman William Colmer (D-Mississippi). Colmer, a long-time
Democrat, had been the chairman of the House Rules Committee. When
Colmer announced his retirement, Crane urged Lott to run as a Democrat.
Lott chose the hard road and decided to run as a Republican from the
Fifth District of Mississippi. He was elected to succeed Colmer in 1972.
The second key seat was Steve Symms. Symms was an articulate libertar¬
ian^ who ran a successful family business in the agricultural area of Idaho.
The third member of the group was Bob Huber. Huber came to Washington
with a successful small business background and a willingness to stand up
in the Michigan State Legislature against both the Democratic majority, and
the liberal bloc in the Michigan Republican party. John Conlan of Arizona
also came to the Congress via the state legislature where he was known as
an articulate conservative.. The fifth candidate was Harold Froehlich of
Wisconsin who was a State Representative attempting to succeed the
retiring John Byrnes who had been the senior Republican on the House Ways
and Means Committee. David Treen had served as the Republican State
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Party Chairman in Louisiana and had been identified as an articulate con¬
servative spokesman. Treen was the sixth potential conservative leader in
this category.
Weyrich's Five and Thirty concept was more than a grandiose scheme.
Weyrich and several other staff aides ran an organization called the "Com¬
mittee of Nine" which had been established by several U.S. senators to help
elect non-incumbent Republican challengers. These tended to be conserva¬
tive candidates primarily from western states, although James Buckley
(R-Cons.-New York) was also assisted by the Committee of Nine. Because
Weyrich was the committee's volunteer staff head, he could also provide
research assistance to Republican challengers in key House races. The
staff of the Committee of Nine consisted of volunteers from congressional
offices and conservative groups in Washington. The organization maintained
regular duty rosters and office hours during the period from early Septem¬
ber to the general election in November 1972. During this time contact
was maintained with the campaign headquarters of candidates who were
contesting key target races. Information on issues and vote ratings were
provided, speakers from among the incumbent members were contacted,
and a close liaison was established between these campaigns and this group
of Washington staff aides.^ Thus, in these targeted districts, a network
of assistance was available to help the candidates in their election bids.
Regarding issues, the Red Fox participants discussed welfare reform,
child development, legal services and several national security questions.
On all of those issues, the Nixon Administration had adopted non-conser¬
vative positions. As Crane noted at the time, "We get all the rhetoric and
Jake Javits gets all the action."^ Or as William Safire, the noted political
commentator, told Daniel Moynihan regarding the Family Assistance Plan,
"You miss Richard Nixon's main point, which is to make a radical proposal
on
seem conservative.
Feulner and Harold Eberle, a long-time Capitol Hill staff aide, dis¬
cussed House structure. The Democratic Study Group was examined in
detail. Its important roie within the Democratic party was elaborated.
The Red Fox participants decided that it provided a good pattern for a
possible conservative group within the House to follow. The cases of
welfare reform and child development were discussed, as were the short-
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comings of the conservatives' reactive strategy.
The Red Fox group wanted to build on the existing organization within
Washington. Thus, it was decided that the House Whip Group meetings
should be given a more formal role. Assignments should be made to share
research projects, and members should be encouraged by their staff aides
«*»•
to take more active roles on questions like detente, SALT (I) and Vietnam.
Recounting the history of the Conservative Luncheon Club, dim Lucier
of the staff of Senator Strom Thurmond noted that it had begun to function
as a bi-partisan senate staff social gathering in the late 1960s. In 1971,
Weyrich and Eli Howell from the staff of Senator James B. Allen (D-
Alabama) and Lucier became active in it. They supplemented the guest
speakers' remarks with reports on pending legislation for "the good of the
order." These issue-type reports were frequently planned ahead so as to
elicit a positive response from other participants. This involvement could
be to ask their members to co-sponsor bills, to volunteer for the Committee
of Nine, or to otherwise become more active in conservative activities on
Capitol Hill.21
The Red Fox meeting provided the opportunity to draw up the strategic
framework to organize the conservatives on Capitol Hill. However, it was
only effective because it could utilize the skeletal organizations which were
already in place. These were the Conservative Luncheon Club, the House
Whip Group, and the Committee of Nine. In a rudimentary way, they
brought the electoral politics, the issue concerns, and staff aides from both
the House and the Senate together.
Conference with New Members Following the 1972 Elections
One of the results of the Red Fox meeting was the decision to hold
another meeting shortly after the November election with the prospective
conservative leaders from the new class of Republican Representatives.
This "Red Fox II" meeting was scheduled for early December, 1972. The
objective of the meeting was to meet with these newly-elected members
and give them a conservative perspective on the operations of the House.
Orientation programs for newly-elected Members of Congress are an estab¬
lished tradition. In 1959, 1963, and 1965 they were conducted on a bi¬
partisan basis in cooperation with the American Political Science Association.22
102
Since 1966 however, the Republican leadership had conducted its own meeting
to orientate the newly-elected members. The Red Fox meeting would supple¬
ment this official orientation program. It would give the newly-elected
members a conservative rather than a Republican perspective and, hopefully,
convince them of the value of conservative activities outside of the formal
party structure.
1972 was a good year for House Republican candidates. Forty-three
Republican House members were elected and thirty of them were conserva¬
tives. In addition, all six of the projected conservative leaders were elected.
Crane's staff prepared invitations to Red Fox II to Representatives-elect
Steve Symms (R-Idaho), Hal Froehlich (R-Wisconsin), Bob Huber (R-Michigan),
Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), David Treen (R-Louisiana), and John Conlan (R-
Arizona). The other newly-elected conservative Republicans were not invited
because the group had a limit on its optimal size, and because those who
were invited had worked most closely with Red Fox personnel through the
Committee of Nine. Crane explained the idea of Red Fox II to several of
his colleagues and they expressed their willingness to participate in the
event. Thus, the invitations were signed by Blackburn, Crane, Derwinski and
Rousselot. Fourteen House and Senate staff aides were invited, as well as
Tom Winter, the editor of Human Events, and Larry Pratt, the director of
the American Conservative Union.^ All except Treen accepted; he apol¬
ogized for his inability to attend because of a scheduling conflict. Pratt's
participation was particularly important because his organization had financially
supported these candidates in their election races. He reinforced the Crane
group's invitation by personally urging ail of the members-elect to participate.
The one and a half day conference included a discussion, chaired by
Ben Blackburn, on the legislative agenda for the new Congress with indiv¬
idual presentations by staff aides on foreign policy and defense, domestic
and economic issues. An entire session was devoted to the nuts and bolts
of office organization so as to assist the newly-elected freshmen in estab¬
lishing the most efficient office operation as quickly as possible.
The agenda also included a session on electoral politics and the
political outlook. Kevin Phillips, the conservative political commentator,
made this presentation. He was very cautious in his presentation, urging
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the newly-elected members to use the advantages of incumbency to help
establish their base. He pointed to the historical pattern of congressional
losses to the President's party during the mid-term elections and cautioned
them on being overconfident. At this time Watergate was still only a
minor nuisance to the White House and was not perceived to be a subject
that would affect the House Republicans in 1974.
During the issue discussion session, the group reviewed a number of
issues. They came to the basic conclusion that "anything that cuts the
revenue off from Washington is good,"^ and that a comprehensive tax
reform package ought to be proposed by conservatives. The staff aides
present at the meeting agreed to work on this project with some of their
academic contacts. This was important because it showed the new members
that these aides had resources which could be called on to implement their
legislative agenda. As a direct result of that discussion, the staff aides
prepared a letter signed by Crane to be sent to twenty-three academic econ¬
omists indicating that:
"A number of conservative Members in the House of Repre¬
sentatives are planning on introducing a comprehensive tax reform
package in early 1973. The package would, we hope, redirect the
tax reform question toward our point of view."^
On the basis of the Red Fox meeting, Crane took the initiative in speaking
for a group which was not yet formed. The names of the economists were
assembled by the staff aides and by Crane. Crane had been a history professor
at Bradley and Indiana Universities. He was interested in involving academics
in the legislative process, while at the same time showing the other members,
both senior and newly-elected, the value of building contacts of this type.
The discussion on issues also gave those new members in attendance an
opportunity to get ahead of their colleagues who were not included in the
Red Fox group.
Other results of Red Fox II included the leadership roles which
John Conlan, Steve Symms, Bob Huber and Trent Lott were to play later.
Within a month of Red Fox II, Conlan was elected President of his class
of freshmen Republicans. Conlan was an aggressive individual who did not
hesitate to request support for himself for this position. While the role of
class president was largely honorary, it was Conlan's ability to call on his
early Red Fox contacts for support that elected him. Lott, Huber and
Symms were all to be elected to the Executive Committee of the newly-
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formed Republican Study Committee at the first regular election in 1974.
Follow-on Meetings
At Red Fox, Blackburn, Crane and Rousselot encouraged the freshmen
to become involved in the conservative activities which were taking place
in the House. They recounted conservative legislative activities dealing with
the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill. The impression
Crane and Rousselot tried to convey to the new members was that the con¬
servatives were already organized into an ad hoc, coalition. Then, in private
discussions, Crane convinced his senior colleagues—Blackburn and Derwinski—
that they had to take the lead to channel the activities of these new mem¬
bers into a useful direction. Crane argued that they would be organized
and that the more senior members should be the leaders rather than letting
the freshmen form their own group. The newly-elected members who
attended the Red Fox II meeting were the ones who had been targeted at
Red Fox I for special campaign help. Additionally, the senior members who
were involved in Red Fox II were the ones who would be playing key roles
in the formation of the Republican Study Committee.
Shortly after their return to Washington, Derwinski agreed to Crane's
suggestion to host a series of meetings in his office to encourage the mem¬
bers to participate in a new conservative group in the House. It was impor¬
tant that Derwinski host the meetings because his seniority would give the
sessions automatic credibility. Additionally, his office had been the meeting
site for members who discussed the conservative response to President Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill. Furthermore, mem¬
bers considered Derwinski a sharp political spokesman who was an effective
legislative tactician on the House floor. It must be remembered that the
conservative Republican members of the House had not previously engaged
in any formal ideological organizations. Therefore, the group could not be
perceived to be strident, or to be working at odds with the House Repub¬
lican leadership.
Five of these meetings were held over the next six weeks. The in¬
vitation list was carefully designed to include some senior and some junior
members. In addition, Crane, Blackburn, Rousselot and Barry Goldwater, 3r.
(R-California) attended each of these sessions as did several key staff aides.
These meetings were designed to involve more members in a formal alliance
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on the major issues. Derwinski made the political case at a meeting when
he said:
"As Republican House Members, we have set our own indepen¬
dent course. After all, I can even imagine circumstances under
which Spiro Agnew will not be our Presidential in 1976." ^
Crane recounted conservative activities in welfare reform and child develop¬
ment. Blackburn talked about the Legal Services battle. Barry Goldwater, Jr.
mentioned the Democratic Study Group, which happened to be located across
the hall from his office. He would graphically describe the arrivals and
departures of their many staff members, and the range of publications they
were producing for the liberals in the Democratic party.
The senior members projected a low profile image to the new members.
They stated that the purpose of the group was to provide research capabil¬
ities in specific areas of common concern. The group would not be too
formal, and certainly did not have any intention of usurping the leadership's
prerogatives. While the minority leadership did not exercise a great deal
of authority, the newly-elected members were dependent on it for their
committee assignments and certain other dispensations of patronage.
At the meetings, the members were asked to make voluntary staff
contributions to a common pool of legislative talent to develop constructive
initiatives. Crane made the first commitment to share his administrative
assistant to coordinate the activities and to provide the full payroll support
for a secretary for the group. Other early financial commitments were
received from Congressmen Blackburn, Clawson, Collier (R-Illinois), Derwinski,
Goidwater and Rousselot. Commitments from the freshmen were received
from Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland), Huber, Lott and Symms. Their commit¬
ment usually took the form of a block of time from a legislative staff
aide already working for a member. Acting under the direction of
Edwin Feulner, Crane's administrative assistant, part-time contributed staff
personnel were recruited in energy, economic policy, foreign affairs, the
federal budget, housing, trade and social issues.
Derwinski became the chairman of the embryonic group, although no
formal election was held. The selection took place in an informal manner.
At one of the meetings, Crane said, "We need a chairman," to which
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JODel Clawson replied "Obviously, it should be you, Ed," referring to
Congressman Derwinski. Derwinski remained chairman until late October
1973 when he indicated that the chairmanship ought to be rotated among other
members. Then he and Crane met with Del Clawson to ask him to be
chairman. At this time, the job primarily involved raising funds for payroll,
maintaining oversight on the staff, and keeping the membership informed of
the staff's activities. Clawson served as chairman for a brief period from
October 1973 through the first formal general meeting in February 1974.
Thus, the Republican Study Committee, was launched with a minimum of
specific structure, personnel or goals.
C. Conflicting Views of the role of the Republican Study Committee
Because of the nebulous form, which the early meetings took, different
members expected different results from the embryonic group. Some wanted
it as a supplementary information source for forthcoming floor activities,
others anticipated that it would be an in-house "think tank" for conservative
ideas, a third group wanted it to replace committee staff to which they did
not have access, and a final group viewed it as an adjunct to their personal
staff. These different perceptions of the role for the organization placed
a great burden on the staff and it became clear that not ail of the mem¬
bers could be satisfied. Still, as Michael Malbin notes, "Congress can be
changed only if Members think their individual political needs are not being
ignored in the process.The delicate balancing of these needs occupied the
attention of the executive director, the chairman, and the active members.
These conflicting views revolved around the different perceptions of
the shared staff and how it would be used by the group. The literature on
congressional staffs has grown substantially in recent years. Along with
the growth of the literature, there has been a growth in the number of
theories about the function of staff, its relation to members, and its impact
on the institution of the Congress.
The traditional justification for staff has been analyzed by author
Allen Schick:
"Staff brings independence. Access to staff enables a member
to participate more independently in committee and on the floor. A
member might campaign for more staff of his own in order to free
himself from a committee staff beholden to the chairman or to ex¬
pand his legislative range beyond his committee assignments."30
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However, there is a negative argument against increased congressional staff.
Political analyst John Walsh sees it largely as a matter of control:
"Increased staff numbers mean the staffer has a less direct and
personal relationship with his boss than in the past. Those hired
because of their professional credentials have been trained to have
confidence in their expertise and to assume responsibility. And in
doing what they see as their jobs, they are more likely to cross
the line and infringe on the legislator's domain than staff members
of the past, who were acutely mindful of their patronage status."^*
The traditional role of staff, as stated by Professors Salisbury and
Shepsle — "ties than bind mean staffers stay or leave with their member"-^ —
has become less true as the congressional staff has become increasingly pro¬
fessionalized. This professionalization has resulted from the increased number
of staff aides dealing with legislative issues as distinguished from those
dealing with constituent-related concerns. For example, political scientist
Stephen Frantzich says that:
"Congressmen desiring to improve their electoral futures would
be well advised to stay away from legislative activity and pursue
other behavior patterns that constituents will reward.
This was a concern of many of the Republican Study Committee members,
but the role of the staff and of the leadership of the committee was to
involve as many members as possible in the activities of the RSC, which
were geared to legislative activities.
The members and the key staff aides shared a view that the RSC had
to have its own professional staff. As Paul Weyrich noted, "If the members
hadn't had a staff at the RSC to do things, they wouldn't have been done."-^
Another issue was the concern which was expressed by those who
worried about the organization having "high visibility." As Congressman
Ed Derwinski noted:
"The senior Members were worried about what the leadership
would think, the freshmen were worried about what the senior
Members in their state delegation would think, and everybody
was worried about how the press would label the operation."^-3
The first mailings of the group were made in anonymous orange enve¬
lopes with only the Derwinski frank^ appearing on the outside of the enve¬
lope. The orange envelope was used to indicate to the congressman's staff
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that the material was "time urgent" and was to be delivered immediately
to him without being opened by the staff. As the group developed self-
confidence, by late 1973, the orange envelopes were discarded and the staff
of the members was encouraged to participate in RSC activities.
An area of concern which receded in time was the reaction of the
minority leadership. While the embryonic RSC was not consciously trying
to antagonize it, the RSC was not particularly concerned about it either.
The leadership actually holds little power over the party members in the
House. David R. Mayhew, one of the most astute observers of Congress,
notes that the role of the party leadership in terms of "vote whipping" is
limited:
"Party leaders are chosen not to be program salesmen or vote
mobilizers, but to be brokers, favor-doers, agenda-setters, and pro¬
tectors of established institutional routines."^'
Of course, an RSC could upset the perceived balance of the institutional
routine. Additionally, there would be favors which the members would ask
from the leadership for themselves or for the group at various times. For
these reasons, the RSC moved with care, while not being overly concerned
about possible retribution from the minority leadership.
Some members used the RSC staff as an extension of their own staff
to perform minor projects such as answering constituent correspondence which
their own staff could not handle. At the same time, the executive director
and the active members had established a major legislative agenda for the
staff to work on. The 1973 legislative efforts centered on the Legal Services
Corporation, the private ownership of gold, and efforts to avoid a federal
land use act. The agenda represented a consensus covering specific pending
bills of particular interest to the members. It changed from meeting to
meeting, although these were the primary long-range issues. Despite this heavy
agenda, many random requests for information were received. A case which
Daphne Miller, the Legislative Counsel of the Republican Study Committee,
has cited was an_ inquiry from a staff aide in a member office asking "What
is the population of mainland China?" Miller said she would be back with an
answer within two minutes, after she consulted with the RSC China expert.
By checking an almanac in the RSC office, she was able to determine the
best estimate of China's population and call the office back with that informa¬
tion.-^ Of course, not all requests were handled that easily, but many staff
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aides were not acquainted with either the research capabilities available to
them elsewhere, or how to use the most basic research tools which were
available in their own office. These nuisance requests were diversions from
the important policy work of the staff. Yet, the staff was constantly aware
of the source of their payroll support, and the conclusion that they had to
be helpful whenever possible.
Most of the members involved in the RSC at this time believed it
had an ideological role to play relating to major issues. The activities of
the Democratic Study Group were monitored so that if the DSG was actively
interested in a bill, the members knew the RSC should be interested in it.
Crane and a few others were convinced that concentration on several specific
projects would be the best route to follow. The staff resources were limited,
the party's committee staff dealt with many issues in a manner which was
satisfactory for the majority of the RSC members, and other bills were non-
controversial, and hence of no ideological importance. However, the need
for concentrated resources was based more on the successful Family Assistance
Plan experience, than on a conscious decision to employ the committee's staff
resources in the most efficient manner. As Waiter Dean Burnham said in 1970:
"Intense and focused minorities with well-defined interests
exert influence on legislation and administrative rule-making
out of all proportion to their size."-^
The exercise of influence was the goal for the conservative coalition to work
toward.
The legislative issues were readily agreed upon. Again, the RSC found
itself in a similar position to its older ideological rival, the Democratic Study
Group:
"On substantive issues, either the DSG position is 'obvious'
(e.g., civil rights), necessitating no formal decision before action
is begun, or the issue is sensitive enough to divide DSG opinion
(e.g., funding the supersonic transport aircraft). Hence, generally
no formal DSG positions on legislation are taken.
At the same time, however, the role of constituent service was demanding
still more attention from the staff.The reconciliation of these roles using
the limited staff resources of the Republican Study Committee was a balancing
act for the executive director and the staff members.
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D. Early Organizational Issues Concerning the Republican Study Committee
The success of the Republican Study Committee depended to a large
extent on the interest and good will of a key group of people. The small
group of involved members of the RSC had to support the staff and to
give it direction. Simultaneously, the staff had to produce effective re¬
search projects and non-duplicative services for the members. Trust and
confidence in the Republican Study Committee staff had to be established.
Harrison Fox and Susan Hammond have written a major work on congres¬
sional staffs.As Fox and Hammond stated:
"Channels of information are developed primarily through
informal contacts, facilitated in some instances by existing
groups such as staff aides of the Democratic Study Group
(DSG), members or AAs (Administrative Assistants) of a state
delegation. But exchange of information that extends to
strategy, content, and mutual accomodation, appears to occur
only after an investment of trust on both sides and some
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experience.
As they rightly state, trust must be built on the basis of experience. Walsh
states:
"The buildup of staff may compensate in some degree for
legislators' lack of experience, but a troubling corollary is that
staff, in the process, may exercise undue influence."
Since the conservative Republicans traditionally had been less inclined to
use research or legislative staff than their liberal colleagues, their sus¬
picion — or at least caution — regarding the use of staff was even greater.
Thus, a situation similar to the one in the Senate Small Business Committee,
which Michael Malbin outlines in his book, would not be likely to be replicated
by a group of conservative Republicans. Malbin recounts how Senator Nelson
became the chairman of this committee and placed a trusted aide from his
personal staff in the position of staff director. This aide then "played a
pivotal role in the transmission belt on the committee.Since the Repub¬
lican Study Committee was a new venture for everyone, all were learning,
and the interaction of these key members and staff aides would determine
the success or failure of the new organization.
These questions became delicate issues in inter-personal relationships
among the participants in the Republican Study Committee. The evolution of
an effective working relationship between the RSC staff and the members was
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a difficult process. It included compromises and changes in its basic
structure before it finally developed along an effective pattern. Aspects
of this developmental process are discussed in the following sections of
this chapter.
Efforts with "Contributed Staff" versus "Shared Staff"
A staff capability was the sine quo non for the Republican Study Com¬
mittee. Without it, the organization would be just another member discus¬
sion group without any discernible impact on the legislative process. This
lesson was learned from the Child Development Bill and the fight against
the Nixon Family Assistance Plan. Thus, the role of its staff would deter¬
mine the ultimate effectiveness of the Republican Study Committee.
The initial idea advanced by Derwinski and several other senior mem¬
bers was that staff expertise should be shared among the members. With
this plan, under the ideal circumstances, one member's staff expert on
foreign policy would contribute his policy papers to the group effort. Those
papers would be distributed to the entire group. Other members who had
need for work in foreign policy would be able to call on Derwinski's staff
for assistance with the understanding that Derwinski could call on their
person for expertise in banking, agriculture or other matters. While the
theory sounded good, this arrangement of "contributed staff" did not work
with the R5C. There were several reasons for this. Some of the staff
aides who were enthusiastic about committing time to the joint effort were
overworked. Others had conflicting duties between their member and the
RSC. When these conflicts arose, the staff aide inevitably would first meet
the member's needs. The staff aide worked in the member's personal office
and was paid by him. In most cases, the staff aide reported to the admin¬
istrative assistant in the member's office rather than to the director of the
RSC. As Paul Weyrich said, "If the Member of Congress felt it was 'his'
person rather than the 'group's' person, he would load the person with 'his'
work."^ Even if the member didn't do this as a matter of policy, as
John Rousselot said, "The time-shared guy didn't work because he would always
choose the member over the Study Committee." Therefore, the executive
director did not have effective control over "his" staff. Within several months,
it became clear that the "contributed staff" concept did not provide sufficient
staff resources for the RSC's staff to perform the tasks which the members
expected from it.
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The next stage in the staff development process was suggested by
John Rousselot. It was that members contribute their staff aide on a
half-time basis to the RSC. That is, they would work 20 hours a week
for the member and 20 hours a week for the RSC. The RSC time would
be assigned by the RSC's executive director who would oversee the projects
and assure that they were completed on time. After a trial period, it
was learned that this alternative did not work either because the staff aides
still worked out of the members' offices where they were under the constant
scrutiny and pressure of the member's staff. In several cases, the members
were becoming disturbed because it seemed whenever they needed the
services of their staff aide, his reply was that he was "working on an RSC
project." At the same time, the RSC executive director was frustrated
because when he asked for his product for the RSC, he was advised, "I'm
sorry, I'm working for Congressman Smith."
The third and final step in the evolution of the staff assignment sys¬
tem came when Derwinski, Crane, Symms, Clawson and the other active
members asked their colleagues to contribute funds to support staff aides
in specific research areas. In this system, two, three or more members
would be asked to support a research assistant in social issues, economic
issues, national security problems, or another issues area. Or, salary support
for secretarial help was solicited from those members who were concerned
about the possibility of research aides not under their direct control. Under
this plan, the individual staff member would be on the payroll of the group
of members, but would report directly to the executive director of the RSC.
He would be housed in the RSC office, and his duties would be assigned by
the RSC. Thus, an individual working on land use might be paid by three
or four members who were not particularly interested in that subject. Instead,
these members might be working closely with a staff expert on energy issues
for whom they were not supplying any direct support. The evolution of the
entire staff from contributed to shared status took almost a year. It was
not until the fall of 1973 that the entire RSC staff was available on a full-
time basis to the RSC executive director rather than being shared with
member offices.
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With its own professionai staff in piace after September i973, the
RSC was abie to provide real assistance to its members. By their contribu¬
tions to the staff, the members expanded their own capabilities without
adding new research aides to their personal staffs. In addition to working
in their own issue areas, the RSC staff had a specific charge to develop
close links with academic experts, lobbyists with issue expertise and con¬
servative Capitol Hill aides in member offices. As Michael Malbin noted:
"The advantage of a good staff is not in coming up with new
proposals, but in expanding the pool of resources upon which
Congress draws. °
The RSC staff tried to perform both roles. That is, both drawing on out¬
side resources and coming up with their own new proposals.
Additionally, the RSC staff took the place of committee staff in sev¬
eral cases like the Atlantic Union Resolution, energy legislation, and the land
use bill. As Congressman Derwinski pointed out, it was impractical even
for senior members like him to utilize the congressional committee staff:
"Formal committee staff are inherited from your predeces¬
sors. They are inward looking toward their own committee.
In many cases, they are not sufficiently ideological or Repub¬
lican in their outlook, but fatter more concerned about the
turf of their own committee."
The Executive Director
The members of the Republican Study Committee combined their resources
to make themselves more effective. While there was no assigned quota to each
member, the leading active members contributed salary in the amount of $12,000
to $35,000 per year. Crane was the largest contributor, and the most effec¬
tive salesman for the group. Derwinski and Clawson also helped in the con¬
tinuing struggle to meet the group's salary requirements. Many of the members
were reluctant to solicit payroll support from their colleagues. Mrs. Holt
expressed the view of most of the members when she said, "Payroll solicitation
was embarrassing. I was always embarrassed to ask for dollars."-5*
Theoretically, the members realized it would be up to this joint staff
to carry out their legisiative agenda. What was lacking in this period was an
accurate evaluation of how much administrative attention was required to run
such an organization. The administrator's job description was complex:
massaging the member's ego; obtaining salary support; meeting legislative
m
and publication deadlines; and disciplining a staff which was located in dif¬
ferent offices and which had conflicting priorities with its member offices.
The administrative role quickly became a full-time job for Ed Feuiner, the
executive director. When these duties were added to his job of administra¬
tive assistant to Philip Crane, an activist member of the House, it proved
to be too much. Feuiner and Crane both perceived that Crane's congres¬
sional office was suffering and that the most sensible alternative was to
locate a full-time staff director for the Republican Study Committee. In
May 1973, Crane, Derwinski and Feuiner discussed the problem and Crane
agreed to fund the entire salary requirement for a full-time executive
director. They discussed various candidates who might fill the key position.
The selection would be a critical decision because the director was the pri¬
mary link between the members and the staff. They considered a number of
current congressional staff aides but decided that Dr. Albert Gilman would
be the best candidate for the job. Giiman and Crane had been graduate
students together at Indiana University a decade earlier, and since that time,
Gilman had become Administrative Vice President of Western Carolina
University in North Carolina. Thus, Gilman had both academic credentials
of his own and the substantial administrative experience important to cope
with the myriad of details that the job of executive director involved. In
addition, he was conservative politically and had been active in local Repub¬
lican politics in North Carolina, and he enjoyed Crane's personal confidence.
After visiting Washington, and meeting with Crane, Derwinski and Feuiner,
Gilman was hired as the RSC's executive director. Gilman joined the staff
of the Republican Study Committee in June 1973, but by September 1973,
disenchantment began to set in from both members and staff aides in mem¬
ber offices. Derwinski had contributed a room to serve as the group's
headquarters. Crane had raised substantial payroll support from the members.
And Feuiner's role was to have kept members' staffs involved and enthusiastic
about the group. However, they did not receive the necessary follow-up help
from Gilman. Their primary criticism was that Gilman's method of operation
was too slow for the fast-paced life of Capitol Hill. Gilman had been thrown
into a difficult position. The RSC was an embryonic organization trying to
carve out its own niche in the House of Representatives. He was totally
unfamiliar with the ways of Washington and Capitol Hill. His life at Western
Carolina University was a leisurely one compared with the pace which he was
expected to maintain at the Republican Study Committee. Yet on paper
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and from the preliminary interviews, the appointment of Gilman appeared
to be a perfect choice for the group.
Crane assumed full responsibility for the appointment of Gilman and
later admitted the mistake he had made. As he wrote to Senator James
McClure (R-Idaho):
"After his [Gilman's] arrival, it became apparent that we had
made an error in our selection criteria. Instead of emphasizing
academic background, we should have looked for an individual who,
while still possessing the required philosophical commitment and
educational background, was well-versed in the operation of the
Hill on a day-to-day basis. Quite frankly, the theoretical discus¬
sions which consumed much of the staff's time was (sic) not nearly
as important as the production of legislative issue area papers,
bills, press contact, etc. ^
Gilman's tenure as director of the RSC almost resulted in the organ¬
ization's collapse. By late October 1973, the payroll support for his staff
of 7 had fallen off substantially. A research analyst gave a case in
point: when Gilman was asked about the half of the analyst's pay which
was uncovered for that month, Gilman replied "It's o.k. — if I don't raise
it, you can take half of next month off."-^ This was no consolation to the
staff member who had financial obligations to meet. Rambling ideological
discussions had replaced productive work on specific legislative issues, and
with the exception of the new legislative briefing series, few new or helpful
ideas were forthcoming from the RSC's staff.
It fell to Crane to discharge Gilman if the organization was to survive.
Crane was notoriously unwilling to handle personnel problems, and he looked
for an easy way to convince his friend to leave the RSC and return to
North Carolina. Gilman did in January 197^ when he became the Republican
candidate against Roy Taylor, the incumbent Democratic member of the
House. To encourage that decision, Crane and several other members of
the RSC agreed to speak on Gilman's behalf in his district and to help him
raise the funds necessary to finance his 1974 general election campaign."
Thus, in January 1974, a vacancy occurred in the top staff job. Chairman
Clawson appointed a selection committee to find a new director. The com¬
mittee interviewed candidates for the job. As Clawson stated in his annual
report to the members of the RSC on February 19, 1974:
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"The committee was chaired by Mr. Baker and served by
Messrs. Blackburn, Crane, Derwinski and Rousselot. They con¬
sidered three men for the job: Ed Feulner who had served as
acting staff director during the formative days of the Steering
(sic) Committee, Lou Ingram who has been serving as Special
Counsel on energy for the past nine months, and Dan Joy who
has held various positions in Washington and on the Hill.
The Executive Committee confirmed the recommendations of
the Selection Committee naming Ed Feulner as Executive Director
and Lou Ingram as Legislative Director with the additional re¬
sponsibility of Deputy Director.
Thus, the first acting director became the full-time director in Feb¬
ruary 1974. The brief period under Gilman had reduced the RSC's effec¬
tiveness to such a point that it had to reestablish its credibility in the
eyes of the members, and to rebuild the morale of the shared staff.
Feulner did this by first assuring his employees of the solidity of their
pay. He instituted a policy of paying the executive director last, on the
theory that it was good for staff morale to know that they would receive
their pay before the boss. This would also insure that the director kept up
his search for payroll support. He began a series of courtesy calls on mem¬
bers to determine their perspectives on the RSC. In addition, he insisted
that every staff aide at the RSC call on all the administrative assistants
of their employing members at least twice a month. These efforts were
supported by Crane and LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), the new chairman.
They provided the impetus to put the organization back on its track.^
The Published Work Product
During this time period, the staff worked closely with several members
on major issues. Legal services, land use and other domestic policy questions
were high on the priority list. At the same time, weekly "fact sheets" were
produced on major bills which had ideological significance. Few of these
bills were covered by the regular publications of the Republican party in
the House. In some cases, they were not considered of broad interest. In
others, the party's analysis looked only at local considerations rather than
the basic philosophical implications of the issue. Thus, an analysis of mass
transit subsidies by the Republican Conference might examine the amount
of subsidies distributed to each district, while the RSC interest was in the
underlying structure and philosophy of the proposal.
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The RSC fact sheets followed the basic DSG pattern:
"A typical fact sheet is approximately five to ten pages long.
It contains the legislative history of a bill, the background of the
substantive problem, an outline of the major provisions of the bill,
the views of the Administration, probable amendments, and argu¬
ments for and against."^
The RSC fact sheets were indexed, hole-punched for binding, and distributed
in a weekly packet. Special emphasis was placed on RSC-member initiatives
related to pending bills. Thus, member amendments were highlighted in the
fact sheets. In addition to providing information in a new format to mem¬
ber offices, the fact sheets kept the RSC name before the members and
their legislative staff aides. Special written products were also produced in
response to member requests. For example, floor speeches and legislative
amendments were prepared. In addition, "Dear Colleague" letters were
frequently drafted for members who were active on various issues.-^ These
publications were later supplemented by others as discussed in Chapter VI.
Weekly Staff Briefings
During 1973, Gilman tried different means of communicating with the
staff in member offices. At first, the RSC was secretive. The Derwinski
meetings were exclusively for members with the exception of two or three
staff aides who had helped organize the RSC and who acted as liaison with
the contributed staff. However, the RSC was moving away from this method
of operation. One of these new forms of communicating with the member's
office began with Gilman's first staff briefing on December 3, 1973. The
first briefing dealt with energy. The featured speakers were several indus¬
try experts and Lou Ingram, staff counsel on energy for the RSC. The
subject was President Nixon's forthcoming energy bill. Members' staff
aides were invited. The response was encouraging with 74 participants,
including 11 members attending. This meeting format was a new role for
the RSC, and one which no Republican organization in the formal party
hierarchy was performing. As a consequence of this successful meeting,
the series was institutionalized early in 1974 as a regular Monday morning
feature beginninjg at 8:30 a.m. The time of the sessions was a compromise,
since it would involve staff members arriving before the normal starting hour
(9:00 a.m.) and would give the staff aides a head start on the week's legis¬
lative agenda. The Minority Leader was informed of the meeting series;
however, there was no reaction from his staff to the plan.
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The entire research staff of the RSC routinely attended the Monday
briefings. They met with their counterparts from member offices and
exchanged information between the RSC staff and the member office staffs.
As the meetings were formalized, participation from various sources was
encouraged. In March 1974, when the subject of the briefing was the instant
voter registration proposal,^0 the speaker was Congressman Bill Frenzel (R-
Minnesota). Frenzel had led the Republican opposition on the House Admin¬
istration Committee to this bill, so it was not unusual that he would be
invited to participate. What was unusual was that Frenzel was an active
member of the Wednesday Group.^ However, instant voter registration was
a partisan issue rather than an ideological one.
Occasionally, special staff meetings were held, such as a luncheon
meeting on March 29, 1974, with legislative assistants from member offices.
This meeting was held to give the legislative assistants an opportunity to
air any grievances they might have with the RSC and also to determine
their specific issue areas so that they might coordinate their activities more
closely with the research staff of the RSC. The good will of the members'
staff was a continuing concern. This meeting was not held to answer a
specific problem, but rather to establish a close relationship between the
member offices and the RSC's new executive director. By keeping these
avenues of communication open, the RSC staff hoped to avoid any problems
before they had the opportunity to develop.
Adoption of a Statement of Purpose
From its inception, the Republican Study Committee had described
itself as a group of "conservatives," who generally agreed on policy issues;
they did not always reach those conclusions for the same reason, nor did
they agree in every specific. Members within the group defined the group's
role on a consensus basis and expected general agreement on most of the
issues from any prospective member. In this way, the RSC was differentiating
itself from those social Republican organizations such as the Chowder and
Marching Society and SOS which had no ideological basis for membership. In
addition, the RSC was identifying itself as the counter organization to the
Wednesday Group which advanced the liberal ideology.
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After their election, Baker and Symms spoke about the desirability
of drafting a broad statement of what the group stood for. Such a "State¬
ment of Purpose" had to reach several audiences. It had to be both conser¬
vative and Republican. It could not be so specific as to be of only transitory
interest, nor could it be so philosophical as to lose the attention of the prag¬
matic politicians. It had to set a cooperative tone with the Republican
leadership and the Republican Administration, and yet set an independent
course.
Chairman LaMar Baker appointed a drafting subcommittee to come up
with a working document. The drafLing committee directed the staff to
prepare the first draft. The first draft of the Statement of Purpose was
prepared by the RSC staff and circulated at the Executive Committee
meeting on Monday, February 25, 1974. Following a brief discussion of it
at that time, each member in attendance took a copy to review prior to
the next meeting on March 4, 1974. That entire meeting dealt with the
redrafting of the Statement of Purpose. After some discussion, the different
perspectives of the members were incorporated. Crane was particularly
interested in emphasizing the philosophical basis of conservatism. Other
members minimized the importance of the effort. For example, Derwinski
said, "The Statement of Purpose was important to some of the members who
were ideologically inclined, and it didn't hurt anything.
The two subsequent meetings on the 11th and 18th of March also dealt
with the Statement of Purpose. Finally, at the March 25th meeting, a version
was hammered out which included general references to conservative issues
and a differentiation of the RSC from other Republican organizations. At
the insistence of Derwinski and Baker, it was stated emphatically that the
RSC had as its purpose "To persuade rather than to divide."^ The sentence
was basically a verbal concession to the party structure and the minority
leadership. While the leadership had not exerted any pressure on the senior
members to draft the Statement of Purpose in a certain way, the members
were aware that the document would label the group for some time. The
avowed purpose was to lead the House Republican members in a more conser¬
vative direction. The Statement went on to indicate that the group was
willing to cooperate closely with the Republican leadership in the House of
Representatives, but also to "insure that conservative alternatives are given
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a full and fair hearing on the floor of the House and in the councils of the
Administration."6^
The evolution of the draft statement also showed compromise among
the different individuals who were involved in preparing it. For example,
in the second draft which bore the primary imprint of Crane, the word
"progressive" was inserted in the first paragraph at the insistence of Baker.
The point being, as Baker said, "The liberals are always stealing good
language and we ought not to let them get away with it. ^ Thus, the
Statement of Purpose opens with:
"The Republican Study Committee is a group of conservative
Republican Congressmen who favor progressive measures within
the framework of constitutional government and who have pooled
their resources to provide themselves with more effective re¬
search and legislative support."6®
In the opening paragraph, the RSC describes itself as being conservative and
yet favoring progressive measures. The opening paragraph emphasizes
immediately the shared staff concept for achieving the group's objectives.
This, plus the exclusive membership within the House, differentiated the
Republican Study Committee from other non-congressional conservative
groups such as the American Conservative Union.
The Statement of Purpose was adopted on March 25, 1974,6^ and circu¬
lated to the Republican leadership with a letter from LaMar Baker to
Minority Leader John Rhodes (R-Arizona) indicating that "We look forward
to working closely with you."6^ By emphasizing its complementary role
to the formal party structure, the group attempted to minimize any concern
that the leadership might have about the new group. At the same time, the
statement called for independent positions from both the Administration and
the party leadership in the House.
The Statement of Purpose indicated that the Republican Study Committee
had become more mature. It was willing to become more visible in its
dealings with the party's leadership and with the general public. The State¬
ment set the group apart from the social groups, while indicating that its
basic purpose was not to divide, but rather to reinforce the conservative
position within the Republican party in the House. The Statement also acted
as a convenient explanation for the members to respond to questions about
the Republican Study Committee and what its role was.
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Intern Lectures
In the summer of 1974, the staff of the RSC instituted its intern
lecture series. "Interns" have become an established part of the Washington
summer scene, particularly on Capitol Hill. In most intern programs,
students work in congressional offices for all or part of their vacation. The
programs are many and diverse. Some are administered by a specific college
or university. Others are run by a congressional or senate office to benefit
their own constituents. Some interns are paid, others are not. In a memor¬
andum to the Executive Committee, the RSC executive director noted that:
"The past several summers a number of liberal and radical
groups (environmentalists, peace groups, etc.) have taken advan¬
tage of the presence of the large number of politically inter¬
ested students on the Hill to indoctrinate them in their point of
view and enlist them in their causes in the future. I believe
there would be several advantages to the RSC if we were to
initiate a program along similar lines."
At a subsequent meeting of the RSC's Executive Committee, the pro¬
gram was approved, and during the summer of 1974, eleven lectures were
offered by 14 members of the RSC. Attendance was encouraged from interns
who served in RSC member offices, as well as other Republican offices. In
addition, interns from several senate conservative offices were invited.
Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) who hosted groups of 25 interns
for two-week periods in his office all summer long, helped provide a good
attendance base for the RSC lecture series. Attendance ranged from as
many as 150 to as few as 30 during the course of the series. Each member
of the Executive Committee was asked to talk on an issue of particular
concern to him.
The lectures helped offset both the liberal intern programs and the
formal intern program established by the "Bi-partisan Intern Program." It
also served to show the conservative interns on both sides of the Hill that
the members for whom they worked had allies who were able to express an
articulate viewpoint on specific policy issues.
Membership Dues
In 1973 the financial requirements of the Republican Study Committee
consisted almost entirely of payroll for the shared staff. Nonetheless,
finances were required for other purposes. Office machines — typewriters
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and a used mimeograph machine — were borrowed from member offices.
They were the rejects from those offices and as Chairman Clawson noted in
his annual report to the membership on February 19, 1974:
"The staff does not even have its own copying facility. Its
typewriters all have different type faces which greatly impedes
the physical handling of rush work."'0
An even more pressing problem, however, was the provision of office sup¬
plies. Typewriters need ribbons and mimeograph machines require ink and
paper. Crane had permitted the RSC to charge up to $150 a month at the
House Stationery Room. But this was a major commitment and it was using
a substantial amount of Crane's office funds. Rather than making another
round of efforts to meet the office supply needs, Clawson and Crane asked
a number of members if they would object to an annual dues fee. Very
little resistence was encountered and Clawson made the formal proposal at
the annual meeting:
"In general these housekeeping inadequacies result from the
fact that the Committee has no formalized and dependable bud¬
geting system. We are not the only shared staff operation on
the Hill. Our conservative counterpart among the Democrats,
Mr. Waggonner's Democratic Research Organization, and the
grand-daddy of all shared staff, the Democratic Study Group,
have solved this problem by requiring annual dues of $100 per
Member. This amount can be withdrawn from the stationery
account and, in view of the increase of $750 in that account
available as of January 1, this year, I believe that the time is
right for us to face this problem squarely and adopt similar
dues."
Under "new business" in the general meeting, the proposal for dues passed
without any opposition. This gave the RSC's staff the basic financial support
which it required.
Annual General Meeting
The first general meeting of the Republican Study Committee was held
on February 19, 1974. Thirty-four members attended. For that meeting, the
staff had prepared by-laws, which were adopted; an election of a full slate
of officers and a board known as the "Executive Committee" took place; a
membership committee was appointed; and membership dues were established
at $100 per year.
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The newly-elected chairman of the Republican Study Committee was
LaMar Baker. Baker was first elected from Chattanooga, Tennessee in the
1970 general election. He was less ideologically rigid than some of the other
younger members like Crane, Huber and Symms, and yet was an active con¬
servative.
In summary, the RSC had advanced a long way in just over a year
since the preliminary meetings in Congressman Derwinski's office. As out¬
going Chairman Clawson pointed out:
"Given the operational problems of getting a shared staff
organized and the inherent independence of conservatives in
relation to providing such a staff direction, the Steering (sic)
Committee has chalked up accomplishments that have exceeded
what our expectations a year ago should have been." .
The group had sorted out its staff problems, become more visible both within
the Congress and to the general public, and developed a long-range basis for
financial support. Its office was open, the staff was consolidated within that
office, and meetings were being held. Where it saw a possible opening to
influence the House Republican party in a more conservative direction, it was
prepared to act. The structure was in place to exercise an impact on the
legislative process.
E. Acceptability within the Congress, the Party, and Washington
It must be emphasized that conservative rank and file members in the
Republican party in the House were at a strong disadvantage. The majority
of the minority party is not in a powerful position in a legislature. In com¬
bination with a presidential veto, or with all of their own party allied on a
straight partisan issue, the RSC membership could have an impact, although
slight. On its own, however, the RSC's senior members realized that, if
the group was to do more than act as a fringe operation for the conserva¬
tives within the minority party, it would have to have credibility with
individuals in the formal Republican leadership. Thus, a degree of respect¬
ability could be .achieved by effective cooperative efforts with the Repub¬
lican leadership. This cooperation was not easy. Minority Leader John Rhodes
later admitted that:
"Any leadership would rather not have any of them [ ad hoc fac¬
tions], but if you have to have one, better to have them all."'^
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Thus, no one in the RSC expected the minority leadership to greet the
arrival of a new ad hoc group enthusiastically. John Mackintosh asked a
rhetorical question which is apropos of this situation: "Why should ministers
made rods for their own backs?"^ If the RSC could convince the leader¬
ship that it could make a positive contribution, its reception could be more
favorable. Yet, everyone in the RSC assumed that the road to respectability
would be long and arduous. In the ultimate test, the only way that the
institutional base of the House could be altered to include an ad hoc coalition
of conservative Republicans would be through the RSC's playing an unique
role and exerting an impact on a major issue. This institutionalization process
of the RSC was begun with the legislative leadership of the Republican Study
Committee on the federal land use bill in July 1974.^
In the meantime, however, small steps had to be taken by the staff
and members of the Executive Committee to gain respectability for the
organization. For example, on April 2, 1974, letters were sent from the
chairman of the Republican Study Committee, LaMar Baker, to every mem¬
ber of the House Republican leadership. The letter noted that while the
leadership was invited to join the RSC, it would not be expected to do so
"in order not to compromise your position in the leadership."76 This avoided
the possibility of a rebuff to the group while formally advising the leader¬
ship of the RSC's existence. Baker also offered to make the publications
available to the leadership if they requested it. Responses were received
from several members of the leadership, including the chairman of the
Republican Conference, John Anderson (R-Illinois). Anderson indicated "I
would be happy to receive your reports."77 in reply to an identical letter,
Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York), chairman of the Republican Policy Com¬
mittee, wrote Baker that:
"I do not feel that any association with the Steering (sic)
Committee would compromise my relationship to the leadership
of the Republican party since it is important as chairman of
Policy Committee that I have all avenues of communication
open with significant groups of Republicans. Needless to say,
I consider the Steering Committee a significant group."78
Conable requested that a copy of the RSC mailings go both to his staff
director on the Republican Policy Committee and to his personal office.
By the spring of 1974, these small steps made the RSC an organization
which was tacitly recognized by the leadership. The relationship with
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Minority Leader John Rhodes' office was more complex since Rhodes was
relatively new in the Minority Leader's role. In addition, the RSC potentially
could interfere with his role of leading all the Republicans in the House.
In an overture to the RSC, Dennis Taylor, the legislative director to the
Minority Leader, invited the executive director of the RSC to participate in
meetings of the "Nameless Group." The Nameless Group is an organization
of Republican staff counsels on the House standing committees which meets
on a bi-weekly basis to discuss legislation and activities in each committee.
Since the Wednesday Group of liberal Republicans had been represented by its
director at these meetings for some time, Taylor decided to include the RSC
as a counterpart in the meetings. This was a breakthrough since it gave
credibility to the RSC after only a year's existence. Similar recognition
had come to the Wednesday Group after six years. The staff and members
also worked with Rhodes on more mundane matters. Rhodes' assistance
was essential to expand the physical facilities for the RSC. In a series of
letters from Baker to Rhodes, the problem of inadequate space was raised.
Rhodes repeatedly requested space from the Speaker, but was consistently
turned down. It was not until after the RSC had stopped the federal land
use bill that the RSC obtained further space from the House Office Com¬
mission via Rhodes.^
By the summer of 1974, the number of members in the Republican
Study Committee leveled off. This was due to anticipated difficulties in
the fall elections about which many members expressed serious concern.
For example, Bob Mathias (R-California), who had one of the most conserva¬
tive voting records in the House, declined membership in a letter to
Del Clawson, the membership chairman of the RSC, with the following
comment:
"With the tough race I face this year and my work on two
major committees, I feel that I would not be able to attend
many of the Steering (sic) Committee meetings. Therefore,
let me think about it next year and hopefully I will have more
time."
Mathias lost in the 1974 general election.
The Republican Study Committee also had to "be credible to the business
community. The business lobbyists would be allies with the RSC on many
occasions and this relationship needed to be cultivated. The executive
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director had already met with the legislative director of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce and the vice president of the National Association of Manu¬
facturers. After several meetings, the U.S. Chamber officials suggested
that Baker address the U.S. Chamber's breakfast group. This meeting took
place on August 15, 1974. In his remarks, Baker told of the history and
evolution of the Republican Study Committee, and areas in which it could
cooperate with the business representatives.^ It was significant that an
outside organization with the prestige of the U.S. Chamber would invite
the head of the RSC to address it. This represented a breakthrough in
expanding relationships between the RSC and the business lobbyists in
Washington. Closer collaboration followed on major legislative issues such
as land use and the Agency for Consumer Protection.
After the 1974 general election which resulted in substantial losses for
the RSC, Minority Leader Rhodes forced the RSC to change its name from
Republican Steering Committee to Republican Study Committee.Further¬
more, he questioned the wisdom of the RSC cooperating with non-Republican
political action groups such as the Committee for the Survival of a Free
Congress (CSFC) in orientation sessions which he thought conflicted with
the formal programs that the leadership held for newly-elected members.
Specifically, Rhodes expressed concern that the CSFC-RSC program might
be considered officially sanctioned, despite the fact that the invitations
quite clearly identified the sponsors of the program. Rhodes expressed these
two ideas to make sure that the RSC did not step out of line with the party.
As Philip Crane noted later:
"We changed our name, which was easy to do. But when it
came to cutting off contacts with outside groups, there was no
way [we would comply]. After all, many of us in the RSC had
close ties to CSFC and to ACU [the American Conservative Union]
and other groups. Besides, we thought of Rhodes as a 'toothless
tiger'."
Thus, when bending to pressure did not involve problems of major
principle, the RSC was flexible. Despite the mild objection of Rhodes, the
RSC maintained'its relationship with other groups without any adverse con¬
sequences since the cost of imposing any sanctions on the RSC by the
Minority Leader would be too great.
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F. Conclusion
If the 92nd Congress was the time of gestation for the Republican
Study Committee, the 93rd Congress saw its birth and early development.
It survived the perils of childhood in a hostile environment and emerged
humbled but unbowed in 1975. The years 1973 and 1974 saw the House
Republican conservatives mature in their attitudes toward cooperation with
each other and toward the effective use of shared staff.
Starting with a flimsy base of support, the incumbent members helped
the members-elect in the "socialization" process^ which is vital to a new
member's acceptance as a member of the legislature. That is, they intro¬
duced the newly-elected members to the intricacies of the system and
made them receptive to the concept of a new conservative Republican
faction within the structure of the House.
With this new base of support, new and old members agreed on the
need for a joint research staff. Many of the RSC's contributing members
had originally supported the shared staff only with reluctance. These
reluctant members were the traditional members. Their legislative role
had been limited, and their continuing concern was with their re-election.
Stephen Frantzich cites Mayhew's theory in an accurate description of these
RSC members:
t>y
"According to the electoral theory y\ Mayhew, insecure
congressmen use bill introduction as a method of advertising
their good points, position-taking on positively evaluated issues,
and claiming credit for what was expected of them."^-5
Contrasted with this perspective, by the end of the 93rd Congress, the RSC
was almost at the same status as the DSG regarding its staff:
"In practice, virtually all of the DSG's activities are gen¬
erated and executed by the staff, which has assumed an in¬
dependent leadership in recent years....The institutionalization
of the DSG has left the staff director a good deal of discretion
in initiating and overseeing DSG operations."
This independent professional staff was a new asset for the conservative
Republicans. For conservative members who were lacking in seniority, the
new organization provided them with an institutional base which they would
not have had otherwise: "House members find it more difficult to develop
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a base of power from which to operate [than do senators]."8'7 Adding a
lack of seniority to the disadvantage of being in the minority party, the
RSC presented an unique opportunity to members like Crane and Sam
Steiger (R-Arizona). Paul Weyrich commented on the changed attitude:
"There was a feeling in 1973-1974 that the RSC was divisive.
By the 1974 election, this feeling had changed to 'we have to have
it'."88
This was partly a change in the attitude of the members toward the staff.
The RSC members had learned the value of professional staff working on
legislative issues. At this time, Malbin's evolving pattern was becoming
apparent: "even the most traditionally styled conservative members of the
House are choosing increasingly to rely heavily on their staffs."8^ Of
course, the change did not occur without encountering difficulties. In the
British context, the late Professor Mackintosh said that:
"The House of Commons has no independent sources of power,
and why should any government in its right mind concede authority
to a body that cannot exact it... ®
Similarly, the Republican Study Committee was not able to simply move
into the House structure and begin to operate with its own niche clearly
defined. Every step of its development and every small gain in status,
prestige, size, power or influence was achieved with difficulty since many
of these steps were at another organization's expense. The group was not
welcomed within the House, nor should it have expected to be. But its
positive impact on the legislative scene, as well as its contributions to party-
wide activities helped it become established with a relatively small number
of complications in a relatively short time.
By late 1974, the RSC's original members' objectives of forming a
viable faction were realized. Richard Rose has defined a political faction
as:
"a group of individuals based on representatives in Parliament
who seek to further a broad range of politics through consciously
organized political activity....Factions are thus distinguished from
other influence groups by having membership based in Parliament,
rather than in the civil service or elsewhere. Because they per¬
sist through time, factions can be distinguished from ad hoc com¬
binations of politicians in agreement upon one particular issue or
at one moment in time. Factions may be distinguished from pres¬
sure groups because the former are concerned with a wide range
of political issues....Factions may be distinguished from exponents
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of a political tendency because factions are self-consciously organ¬
ized as a ^ody, with a measure of discipline and cohesion thus
resulting."
Rose has listed the chief features of an organized political faction
as not only nationally recognized leadership, but also an adherence to
ideological principles to help justify the faction's action; a limited knowledge
of technical matters to help influence valuations; the support of cadres to
help implement the faction's program; a network of communication to stim¬
ulate private conversations and combinations; and a system of rewards
whether material or psychological.-^
In this chapter the structure and organization of the Republican Study
Committee have been considered. The issues with which the RSC was con¬
cerned are analyzed in- Chapter V. This broad range of interests combined
with the independent continuing existence of the RSC to make it a faction
by late 1974.
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V. CASE STUDIES (1973-1974)
A. Introduction
The emphasis in Chapter IV was on the form, administration and
structure of the Republican Study Committee. Yet, the RSC's main purpose
was to promote conservative views on pending legislative issues. The RSC's
involvement in legislative issues would determine its usefulness and ultimate
political viability. A series of legislative activities is described and analyzed
in this chapter. The issues in which the RSC became involved had to be
carefully selected. If the RSC were to promote only hard right-wing issues
like opposition to East-West trade, its base would be narrow. With a narrow
base, its influence on the Republican leadership would be marginal. Earlier
attempts to establish an ideological caucus had floundered. They were viewed
as being merely right-wing fringe groups, of no particular consequence to the
congressional party. After a brief mention, and even briefer lives, they had
faded away. The question of issue focus was a lesson which the conserva¬
tives had learned from their liberal colleagues in the Wednesday Group and
from earlier attempts at organizing the conservatives.
At the same time, the Republican Study Committee faced another
limitation. It could not become the source of "instant experts" exerting
leadership on major issues of broad concern to the Republican members of
the House. Neither the party's House leadership nor the senior Republican
members of the standing House committees would permit the self-appointed
RSC activists to become their leaders on issues which these senior members
had studied, debated, and fought over for many years. The RSC members
also learned that other areas were off-limits. These were decisions which
individual members made based on their own district interests or on personal
relationships with other Washington power centers. The vice-presidential nom¬
ination of Nelson Rockefeller and the member's individual position on Water¬
gate indicated these limitations.
After all these areas of focus were excluded, the primary areas which
remained for the RSC concentration were either special amendments or nar¬
rower issues. These could either be carved out of broader issues, or could be
special bills on behalf of a narrow-based constituency. An example of the
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amendment approach was the committee's battle over the Legal Services pro¬
gram. While this initiative represented a frontal attack on part of President
Johnson's Great Society, it began as an issue of limited interest to a few
conservative members. Gradually, it became a party position, and the senior
committee members worked with the RSC members to achieve shared objec¬
tives. The second type of RSC activity was represented by the restoration
of the right of private citizens to own gold. This was a deep ideological
issue, but only of direct interest to a small, but vocal, national constituency.
A third categoryLwas the federal land use bill. The RSC could intervene,
in this case, because the committee members were either concentrating on
other committee issues or else indifferent to the specific land use bill, and
the RSC's leadership was eventually followed by both the House Republican
leadership and the White House in its action.
In most cases, for the RSC members to take the lead, the tacit support
of their senior colleagues was required. For example, the senior Republicans
in the House eventually supported the RSC position on the battle over federal
land use planning. This support was given after the early RSC work on the
issue proved that it could be an issue on which to oppose successfully the
Democratic majority. On the other hand, the House Republican leadership
did oppose the RSC's efforts in support of the Byrd Amendment to permit
the importation of Rhodesian chrome. On other issues, the RSC membership
remained constant while the Administration shifted its views. For example,
the Administration changed its position on mass transit operating subsidies
while the RSC maintained their negative position.
Members sometimes used the Republican Study Committee to express
their traditional political views on issues of general concern, such as the
Kemp Special Order which dealt with government spending. Neither the
Republican Study Committee nor Congressman Jack Kemp were the first
Republicans to oppose excessive federal spending, but a coordinated floor
discussion of an issue of this type was unusual. The Republican Study
Committee staff and members also introduced the new concept of tax
indexing. While* it did gain some bi-partisan support, it also met resistance
from some members who viewed it as heretical.
The case studies in this chapter are selective. They do not represent
all of the legislative activity of the RSC during the 93rd Congress. Other
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legislative activities included attempted amendments to occupational safety
and health laws, amendments to the Clean Air Act, and opposition to aspects
of electoral reform. Each of the cases discussed in this chapter is repre¬
sentative of the successes and failures of the Republican Study Committee.
The cases illustrate the activities of the RSC in committees, on the House
floor and in the electoral arena. Sometimes working with, other times
opposing, their own party leadership and the Republican Administration during
1973 and 1974, the legislative leaders of the RSC carved out a specific role
for their organization.
B. Atlantic Union Resolution
The first legislative measure in which the Republican Study Committee
staff became engaged on a formal basis was the Atlantic Union Resolution.
This bill called for an eighteen-person delegation to participate in a conven¬
tion comprised of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to explore
the possibility of establishing an "Atlantic Union" of member countries on
federal principles. Similar resolutions had been introduced in prior Congresses
but had never before come to the floor for a House vote. Then, on April 2,
1973, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H. Res. 205 by a 21-8
roll call vote.* The supporters included the chairman and most of the Dem¬
ocratic members, as well as several Republicans. One of the outspoken
negative votes on the Atlantic Union Resolution was Edward J. Derwinski
(R-Illinois). Derwinski then was a middle-ranking member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee and strongly opposed the Atlantic Union Resolution for
several reasons:
1. Because if it were enacted, it would substantially dilute U.S.
sovereignty.
2. More pragmatically, he realized that the likelihood of such a
resolution becoming law and instituting a supranational government
of Canada, the United States, and the major western countries of
Europe was very remote.
3. Additionally, he also feared that such a delegation would reduce
the status of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Derwinski was
the treasurer of the IPU, which frequently met in Europe, Asia and
elsewhere to discuss matters of mutual concern with parliamentary
delegations from other nations.
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At Derwinski's request, the shared staff of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee prepared and distributed a fact sheet on the Atlantic Union Resolution
which was circulated to the members.^ After its passage in the Foreign
Affairs Committee, the battle moved to the House Rules Committee. The
resolution was then reported out of the House Rules Committee with a letter
of endorsement from President Nixon to its principal House sponsor, Rep.
Paul Findley (R-Illinois). The Nixon letter endorsed the concept and Findley
used it to enlist Republican support for his resolution. By this time, Derwinski
decided to actively oppose the measure. In addition to the reasons cited above
for his opposition, Derwinski had a personal motive in opposing the passage of
his Illinois colleague's bill. Findley and Derwinski were in the unusual position
of both serving on the same committee from the same state. While Findley
was an active member of the House Wednesday Group, he had not been
included in Derwinski's IPU meetings. Thus, personal rivalry led Derwinski
to particularly oppose this initiative of his junior Illinois colleague.
During this time, the Republican Study Committee had begun pressing
Derwinski to help it obtain a headquarters office for its staff operation.
Because of the office situation,, Feulner, the part-time executive director
and Jane Craft, general secretary, had the difficult task of overseeing a
number of staff members located in different member offices. Feulner and
Craft had complained to Crane and Derwinski about the lack of a central
room. Derwinski mentioned to Minority Leader Ford that he would like to
have a room in the House Office Building Annex I; some of these rooms had
already been given to other senior Republican members who were not ranking
on committees. Therefore, Derwinski pleaded with Ford on the basis of his
seniority and his position as head of the Nationalities Division of the Repub¬
lican National Committee.^ Although Derwinski mentioned the need to Ford
on several occasions, there were no results. Then, the matter of the Atlantic
Union Resolution came along.
At a meeting of the Republican Study Committee, Derwinski argued
against the bill and asked his colleagues to help him oppose it. Derwinski
asked the executive director to prepare a "Dear Colleague" letter for
Derwinski's signature opposing the resolution. The RSC staff prepared the
"Dear Colleague" letter. Then, Derwinski contacted Sam Stratton (D-New
York) who was one of the original co-sponsors of H. Res. 205. Stratton
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signed the "Dear Colleague" letter with Derwinski and later admitted his
change of viewpoint on the House floor:
"Confession is good for the soul. I am listed in the report,
and properly so, as a cosponsor of this resolution. However, I
have become convinced from the developments that have occurred,
particularly this year, and from what I have learned from our sit¬
uation in Europe as a result of my membership on a NATO sub¬
committee, and from a visit recently to a NATO Defense Confer¬
ence in Munich, that this is not the proper time to take up this
resolution and talk about some form of federal union in the
Atlantic."^
Stratton realized the political liability of advocating a reduction of U.S.
independence or sovereignty. His support of the Derwinski position enabled
him to avoid these political charges. It was a reasonable move for Stratton,
particularly because there were no strong lobbying efforts on behalf of the
bill. From Derwinski's perspective, Stratton was an ideal ally, because he
was a Democrat who had defected from the other side.
Derwinski did not participate in the floor debate on the resolution,
although he was the acknowledged leader of the opposition. The RSC fact
sheet was the only analysis of the bill which mentioned both the advantages
and the disadvantages of the proposal. The floor debate was carried by a
group of his RSC colleagues including John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), H.R. Gross
(R-Iowa) and J. Herbert Burke (R-Florida). Both Burke and Ashbrook were
then members of the embryonic Republican Study Committee, and Gross
eventually became one. The effort to provide the measure with a rule on
the House floor was defeated by a 197-210 record vote. The three senior
members-of the Republican leadership (Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan), the
Minority Leader; Les Arends (R-Illinois), the Minority Whip; and
John B. Anderson (R-Illinois), the chairman of the Republican Conference),,
ail voted for the resolution and for the Findley position which was supported
by the Administration.5
Following the record vote on the Atlantic Union Resolution, Derwinski
again approached Ford about the possibility of securing a room in one of
the House Office Building Annexes.^ In this conversation with Ford, he
admitted that his prior request for space in the House Office Building com-
lex was inaccurate. Derwinski told Ford:
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"The real reason why I want the room is so that a number of
us can get together with our pooled legislative staff in order to
be more effective. We beat you and Findley today and we are
going to do more of the same."
Ten days later, Ford assigned a room for the Republican Study Committee
to Derwinski. As Derwinski recounts "if you show them muscle, they will
give you what you want."^ This room was to be the RSC's first head¬
quarters. Prior to that time, the staff of the RSC was housed in member
offices, scattered throughout the House Office Building complex.
While the substance of the Atlantic Union Resolution was minor, the
success gave the leadership of the embryonic group considerable satisfaction.
The RSC members had beaten their own party leadership, which was acting
in unison with the Republican Administration and with a leading member of
the House Wednesday Group. The coordinated action of the RSC fact sheet
produced by the shared staff, followed by the "Dear Colleague" letter, showed
them that they could work together effectively. The granting of the room
also gave Derwinski satisfaction. The Wednesday Group had an office
assigned to it for several years. Now the RSC had parallel status. Practically
speaking, with the staff combined in one room, supervision was easier, and
productivity increased. When the room was assigned to the RSC, it enabled
the staff to become more effective because they were all consolidated into a
single location which eliminated some of the problems outlined in Chapter IV
above.
C. Government, Economy and Spending Issues
A long-time objective of conservative Republicans in the Congress has
been cutting the size of the federal budget. This position has substantially
changed in recent years with the popularity of so-called "supply side
economics." Supply side economic policy encourages tax rate reductions to
increase investment, jobs and eventually income. But the traditional attempts
at budget cutting have taken a number of forms including voting against
appropriations bills, or recommending cuts in them; voting against the
periodic increases in the federal debt ceiling; and voting against specific
authorization programs as an economic measure.
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The Republican Study Committee was actively involved in several
different aspects of this "economy in government" issue. These included
studies of the projected costs of legislation which had been introduced in the
Congress but not yet enacted, and new ways of combatting inflation such as
indexing the federal income tax brackets.
Each of these activities drew from different elements within the RSC
membership. The RSC staff developed themes with which the RSC member¬
ship was comfortable. More importantly, these coordinated efforts enabled
the members to speak with a coordinated voice on specific matters of con¬
cern. The RSC role as a research source and a speech-writing mechanism
available to its members to act together on joint projects was brought to
the fore. The staff offered the members the opportunity to participate in
specific projects which might be outside the member's committee expertise.
This proved helpful to the RSC because it showed how the RSC couid expand
the member's ability to speak authoritatively on major issues.
Kemp Special Order
Congressman Jack Kemp (R-New York) took the lead in calling the
attention of his House colleagues and other readers of the Congressional
Record to the excesses of projected government spending. This took the
form of a Special Order on April 10, 1974 which was participated in by
Kemp and six of his RSC colleagues.^ A Special Order is a device used
aiter the regular legislative business has been completed on the House floor.
With the agreement of the Speaker, members of the House are recognized
to discuss any topic of concern to them. On appropriate occasions, the
member who has requested the time for the Special Order can use the
opportunity to engage in a colloquy with his colleagues, either by prior
arrangement, or at the time of the Special Order.
Svend Peterson, an RSC staff member who concentrated on federal
budget issues, conceived a plan for listing prospective legislation by total
dollar authorization. This work involved a listing of all of the spending leg¬
islation introduced by members of the House in various issue areas. These
bills were then categorized by cost. It was planned that each of the par¬
ticipants in the Special Order would list and discuss the spending proposals
in a defined spending category. As the project developed, Sam Devine (R-
Ohio) discussed spending proposals in the $25 million-$50 million category;
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Del Clawson (R-California) discussed programs in the $50 million-$100 million
range; Phil Crane (R-Illinois) examined the $100 miilion-$500 million range;
Harold Froehlich (R-Wisconsin) reviewed programs in the $500 miilion-$l billion
range; Ed Derwinski listed programs that would cost at least $1 billion but
under $10 billion; and Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia) cited programs in excess of
$10 billion a year.
The division of the bills into dollar categories was agreed upon for two
reasons:
1. It would dramatize the need to look at the totality of federal
spending and the need to establish priorities among the competing
demands for the limited resources of the government.
2. Each member would share the responsibility for attacking the
sponsors of the spending proposals. That is, if one Democratic
member had introduced six new spending bills in the field of educa¬
tion, it was highly unlikely that they would all fall into the same
category. Thus, no individual R5C member would be accused of
attacking an individual in the Democratic party who was regarded
as being especially in favor of federal aid to education.
While the data was being compiled by Peterson, it was discussed at an
Executive Committee meeting. The executive director asked members to
participate, and Kemp agreed to coordinate the effort. The Kemp introduc¬
tory remarks summarized governmental revenue, expenditure and debt pro¬
jections and included a call for balanced federal budgets and a reduction of
spending.
Kemp argued that federal spending was already too high. Additionally,
Kemp said, "Congress now has before it 450 measures which, if they all be¬
come law, will cost the taxpayers $871,363,307,000 between the current
fiscal year and fiscal 1977.The staggering level of this additional spend¬
ing which approached one trillion dollars, became the common theme of all
of the participants. Regarding the specific programs, they said:
"Each one examined alone appears to have some merit when
judged on its objective of making life easier for the American
public. Lumped together, they are a frighteningly costly package."! 1
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Other RSC activities in connection with the Special Order centered on
specific legislative battles. This effort concerned itself with a united stand
on the general theme of government frugality and was not geared to a
specific bill. The individual members issued press releases to their local
media outlets. The RSC staff called several reporters at other newspapers.
These efforts resulted in some national news media exposure, including a
lengthy article in Phoenix, Arizona. Phoenix was far distant from the home
cities of any of the participants in the Special Order. The participating
members were not accustomed to being noticed outside their own congres¬
sional districts or, at most, their own states. To be quoted in a distant
city gave them attention which they had seldom received in the past. This
was a tentative first step toward working with the national media which
would occupy their attention on subsequent occasions. Beyond this limited
media attention, however, the effort had no measurable impact. It did not
affect the legislative process or result in any cuts in government outlays.
However, it was a preliminary step toward coordinated action through an
ad hoc group, rather than through the formal party structure or the arrange¬
ment of an individual member's personal staff.
Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget
A balanced federal budget has been a long-time objective of congres¬
sional conservatives. The effort to amend the federal Constitution to
achieve this objective was led by Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South
Carolina), a member of the Republican Study Committee's Executive Com¬
mittee. Spence's committee assignment on Armed Services did not provide
a logical base for his efforts. Hence, he called on a member of the RSC's
professional staff, Jerry James, to aid him. James was well-suited to this
effort because he had extensive experience in studying congressional budget
minutiae. The major portion of James' salary came from Spence, and their
collaboration in this project was very close.
The Spence bill was first introduced in 1973 as H. Res. 332 with 17
co-sponsors. A number of similar resolutions were introduced prohibiting
deficit spending ^except in a time of war or national emergency. The Reso¬
lution included a second section which mandated a system for repayment of
the national debt.*2 Much of the preliminary research done for the study
was published in a monograph written by James entitled Federal Spending
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and Budget Control: An Analysis and Review. While the James mono¬
graph was a starting point, the subject required further extensive research.
His original monograph dealt with the so-called "uncontrollable" portions of
the budget, and how they might eventually be reduced.
At the instigation of the executive director, the James monograph was
distributed at an RSC meeting where James presented his findings to the
members. Spence spoke about his bill and enlisted supporters for his measure.
The supporters of the Spence Amendment were his RSC colleagues plus a
handful of conservative Democrats. The conclusion of these members was
that a Constitutional Amendment was required because the Congress was
incapable of controlling its own profligate spending. This argument had been
made by James in his monograph which he had produced while on the 'staff
of the RSC. The monograph was helpful to Spence because he referred to
it in debates on the House floor whenever the subject was discussed. The
members of the Republican Study Committee were comfortable in supporting
the bill. It agreed with their basic fiscal frugality, and would reinforce
their image as responsible representatives both in Washington and at home.
The basic effort, however, was not a serious legislative initiative. There had
been no contact with the Minority Leadership or the White House about the
bill, no hearings were held since the Democrats controlled the committees,
and it was not viewed as a serious effort to enact legislation.
Neither of these efforts achieved success, but both the Kemp Special
Order and the Spence bill helped set the stage for later activity in the House
and in the Senate. They were the precursors to the call for a Constitutional
Convention to mandate a balanced federal budget, limitations on federal
taxing and spending, the impact of California's Proposition 13 throughout the
nation, and the Kemp-Roth Bill. While the eventual form of the amendments
would be different, some of the basic research was conducted and some of
the member leadership was generated through these early RSC coordinated
research efforts. They were not accompanied by effective lobbying or pub¬
licity activity. These other dimensions only came later.
Indexing the Income Tax System
Indexing is adjusting the income tax rate schedules by an automatic
factor to account for inflation. The concept was a new one to Members of
Congress in 1974. The idea was introduced by Milton Friedman who advocated
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it in his Newsweek column. As Friedman explained, indexing involves built-
in adjustments so that government would not profit from individuals being
forced into higher income brackets because of government-caused inflation.^
The concept was brought to the fore after Friedman visited Brazil and wit¬
nessed the practical implementation of indexing in a large economy. As the
original concept evolved following his trip to Brazil, Friedman was anxious
to expose the concept and develop it into a major public issue.
When Friedman advised the RSC's executive director that he was com¬
ing to Washington for a speaking engagement, the executive director asked
him to meet with the RSC members. This meeting occurred on May 7-8,
1974. In a private dinner meeting, followed by a luncheon meeting with
members from both Houses and both parties, Friedman advocated a specific
bill on indexing. Among the Democrats in attendance was Phil Landrum
(D-Georgia). Landrum was a senior member of the Ways and Means Com¬
mittee which would have legislative jurisdiction over changes to the tax
code such as indexing. Initial questioning from the conservative congress¬
men was largely hostile. But the questions were handled deftly by Friedman.
Eventually, the hostility gave way to considerable enthusiasm for the con¬
cept from a majority of the members present. The opposition of some of
the members stemmed from their belief that indexing tax rate brackets
would be conceding that the war against inflation was unwinnable, Friedman's
simple response was that "a world of zero inflation would obviously be
better. Yet, given the inevitable, if temporary, costs of reducing inflation
without such a measure as indexing, we should adopt it to protect ourselves
from government profiting from inflation."^
Following the discussions at this meeting, enough interest was estab¬
lished in the concept for the bill to be drafted and introduced. The draft
of the bill and accompanying floor statements were prepared by Senator
James Buckley's (R-Cons.-New York) legislative director and the staff of
the Republican Study Committee. The bill first appeared on the Senate
side under the title of the "Cost of Living Adjustment Act," and was intro¬
duced by Buckley.
Following the introduction of S. 3396, Friedman returned to the theme
in his Newsweek column. As he noted, "The changes (as incorporated in the
Buckley bill) would largely immunize the income tax from inflation."!'7 The
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bill was subsequently discussed in the Republican Study Committee White
| O
Paper,10 and introduced on the House side by a number of Republican
members. The RSC staff actively solicited co-sponsors and the bill attracted
eighteen of them from both parties.^
This bill was important for many members of the RSC. As the political
climate became chillier because of Watergate and inflation, the RSC mem¬
bers looked for positive measures to support which would deal with the prob¬
lems of the economy. Indexing was one, although its technical nature made
it a difficult concept to convey to the electorate.
The indexing bill did not pass in the 93rd Congress. However, it gave
the conservatives a tax program to support and advocate in their districts.
The alternative arrangement,, advocated by the Democratic leadership, was a
series of election year tax cuts. These tax cuts were barely adequate to
maintain an individual's relative tax position as it existed prior to the infla¬
tion which had pushed him into a higher income tax bracket. To effectively
advocate indexing, on the other hand, required an electorate educational
process. In subsequent books' and articles and in the Congress it has been
reintroduced and continues to be discussed in public policy circles.
The issues of fiscal prudence were basic questions which united the
membership of the Republican Study Committee. Staff aides provided the
basic documentation and member involvement was enlisted on these broad
issues. Their own innate conservative attitudes were reinforced by intel¬
lectual arguments and staff support which extended their individual capabil¬
ities. They were broad issues which brought conservative members together,
rather than splitting them apart. Additionally, the RSC was perceived by
the members' staffs as filling a useful role. This was helpful to the RSC
staff which had to depend on members' (and hence, members' staffs) good
will for their salary requirements. The economy,, taxes and government
spending were unifying issues for building the Republican Study Committee,
even though they did not lead to legislative victories, or even serious con¬
sideration in the legislative process.
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D. The Battle Over Federal Land Use Planning
The legislative role of the Republican Study Committee was more
important than preparing Special Orders and performing other "service"
roles. If the RSC was to play a significant role in the House of Repre¬
sentatives, it would have to make a direct and visible impact on the legis¬
lative process. It was necessary not only to play the role, but also to be
perceived as playing the role. Mayhew describes this as "credit claiming":
"[A]cting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political
actor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing
the government, or some unit thereof, to do something that
the actor (or actors) consider desirable.*
Mayhew describes "credit claiming" in terms of the individual member and
the benefits which accrue to him. But for a young organization, generally
viewed with some skepticism by most of the outside political actors, credit
claiming is an essential element in establishing credibility. The elements,
whether for an individual member or a faction, are clear: "it becomes
necessary for each congressman to try to pull off pieces of governmental
accomplishment for which he can believably generate a sense of respon¬
sibility."^ This meant active leadership in the passage or defeat of a
specific bill. The legislative battle over federal land use provided such an
opportunity.
While the concept of governmental regulation of the use of privately
owned land is an old one in United States history, the advocacy of compre¬
hensive land use planning at the federal'level is recent. The traditional
governmental control in this area had been exercised by city or county
governmental officials. Local zoning boards, usually elected but occasionally
appointed, were the forums in which citizens could participate in the desig¬
nation of uses to privately-owned land. Zoning decisions affect the value of
land. A higher use zoning decision for, say commercial purposes, would give
a tract of land substantially greater value than a comparable plot designated
for single family residential use. This was the long-established local pattern
of land regulatiop.
The first attempt to enact a federal land use policy act through the
Congress was made in January 1970. At that time, Senator Henry Jackson
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(D-Washington) introduced a bill which was referred to the Interior Committee
of the Senate, of which he was the chairman. Four days of hearings were
held on his bill, and his committee reported the bill favorably. However,
no vote was taken on the Senate floor and the House Interior Committee
also failed to take any action on the House companion measure.
Following the 1970 elections, in January, 1971, Senator Jackson introduced
S. 632 which was identical to the bill reported by the Interior Committee the
preceding year. At the request of the Nixon Administration, Jackson intro¬
duced another bill, S. 992. S. 992 was the Nixon Administration's response
to federal land use planning and was basically a milder version of the Jackson
bill. By January, 1972, an amendment was introduced to S. 992 at the re¬
quest of the Administration which provided sanctions against states that did
not develop a comprehensive land use system. Finally, the Jackson bill,
S. 632, was reported out of the Senate Interior Committee. That is, the
committee endorsed the bill and sent it to the floor of the Senate for action.
However, the committee had substantially amended it before sending it to
the Senate floor. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 60-18 on September
19, 1972, but again no vote was taken in the House on a companion measure.
The 1972 election prevented final action from taking place, and the bill died
again.
In January, 1973, Senator Jackson again introduced a bill. This one was
virtually identical to the Senate-passed version of the previous year, S. 632.
The Nixon Administration's bill was again introduced on request, this time by
Senators Fannin (R-Arizona) and Jackson. The Jackson bill, S. 268, was
marked up in the Senate Interior Committee in April, 1973. With the excep¬
tion of vocal opposition from Senators Clifford Hansen (R-Wyoming) and
Fannin, Senator Jackson was given virtually a free hand in shaping this leg¬
islation. Committee mark-up of the bill was completed in May, 1973 and
the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 62-21. With this overwhelming vote,
the momentum for passage of federal land use legislation had begun and it
seemed assured of early action in the House. If, as Froman and others main¬
tained, even though the Senate was a more liberal legislative body than the
House,^ its early action, the overwhelmingly favorable vote, the Adminis¬
tration's support, and the substantial House support, made the prospects for
passage very bright indeed. Jackson was strongly supported by Congress¬
man Morris Udall (D-Arizona) who headed the House Subcommittee
on Environment. Udall had already completed hearings on a companion bill.
The opposition in the House Interior Committee seemed limited to members
of the Republican Study Committee who were outnumbered in both the sub¬
committee and in the full committee. The member who became the leader
of the opposition, Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), had already expressed his out¬
spoken opposition to the bill despite the fact that there was no plan to stop
it in the subcommittee.
In early dune, 1973, Phil Truluck, who was on the payroll of Congress¬
man Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia) assigned to work on the staff of the RSC,
discussed the pending bill with the RSC's executive director, Albert Gilman.
Gilman arranged for Truluck to brief the Executive Committee about the
bill, its provisions, and the likelihood of its passage. The Executive Com¬
mittee expressed concern and authorized Gilman and Truluck to try to help
defeat it. Therefore, Truluck and Gilman met with Steiger about the
land use bill. They offered him and the other minority members of the
committee the assistance of the Republican Study Committee to fight the
bill. Shortly thereafter, Truluck wrote and distributed a fact sheet on the
Senate-passed bill to RSC members of the House.^ In it, Truluck noted
that the House Subcommittee on Environment of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Commiteee would begin mark-up of the committee bill on July 12
with completion expected by July 27.
The members of the Republican Study Committee objected to the bill
both because it offended their concept of federalism and because of the
specific provisions of the bill. Pressure from local interests, both elected
and those representing real estate developers, industry, and others expressed
their concerns about still more federal regulations. On the philosophical
issue of federalism, the viewpoint was expressed that even if there were
problems with the use of the land, adding another layer of bureaucracy would
not solve them. Rather, to require additional permits from the government
would substantially lengthen the period to complete a construction project,
increase costs, and remove the decision-making process from the local citizens
to distant offices, of the federal government which could be out of tune with
local conditions and requirements.
After the publication of the fact sheet, Gilman assigned Truiuck to
full-time work in conjunction with several members of the minority committee
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staff. As on every committee, the senior minority members on the Interior
Committee were responsible for the hiring of the minority staff. One of
these members was Philip Ruppe (R-Michigan) who was a principal co-sponsor
of the Udall bill. Ruppe was the ranking Republican on Udall's subcommittee.
Consequently, his minority staff was more responsive to the Udall position
than to the view held by Messrs. Steiger, Ketchum (R-Caiifornia), Bauman
(R-Maryland), Symms (R-Idaho) and the other Republicans on the committee
who opposed the legislation. Because of this vacuum, Truluck bacame an
ad hoc staff member of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's Sub¬
committee on the Environment working for the minority members who were
deprived of staff representation because the ranking minority member's view
coincided with that of the chairman.
The Nixon Administration continued to express support for a compre¬
hensive land use planning bill. The Secretary of the Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton,
himself a former House member from Maryland, was an enthusiastic supporter
of some form of federal land use planning. Privately, Steiger and others
questioned his motives. The Jackson/Udall bill would enhance the size and
power of the Department of Interior in Washington. Thus, the bureaucrats in
the Interior Department strongly supported the bill and applied pressure on
the Secretary to support it as well. Whatever his motives, Morton's support
gave the bill a bi-partisan cast which made opposition even more difficult.
Despite Truluck's assistance in the preparation of amendments, during
the mark-up sessions in the Subcommittee on the Environment, Steiger was
unsuccessful in having any of them adopted. His fellow Arizonan, Udall, was
unyielding. Udall suggested that the provisions which Steiger found obnoxious
should be left in the bill and that they could be taken out when the bill
reached the full committee. This reversed the usual theory which was that
the subcommittee stage was for drafting, amending and perfecting proposed
legislation before it reached the full committee. The bill was finally re¬
ported from the Subcommittee on the Environment in late September. It
was a Jackson/Udall bill without any attempt at compromising with the
Steiger forces. Truluck maintained his full-time relationship with Steiger and
the other members of the Interior Committee who were also members of the
Republican Study Committee. During the last quarter of 1973, he gave brief¬
ings to members and staff, wrote speeches which were inserted in the
Congressional Record opposing the Udall comprehensive land use approach,
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arranged for a Special Order on the House floor which included speeches by
more than twenty members on the subject, and worked on language for a
substitute land use bill which would be introduced by Steiger.The Steiger
substitute gave incentives to the states to adopt their own plans and made
the federal role simply an advisory one. Truiuck and Steiger frequently re¬
ported on their progress to the Executive Committee. This was helpful
because it kept the members informed, and more importantly, they could see
that the RSC staff was playing a role in the legislative process. The Execu¬
tive Committee strongly supported Steiger in his efforts, and worked with
him on projects like the Special Order. Truiuck outlined provisions of the
Steiger alternative bill in a section-by-section analysis which was distributed
to all members of the Republican Study Committee.^ At the same time,
Steiger sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to all members of the House in which
he indicated that he would be introducing his alternative bill and inviting
them to co-sponsor it with him.27 The timing was crucial because Chairman
Udall had planned to report the bill from the Interior Committee in order to
have a vote on the House floor before Christmas. However, Steiger and his
colleagues planned to offer a number of amendments to the Udall bill on the
House floor. This and the introduction of the Steiger substitute bill delayed
Udall's timetable.
The Steiger substitute (H.R. 11325) played a vital role in his strategy.
Considering that the Administration basically supported a Udall-type compul¬
sory approach to land use planning, and that the environmental movement
was at the height of its political power, it was politically impractical for
some members to be in a position of outright opposition to federal land use.
The Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups were very powerful
at this time. They had active allies on the committee including Chairman
Udall. However, there was some dissatisfaction from the environmentalists
with the younger liberal members of the committee:
"[T]hey seem to skimp on their homework. There is this com¬
ment by an official of Friends of the Earth, a preservationist
group: 'They (pro-environment younger committee members) are
usually preoccupied with their other committee assignments. So
they don't provide any leadership. They vote with us, but they
won't take the time to learn about the subject matter'."2^
On the other side of the issue, Steiger and Truiuck were trying to educate
their supporters on the complicated provisions of the bill. Despite these
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flaws, however, the balance of power on the committee clearly resided with
Udall and his allies. It was politically difficult to be labeled "anti-environ¬
ment" by the organizations which supported the Udail bill. Therefore, many
members had the desire to "hang their hat on another peg" — in this case,
a milder bill in the form of the Steiger substitute. An important factor
was the support of John Rhodes, Steiger's Arizona Republican colleague in
the House, as the principal co-sponsor of the bill. Rhodes' credentials with
the Republican establishment were impeccable, and they would offset Morton's
appeal to his former House colleagues.
Truluck also served as the contact man for outside interest groups
which opposed comprehensive land use planning. For example, on November
28, 1973, he accompanied Messrs. Steiger, Symms and Ketchum to a meeting
with representatives of approximately 30 trade associations -which opposed
the Udall approach to land use. This was a session to discuss not only the
contents of the Udall bill, but also the likely scenario if the Udall bill went
to conference with the Jackson bill. The presumption of Steiger and Truluck
was that the worst provisions of both Udall and Jackson (I.E., the least
conservative) would be merged into the final version of the bill. They argued
that any industry lobbyist who believed that his amendment might be adopted
in the House but who did not realize that his amendment would be deleted
in conference was being unrealistic. They strongly urged the industry lobby¬
ists to help them fight the Udall bill. Because of these external and internal
pressures, the full Interior Committee continued its mark-up sessions after the
Christmas holiday recess and did not complete them until late January, 1974.
At the completion of the mark-up sessions, Steiger again relied on the
Republican Study Committee, this time to write the Dissenting Views. At
the same time, Ketchum requested that the minority committee staff pre¬
pare an official minority report. This official report was written by
Bruce Driver who had been appointed by Congressman Ruppe and, as such,
was a leading advocate of the Udall bill. The Driver report was not
acceptable to the minority, and Ketchum signed the RSC-prepared Steiger
Dissenting Views. Eventually, the official minority report died for the lack
of any signatures at all. The Steiger-Truluck views gathered eight of the
99eleven opposing members as signators.
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The report on H.R. 10294 together with these Minority Views was filed
on February 13, 1974.^0 With the bill having been reported officially from
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, attention now moved to
the battle on the House floor. However, in RSC meetings and strategy ses¬
sions among Steiger, Truluck and others, their attention focused on the Rules
Committee. A preliminary count of the Rules Committee membership
indicated that 5 of the 15 members would oppose granting a rule for the
bill. Because the Rules Committee functions as the clearinghouse for all
legislation before it reaches the House floor, with three additional votes,
the rule could be killed and a more difficult fight on the House floor would
be avoided. The Rules Committee operates under unusual procedures. The
only witnesses who are permitted to testify before the committee are other
members of the House. It is customary for the chairman and possibly one
or two senior members from the originating committee to testify on the
merits (or lack thereof) of a bill originating in their committee of original
jurisdiction.
Steiger and Truluck worked out a strategy to gain three more votes in
the Rules Committee to oppose the bill. They met with the Executive
Committee, and the members made the defeat of the land use bill their top
legislative priority. With this decision having been made, the entire RSC
staff began working closely with Sam Steiger and in support of Truluck.
The staff began a concerted effort to line up as many members as possible
to oppose the bill in testimony before the Rules Committee.
Simultaneously, attempts had been made to convince the White House
to change its position. In February, 1974, several RSC members paid a
visit to President Nixon to discuss some of the issues coming before the
Congress. Among these was Steiger discussing land use. The President
indicated that he would certainly look into the land use issue because he
didn't realize that there were the problems with this bill that Steiger had
outlined to him. During the following week, three White House staff mem¬
bers visited Steiger's office to review his objections to the bill. Steiger was
out of town and it fell on Truluck to present the Steiger objections to the
bill. H.R. 10294 — the official version of the Udail bill — was reviewed
page-by-page and the RSC objections were raised. While no commitment
was made by these White House emissaries, they said they would review
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their position and reconsider it if necessary. The Truluck objections, com¬
bined with Rhodes' support of Steiger, and the strong views of the RSC
leadership, convinced the White House staff to change its position. Two
weeks later, the White House sent word to Minority Leader John Rhodes
that the Administration was withdrawing its support for the Udall bill and
would instead support the Steiger substitute on land use. When Rhodes
testified in opposition to the Udall bill before the House Rules Committee
on February 26, 1974, he was able to announce the switch in the White House
position. This change came as a surprise to Udall and his colleagues. Be¬
cause of this announcement and the testimony of more than 15 members of
the Republican Study Committee, the Rules Committee voted to defer action
indefinitely by the strong vote of 9-4. The strength of the opposition to
the rule was much greater than Udall or the other supporters had expected.
Both the White House opposition, and the fact that fifteen members were
sufficiently concerned to testify against the bill had an impact on the com¬
mittee. But the battle was far from over.
Udall then began his own series of negotiations with key members of
the Rules Committee to have his bill reconsidered. Private assurances were
made to Udall that if additional hearings were held, the Rules Committee
would bring the bill back up for consideration. Udall scheduled further
hearings in late April. By this time, the Republican Study Committee staff
had been able to contact a number of trade and industry organizations from
throughout the country to urge them to coordinate their local affiliates to
testify in opposition to the Udall bill. The message of these grass roots
witnesses was simple: oppose the Udall bill and call for full hearings
throughout the United States. The Washington hearings were originally
scheduled for two days, but they had to be lengthened to three days because
of the large number of witnesses desiring to testify. Of the more than 70
witnesses who testified, 56 opposed the bill and called for field hearings on
it. This strong showing was a direct result of Truluck's efforts to work
with the business community. Even with this evidence of opposition, Udall
changed nothing in the bill and continued to press the Rules Committee to
consider his bill again.
The Democratic leadership joined him in pressuring the Rules Committee
Democrats who had previously opposed the rule to switch their position.
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Consequently, Chairman Ray Madden (D-Indiana), James Delaney (D-New
York) and Morgan Murphy (D-Illinois) switched to favor the granting of a
rule for H.R. 10294. On May 15, the Rules Committee met again and
passed a rule by a vote of 8-7. Steiger and the RSC had lost in the Rules
Committee and the next stage of the land use battle would move to the
floor of the House of Representatives.
In a strategy session at an RSC Executive Committee meeting, Steiger
and his colleagues decided to attempt to defeat the rule on the floor of
the House rather than wait and vote against the bill or in favor of the
substitute. This strategy was adopted because Steiger believed if the bill
came up for debate on the floor of the House, Udall would probably accept
enough Steiger-type amendments to convince some of the swing votes to
support his bill. Then, when Udall and his House colleagues went into the
Joint House-Senate Conference with Jackson and the other Senate conferees
to reconcile the two measures, the House would recede from its position
and accept the Senate version of the bill. Thus, Udail would achieve his
objective anyway.
Therefore, the attention of the Steiger forces focused on the rule.
This was a crucial decision because defeating an open rule on a major
piece of legislation is difficult. Most rules battles evolve around closed
rules (those which fail to permit amendments) to legislation such as tax
bills. However the land use bill's opponents believed that with the original
Rules Committee vote, the additional hearings which overwhelmingly opposed
the bill, the availability of a substitute, and the new White House opposition
to the bill, there was a strong base to oppose the granting of the rule on
the House floor.
At Steiger's request, the RSC made a whip call. This preliminary RSC
headcount indicated a firm 190 votes in opposition to the Udall bill in its
current form, but it was uncertain how many of these votes could be trans¬
ferred into opposition to the rule on the Udall bill. The Udall bill was
scheduled for action on Tuesday, June 11, 1974. Under House procedures,
the debate and voting on the bill is preceded immediately by the discussion
and vote on the rule to accompany the bill. In the Congressional Record
appearing on Monday, June 10, the opponents of the bill received a major
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surprise by Udall who published 21 amendments that would be offered on the
floor to his bill.32 These amendments were ones which Steiger and his
colleagues had been trying to have adopted since the beginning of the land
use battle in subcommittee and which Udail and his proponents had been
rejecting. The adoption of these Steiger amendments would weaken Steiger's
hand for the subsequent floor vote on the bill. The amendments indicated
that the Steiger strategy was right and that the vote on the rule was all-
important. Steiger was convinced that Udall would accept these amend¬
ments on the floor, and then recede from them in the conference with the
Senate. In addition, these Udall amendments gave the Steiger forces extra
evidence that the bill was not ready for action on the floor of the House
because Udall, himself, admitted many changes needed to be made to his
bill. Truluck and others on the Republican Study Committee staff prepared
a number of floor statements which stressed this point during the debate on
the House rule. The Republican Study Committee not only provided speeches
in opposition to the rule, it also made a series of whip calls to member
offices urging a no vote on the rule and explaining the rationale for it.
Their whip calls indicated that the RSC had a good chance to prevail, but
that the vote would be very close. On the critical vote on the House rule
on June 11, 1974, the Steiger forces did prevail and the rule to accompany
the bill, H.R. 10294, was defeated by a vote of 211-204.33
The stunning victory on land use for Steiger and his colleagues in the
Republican Study Committee not only was a reassurance to the RSC Execu¬
tive Committee that the activities of the RSC were meaningful and important,
it was also vital to giving the organization credibility in the eyes of the
formal power structure of the House. Because its staff resources had been
substantially committed to the efforts, and because Steiger had kept the
RSC members involved in formulating his strategy, the RSC achieved
important credibility by winning the seemingly impossible battle on the House
floor against the rule. The RSC's role as the leader on this major issue
which had originally been considered in 1970 was widely recognized. As
Mayhew notes:
"The single fact that Congress records a roll call, whether
close or one-sided, supplies no evidence that anyone has engaged
in any mobilizing activity."3^
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It was clear to Udall, the White House, Rhodes and all of the other partici¬
pants that the RSC had mobilized the opposition on this bill and that they
had succeeded. As John Rousselot (R-California), the treasurer of the RSC,
was to point out later:
"The RSC victory on land use was an accomplishment recog- .
nized even by the liberals in the party. Alan Steelman (R-Texas)
told me 'You guys really did your homework'.
Other members also recognized the role of the RSC, and they attended a
victory party in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building
which the staff had arranged for the late afternoon of the vote. In all,
more than 300 people attended. The party was important because it pro¬
vided psychological recognition that the RSC was now a major participant
in the House legislative process. The RSC had become a significant force
both theoretically and practically in the House. Theoretically because the
leadership was now forced to take formal notice of the organization and
discuss the organization's concerns on major issues of interest to it. On
the practical side, three days after the victory on the House rule,
John Rhodes, the House Minority Leader, and the only Republican member
on the House Building Commission, called LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), the
RSC chairman, and advised him that the Building Commission had just met
and the RSC had been given the use of Room 134 in the Cannon House office
Building. The room had formerly been occupied by the Executive Liaison
Office, but their use of it had been terminated. The room itself was approx¬
imately three times larger than the RSC's headquarters on the third floor
of House Office Building Annex I. In addition, the prestige of being located
in one of the main House buildings with vote bells, meant the RSC was a
serious legislative organization on a par with the Democratic Study Group.
It was the symbolic fulfillment of the efforts of many of the individuals who
had supported the embryonic RSC.
E. Legal Services Corporation
Of all the public policy issues which confronted conservative Republicans
in the House during the Nixon Administration, few faced as much innate hos¬
tility as did the component programs of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty.
According to conservative analysis, the Johnson-type massive social welfare
programs had been judged a failure. It was argued that these programs were
spending vast sums of money which were not aiding the poor, but rather
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aiding the poverty bureaucrats. Even more importantly to the conservatives,
they were upsetting the established social order. For example, in the case
of legal services, rather than concentrating on legal assistance for the poor,
it was said that the legal services lawyers were involved in class action
suits, political activity, divisive social activities, such as setting children
against their own parents, and other para-legal actions which the conserva¬
tives considered outside the original scope of the 1966 charter of the Legal
Services Corporation. These activities were seen as a different concept of
Legal Services, which had been to provide basic access to the legal system
to poor citizens in their everyday lives. The proponents of Legal Services
had justified the program on the basis of the need to protect the poor from
usurers, assist them with small claims, help in divorce settlements and other
civil proceedings. The implementation of the Legal Services program was
very different, according to conservatives.
In this battle, the conservative members of the House were completely
united. They found a ready ally in Richard Nixon who had always been
skeptical of the Legal Services Corporation. In 1971, President Nixon vetoed
a Legal Services expansion bill because the compromise version provided for
the Presidential appointment of only 6 of the 17 members of the board. In
1972, a provision to transfer the legal services function to a separate corpora¬
tion out of the Office of Economic Opportunity was dropped because of a
threatened Presidential veto.
By 1973, Nixon had announced his plans to dismantle the Office of
Economic Opportunity of which the Legal Services Corporation was an
integral part. He would parcel the various elements of OEO out to older,
established federal agencies. In the budget accompanying his message, it
was also provided that Legal Services would be established as an independent
corporation. The conservatives had hoped that Nixon would abolish the pro¬
gram. Failing that, a complete restructuring provided the opportunity to at
least rein the program in substantially. Thus, in the fiscal year 1974 budget,
there was no money included for the Office of Economic Opportunity.
With the advent of the 93rd Congress in 1973 and the newly formed
Republican Study Committee, a number of its members expressed renewed
concern about Legal Services. The outspoken wrath of the conservatives
received a new impetus through the appointment of Howard Phillips as
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Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.-^ Phillips served in this
capacity for a stormy six-month period from January 1973 to June 1973.
During his service, Phillips was to have presided over the abolition of the
Office of Economic Opportunity at the expressed direction of the President.
But his venture at OEO was more a public relations success for him and
his conservative allies than it was a substantive victory over the allies of
the Office of Economic Opportunity. Phillips later became the founding
director of the Conservative Caucus. His stormy tenure at OEO was
marked by outspoken exchanges with senior congressional Democrats, other
governmental agency heads, and some of his own subordinates who had the
protection of the Civil Service Commission and could criticize their nominal
superior.
On May 11, 1973, President Nixon announced his decision to support a
Legal Services Corporation. This position was being advocated by a number
of his personal White House advisors, the "legal establishment" in the form
of the American Bar Association, and the Democratic leadership of the
Congress. Opposing them was Acting Director Phillips who advocated a
revenue sharing type approach which would have established 50 separate
entities to administer a legal aid program, a different one being set up
in each state. The revenue sharing alternative presumably would have been
under the tighter restrictions of state supervisory agencies. Additionally,
Phillips maintained that advances in providing real services would have a
better opportunity to flourish in a decentralized program. Phillips had the
enthusiastic backing of conservatives in both the House and the Senate who
could point to substantial abuses in the federally funded and federally directed
program.^7
Following the President's indication of support of the bill, the House
Education and Labor Committee reported a bill (H.R. 7824) on June 4
which would establish an independent Legal Services Corporation. While
there were some differences between its version and that offered by the
Administration, the bill embodied the corporation concept with little to
mollify the House conservatives. During his tenure at OEO, Phillips main¬
tained a close relationship with the staff of the RSC. He met with the
RSC Executive Committee on two occasions and helped feed "horror stories"
to his congressional allies. These became the basis for two Special Orders
on the House floor.
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•The Special Orders were taken on May 31, 1973 on the Legal Services
issue and on June 5, 197338 on the general question of the continuation of
the Office of Economic Opportunity. While the two issues were closely
interrelated, it was clear from the outset that the Legal Services program
would engender most of the opposition of the conservatives. The question
of which agency would be the home for an OEO program was not as polit¬
ically important a question as was the involvement of the Legal Services
Corporation in local political issues. Some of President Nixon's advisors
encouraged him to support an independent corporation. Others leaned toward
the RSC viewpoint. Thus, the question was open and the RSC members had
a reasonable expectation that they might influence the results toward reining
in the legal services activists.
The Legal Services bill, H.R. 7824, was reported to the House from the
House Education and Labor Committee on June 4, 1973.39 The committee
bill called for an eleven-member board for the corporation with all members
appointed by the President. All members would be subject to Senate approval
and no more than six could be in any one political party and at least a
majority had to consist of attorneys. Thus, Nixon's earlier objection to the
lack of executive control over the board was met by permitting the President
to nominate all the members. Despite this concession to the White House,
the members of the Republican Study Committee continued their active
opposition to the bill. Earl Landgrebe (R-Indiana) objected to the bill
because no hearings were held on it and because the provisions against
political activity and lobbying by legal services attorneys were weakened.
He also objected to the committee deleting the language barring frivolous
appeals and negating the ban on grants to public interest law firms. All of
these matters were to become the subject of amendments when the bill
reached the House floor on June 21. Similarly, John Ashbrook and
Robert Huber (R-Michigan) objected to the committee bill because they
claimed it had stretched "gaping holes [in the Administration's proposals]
so as not to provide effective defenses against political abuse of the corpor¬
ation.Ashbrook was a member and Huber was one of the four vice
chairmen of the^ Republican Study Committee.
The House passed H.R. 7824 on June 21 by a 276-95 record vote. But
it did so only after adopting 24 amendments sharply restricting the activities
of the Legal Services Corporation.At the beginning of the debate, a
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number of amendments were offered and accepted, such as those by
Albert Quie (R-Minnesota), the ranking member on the committee. Quie
was a liberal Republican member of the Wednesday Group. An early Quie
amendment prohibited Legal Services Corporation employee participation in
referenda or political matters and from engaging in boycotts or illegal
activities. But the first major floor battle was the question of backup
research centers for the Legal Services Corporation. As Congresswoman
Edith Green (D-Oregon) asked when she introduced an amendment to pro¬
vide legal aid for the poor:
"Does it mean that we should also finance, using millions of
dollars, research centers aimed solely at changing social policy?
That is, unless my amendment is adopted, precisely what will
you be doing by this legislation?"^
Green's leadership, as a moderate Democrat, was a key element in achieving
success on many of these key amendments. Among the participants in the
debate on the Green Amendment on backup centers was Minority Leader
Gerald Ford who pointed to the local situation in his home town of Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Ford noted how the local members of the bar had a
common library which they mutually supported and which was able to pro¬
vide research capabilities to any of the subscribers. As Ford stated:
"I do not know of any lawyers who practice who have the
benefit of the massive backup in their private practice. Why
should we give to the corporate attorneys an extra capability
through backup centers when we do not do it for the lawyers
generally.
Thus, Edith Green, representing moderate Democrats, was joined by the
leader of the Republican establishment, Gerald Ford, in opposing the backup
centers. Other speakers included a number of members of the Republican
Study Committee, including future chairman, David Treen (R-Louisiana).
Their involvement had been solicited by the RSC staff. The staff had
briefed them and prepared their statements. The Green Amendment over¬
whelmingly carried by the vote of 245-166.^
The next recorded vote on an amendment was that offered by RSC
Vice Chairman David Dennis (R-Indiana), which provided that in the interest
of citizens, they could bring suits against the Legal Services Corporation
for non-compliance with their charter. The amendment, floor speeches
and preparatory work on the Dennis Amendment had been prepared by the
RSC staff. The motion was defeated by a vote of 159-237. The supporters
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of Dennis included the majority of members of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee, conservative Democrats, and some establishment figures including
Congresswoman Green. Arrayed against him were Minority Leader Ford,
as well as the party leadership which carried with it a number of moderate
members of the Republican party.
Another major ideological battle was the amendment offered by Quie to
prohibit lobbying activities by employees of the Legal Services Corporation.
He cited the activities of past legal services attorneys on lobbying both in
the Congress and in the state legislatures. The Quie Amendment specifically
banned lobbying unless the legislative body issued a formal invitation for
them to testify. This Quie Amendment carried by a vote of 200-181.^
While Quie was not a member of the Republican Study Committee, the
amendments which he and Mrs. Green offered in the legal services battle
were supported overwhelmingly by the membership of the RSC. The numerous
RSC members who participated in the floor debate all had their statements
prepared by the RSC staff. The RSC staff had briefed these members
individually to prepare them for the debate. The next Quie Amendment pro¬
hibited participation in partisan political activities. It carried by a vote of
207-171.^6
Other votes on sensitive subjects included one offered by RSC member
Wilmer Mizell (R-North Carolina) to forbid the Legal Services staff from
engaging in activities regarding busing of school children to achieve racial
balance in the schools. In the past, legal services attorneys had used their
position to contravene the stated congressional position on social issues —
such as busing — by supporting activities which the Congress had strongly
opposed. The Mizell Amendment carried 221-150.^7 Two amendments
dealing with federally funded abortions also carried overwhelmingly.^
These amendments were offered by two other RSC members, Harold Froehlich
and Larry Hogan (R-Maryland).
The motion to recommit the bill, and thus kill it, failed by the very
narrow margin of 191-189. The bill itself carried on a vote of 276-95 with
the 95 opposition votes including sixty members of the Republican Study
Committee, four liberal Democrats who were upset with the local political
involvement of the Legal Services Corporation, and twenty-five conservative
158
Democrats led by their traditional leader, doe Waggonner (D-Louisiana).^^
Despite this apparent weak showing on final passage, the "Vote was a major
victory for conservatives, containing provisions sharply restricting the
activities of Legal Services lawyers and eliminating existing legal research
backup centers."^0
While Congressional Quarterly considered the results a "major victory"
for conservatives, the RSC membership only considered it a partial victory.
The RSC's amendments had not carried. The successful amendments were
offered by Edith Green, a moderate Democrat, and A1 Quie, a liberal and
leading member of the Republican establishment. While it was the support
of the Republican conservatives who backed their amendments during the
floor debate and on the votes, on RSC substantive amendments, like
David Dennis', the Republican establishment was not supportive. While Mizell,
Froehlich and Hogan had their restrictive amendments adopted, they were of
a prohibition type rather than dealing with the structure of the Corporation.
The results were not as good as they might have been, particularly since the
conservatives were dealing from a position of strength including the President's
two prior refusals to sign the Legal Services bill. The conservative RSC
members provided Quie and Green with the necessary support during the
debate on the House floor. The RSC staff briefed the members, conducted
whip calls for the votes and generally coordinated the position of the opposi¬
tion to the Legal Services bill. RSC members also provided the necessary
votes to pass the amendments, thus making the bill less objectionable than it
otherwise would have been. Every officer of the RSC actively participated
in the general debate and RSC Vice Chairman Ben Blackburn was the group's
coordinator for activities on the bill. Despite the 24 major amendments which
were adopted with the RSC member support, they were not sufficiently attrac¬
tive for the RSC members to support the bill on final passage.
The issue was later carried to the Senate floor where it was filibustered
by a group of conservative Republican senators led by Jesse Helms (North
Carolina), Bill Brock (Tennessee) and conservative Democrat James Allen
(Alabama). Blackburn met with Helms, Brock and Allen to advise them of
the House activities and to offer the RSC's staff help in the Senate battle.
The filibuster attempt in the Senate survived two December 1973 cloture
votes and carried over to the 1974 session. Following the Christmas recess
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and the institution of the Second Session of the 93rd Congress, the Senate
passed the Legal Services Corporation Act on January 31, 1974. While the
Senate-passed version was given the designation S. 2686, the entire substance
of the bill was that of H.R. 7824 which failed to include any of the restric¬
tive amendments which the House had so painstakingly put into their version
the previous June. The RSC members had learned the value of coordinating
their activities with the Senate allies in this instance. The RSC members
observed how their House adversaries were working closely with their Senate
counterparts and thus able to use the intricacies of the legislative process
to their own advantage. In an RSC fact sheet issued shortly after the Senate
passage of the bill (on February 8, 1974), the legislative recommendation was:
"The only way to keep an unrestricted bill from becoming law
is to defeat the Conference Report. That is an ususual step to
advocate, but the gravity of the consequences of having an inde¬
pendent fully-financed, totally unaccountable federal Legal Services
Corporation justifies such a strategy."-' *
At this stage, the decision on Legal Services shifted to the Conference
Committee between the House and Senate. The national news media, including
most political commentators, had related decisions on subjects such as this
and virtually all others to "impeachment politics." As commentators
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak noted in the Washington Post:
"...the President also might veto a bill for a new Legal Services
program (formerly lodged in GEO) if the Senate-House Conference
now devising the final form persists in the present trends." ^
That is, according to Evans and Novak, Nixon might give in to the conserva¬
tives on Legal Services with the hope it would win him support from the
RSC members. Legal Services was discussed at virtually every weekly
meeting of the Executive Committee. In May, a new RSC fact sheet was
published. This updated fact sheet on the results of the Conference Report
was distributed on Tuesday morning, May 14 and inserted in the Congressional
Record by Ben Blackburn on that date. ^ The next day, A1 Quie rebutted
the fact sheet stating, "In the scope of its misrepresentations, omissions, and
mistakes, it is incredible.The matter was subsequently debated in the
House Republican Conference where Rousselot and Blackburn from the
Republican Study Committee led the debate among their colleagues. The
senior staff of the RSC and Howard Phillips met with the RSC members to
keep them current on the intricacies of the bill. Blackburn opened the
Republican Conference discussion with the rhetorical question: "I'd like to
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see everybody raise his hand who believes that a majority of his constituents
favor this bill." According to Blackburn, only two members — William Steiger
(R-Wisconsin) and Quie — raised their hands.55
The Conference did not unify the Republican position. The White House
opposed the bill because of the backup centers, but Quie and other liberal
Republicans supported it. The RSC opposed it for a wide range of reasons.
On May 16, the floor debate began on the Conference Report. RSC member
John Ashbrook moved to recommit the report to the Conference Committee
with instructions to delete provisions for the legal backup centers. Ashbrook
was defeated by the narrow margin of 183-191.56 jhe next vote was on
final passage of the Conference Report when 143 members voted against the
bill. This was just three short of the necessary one-third of the entire House
membership which would be required to sustain a Presidential veto of the bill.
The White House had indicated that with the backup centers still in the bill,
a Presidential veto was almost certain.
With the political reality of a possible veto and a strong opposition
House vote, the Senate conferees reclaimed the bill and deleted the backup
center provisions in order to save the rest of the Legal Services Corporation.
The Senate sent the President the revised bill and on July 25, 1974,
President Nixon signed into law the Legal Services Corporation.
This battle was a legislative failure for the RSC. It was a bitter pill
to swallow because the RSC staff had provided the members with resources
which they could not have allocated from their personal staffs. The staff
had monitored the issue during the entire legislative process for more than
a year. The issue had been discussed at numerous Executive Committee
meetings, and outside experts had provided the members and the staff with
arguments and amendments.
Still, the RSC did not have the full cooperation of the Republican
leadership (as it had on the land use battle), and the Administration did not
support its efforts. Despite a year's efforts, the RSC activists' battle over
Legal Services was unsuccessful.
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F. Reinstating the Private Ownership of Gold
The legislative battle to legalize the private ownership of gold was
basically the crusade of a single man, Congressman Philip M. Crane. One
of the first bills that Crane introduced in 1970j after his initial election
in November 1969, was legislation to allow American citizens to buy, hold,
sell or otherwise deal in gold. Private ownership of gold had been declared
illegal in the Roosevelt Administration as one of his means of dealing with
the Great Depression. By the 1970s, Crane and his allies no longer argued
for the return to the gold standard. Rather, they adopted the Administration's
rhetoric that gold was a commodity which had been demonetized by President
Nixon in August 1971. Thus, it was merely a commodity, and as such the
ownership of it by private citizens should not be proscribed. Despite this
semantic concession, Crane was considered a "hard money" man, who had a
national constituency which would like to be able to own gold again. Despite
Crane's service on the House Banking and Currency Committee which had
legislative jurisdiction over the subject area, Crane could not secure hearings
on his bill because of the outspoken opposition of the committee's chairman,
Wright Patman (D-Texas), and other senior Democrats on the House Banking
and Currency Committee such as Henry Reuss (D-Wisconsin) and Henry Gonzalez
(D-Texas). Crane's position as a junior Republican worked against him, as did
the prevailing philosophy against the private ownership of gold.
He made a futile attempt to introduce appropriate language in 1971 to
the Par Value Modification Act. On his second attempt on a similar bill in
May 1973, Crane enlisted the aid of the Republican Study Committee. The
RSC staff produced a fact sheet in support of his amendment. Then Crane
achieved a modest victory when Henry Reuss agreed in committee to an
amendment which would permit the private ownership of gold on a future
date to be set at the discretion of the President. Crane pushed further with
an amendment to reinstate a date certain. This Crane amendment was voted
on when the bill reached the House floor. His position was defeated by a
tie vote of 162-162. The bill carried with it the compromise provision of a
date to be deterhnined at the discretion of the President.-''7
Crane continued to advocate a date certain. The legislative vehicle
which he next used came about via unusual circumstances. On the floor of
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the House on January 23, 1974, the House voted down H.R. 11354, the bill
to expand the U.S. commitment to the International Development Association.
IDA is the soft loan window of the World Bank making congressional loans
to underdeveloped nations. H.R. 11354 specified that the United States to¬
gether with other countries should agree to a fourth replenishment of funds
in order to insure IDA's continuing ability to make loans on a concessionary
basis. This bill was defeated in the House by a vote of 155-248. The Nixon
Administration had carefully worked out the agreement with the other major
World Bank members. The Administration could not let the matter rest.
When it came before the Senate in the form of S. 2665,the primary advo¬
cates of private ownership of gold, Senators James McClure (R-Idaho) and
Peter Dominick (R-Colorado), joined together to sponsor an amendment to the
IDA replenishment which called for private gold ownership on September 1,
1974. The amendment was introduced on the Senate side because the germane¬
ness rules in that body are less stringent than they are in the House of Repre¬
sentatives. That is, in the House, the Parliamentarian could rule such an
amendment out of order because it was not directly related to the subject
under consideration.
After considerable debate, the McClure-Dominick Amendment carried and
the Senate passed the bill including reinstatement of private ownership of gold
on May 29, 1974 by a vote of 55-27.^ Immediately afterwards, the House
Banking and Currency Committee's Subcommittee on International Finance,
under the chairmanship of Henry Gonzalez, began another series of hearings
to try to pass the IDA bill again. Crane utilized the RSC staff to prepare
questions for Treasury Secretary Simon, and to check with his colleagues
about their position on a compromise bill.
In the one day of public hearings held on June 11, 1974,^ Secretary Simon
was specifically asked by Subcommittee Chairman Gonzalez as to the desirability
of establishing a specific date for reinstituting the private ownership of gold.
Simon's response was:
"I do not believe, on the other hand, that it would be wise for
the Congress to legislate removal of the existing gold restriction
on a certain date. Such legislative inflexibility could hamper the
U.S. representatives [to the IMF meetings] in renegotiating the
reform which is now underway."61
At the same appearance, Simon went on to say:
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"My own desire is that I would be able to recommend that...
the President [exercise] the authority to remove the gold re¬
strictions when this step can be taken without serious disturb¬
ance."62
Simon objected to the September 1 date adopted by the Senate because
it fell in the middle of the IMF Special Meetings and Simon believed that
this could hamper those delicate negotiations. But he was also a political
realist who then requested that the date at least be put back to December
31 if there was going to be a date certain.
In a colloquy between senior Republican, William Stanton, and Philip Crane,




Mr. Crane, I would ask you directly — this
subject, I know, is very important to you. It
is going to be changed some time or another.
But would you and your friends vote for IDA
legislation if we put this gold amendment in
it or would you not?
I would vote for it. I would accept the com¬
promise on the December 31 date as well.
I have polled some of my colleagues who
voted against IDA and who also are for gold
ownership and there are somewhere in the
neighborhood of 18 thus far, I have found,
who would do likewise. Now there are 80
who voted for gold and who simultaneously
voted against IDA but I cannot vouch for
all of them, because as I said, I have only
had responses, favorable responses, from about
18. That would be a turnaround vote of 36
votes.
I thank you for your honesty.6^
Crane had used the RSC staff to poll its members to see how many
would be willing to trade their votes. With Crane's indication of 18 certain
switches already, a division within the Republican Study Committee became
clear. Serving on the Banking and Currency Committee with Crane was his
equally conservative colleague, John Rousselot. Rousselot expressed dismay
to Crane that he had been using the staff of the Republican Study Committee
to pursue this goal. Rousselot demanded that the matter be put to a vote
of the Executive Committee. He objected to Crane's position because he
opposed the IDA replenishment under any circumstances. Rousselot wanted
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RSC staff assistance to be discontinued immediately until the Executive
Committee had voted on its position on the bill.
Crane responded to Rousselot that the RSC's staff involvement had
been minimal. He agreed that unless the Executive Committee of the RSC
supported involvement, he would stop using the RSC staff resources for this
project. At the next meeting, the Executive Committee discussed the issue,
but it was never brought to a formal vote. The Rousselot pressure forced
the staff to limit its involvement because of the conflicting positions. In
retrospect, Rousselot's opposition was based on his belief that the RSC had
defeated IDA. Rousselot stated later:
"I urged Crane lo put the gold amendment on another bill — not
one which we had defeated. But he resisted because he said, 'we
know the White House will sign this one.' It was a disagreement on
strategy, that's all." ^
On June 18, the Committee voted 15-6 for the IDA replenishment
together with the private ownership of gold effective December 31, 1974.
By this time, Crane had exchanged views with the Under Secretary of the
Treasury, Paul Volcker, on a number of other issues,^ including IDA assist¬
ance to Vietnam, the U.S. position on continued membership of the Republic
of China in the IMF/IBRD, and the use of IDA loans for countries which had
purchased military hardware from non-IMF/IBRD members.Crane brought
in these other issues because he wanted to make the trade-off as attractive
as possible for his conservative allies. Volcker reassured Crane of the
Administration's support on these issues. The exchange of letters was
designed by Crane to be a part of the legislative history on the bill although
he had no intentions of requesting a vote on every issue. The Crane views
in support of IDA with the gold ownership provision were stated in the
Supplementary Views to H.R. 15465 accompanying the report on the bill.^
By this time, Crane had obtained the additional support of two of his
colleagues on the Banking Committee, Lawrence Williams (R-Pennsylvania)
and Ben Blackburn. Williams supported Crane basically on the merits of the
issue and his belief in the private ownership of gold. Blackburn recognized
the adroit manner in which conservatives in the House were obtaining some
of their legislative goals by this legislative compromise and also supported
Crane. Blackburn, at that time, served as one of the four vice chairmen
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of the Republican Study Committee. When Crane enlisted Blackburn,
Rousseiot again stated his opposition to RSC staff involvement in the bill.
At this point, Crane's strategy was well on track and he refrained from
overtly using RSC staff support for his goal. As he said later, "I didn't want
to divide the Committee. It was still too fragile, and couldn't stand a con¬
frontation like this.
Despite his attitude, the split within the RSC was further complicated
by Frank van der Linden of the Nashville Banner. In one of his columns,
van der Linden made the point that Crane and Blackburn were receiving not
only the end of the 40-year old government ban on the private ownership of
gold but
"...he and his associates want more. They demand a clear com¬
mitment that IDA loans will go to the Republic of South Vietnam,
to the new anti-Marxist government of Chile, and other non-com¬
munist countries; and that the Republic of China on Taiwan won't
be kicked out of the International Monetary Fund as it has been
ousted from the United Nations.
Because van der Linden was a highly respected conservative columnist whose
column was read by the members of the RSC, this article heightened the
rivalries between Rousseiot and Crane.
In the debate on the House floor on duly 2, 1974, the RSC split in an
interesting pattern. Two of its vice chairmen (Crane and Blackburn) were
among those taking the lead in favor of the bill, while the treasurer
(Rousseiot) and another of the vice chairmen (Steve Symms) were active in
the opposition to the bill saying that the price was too high to pay/®
Despite these divisions, the bill together with private ownership of gold
carried by a vote of 225-140 on July 2, 1974. Thus, the vote on July 2
represented a net increase of 70 votes from the 155 who had supported IDA
on January 23, 1974.
Of the switches involved in this gain of 70, Crane could take credit
for more than one-half of them. A comparative evaluation of the two votes
indicates that of "the switches from "No" in January, to "Yes" in July, 38 of
the 82 switches were from among Crane's fellow members of the Republican
Study Committee. An additional 9 switches were philosophical allies of
Crane who were convinced that this was a worthwhile vote with the added
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inducement of private ownership of gold. They were either conservative
Democrats or Republicans who were not members of the Republican Study
Committee.While some could maintain that the single-mindedness of
Crane on the issue was enough in itself to assure the eventual private owner-
*
ship of gold in some form, it should be borne in mind that until he was able
to muster the support of his colleagues in the Republican Study Committee,
the actual numbers were never present to pass the bill with a specific date
for private ownership.
Regarding the Republican Study Committee's role in this specific debate,
it focused the attention of the members on the staff of the RSC and its
relationship to the members.72 The fact that the staff was now viewed as
an asset to have on one's side in legislative battles was a positive step for
the organization, although its divisiveness on this occasion had been obvious.
While the staff efforts had been concentrated in two people — the executive
director and the staff economist — they proved to be a considerable asset
for Crane. He later admitted that the RSC staff work had been invaluable
to him in his battle. While it began as a high-profile project for Crane,
after the Rousselot encounter, it was used in a more discreet way. Whip
calls were not made by the RSC, but floor statements were prepared and
Crane's committee views were written by the RSC staff.
In one sense, Crane had the right to call on the RSC staff for its
support since he was the largest single payroll supporter of the group. At
the same time, he did not want to pull the group apart over this or any
other issue when it was just becoming established. Thus, he looked for a
prudent way to utilize the staff resources without increasing tensions between
the members of the group. On the gold issue, both sides had strong opinions,
but their differences were limited to this bill and they were back working
together soon after the gold battle was completed.
The RSC involvement in this issue came at the same time as the major
effort on federal land use was reaching its peak. These two simultaneous
efforts were legislative initiatives which the House Republican conservatives
could not have mounted without a coordinated staff resource like the RSC.
In addition, the weekly Executive Committee meetings provided an opportunity
to enlist the support of other members and also to discuss differences of
legislative strategy in a private forum.
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G. The Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian Chrome
Congressional conservatives occasionally expressed their concern about
relations between the United States and Rhodesia. President Lyndon Johnson
had imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia in conformity with the U.N.
Security Council Resolution which stated that Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) represented a threat to world peace. Conservatives
considered this an insult to the sovereignty of the United States, and an
attempt to apply a double standard to one of the few relatively stable areas
on the continent of Africa. Rhodesian advocates asked: every other British
possession in Africa has been given independence, why not Rhodesia? Conser¬
vatives also opposed the U.N. sanctions because the only alternative source of
chrome was the Soviet Union. Chrome was a vital raw material for all high-
technology industries. Finally, the habitual mistrust of the United Nations by
most conservative members of the House and Senate meant that the issue
was not simply a bilateral one between the United States and Rhodesia or the
United States, the United Kingdon and Rhodesia, but rather, it provided an
opportunity to display their lack of enthusiasm for the United Nations. Thus,
in 1971, Senator Harry F. Byrd (I-Virginia) introduced an amendment to the
Military Procurement Act which prohibited the President from adhering to
any trading ban on strategic materials from a western nation when the
United States was importing the same strategic materials from a communist
nation. The Byrd Amendment passed and became law. Since the United
States was importing chrome from the Soviet Union, the Byrd Amendment
had the practical effect of opening U.S. markets once again to Rhodesian
chrome. The Byrd Amendment was passed as much as an anti-Soviet amend¬
ment as it was a pro-Rhodesia or anti-United Nations amendment. While
chrome from Rhodesia began to flow into the United States, the Byrd Amend¬
ment also had the effect of arousing the ire of member states of the United
Nations and their supporters in the House and Senate. Opponents of the
Byrd Amendment who controlled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
passed a bill on October 1, 1973 to repeal the Byrd Amendment.73 a fili¬
buster against repealing the Byrd Amendment was overturned after several
attempts by a December 18, 1973 vote. The repeal bill then passed the
Senate on the same day by a vote of 53-37.
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In the House, Congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota), one of the
leading liberal members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
former chairman of the Democratic Study Group, introduced a companion
bill7^ That bill quickly passed the Subcommittee on International Organiza¬
tions and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 17, 1973.
The opponents to repealing the Byrd Amendment were primarily Republicans
and included a senior member, Edward Derwinski, who was then the chairman
of the Republican Study Committee. In an RSC Executive Committee meeting,
he urged the members to oppose the repeal of the Byrd Amendment when it
came to the House floor. Derwinski and his colleagues had time to plan their
activities. After the subcommittee vote in October, the bill was held up,
pending final action in the Senate. Under Derwinski's direction, the RSC
staff developed fact sheets for the use of members. The RSC staff role was
critical because the Administration and several of the senior Republican
committee members favored the Fraser position. Thus, the Foreign Affairs
Committee staff was not available to Derwinski and he had to rely on the
RSC for staff support. On July 9, 1974, the full Foreign Affairs Committee
favorably reported this bill by a vote of 25-9. The battle moved to the
House Rules Committee where Derwinski and his RSC colleagues had developed
a strategy similar to the one used on federal land use legislation. This
strategy was to pressure the five swing Democratic votes to oppose the rule.
Because of the date of final passage from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
due to the precedence of other committee bills, and the anticipated debate
on the impeachment of President Nixon, the delay at the Rules Committee
stage would be a critical element in putting off the repeal of the Byrd Amend¬
ment for 1974. If the bill came back in 1975, the entire legislative process
would have to start all over again. This preliminary assessment by Derwinski
and the RSC staff proved to be accurate. The strategy was discussed in an
RSC Executive Committee meeting and a follow-up meeting in Derwinski's
office. At the follow-up meeting, Derwinski, RSC senior staff analyst, Bob
Schuettinger, and Washington attorney and lobbyist representing the U.S.
specialty steel industry, Donald deKeiffer, were present. The specialty steel
industry had a vital stake in the Byrd Amendment since they utilized the bulk
of the chrome imported into the United States. deKeiffer agreed to lobby
specific members who might be sensitive to employment issues in steel pro¬
ducing districts, and to coordinate his efforts closely with Derwinski and the
Republican Study Committee staff. Later, deKeiffer led an RSC staff
briefing on Monday, July 1, 1974. At that meeting, the strategy was outlined
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to members' staffs in detail. Despite the House Foreign Affairs Committee's
positive vote in July 1974, pressure from Derwinski and others delayed the
repeal bill in the Rules Committee. It was not acted on by the House of
Representatives in 1974. This failure to act was due largely to DeKeiffer's
effective lobbying however, the leadership of Derwinski and his colleagues
provided the basis of the anti-repeal forces within the Congress. This was
a slightly different pattern for the RSC. The usual fact sheets, member
leadership, and strategy had an extra dimension in this issue, namely the
presence of an effective, articulate lobbyist. The RSC's staff had worked
with outside groups earlier, including their allies in the battle over federal
land use legislation. Because these other efforts had shown that the RSC
had the ability to influence a group of members in the House, the representa¬
tives of the business community were willing to work with the staff and the
members in developing and implementing coordinated legislative strategies.
Thus, with the RSC working within the Congress and deKeiffer outside of the
Congress, action on the bill was delayed. While the battle over the Byrd
Amendment was temporarily derailed, it continued to occupy the attention of
Derwinski and his RSC colleagues in the 94th Congress.
H. Mass Transit Operating Subsidies
A battle for several members of the Republican Study Committee re¬
volved around the issue of federal operating subsidies for urban mass transit
systems. The principle of federal grants for the construction of subway systems
and intra-city buses (capital grants) had long been established.^ But, the pro¬
posal for federal funding to maintain low subway and bus fares in major met¬
ropolitan areas (operating grants) had never been enacted into federal law.
Conservative opposition to it was based on several points:
1. The suburban and rural members resented the idea that their con¬
stituents would have to subsidize $ .25 or $ .35 fares for the residents
of big cities like New York and Chicago. This was particularly annoying
when referenda to subsidize low fares were rejected by local voters in
the urban areas; and
2. the operating subsidies were considered to be direct subsidies to
the big city Democratic political machines.
For example, the Boston MBTA subway routinely carried extra employees on
every train in operation. Congressman Philip Crane maintained that the employ¬
ment of these personnel was under the patronage of the Boston Democratic
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political machine and was a major form of its political largesse.'7'7 Thus,
Crane contended that to subsidize operations of urban mass transit regions
would be to subsidize both the inefficiency of local systems, and also the
local political machines in those cities.
The legislative issue was complex because jurisdiction was shared between
the Public Works Committee and the Banking and Currency Committee with
its newly-formed Mass Transit Subcommittee. The Public Works Committee
had traditionally exercised jurisdiction over capital grants for mass transit
systems. The Banking and Currency Committee exercised jurisdiction over
federal housing programs which led to the committee's general concern with
urban affairs and allowed it to claim legislative jurisdiction to form a Mass
Transit Subcommittee.
One of the early leaders in opposition to operating mass transit subsidies
was Crane who served as a member of the Banking and Currency Committee
and was on its new Mass Transit Subcommittee. The Mass Transit Subcommittee
had been specifically formed by the Democratic majority to enact operating
subsidies for mass transit systems. Because of the alleged "pro-highway bias"
of the Public Works Committee, no operating subsidies had ever been reported
from that body. Crane's staff assistance came from members of the RSC
staff who were called on to perform research and speech writing services for
Crane on this issue. The votes on operating subsidies to mass transit took a
number of different forms in one of the most complicated pieces of legis¬
lation to be considered during the 93rd Congress. RSC fact sheets kept the
members informed of the bill's progress and it was discussed at several
Executive Committee meetings.
The first key vote was on the amendment to H.R. 6452 offered by
Chalmers Wylie (R-Ohio)'to strike out operating subsidies to urban mass
transit systems. Wylie had taken the lead in the full committee and on the
floor because he was the ranking Republican on the subcommittee. The House
supported the Wylie position on operating subsidies by the close vote of 206-
203. In the debate on this vote, Crane's remarks were particularly pointed.
He enumerated a number of objections to the operating subsidies, including
the lack of local willingness to subsidize the low cost fares.^ His arguments
were based on the Dissenting Views which Messrs. Blackburn, Rousselot and he
had filed on the bill in committee.*^ Their views had been prepared by the
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staff of the Republican Study Committee, and they included an alternative
funding proposal drafted by the RSC staff at Crane's request. The alternative
proposal^ was offered by Crane but was defeated overwhelmingly in the
committee. It would have given funds on a 90 (federal) - 10 (local) ratio to
be dispensed as determined in the local area. Although Crane and the other
RSC members in the Banking Committee had supported Wylie as having the
best position, the Crane amendment provided the RSC members with an
alternative approach to the issue. This fallback was a second attempt to
gain support. However, after an RSC whip call, it was clear that H.R. 64T2.
would not gather significant support on the floor, and it was not presented
there.
A whip call was then made by the RSC staff on behalf of Wylie's
amendment, the results of which indicated an overwhelming support of Wylie's
position. Seventy-three RSC members voted with Wylie, while only two opposed
him and three were absent.Later in the day, however, Wright Patman, the
chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, asked for reconsideration
of the Wylie Amendment. This was possible because the Wylie Amendment
had passed while the bill was being considered in the Committee of the Whole.^
His request for reconsideration came when the chairman of the Committee of
the Whole, John McFall (D-Caiifornia), was presiding. McFall called for the
vote and the Wylie Amendment lost by a vote of 205-210.^ On this vote,
one member of the RSC who formerly opposed Wylie switched to support him,
and only two RSC members were absent. Thus, only one remained opposed to
the Wyiie position.^ However, pro-subsidy forces gained five members to
carry the vote. With the defeat of the Wylie Amendment, the House supported
07
operating subsidies for the first time. This followed passage of a similar bill '
in the Senate in September. This had been the fifth time in four years that
the Senate had passed operating subsidies. However, the battle was not over
with the defeat of the Wylie Amendment. The threat of a Presidential veto
still remained a possibility.
The matter was discussed at another Executive Committee meeting. Crane,
Blackburn and Rousselot all asked for continued staff and member support to
contest the issue. The Executive Committee agreed. As a result, the staff
drafted a letter which Crane sent to Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Man¬
agement and Budget, in late November 1973, to determine the Administration's
position on the issue. The reply supported the Wylie-Crane position. When
172
Crane received the reply on December 5, 1973, he delivered it to the RSC
staff and appropriate introductory remarks were drafted to be inserted by
Crane in the Congressional Record of December 12. He noted that Ash said
"The Administration continues to oppose operating subsidies, and if legislation
comes to the White House, we intend to recommend to the President that
he veto the legislation."^ While this was a restatement of the Administra¬
tion's prior position, it had never been stated as forcefully as Ash did in his
letter.
Following the House passage of the bill, it went to the Joint House-
Senate Conference where it languished with the threat of a veto hanging over
it. Then the energy crisis erupted on the scene. President Nixon submitted
his own bill, the "Unified Transportation Assistance Program.The UTAP
proposal consisted of a huge authorization of $16 billion for capital grants
over a six-year period. The capital grants would enable the cities to update
equipment and facilities. The Nixon plan involved a large expenditure level,
but only for capital projects, the traditional jurisdiction of the Public Works
Committee.
The Senate-House conferees filed their report on S. 386 (H.R. 6452)
shortly after this time. The report contained a new provision enabling the
$800 million to be used for capital grants as well as operating subsidies.
Crane and several other conferees dissented. The RSC staff immediately
drafted a memorandum updating the situation. The next day, Crane sent this
memo to his colleagues in the RSC urging them to oppose S. 386, and assuring
his colleagues that the Administration continued to stand firm with its veto
threat: "I repeat, I have assurances that this bill will not be signed.
At this time, Crane's concern was premature. Because of the new pro¬
vision in the bill which permitted the use of funds for capital grants, the
Rules Committee would accept a point of order against the conference report.
(The House rules are substantially tighter on questions of germaneness, and a
single member could have raised a point of order to the consideration of the
conference report* because it contained a new provision not originally considered
by the House in its bill and because the capital grants for mass transit systems
are under the jurisdiction of the Public Works Committee.)
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Several months after the filing of the Senate-House Conference Report,
on July 24, 1974, the Rules Committee reversed itself, and permitted a bill to
come to the House floor which allowed for local discretion between capital
and operating subsidies. However, on July 30, the House recommitted the bill
to conference, both because of the threat of a veto and because the Admin¬
istration's own bill, the "Unified Transportation Assistance Program," was still
in mark-up in the Public Works Committee. Finally, on August 15, 1974, the
amended Administration bill came before the House from the Public Works
Committee. Even though this bill came on the heels of Nixon's resignation,
it still generated considerable controversy on the operating subsidy issue.
The key vote came on a Shuster (R-Pennsylvania)-Milford (D-Texas) amendment
to delete the operating subsidies added by the conferees' provision. Debate
was once again centered around the same issues.
The RSC staff again prepared an analysis of the bill for its members
restating many of the earlier objections to operating subsidies, and the staff
made one of its whip calls to the RSC member offices urging them to support
the Shuster-Milford Amendment. These whip calls were of an informational
nature only. They were made to the legislative aide in the Member's office
so that the aide could communicate the contents of the pending issue to the
member. While the RSC had no authority to actually "whip" a member on a
vote, the ability to rapidly inform member offices of the legislative floor
activity of their conservative colleagues was a service.
Despite the lack of seniority of the amendment's co-sponsors, both were
freshmen, their position received substantial support. However, the Shuster-
Milford Amendment lost by a vote of 197-202 with a number of the RSC
members having changed sides. Of the RSC membership, 66 supported their
colleague, Shuster, while 9 opposed him. The opposition votes were clustered
among suburban members whose reelection bids looked particularly perilous.-**
While Shuster did not rely on RSC assistance as heavily as Crane, he did
utilize the staff research facilities, and an RSC whip call was made on behalf
of his amendment. In addition, he discussed his amendment at an RSC Executive
Committee meeting.
Later that year, on November 26, President Ford signed the bill,92 thus
authorizing operating expenses for mass transit systems for the first time, and
reversing the position of his predecessor's Administration. The issue was lost
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by the RSC, but its loss could be attributed to external forces: "If there had
not been an energy crisis, we could have held firm," according to Crane.
The other complicating factor had clearly been the local pressures which were
brought to bear on vulnerable, suburban conservative Republican congressmen.
Despite the loss, the RSC staff and leadership did utilize the technique of
exposing the Administration's position to make sure that what had started as
a private conversation, OMB Director Roy Ash's letter, became a public com¬
mitment inserted in the Congressional Record. This technique proved useful
in other legislative battles where the Administration's position became a
critical factor.
I. Stumbling on Watergate and the Rockefeller Nomination
During the 93rd Congress, the members of the. Republican Study Com¬
mittee agreed on coordinated action regarding most of the major public policy
issues. However, when it came to political questions, a consensus was more
difficult to develop, as can be seen from the reaction to the Watergate sit¬
uation and the subsequent nomination and confirmation of Nelson Rockefeller
as Vice President of the United States. The Republicans on Capitol Hill had
already suffered a major political jolt caused by the resignation of Vice
President Spiro Agnew. The appointment of Gerald Ford as his successor was
a reassuring move by President Nixon. While Minority Leader Ford had become
less conservative than most RSC members, he was still well known to the
House Republicans who were comfortable with him as the Vice President. This
became an important factor as the Watergate scandal unfolded.
Watergate immediately affected a number of Republican Study Committee
members who served on the House Judiciary Committee. These members ranged
from individuals who were staunch supporters of Nixon (Charles Wiggins of
California and David Dennis of Indiana) to others who broke with him early
and opposed his continuing in office (Larry Hogan of Maryland). While Water¬
gate was discussed at the weekly Executive Committee meetings, it was
brought up as an "information" item rather than an "action" item. Conflicting
pressures on the members made their position on Watergate a personal one,
which could only be decided on an individual basis. The local politics, the
reading of the evidence, and the unfolding of the drama on a daily basis,
made it impossible for a newly-organized group like the Republican Study
Committee to offer anything other than a forum for discussing the question.
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To try to impose the will — or even the guidance — of members on each
other during this period would have split the organization apart.This might
be considered "shirking its duty" to some observers, but the fragility of the
group, combined with its novelty, led the key participants to avoid substantive
decisions on political issues like this. In addition, during the summer of 197,
the staff was occupied on a full complement of issue areas, including land use,
mass transit operating subsidies, Rhodesian chrome, and the reinstatement of
the private ownership of gold. Public policy issues were the forte of the staff,
not political questions like Watergate.
In August 1974, Richard Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford ascended to the
Presidency and the Vice Presidency again became vacant. Within a week, Ford
nominated Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice President. Rockefeller had long been
considered anathema to the conservatives in the Republican party and his nom¬
ination should have united the conservatives in the House against it. Remem¬
bering his lackluster support of Nixon in 1960, his outspoken opposition to
Goldwater in 1964, and the allegations of his maneuvering to deny Nixon the
nomination in 1968, it was natural that many Republican Study Committee
members of the Congress would not support his nomination. Thus, immediately
following Nixon's resignation, the chairman of the Republican Study Committee,
LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), called a special meeting of the RSC members to
discuss the vacancy in the Vice Presidency.
The meeting was held while rumors circulated throughout Washington
that Rockefeller would be the next Vice President. In an effort to head off
this possibility, the RSC executive director attempted to arrange a meeting
between the new President and the RSC members. As reported in the Los
Angeles Times:
"Our people feel that they are Jerry Ford's oldest friends and
supporters....They want to sit down and talk to him and see that
attention is paid to their views. The members still mistrust
Rockefeller because of his liberal past, despite the former New
York Governor's recent shift toward the right. They would vastly
prefer Gov. Reagan or Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater as the
new Vice President.
A meeting between President Ford and the RSC members was scheduled
for August 13, 1974 but it was cancelled by the White House. Instead, Ford
asked every Member of Congress to submit names of possible candidates to
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him. By taking this approach, Ford avoided bloc pressures on him to select
any specific candidate.
RSC Chairman Baker circulated a memo to the RSC membership on the
13th noting:
"Consistent with our policy of avoiding Committee positions,
the RSC will not recommend anyone for Vice President. Our
members, however, are encouraged to make their individual sug¬
gestions.
I have talked to more than 50 of our RSC members about
Vice Presidential recommendations and have found throughout
the House, strong first choice support for Rockefeller. We
have also found first choice for Goidwater, Reagan, Howard
Baker and George Bush. Among all of the individuals who
listed these first choices, we found a general acceptance of
George Bush."°°
Although Baker had contacted a number of members of the RSC, his memo
had been confusing:
"Upon later clarification, Baker noted that the Rockefeller
support to which he referred had been throughout the House
and not particularly among members of the RSC." '
This explanation of the political complexion of the House only came after the
Baker memo had been circulated by Rhodes to the White House. The Ford
White House staff used this memo as an indication that the Republican con¬
servatives would support Rockefeller. In accordance with the White House
procedures, the suggestions from members were to be delivered to Minority
Leader John Rhodes by that afternoon for his submission to Ford. Against
this background, the uncoordinated lists by the RSC were submitted to Rhodes.
While some senior House Republican members directly advised Ford, the RSC
input followed channels through Rhodes' office to the White House.
In reviewing the memorandum later, Baker severely criticized the legis¬
lative director who had drafted it. The executive director, who had been on
holiday when the event occured, accepted the responsibility for the misimpres-
sion it had created, but the damage had already been done. Baker and several
other members contacted the White House to try to correct the misimpression
which the memorandum had given. However, their calls were made several
days later when the White House had already used the RSC memorandum for
their own purposes, and the issue had been fairly well decided.
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President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller on August 20. The nom¬
ination was greeted initially by a hostile reaction from most RSC members.
There was a distinct contrast in the conservative ranks between this nomina¬
tion and that of Ford himself a year earlier. At that time, the genial,
friendly Jerry Ford, who had led the Republican band in the House for so
many years, was enthusiastically welcomed as Nixon's Vice Presidential choice
to succeed Spiro Agnew. A year later, however, when Ford was able to make
the decision, his choice did not prove nearly as popular.
The House Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination dragged on
for more than three months. During this time, the Democratic leadership
subjected Rockefeller to intense scrutiny of his personal and financial affairs.
The longer the nomination was kept on the public agenda, the more the public
would be reminded of Watergate. Thus, some Republicans accused the Demo¬
crats of delaying the nomination "to stop Rockefeller from participating in the
1974 [congressional] elections."^ The extended hearings had the effect of com¬
pounding the political difficulties of the Republicans in this already difficult
political year. By the final vote in December, the lines had been pretty well
drawn, and the ranks of the Republican Study Committee were split. A
number of hard right members, including Chairman Baker, Vice Chairmen Phil
Crane, Ben Blackburn and Bob Huber, voted against the nomination. Vice
Chairman David Dennis, who participated in the hearings as a member of the
Judiciary Committee, voted in favor of Rockefeller. He theorized that it was
not his place to judge Rockefeller as if he had made the appointment, but
rather to judge if Rockefeller met the constitutional qualifications for the
position. Party loyalty played an important role, and such usual conservative
stalwarts as former RSC Chairman Sam Devine supported Rockefeller's
appointment despite his comment in his floor speech that "the name Nelson
A. Rockefeller was not on the list I submitted to the President."99 The final
vote tally for Rockefeller was 287 to 128. Of the opposition votes, 26 were
members of the Republican Study Committee, while 54 RSC members supported
the nomination.The support was largely on the basis of Republican party
loyalty, combined with a belief among some of the members that the 1974
elections had repudiated their conservatism.
The role of the RSC in this whole issue had been relatively minor. The
White House had solicited input for the nomination from all congressional
sources. Ford used the formal Republican leadership structure to receive the
178
data, and the Baker memo became a useful tool to reinforce the decision of
the new President. As Philip Crane noted later:
"The Baker memo really put us on the spot. It didn't reflect
our views at all. But beyond that, the choice showed us that on
major political decisions, we were not in the driver's seat."*0*
Crane's comment was harshly accurate. While the group had made some major
inroads in legislative matters, it was not a major factor in important political
decisions. In addition, the personal relationship of their former House colleague,
Jerry Ford, with the House Republicans, overrode the ideological concern of
many of the RSC members. This relationship, combined with the dismaying
election results, forced many RSC members to rethink their position. A
number of their conservative colleagues had been defeated at the polls. One
Republican President had been forced to resign, and another had just ascended
to the Presidency. To insult this new leader by challenging his appointment
for Vice President would be considered disloyal to the party and divisive to
the nation. Those who followed this line of reasoning supported the Rockefeller
nomination. Thus, Rockefeller was confirmed handily, with substantial RSC
support.
J. Setback in the 1974 Elections
The RSC members were concerned with the 1974 congressional elections
long before the beginning of the campaigns that fall. The Republican members
of the House of Representatives knew that this would be one of the most dif¬
ficult elections of their career. The party holding the White House traditionally
lost seats in a non-Presidential election year, and while the Republicans were
not in power in the House, they did control the White House. Added to this
likelihood, the overwhelming burden of the Watergate affair and the months
of extended TV exposure of Nixon — the Republican President — and his mis¬
deeds, meant that the elections would be more difficult than ever.
The direct role of the Republican Study Committee in the 1974 elections
began on March 14, 1974. On that day, the RSC sponsored a "special event"
program. The program was a "members only" seminar including three panelists.
These were Lyn Nofziger, who formerly served as Deputy Chairman of the
Republican National Committee, a former White House aide to President Nixon,
and former Press Secretary to Governor Reagan. The second panelist was
Dick Wirthlin, President of Decision Making Inc. (DMI), one of the most highly
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regarded Republican polling organizations in the United States. The final
panelist was Jim White, direct mail expert who formerly served on the
Republican National Committee staff. The suggested theme struck by these
three men was that disenchantment with the President and the Watergate
affair developed because of big government.Jhe Democrats advocated big
government. The mistrust of elected officials who abused power could not
be solved by concentrating still more power in the hands of the same or
other elected officials. For example, Nofziger stated:
"The trouble with Republicans is that they all go out and act
individually. There is never any unity of purpose, unity of cam¬
paigning or unity of issues, and even more importantly, there is
never any repetition....You now have an organization (Republican
Study Committee) supplying you with information that will enable
you to go out wherever you are campaigning to make a unified
theme. That theme ought to be big government and morality."
Thus, the challenge was laid down in March 197^ that the Republican members
of the House should combine and run against the entrenched interests in
Washington. This advice was hard to follow since the members were all
incumbents. They could place a distance between themselves and the majority
party (Democratic) in the House. They could also try to separate themselves
from Nixon and Ford, but to do both of these at the same time would prove
to be a very difficult political task.
This advice was never followed, however. During the ensuing months, the
preoccupation with the Watergate hearings in the House Judiciary Committee
and the Senate Select Committee detracted from the common theme which
Republicans might have struck. The resignation of Nixon in August was
followed by the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President, a decision
which was not enthusiastically supported by the Republican party rank-and-file
workers. Rockefeller's confirmation hearings were dragging out becoming yet
another albatross to hang around the Republican House members' necks. On
domestic issues, facing a 1396-14% inflation, President Ford called for a
national campaign to "Whip Inflation Now" and circulated his WIN buttons.
Along with this, Ford pardoned Nixon, and then, a month before the election,
he announced major cuts in various federal programs which would certainly
not either help "Whip Inflation Now" in the short range, or help elect Repub¬
licans to the House and the Senate.
Because of these factors, the November 1974 elections were not a set¬
back for the Republicans — they were a rout. The Democrats gained a
total of 40 seats in the House, and the Republican Study Committee itself
suffered a severe loss; its chairman, LaMar Baker, three of its vice chairmen
(Ben Blackburn, David Dennis and Bob Huber), and 15 of its dues-paying mem¬
bers lost their bids for reelection. The losses were cited widely in the news
media beginning with a newspaper column on November 13 by the highly-
regarded Washington columnists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. In that
article, they stated that "The dominant right wing was hurt much worse than
other Republicans, casting implications far into the future for both the party
and President Ford." Citing the specific loss of LaMar Baker, they noted:
"He is now president of a well-disciplined private club of con¬
servative House Republicans known as the Steering Committee (sic)
(labeled in previous incarnation as the 'Republican regulars' and
'the good guys'). Baker was not alone. The election massacre
claimed no fewer than three of the Steering Committee's vice
presidents -- Reps. Ben Blackburn of Georgia, David Dennis of
Indiana and Robert Huber of Michigan....The Steering Committee
thus can be written off as an effective force in the House."104
Evans and Novak admitted that much of their material came from the
office of John Anderson who had long been opposed by members of the
Republican Study Committee. Anderson was chairman of the House Repub¬
lican Conference and ranked number three in the party's leadership. While
he had an articulate manner, his outspoken liberalism had made many enemies
in the RSC. Evans and Novak described the loss as being particularly severe
for conservatives within the Republican party. According to Evans and Novak:
"A subjective analysis by Anderson's staff shows 51 hard right-
wing Members out of a total of 144 Republicans in the next
Congress, compared with 83 out of 187 today."
In an immediate reply, the executive director of the RSC took issue
with the Evans and Novak figures and analysis by pointing out that the
Republicans in the House lost 23.5% of their membership, and that the RSC
members and associates lost 23.1%, not a statistically significant difference)^
These figures were repeated in a memorandum which was circulated by Execu¬
tive Committee member Trent Lott (Mississippi) to ail RSC members.jhe
objective of this memorandum was to maintain the morale of the remaining
members, who were despondent over the negative election results, and
particularly over the loss of so much of their leadership.
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The executive director aiso pointed out to Evans and Novak that:
"Since Conservatism is the Republican mainstream, it is only
to be expected that many Republican losses will be sustained
by Conservatives. But this fails far short of attributing a selec¬
tive electoral defeat for Conservatives which you manage to
impute. "108
Evans and Novak replied by criticizing the RSC for its refusal to reveal the
list of its members and restated their claim that "The percentage of Steering
Committee losers is significantly higher than the percentage of all Republican
Members." ^9
The data on RSC losses extended beyond this single Evans and Novak
column. Additional letters disputing the media's claims were sent to CBS
television, TIME magazine, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street
Journal. In a reply from TIME'S editorial offices, the response was:
"Our problem as you know is that the Republican Steering Com¬
mittee (sic) does not make the names of its members public....For
our November 18 reference we used figures which came to us from
a senior aide to a member of the House leadership."**0
This comment confirmed the executive director's opinion that Anderson's staff
had been actively spreading reports among the media that the Republican
conservatives had suffered a disproportionate loss in the elections.
Offsetting these reports, Kevin Phillips, the editor of The American
Political Report, suggested to readers to:
"Discount floated analyses arguing that the conservative Steering
Committee dropped from 70 to 40 members while the liberal GOP
Wednesday Group lost only 1 of 36. Steering Committee officials
claim that of their 95 dues-payers and associates, they lost 28 (22
defeated, 6 retirees); and of the 65 dues-payers, they lost 19 (17
defeated, 2 retirees). About 10-12 of the 17 new Republicans are
expected to opt for the conservative group. These numbers sound
more or less in the ballpark, which means that they should have
50-55 dues-payers and 70-80 dues-payers and associates in the 94th
Congress." * *
As the 1974 House election has been viewed by scholars, the consensus
is that the conservatives did lose a disproportionate share of seats:
"Very clearly, Republican losses were concentrated at the con¬
servative end of the party's political spectrum....This suggests the
existence of policy voting among some 1974 voters." ^2
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Samuel Patterson has a different emphasis, but the same problems led to his
conclusion:
"But the evidence indicates a profounder weakening of partisan
cues to congressional election voting, and a tendency for congres¬
sional elections to be more responsive to national forces (such as
the state of the economy and the perceived performance of the
President), although local forces continue to have a great impact
on voting." 113-
The battle over these numbers was not merely a theoretical problem.
The perceived victors would enter the pending party leadership elections from
a position of enhanced strength. Thus, if the conservative mainstream was
viewed as having suffered a substantial setback, the liberals and moderates
who backed John Anderson for Republican Conference chairman would have
a psychological advantage in the early December election for leadership
positions where the votes of the newly-elected members would be particularly
critical.
On the day of the election for chairman of the Republican Conference,
Anderson handily defeated the conservatives' chosen candidate, Charles Wiggins,
an articulate defender of Nixon in the Watergate hearings of the House
Judiciary Committee. Wiggins' campaign had been low-key as he was a
somewhat reluctant candidate for the job. His stature among House Repub¬
licans was high but he did not want to be accused of leading a public fight
within his decimated party.
While Anderson was a liberal, he was also one of the party's most articu¬
late spokesmen. The maintenance of Anderson in the Conference chairmanship,
however, was not the end of the problems for the newly-organized Republican
Study Committee. Late in 1974, the Minority Leader, John Rhodes, had
expressed some dissatisfaction privately to several of the senior members of
the RSC about the name of the group. He specifically objected to the
idea that this organization was supposed to be "steering" the Republicans,
despite the fact that it had no official position within the party structure.
The members who had already had their ranks substantially reduced did not
want to make a major issue of the name of their group. Therefore, at the
first meeting of the group on January 16, 1975, they examined a variety of
combinations, "as if we were choosing from a Chinese menu,"^^ and picked
a name (Republican Study Committee) that maintained the same initials as
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the old name (Republican Steering Committee), while also reflecting a close
affinity to the Democratic Study Group after which the RSC had been pat¬
terned. The actual choice also reflected a viewpoint which their Democratic
adversaries in the DSG had discussed some fifteen years earlier. That is,
in order to be effective and not antagonize the established power structure
in the House, do not wear your ideology as a prominent label.Therefore,
options which included words such as "conservative" were quickly discarded
for the more innocuous Republican Study Committee.
K. Conclusion
In a series of case studies like the eight preceding legislative battles,
instructive lessons can be drawn. Besides learning how to employ profes¬
sional staff more effectively, the RSC members proved to themselves that
they could be an effective legislative force on selective issues. The RSC
members' use of professional staff gave them a new independence. In the
past, they had found it necessary to rely either on personal staff, committee
staff, the leadership or the Administration for analytical help. In these case
examples, all of the usual sources were inadequate. In the land use battle,
for example, the minority committee staff was committed to the majority's
position. Congressman Sam Steiger had no personal staff resources to help,
the Minority Leadership's position had to be changed and the Administration
began on the wrong side of the issue. The relationship with the Administra¬
tion on this issue was complex. The Nixon Administration was devoid of a
consistent ideology. It could be swayed by bureaucrats within its agencies,
by political pressures from either the left (which initially led it to support
a 3ackson-Udall type of bill) or the right (which finally convinced the Admin¬
istration to support the Steiger-Rhodes substitute). 3ohn Lees notes that
the bureaucracy which Nixon inherited from 3ohnson had been "dominated
by Democrats."During his tenure, Nixon did little to change this, which
was why a cabinet member, like Rogers Morton, was a supporter of a
3ackson-Udall type bill. It fit into the bureaucrats' pattern of objectives
for their agency. Former Ambassador Laurence Siiberman notes the prob¬
lem which confronts a new high-level appointee:
"That co-optation [by the bureaucracy] is inevitable if an
appointee has no independent, preappointment view of desirable
agency goals, closely connected with overall administration
policy....Issues brought to the appointee by civil servants will
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rarely call into question the fundamental aims of the agency;
typically, they will instead be marginal or incremental ques¬
tions which assume the propriety and wisdom of all that has
gone before."
In the land use case, a coordinated, "inside-outside" opposition with a clear
objective became a significant battleground. Effective opposition to the
bill required more than the leadership of Sam Steiger. As Senator James
McClure commented:
"The other members of the [Interior] Committee hadn't
listened to Sam. They dismissed him as a maverick. But
once he started working with the RSC, he became a legisla¬
tive leader with respect from other members."
That is, the RSC provided Steiger a research and operating base which made
him credible. This point is vital, because there is a common perception that:
"The nature of the process by which legislation is con¬
sidered in Congress provides many opportunities for individual
Congressmen to exercise influence on the fate of a particular
bill."121
Indeed, an individual member can influence a bill at various points during
the legislative process. But, such a member can be substantially more influ¬
ential if he represents more than just himself. Thus, when a congressman
such as Steiger represents a faction like the RSC in the House, and utilizes
its resources in his effort, he will be more effective than when he acts
independently.
This was a new discovery for the conservative legislators whose repu¬
tation as negative voters did not include active strategy sessions on pending
bills. Coordinated action took different forms and sometimes members who
were party "regulars" were asked to oppose their own Administration.
The cases described above were not all successes. Even when they
were successful, the full measure of the success was not due solely to the
role of the RSC. But, they do represent the traits of a faction.
For many of the members who were team players, accustomed to fol¬
lowing their party leaders, the idea of being "out front" of them on a
specific issue was uncomfortable. It was a conflict situation with which
they were unfamiliar:
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"In the absence of conflict it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to distinguish power relationships, since power
involves the notion of getting someone to do something he
would not otherwise do."
The land use case is again significant. The RSC exercised power in a con¬
flict situation. The potential impact of this new power source presented
a complication to the Minority Leadership. Many congressmen "do not
believe that re-election depends on their strong support of their party."123
A new faction tends to further decrease party cohesion and to make the
members more independent from the leadership's control.Power was
exercised in a new way from a new source, and all of the actors had to
adjust to it.
On the basis of influencing legislation, a success/failure measure of
the RSC's major legislative activities can be shown. Land use, Rhodesian
chrome, and gold ownership were clear successes. Mass transit was a clear
failure. The economic issues were raised, but the RSC impact was negligible.
The Atlantic Union Resolution and the Legal Services Corporation battle
could have had similar outcomes without an RSC input.
Even with its failures, the Republican Study Committee's results were
impressive for a new organization: during the summer of 1974, the small
staff of the RSC was engaged in intensive work on five major issues simul¬
taneously: land use, legal services, private ownership of gold, mass transit
operating subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian chrome. It had
not done everything successfully, but it had engaged in a number of serious
efforts, and it had made an impact. Furthermore, the organization had
survived its first Congress in one of the most tumultous periods in American
politics. Its role of working with individual members had been challenging.
Common legislative goals came from different sources, and involved different
priorities for the members. The staff acted as the common bond to keep
the members moving in the same direction on the same priority bills. The
bills were not the most important ones debated during this Congress, but
they were specific areas where a group of conservative members of the
minority party in the House of Representatives could have a real impact.
The Republican Study Committee had proven to be a viable faction
in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, with its reduced member¬
ship, and decimated leadership, its future role was uncertain.
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VI. REBUILDING, REGROUPING AND EXPANDING
A. Introduction
In this chapter the institutional role of the Republican Study Committee
in the 94th Congress is examined. The RSC performed various service func¬
tions for its members and their staff aides. At the same time, the members
were asked to provide the RSC with administrative and financial assistance.
These activities could be considered unnecessary if ail of the members
of the RSC were either compulsory members or if they unanimously viewed
the RSC solely as a legislative support organization. However, membership
in the RSC was not like membership in the Republican Conference. If you
are elected a member of the House as a Republican, you are automatically
a member of the Conference. On the other hand, membership in the RSC
was voluntary. Furthermore, with alternative demands competing for mem¬
bers' time, finances and attention, it was necessary to promote the unique
role and services of the Republican Study Committee for its own members.
Regarding the role of the RSC as a legislative support organization, its value
was clear to the legislative activists like Phil Crane (R-Illinois), John Rousselot
(R-California) and Sam Steiger (R-Arizona). However, to reach out to other
conservative Republican House members who were not legislative leaders, it
had to provide other services to its membership. This chapter will discuss
these service functions and supporting relationships.
Chapter VII reviews the same period but considers specific legislative
case studies in which the RSC played an active role.
After the setback in the 1974 elections, it became clear to the surviving
members of the Republican Study Committee that they would have to review
their operations and re-examine the RSC's role vis-a-vis its own members,
the party leadership, and the Republican Administration.
While the embryonic organization had a measurable legislative impact
in 1973 and 1974, the outlook was not good for 1975 and 1976. The RSC's
leadership had been depleted in the 1974 election and the group's institutional
role was in serious question to its own members, the leadership and the
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new Ford Administration. The electoral defeats have been described in
Chapter V, but the losses presented an additional difficulty for the RSC. With
reduced Republican numbers in the House, it would be necessary to be per¬
ceived as positive participants in party-wide activities. The old mentality
of "rally round the flag" came to the fore, and the weakened RSC could
not afford to be cast as a divisive element within the party. Careful action
by the remaining members of the Executive Committee would be required to
insure the survival of the RSC. The first opportunity to exhibit this leader¬
ship was made at the Republican Study Committee's 1975 Annual Meeting.
At the Annual Meeting on January 16, 1975, a slate of officers was
presented by the Nominating Committee. Congresswoman Marjorie S. Holt
(R-Maryland) was nominated and elected the new chairwoman. The remainder
of the officers included Phil Crane, Steve Symms (R-Idaho), Barry Goldwater, Jr.
(R-Caiifornia) and freshman Tom Hagedorn (R-Minnesota) as vice chairmen,
and John Rousselot as treasurer. The new chairwoman was first elected to
the House of Representatives in 1972. She served on the Armed Services
Committee where her diligence had won the admiration of her senior Repub¬
lican colleagues. Her leadership in 1973 and 1974 in opposition to mandatory
school busing had gained the attention of conservative members in both parties.
In addition, it was candidly admitted that it would be a "publicity coup" if the
conservative Republicans would be the first group in the House to elect a
woman as its chairman. The Holt nomination was also advantageous because
it avoided having a high-profile ideological conservative leading the organiza¬
tion. Philip Crane, Steve Symms or John Rousselot — the three ranking
officers who had survived the 1974 election setback — were all publicly
identified as being hard-core ideological Republicans, and had any of them
assumed the chairmanship at this time, the image of the organization would
have been very different. The more conservative leadership would have
appealed to a smaller number of Republicans in the House, and it would have
almost certainly meant that the effectiveness of the group in the legislative
arena would be greatly reduced. Mrs. Holt had an almost perfect voting
record, and she was widely respected within the Congress. Thus, her election
would be an asset for the RSC rather than a problem within the group. She
was a member who was relatively less controversial, and yet highly regarded
by other members. Both RSC and non-RSC Republicans respected her, and
the Nominating Committee believed her election would avoid unnecessary
problems.
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The RSC took to heart the words of Evans and Novak in their post¬
election analysis. At that time, Evans and Novak argued that President
Ford and Minority Leader Rhodes would have to redirect their programs in
order to gain support from the liberals within the Republican party in the
Housed Presumably, they would do this by proposing programs further to
the left. Through the Holt election, the new RSC Executive Committee
hoped it could work with Ford and Rhodes and be considered a major
participant on the House Republican scene. Admittedly, its role would be
conservative, but members hoped it would be respected within the House.
As Rhodes admitted later, his role as the Minority Leader was complicated
by the presence of ideological factions. 4.t the same time, while "any
but
leadenbifwould rather not have any of them,^if you have to have one, better
to have them all."^ The task of the new RSC leadership would be to work
within these constraints and to provide an unique opportunity for its members.
B. Expanded Member Services
The staff of the Republican Study Committee realized after the 1974
elections that it would be necessary to redefine its role in order to maintain
the viability of the organization. It was clear that some of its earlier legis¬
lative victories or near victories would be more difficult to repeat because
of the smaller number of Republicans in the House and the smaller number
of members in the RSC. Thus, there would have to be other ways to ensure
the viability of the RSC as an institution. The RSC service role would be
more important than ever if it was to fill part of the legislative gap. The
base of its support had to be consulted, and a new method of operation had
to be developed in a number of areas. Both substance and appearance would
prove to be important. It had to both perform specific unique services, and
be seen as filling a vacuum. The following specific examples show how it
attempted to do both.
Meetings with Outside Experts
Among the services which the Republican Study Committee could provide
were meetings of long-range interest to the members. The organizations
within the formal party leadership — the Conference, the Policy Committee,
and the Research Committee — were primarily involved in day-to-day legis¬
lative activities and unable to look at longer range programs. The RSC, on
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the other hand, had a staff which included several former academics.-^
Additionally, several of the professional staff members were pursuing grad¬
uate degrees. Even those staff members who did not come from the acad¬
emic community were comfortable in the realm of ideas. The weekly
briefings were balanced between legislative discussions and long-term policy
questions. Thus, it was a logical role for the RSC staff to propose meetings
between prominent academics and the RSC members.
The staff of the RSC called on their contacts in the academic world for
these sessions. Specifically, Nobel Laureates Friederich von Hayek and
Milton Friedman met with the members to give them advice and counsel.
The Hayek meeting was held on April 10, 1975.As an extra service for the
members who participated in that meeting, the staff arranged for the Repub¬
lican staff photographer to be present from 9:45-10:00 to take photos of the
members with Professor Hayek. These photos could then be used in members'
newsletters and for release to newspapers back home. Local headlines of
"Congressman John Doe meeting with Nobel Laureate in Economics F.A. von
Hayek" were the objective. The Hayek meeting only attracted 12 members,
whereas when Milton Friedman met with members of the Republican Study
Committee on May 25, 1976, more than 60 were in attendance.^ Friedman
was more widely known to American politicians and attracted a larger
audience. These hour-long meetings were more than photo opportunities.
Professor Hayek covered a range of economic topics including inflation,
unemployment and labor unions. In addition, he discussed his ideas for a
new constitution. While the latter idea did not attract much enthusiasm
from the members, his observations from his European perspective on common
problems were of interest to them. The Friedman meeting was held in
conjunction with his advocacy of "indexing" the income tax system.^
An additional purpose of these meetings was to give the conservatives
intellectual ammunition. The background of RSC members was similar to
that of the entire House membership. That is, the majority of the RSC
members was attorneys. Few of them had any formal economics training.
Therefore, to meet with noted economists who generally shared the member's
perspectives on major issues was a broadening experience. Appearance as
well as substance was important. Congressman Robert Michel (R-Illinois),
then the Minority Whip, described this from his perspective:
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"The RSC gave a little bit of an academic aura to the Repub¬
licans, and elevated the conservative cause from just guys who
came in here prepared to vote against everything."
Among other academics who met with the members of the RSC were
Professors Allen Meitzer and Karl Brunner of Carnegie-Mellon University
and the University of Rochester, respectively. Meitzer and Brunner are
the co-chairmen of the "Shadow Open Market Committee," which is a
group of monetarist economists which meets quarterly. Its primary purpose
is to audit the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board and to crit¬
icize the policy if it deviates from their strict monetarist standard. This
was a technical meeting and only eight members attended, several of whom
would hear the two guests later that day when they appeared before the
House Banking and Currency Committee.^
The second group of speakers to participate in the RSC programs were
representatives of the Ford Administration. While the members who special¬
ized in certain areas would meet frequently with Administration experts,
other members whose areas of specialization were different would not have
the opportunity to do so. Thus, the RSC held private meetings with
Frank Zarb, Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration;^ Howard
H. "Bo" Calloway, Secretary of the Army;*** William Simon, Secretary of
the Treasury;** and George Bush, Director of the CIA.*2
The content of these meetings usually related to pending bills of par¬
ticular concern to the Executive Branch speaker. The informal opportunity
for discussions was helpful to the members. The objective of the spokesmen
for the Administration was to advance its own proposals. Any reasonable
opportunity to meet with groups of House members was welcomed. From
the RSC side, its staff was pleased to arrange the meetings because they
provided another service to the members. More importantly, it helped estab¬
lish the RSC as a credible organization within the Congress.
Chairwoman Holt commented on the value of both series of meetings:
"Regarding Friedman and the other academics, no one else was
doing it, so we decided to fill a vacuum...
The meetings with the Executive Branch people were important
not only for us but also for our influence on the Administration
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because they showed that the Republican Study Committee was a
group to be reckoned with.
Publications and Distribution
The format and combination of RSC publications changed frequently.
For example, the weekly legislative tracking sheet was added. While Congres¬
sional Quarterly and other publications tracked major legislation, they were
not always tracking bills of interest to the RSC. Hearings on the food
stamp program or welfare reform which might be of particular interest to
RSC members were frequently not listed in the Congressional Quarterly
tracking sheets. While some issues of interest to the RSC were monitored,
others were not. The RSC tracking sheet filled this gap. This single sheet
was appended to the publication package which was distributed to ail the
members 'at the weekly member meetings. It was instituted in January 1976
as a companion to the weekly project sheet.
Another new publication was the project sheet which came about in the
following way: In early 1975, several of the new members of the Executive
Committee questioned the RSC staff as to what research projects were being
carried out for other members. A partial response was that the staff per¬
formed many minor projects which never resulted in published material but
were responses to member or staff inquiries. Mrs. Holt suggested that these
projects should be listed and made available to the members so that they
were aware of the full range of responses which were being made to member
inquiries. Thus, another routine attachment — the project sheet — was pre¬
pared for the package of material to be distributed to the members. The
project sheet included all staff activities, ranging from simple telephone
responses to member offices to detailed projects, speeches or analyses which
were assembled on their behalf.^
In 1975 the RSC staff began to distribute all of the material published
during the preceding week at the weekly meetings of the membership. This
included BULLetins and fact sheets which had already been sent to the mem¬
ber offices. Frequently, members expressed interest in the formal published
works of the RSC because they had not seen them previously in their office.
Presumably, the material had been sorted by their staff member who opened
the mail, sent on to another staff member, or discarded, but had never
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reached the member's personal attention. The "paper explosion" meant
that RSC material as well as other research material was not always used
by members or their staff. However, it was to the RSC staff's advantage
that the members at least be made aware of what the staff was producing.
To increase its usefulness to the RSC member offices, the RSC staff
reorganized its printed material during the recess between the 93rd and
94th Congresses. The staff instituted a cumulative numbering system
together with an index. Then, looseleaf binders were obtained for all the
members so that the material could be kept in one place. The RSC staff
hoped that this would make the material more useful over a longer period
of time. An additional psychological advantage was that all of the RSC's
material bound together would be more impressive to the staff aides and
members than the individual papers which had been issued on a weekly
basis. Thus, the staff and members would be more conscious of the ser¬
vices offered by the RSC and, it was hoped, more sympathetic to it.
Member Meetings
The weekly meetings of members were expanded to include ail members
of the RSC in early 1976. This was a means of assuring participation of as
many members as possible. It also enabled the rank-and-file dues-paying
members to express an opinion about the affairs of the organization. In
1974 and 1975, the weekly meetings were described as being meetings of the
"Executive Committee." In fact, other members who were not on the Execu¬
tive Committee frequently attended these sessions. But the designation tended
to exclude other members of the RSC, even though they were all implicitly
invited on a routine basis. By designating the meetings as "member meetings,"
the staff hoped that a larger number of members would participate. As
Mrs. Holt commented, "The Executive Committee meetings were expanded to
member meetings to broaden the base and expand the interest in the issues."*^
This was particularly crucial because as the 94th Congress progressed, attend¬
ance from the Executive Committee would decrease to as few as four or five
members because of conflicting meetings, and the lack of particular interest
in the substantive issues being discussed at that week's meeting.*'7 The RSC
staff had expected this diminution of interest in its activities. The time
pressures on members of Congress are considerable, and the priority of the
individual members frequently shifts away from issues to other roles. Morris
Fiorina notes:
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"Along with the expansion of the federal presence in American
life, the traditional role of the Congress as an all-purpose ombuds¬
man had greatly expanded....Constituents respond rationally to this
modern state of affairs by weighing nonprogrammatic constituency
service heavily when casting their congressional votes.
This problem of declining interest was exacerbated by the losses in the 1974
election. Prior to that time, the embryonic Republican Study Committee
had made some legislative progress. But now, in view of its depleted
membership, it was in a more difficult position to offset the Democrats'
or the Administration's legislative initiatives. As Minority Leader John
Rhodes commented about this period, "We were mainly hanging on by our
fingernails, in defensive actions."^
Beyond this defensive action, however, as Paul Weyrich notes, there
was the need for coordinated action:
"By the time of the '74 election, there was loyalty to the RSC.
It had worked. Since the conservative members had been reduced,
they were even more convinced to hang together to fight off the
worst the congressional Democrats might throw at them."
Thus, any efforts which could be used to emphasize that sense of unity and
common purpose would be helpful to the common objective.
C. Member and Member Office Relations
Among the most delicate tasks of the Republican Study Committee staff
was maintaining a close relationship with member offices. Because each
staff member of the RSC technically served on the payroll of one or more
members of the House, the RSC staff served at the pleasure of those mem¬
bers on whose payrolls they were placed. For example, during the month
of February, 1976, 28 members of the RSC supported 13 members of the
staff. Some staffers received all of their payroll support from one member
of Congress, while others were supported by four or five members of the
House.
The annual'dues trickled in over the whole year and were contributed
toward office supplies and operation. While about 70% of the members
would pay their dues promptly without further dunning, the remainder would
be difficult to obtain. To solve this problem, lists of these non-payers
would be circulated to the members of the Executive Committee, and these
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members would encourage their colleagues to pay their dues. Similarly,
routine announcements which invited other members to join or renew were
sent from the RSC over the signature of its treasurer.^
Raising the salary support, however, was a constant burden to both
the chairman of the RSC and the staff director with the ultimate respon¬
sibility failing to the chairman.
Each month, the staff would attempt to raise as much support as
possible. The salary requirements had to be reviewed monthly, not only
because of staff changes, but because members could change their payroll
expenditures once a month. Thus, a phone call from a supporting member's
office indicating that he was withdrawing his support, would result in a
shortfall which would have to be met quickly. Fortunately, only 2596-30%
of the dollars required on a monthly basis had to be raised anew, and of
this 25%-30%, about one-half could be obtained by the staff who could
contact staff in member offices. The balance was raised by the chairman
from his colleagues in the House.
While the staff resented being subjected to the whims of members, they
had to maintain a positive attitude for public appearance. Member loyalty
would not tolerate disparaging remarks about other members, no matter how
arbitrary their actions. A kind of "market test" came to be used, that is,
if the staff produced useful research products for the members, the members
would support the staff. This theory was sometimes noted with bitterness as
some of the members who had been most conscientiously served, would
drastically cut their contributions at the last moment. But, because of
several stalwart members who had always come through in difficult times,
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no payrolls were ever missed, although some checks were occasionally late.
Conservative members of Congress frequently have taken the viewpoint
that the maintenance of large staffs was an unjustified expenditure of tax¬
payers' funds. Those who argued in favor of the RSC staff held the opposite
position. The RSC position was phrased:
"The question of budget frugality is often raised by Members of
the Republican Study Committee. In reply several Members had
noted that the salary of one specific research assistant in the 93rd
Congress, at an annual salary rate of $18,000, was one of the key
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ingredients in saving the taxpayers from the $800 miilion land use
bill. This type of investment certainly represents a prudent invest¬
ment of taxpayer funds.1
The RSC staff examined the payroll records of the individual members
in the Clerk of the House's office. Ail of these salary records are open to
inspection by members, the press, and the general public. When members
were found to have funds available, they were asked to support the RSC
staff. These approaches could either be made at the staff level or at the
member level, with the burden frequently falling on the chairman of the
RSC. When salary support was obtained from one of the members of the
RSC, it was immediately necessary for the staff person who was being
supported to introduce himself to the member's congressional staff in order
to avoid confusion and embarrassment to the member or his office staff.
For example, during the Wayne Hays scandal in 1976, the Legislative Director
of the Republican Study Committee, Daphne Miller, was accused in the
Detroit News of being a "ghost" employee on the payroll of Congressman
Bud Shuster (R-Pennsylvania), Sam Steiger, and David Treen (R-Louisiana).
Since the news media was full of stories about Wayne Hays' mistress,
Elizabeth Ray, being funded by the House payroll, "ghost" employee stories
were a major news item. The reason for Miller's inclusion in the article
was that several staff aides in Shuster's office were unaware of Miller's
position at the RSC or who she was.^ The Detroit News story dealt with
the story of Rep. Charles Diggs who was subsequently investigated and
convicted of accepting payroll kickbacks from his congressional staff employees.
This article asserted that Miller and her RSC staff colleagues had written the
book The Case Against the Reckless Congress, using the names of the con¬
servative congressmen who hired them as their pseudonyms.^ Michael Maibin
stated the concern of the RSC staff in this regard:
"...The members delegate enormous authority to their staffs and
cannot possibly keep track of all or even most of what goes on in
there name. But one thing they can do is to react instantly when
they hear of something they do not like." 6
Such incidents occurred only infrequently but they created serious
complications for the executive director who was attempting to obtain mem¬
ber support. Every contributing member had a vision of his hometown news¬
papers carrying similar stories about his RSC employee. The problem went
beyond the issue of payroll support. The RSC staff was effective only as
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long as the members had confidence in its judgment and maturity. Michaei
Maibin notes that "congressionai decisions are uitimateiy acts of faith —
prudential judgments based upon the^ acceptance of others' opinions." ' If
the members' confidence in the R5C staff diminished, it would impact
adversely on their efforts in legislative activity.
The public relations problem of the RSC staff was exacerbated when
the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee's bulletin entitled
"Congress Today!" accused Congressman Philip Burton (D-California), the
chairman of the Democratic Study Group, of improprieties. These alleged
improprieties included the employment of staff personnel who were on the
staff of the DSG and who appeared on more than one member of Congress'
payroll at the same time. In an immediate response to this article, Chair¬
woman Holt of the RSC pointed out to the Executive Director of the
Campaign Committee:
"these charges with regard to multiple employment and the
alleged impropriety of research people working on the staff of
the Democratic Study Group while on Members' payrolls are
inaccurate and groundless." °
Actually, the fact is the article was accurate, but the implication that this
was an improper procedure was incorrect. Her letter continued:
"The rules of the House have provided, since the late I950's,
for the multiple sponsorship of House personnel....The group of
which I am chairwoman (the Republican Study Committee) oper¬
ates in a similar manner with shared staff many of whom are
employed by more than one Member. A number of other re¬
search groups in the House of Representatives use the multiple
employment system. They include the Wednesday Group, the
Democratic Research Organization, the Black Caucus, the Rural
Caucus, and the Environmental Study Conference. They cover
the political spectrum from left to right and include among
their members a majority of Members of the House." "
While this case was attributed to the eagerness of the Campaign Com¬
mittee's staff to tarnish the Democrats, it also could have had a negative
psychological impact on the RSC contributors thereby encouraging the mem¬
bers to withdraw" support and concentrate more fully on their constituent-
related activities. After all, some observers of the Congress have main¬
tained that the House was moving substantially in that direction:
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"Explicit acceptance of the idea that legislation was not its
primary function would, in large part, simply be recognition of
the direction which change has already been taking. It would
legitimize and expand the functions of constituent service and
administrative oversight which, in practice, already constitute
the principal work of most congressmen."™
A related problem which had to be dealt with on a continuing basis was
rivalries between the RSC shared staff member and the member's office
staff. Because the shared staff person often worked with members of the
House on major legislative issues, he was in close contact with the member
on a day-to-day basis on the House floor. This close working relationship
meant that jealousy could occur between members of the RSC staff and
the staff in the individual member offices. The member has only a limited
amount of time and it was perceived that any time he spent on RSC
activities was time diverted from other activities. This was a particularly
sensitive problem if the member chose an RSC activity over one dealing
with his own constituents. A program was initiated to avoid this kind of
problem. The first of these programs was a series of meetings with
administrative assistants in member offices. These meetings were first held
on December 11, 12, and 18, 1974. Later meetings were held occasionally
during 1975 and 1976. The idea was to build the rapport between the RSC
staff and the staff in the member offices. In these informal sessions, the
RSC staff discussed their range of activities and how these could be helpful
to the member's staff in performing its duties. The purpose of the meet¬
ings was to build personal contact and reduce the tension which might
develop between the RSC staff members and their office counterparts.
In addition, special meetings were held for members' staff aides.
For example, when Professors Hayek and Friedman came to town, in addition
to meeting with the members, staff meetings were also arranged. Similarly,
briefings were held on such subjects as building and maintaining a computer
mailing list.-^ Occasional newspaper articles or other items of administra¬
tive interest were sent to administrative assistants, press releases were sent
to press aides, and the regular Monday legislative briefings were held for
the legislative staff of member offices.
The relationship with member offices was complex. Some involved
requests, others offered services or assistance and still others were procedural.
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From the RSC staff's viewpoint, they were ali important because they gave
the RSC staff an opportunity to prove the worth and vaiue of the organiza¬
tion. Rather than being viewed as a nuisance which demanded the attention,
time and money of the member, the RSC wanted to be projected as an
extension of the member's own staff, performing legislative and service
functions which his staff could not do on its own. Even though the RSC
staff viewed its role as substantially legislative, sometimes in order to
engage in these activities, it had to perform other services.
All of these efforts were undertaken in an effort to further involve
the RSC membership and member offices in the joint legislative activities
of the RSC, and also for the members' staff to view the staff of the RSC
as an extension of and a complement to the member's own district-oriented
staff rather than as a competitor.
The meetings and the publications of the Republican Study Committee
served as a regular reminder to the members that they were engaged in a
common legislative effort. Some of the implications of this were routine.
As Mrs. Holt noted, "The RSC publications are important because they stop
my staff from reinventing the wheel."^2 In addition, these publications
joined the members in a common legislative crusade.
By the same token, the RSC staff did not envision itself as the sole
source of legislative or public policy data but, instead, it wanted to play
the role of clearinghouse and key contact point on specific issues. As
Allen Schick said in a slightly different context:
"The case for indigenous legislative resources should not be
grounded on aspirations for self sufficiency. This status is neither
necessary nor desirable. Rather, Congress should give itself enough
resources to keep in touch with developments outside."33
When the RSC staff was perceived as providing a major portion of these
resources, its role was generally accepted by the members' staffs.
Particular office relations evolved not only among the research staff
members of the RSC, but also with the staff director, Ed Feulner. For
example, the staff director's relationship to Philip Crane, vice chairman of
the RSC, had always been close, since he had formerly served as Crane's
legislative assistant and subsequently his administrative assistant, as well as
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his campaign manager in 1972. Despite this close relationship, the executive
director's successor as Crane's administrative assistant, Richard Williamson,
wrote him shortly after the 1974 election as follows:
"It seems to me that it is a natural outgrowth of the increasing
maturity and viability of the Republican Steering (sic) Committee
and your role as its Executive Director, as well as Phil Crane's
growth as a legislator, that the separation between yourself and
this office now come to pass. Furthermore, I deem such a separa¬
tion absolutely essential for the reinvigoration of Phil Crane's staff,
the new effectiveness I envision this office developing, and my role
as Administrative Assistant with responsibility for and authority over
the office."
Williamson had been newly-elevated to the position of Crane's administrative
assistant. He wanted to prove to the executive director that he was in
charge of Crane's office and that the old special relationship was over.
Coming, as it did, on the heels of the 1974 election setback, it was another
headache which the RSC did not need. In fact, it was a rebuke to the RSC.
While the executive director realized that this was not necessarily Crane's
personal attitude, he also realized the futility of a confrontation with
Williamson which the RSC would almost inevitably lose. In a case like this,
a member's personal staff had virtually unlimited access to the member.
Thus, it was almost impossible for the RSC staff to compete for the mem¬
ber's attention. A sympathetic conversation in an RSC meeting between the
executive director and the member could be undercut by hours of antagonistic
commentary from the member's own office staff. Crane's central role as a
primary founder of the RSC was well-known. His salary support was the
largest of any member, and he had frequently cooperated with the staff in
enlisting other members in the RSC activities. After a "cooling off" period
between the Crane office and the RSC, a new relationship developed. While
it was not as close as it had been in the past, Crane remained actively
involved. His salary contribution was cut, but he remained one of the
largest supporters to the RSC staff.
Specific cases such as this could be resolved, but more difficult
questions arose from group confrontations. For example, a meeting was
held on October 22, 1975, between Ed Feulner and Phil Truiuck of the
Republican Study Committee staff with Rich Williamson and Peter
Braithwaite (representing Phil Crane), Bruce Rickerson (representing
Marjorie Holt), Joe Overton (representing Barry Goldwater, Jr.), Chris Lay
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(representing Steve Symms), Larry Bowles (representing Jim Martin from
North Carolina), Don Senese (representing Bill Archer from Texas), and
Steve Markman (representing Tom Hagedorn). The meeting was instigated
by Overton and Lay and was to deal with their disappointment with the
Monday morning briefing sessions of the RSC. The group confrontation was
a powerful signal. Part of the motivation of the meeting was later
described by Phil Truiuck as:
"...simply complaining because we were losing more battles
now. - For some reason, we bore the brunt of their frustration."3-5
The fact that the chairwoman and all four vice chairmen were repre¬
sented at this particular meeting, and that the members represented at the
meeting contributed 60% of the combined salary of the RSC, resulted in
prompt and serious attention to the concerns of these aides. The group
argued that the briefing sessions should be strategy meetings talking about
specific amendments to pending bills. They objected to the general pre¬
sentations of broad issue material as being too vague to be useful. They
also had other objections to the format and contents of some of the RSC
publications. Some of their specific ideas were helpful, and out of this
meeting came a number of changes to the briefing sessions and the RSC
publications. The first change presented by the group concerned an addition
to the weekly BULLetin of a listing of Congressional Record speeches
and inserts by conservative members of both the House and Senate for the
prior week. This information would enable the staff aides to quickly index
major subjects and pull out the material when it was required instead of
monitoring the Record on a daily basis themselves. This proved to be a
useful service because the Congressional Record is an indispensable tool for
a professional staff aide on Capitol Hill. But to review its 200-500 pages
daily was a chore that every staff aide constantly tried to avoid. The RSC
listing would provide the staff aides with a handy reference guide to speech
material and other useful research data."^ Additionally, the Monday briefings
were restructured to include a regular section discussing legislative initiatives
on pending bills.^7
A problem arose among the members who were pressured into participating
but not wholly enthusiastic. Mayhew notes that:
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"Of course, congressmen must at ail times generate an impres¬
sion that they are interested in winning victories, but there may
not be much behind the impression.
Safe constituent-related services help to build a solid base back home. But,
a visible role in a legislative battle is likely to make as many enemies as
friends. Thus, some of the more timid members were reluctant to commit
themselves beyond the annual dues to the RSC activities. The young Repub¬
lican Study Committee experienced many problems not only in dealing with
the constituent-oriented members. The RSC's work was also complicated
by its public relations problems, staff personality conflicts and the counter-
pressures experienced by the members with respect to time and clerk allow¬
ances. It was the delicate balancing by the staff which kept the organization
alive during the difficult period when the membership was generally dispirited
and frustrated both by its Administration and by the majority party.
D. Relations with the House Republican Leadership
Following Gerald Ford's selection as Vice President in 1973, Congressman
John Rhodes was unanimously elected Minority Leader of the Republicans in
the U.S. House of Representatives. Rhodes' earlier relations with the RSC
have been discussed in previous sections, but the changed composition of the
House following the 1974 elections brought about an altering of Rhodes'
perceptions of both his role as Minority Leader and the role of the Repub¬
licans in the House.
Since the time of the federal land use victory in 1974, Rhodes had been
urging the RSC to change its name to something that sounded less official.
In fact, he maintains that the agreement was made with LaMar Baker to
change the name when Rhodes made Room 134 available as an office to the
group.39 And so, the name was changed at the first members meeting in
1975. Rhodes' view of the RSC had become more cordial; he admitted some
years later, "Actually, I'm not unhappy that it's [the RSC] there.
The second ranking leader among the House Republicans was the Minority
Whip Bob Michel. Michel joined the Republican Study Committee in late
1974, and was elected to membership of the Executive Committee at the
January 1975 general membership meeting.
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With the active invoivement of the Whip in the affairs of the RSC
and the soothing of Rhodes' ego by the name change, it was hoped that
the Republican leadership would accept the RSC and cooperate more actively
with it. This cooperation was seen to be an achievable goal because of the
frequent identity of interests between the formal leadership and the RSC
activities. Michel's role on the RSC's Executive Committee did not affect
Rhodes directly, who later indicated that he was unaware that Michel even
served in this position.^ * On the other hand, Michel recalls that he discussed
the matter with Rhodes, but that "Rhodes had no real reaction to my being
in it [the RSC].,,/f2 Whether the Minority Leader knew of the Whip's member¬
ship or not, it did not affect his attitude toward the RSC.
Cooperation with the Minority Leader on Positive Proposals
Following the 1974 election setback, Rhodes decided to present a positive
package of Republican legislative proposals to the American people. Some
RSC members had suggested an independent legislative agenda for the House
Republicans too; this appeared to be an arena in which the RSC could cooperate
with the Minority Leader. For example, in early 1973, Ed Derwinski had
advocated the "imperative need to establish an identity independent of Nixon....
After all, I can even imagine circumstances where Spiro Agnew will not be
our Presidential nominee in 1976."^
The need to move away from the party's titular leader — President Ford --
was driven home after the 1974 losses. The surviving Republicans partially blamed
Ford for their major losses: although they candidly admitted Watergate had
been the primary problem, his WIN program had not been helpful. With the
announcement of Rhodes' intention, Mrs. Holt and the other members agreed
that the RSC should make its input into the Rhodes package to insure that the
conservative viewpoint on major issues would receive substantial attention.
The RSC executive director was directed by the Executive Committee to
prepare a series of proposals for the Executive Committee to review at its
March 17 meeting.^ The staff assembled the package which dealt with nine
general issue areas, several of which had been of interest to the RSC such as
welfare reform, food stamp reform and land use. The package was circulated
to the Executive Committee in advance of the meeting.
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Also at this time, former Republican Congressman Richard Shoup
(Montana) had been retained as a consultant by Rhodes following his 1974
defeat with the specific assignment of preparing the Rhodes alternative
package. In this role, Shoup was invited by the Executive Committee to
participate in the RSC meeting on March 17, 1975.^ Shoup reviewed the
RSC proposals, and discussed them with the members in detail. Although
there were broad areas of general agreement, the staff was directed to
provide more data to Shoup. And, Shoup agreed to meet with the RSC
Executive Committee again. Shoup also met with other Republicans who
were not members of the RSC.
Despite the fact that he received input from many sources, the RSC
proposals provided a substantial part of the final Rhodes document. In his
cover letter for the "Republican Legislative Agenda," Mr. Rhodes referred
specifically to the Buckley-Michel food stamp reform bill:
"Some of the specifics have already been presented. For
example, the Republican program calls for a 'drastic revision of
the run-away food stamp program.' Certainly the far-reaching
proposal recently introduced by the Republican Whip fits this
category." ^
Members of the RSC could take satisfaction from the fact that their key
joint proposals in welfare and food stamp reform were now part of the entire
party's program in the House, even though their input was not acknowledged
by Rhodes.
In his 1976 book, The Futile System,^ Rhodes discussed the House
Republican Legislative Agenda of 1975 noting that it was "authored by a cross-
section of GOP House Members," and that it "identifies the basic legislative
goals of a Republican-controlled Congress.However, by his own admission,
the 1975 Rhodes legislative agenda was not a set of realistic legislative
objectives. In an interview, Rhodes summarized his dissatisfaction: "We
could put a good legislative agenda together, but we just didn't have the
votes to enact it. °
Rhodes also expressed his own frustration as the leader of a minority.
Because he was outnumbered and working in an hostile environment, Rhodes
consistently maintained that the House "Republicans are essentially without
any congressional power." Rhodes continued:
204
"Because it doesn't have the votes, the minority has no pos¬
itive power. Its chief influence is negative. The current Repub¬
lican minority, for exampie, has had some success in sustaining
presidential vetoes, but that is because there happens to be a
Republican President.
Rhodes' attitude that the minority party could not get positive proposals
onto the legislative agenda frustrated the RSC leadership who considered themselves
"dedicated to a philosophy and dedicated to getting some things changed in
Washington.Rhodes' attitude renewed the determination of the activists
within the Republican Study Committee to pursue their own legislative goals
and to attempt to work closely with conservative allies within the Democratic
party to coordinate bipartisan ad hoc coalitions to influence specific votes.
The Minority Leader seemed to be worn out and negative in his attitude. As
John Rousselot said of Rhodes:
"When you're a Minority Leader, you're working on consensus
so much you lose sight of some of the opportunities."-^
The RSC had a different role in the House. It was not dedicated to com¬
promise and consensus:
"It constantly reminds House Republicans of what the traditional
Republican position is even when the leadership of the White House
deviates....I like to think we have an influence in keeping our party
more conservative."-^
Problems with the "Anderson Oath"
John B. Anderson (R-Iliinois), chairman of the Republican Conference,
had been a leading representative of the liberals within the House Republican
party for many years. Anderson attempted to use his leadership within the
party to gain a voice for the liberal position equal to the more popular
conservative position.
A case in point was "A Republican Statement," which was issued in
March 1975. This statement, circulated by Congressman Anderson among his
House Republican colleagues, repudiated third party efforts which were being
discussed in political circles after the Republican debacle in the 1974 congres¬
sional and senatorial elections. At the same time, the signers
"acknowledged that within our own party there is a wide range
of views on particular issues, yet we feel that this competition of
views and ideas can be healthy in terms of broadening our base of
support and strengthening our party in the long run. That to fail to
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broaden our base — to exclude any section of our society — would
be not only morally wrong, but politically stupid.
Anderson obtained 110 signatures from House Republican members. The
other 34 Republican members did not sign. Of the 34, 30 were members of
the Republican Study Committee, many of them members of the Executive
Committee, including Chairwoman Holt, Vice Chairmen Crane and Symms,
Treasurer Rousselot, and past chairmen Devine (R-Ohio) and Derwinski. The
members' stated reason for not signing the statement included the
emphasis of the statement on the Republican party "being all things to all
people," rather than an adherence to the conservative principles of the last
Republican party platform.
Activities like this by Anderson led to difficulties between the RSC and
the Republican leadership: Anderson had obtained the signatures of the
House Minority Leader, the Minority Whip, and the chairmen of the Policy
Committee and the Research Committee. The members of the Republican
Study Committee learned that the Republican leadership usually stood together,
even when that meant agreeing with the liberal position.
While the Anderson statement was only a minor news story, it emphasized
the difficulties confronting the conservatives within the RSC. They learned
that not only the leadership but also many of their colleagues could be led
into signing a statement with which they may not have agreed, but which
"party unity" required. This was a particularly difficult lesson considering that
in retaining his leadership post, Anderson had recently defeated the Conservative
candidate.
Leadership Assistance to Maintain Facilities
The RSC was constantly in danger of losing Room 134 in the Cannon
House Office Building. For example, a letter was received on June 30, 1975,
addressed to Chairwoman Holt from Elizabeth Holtzman (D-New York), the
chairwoman of the "Task Force on Facilities and Space Utilization" of the
House Commission on Information and Facilities. The Holtzman letter asked
Mrs. Holt to:
"...provide the commission with your assessment of the use now
being made of space under your control....If you would identify the
functions now being carried out in this space, indicate whether such
functions could be handled without loss of efficiency in alternative
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locations at a greater distance from the House floor, or specify rea¬
sons you feel these functions should remain in their present location.
Your views will be given every consideration."-^
While the RSC was not the only group receiving an inquiry on its use of
space, the RSC was in a particularly vulnerable position. This vulnerability
was based both on the organization's status as a Republican body and as an
ad hoc group.
A move from Room 134 would present serious difficulties. To be moved
to one of the House Office Building Annexes, which were located several
blocks further from the Capitol, would make the RSC less accessible to the
legislative process by denying the RSC legislative staff the ability to contact
and influence their members in an effective way. Thus, the RSC staff drafted
a reply for Mrs. Holt to send directly to Mrs. Holtzman. They also drafted a
strong reply on behalf of John Rhodes, to whom Room 134 had formally been
assigned before, he allocated it to the RSC. In Congressman Rhodes' response,
it- was rioted that Room 134 was the permanent headquarters of the RSC
which was occupied by 10 senior research people.She stated that the staff
was in frequent contact with the members on their legislative business and
that such support activities as mimeographing and mailing were carried out
in a borrowed office in one of the annexes further from the Capitol. The
Rhodes response emphasized the same points. As the Minority Leader, Rhodes
was the only Republican on the three-person House Office Building Commission,
the commission with permanent responsibility for allocating all space.
The Holtzman task force — which was an ad hoc body — met sporad¬
ically throughout the 94th Congress. Philip Crane, one of the RSC vice
chairmen, served as a member of the Holtzman group, and represented the
interests of the RSC in these negotiations. It was not until the conclusion
of that Congress that Rhodes informed the RSC that it was being given the
"opportunity" to move to the slightly larger Room 433 of the Cannon House
Office Building, directly above the former office. Even if the room had not
been slightly larger, the staff would still have moved. As long as the office
was in the primary House Office Buildings, the RSC would stay in the
physical mainstream of the legislative process. Rhodes' intervention on
behalf of the RSC was indispensible in keeping the group in its prime loca¬
tion. Although Rhodes was reluctant to acknowledge the input of the
RSC, it began to force itself into the legislative process.
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E. Relations with the Republican White House
The opportunities for the RSC members to meet with the President,
despite the fact that he was a Republican, were not as frequent as might
be expected. Because the RSC was an ad hoc group rather than an official
part of the party organization, its requests to be included on the President's
schedule were often delayed by the White House staff, and by the import of
other business. By granting access to an unofficial group in his own party,
the President could be suspected of undercutting the formal leadership with
which he had to work closely, but to ignore the group would be to alienate
a major part of his voting support. It was impossible however, for Ford to
give too much legitimacy to one ad hoc Republican faction, even though the
RSC was the strongest within his party. In another context, Rose notes
"the need to balance factions, tendencies and individuals against one another."-^
President Ford had to be particularly deft in his "faction balancing" because
it involved philosophical, structural and substantive issues. Access to the
President was not the only issue. The RSC members would have their own
agenda for which they would like to gain Ford's support — possibly pressing
the President on some issues and limiting his range of options. Rose con¬
tinues his analysis noting that this balancing requirement "acts as a major
restraint upon the power of the party leader, whether in opposition or as
Prime Minister." ^
The substance of the issues was not in dispute. On most occasions,
the President, the Minority Leadership and the Republican Study Committee
were on the same side of an issue. But, the appearance of "legitimizing" a
group which was outside the formal structure was of concern to the White
House. Thus, the RSC was in a comparable position to the Democratic
Study Group under the Kennedy Administration:
"From the White House point of view, there was a recogni¬
tion of the fact that the [Democratic ] Study Group represented the
strongest source of support for the President's program in the House
of Representatives. At the same time, however, there was an equal
recognition of the need for dealing with the established power cen¬
ters in the- House, the Committee Chairmen and the elected leader¬
ship."-^
An opportunity did present itself in April 1975 for the Executive Com¬
mittee to meet with the President. The purpose of the meeting was to
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discuss legislative concerns of the RSC membership directly with Ford. Al¬
though the meeting with the President had been arranged by the executive
director, and its agenda had been discussed by the Executive Committee
during several meetings, the request for inclusion of the executive director
was denied. The White House staff did assure Mrs. .Holt that minutes would
be available to the RSC to assist in following up the meeting.
A specific agenda was worked out at the regular member meetings, and
it was agreed that five legislative topics were to be discussed by Mrs. Holt
and Messrs. Burgener (R-California), Symms, Bauman (R-Maryland), Kemp
(R-New York), Armstrong (R-Colorado) and Dickinson (R-Alabama). Each
participant had agreed to speak on one key issue: Burgener on welfare and
food stamp reform; Symms and Bauman on land use; Kemp about the economy;
Armstrong on energy; and Dickinson on political issues and federal appoint¬
ments.
Ford's regular meetings with Rhodes, Michel and Anderson from the
House, together with their Senate counterparts, proved to be pep rallies for
the Administration's programs with discussion centered around how congres¬
sional support could be built for Ford's programs. The RSC Executive Com¬
mittee, on the other hand, wanted to convey their legislative concerns to
the President, rather than merely support the executive branch's proposals.
The meeting enabled the members to express their frustration with the White
House because as Mrs. Holt stated, "Poor communications between the Pres¬
ident and Republican conservatives contributed to a lack of understanding."^
The general tenor of the meeting was to be friendly however, rather than
antagonistic. While commentators like Thomas Cronin noted that Ford "had to
contend with a strong attack from the right wing of his own minority party,"6 *
that attack usually manifested itself over specific issues in the committee or
on the House floor rather than in meetings with the President.
This first meeting took place on April 23, 1975.6^ The RSC agenda
items were covered in detail. The President agreed with the RSC's basic
position on welfare and food stamp reform, but indicated that he "had been
clobbered" the last time he tried to reduce the food stamp program.6^
Regarding energy, he outlined the options available to him and indicated that
he would be deciding shortly which way he would go on this issue. Responding
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to Bill Dickinson's inquiry on federal postcard registration of voters, Ford
stated his emphatic opposition to such a measure. On political appointments,
he heard the members' grievances without making any commitments regarding
specific appointments. As the exchange continued
"He [the President] became more responsive. His changed
mood may have resulted from his awareness that we were not
there simply for the purpose of criticizing him."^
In the formal part of the meeting, other questions were also discussed. For
example, in response to an inquiry from John Rousselot, the President reit¬
erated his opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency. He said he would
re-emphasize his opposition throughout the cabinet departments and elsewhere
in his Administration.
Following the meeting, Mrs. Holt wrote to Max Friedersdorf, Special
Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, restating the RSC
position on its legislative initiatives, specifically the National Welfare Reform
Act of 1975 and the forthcoming National Food Stamp Reform Act of 1975.
In addition, she endorsed the Kemp Jobs Creation Act and stressed the desir¬
ability of giving RSC members the opportunity to submit names for top-level
appointments within the Ford Administration.^
The second opportunity for the Executive Committee to meet with the
President occurred on Wednesday, October 8, 1975. Again, the staff and
members drew up a detailed agenda to discuss with the President. A last
minute change by the White House rescheduled the meeting from a morning
session to one which took place at 4:30 and decreased the attendance at the
meeting — recorded votes were taking place on the House floor and many
members of the RSC refused to leave.^ The reduced attendance at the
October meeting was not surprising because most members have tightly drawn
schedules which do hot readily adapt to major changes. At the same time,
the White House had been using political and social opportunities to court
many members of the House on an individual basis. But, by October, Ford
had vetoed bills and taken strong stands on several issues, and with these
positive signs, tKe RSC members were not as concerned about Ford's
policies as they had been six months earlier.
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Similarly, the RSC's relationship with Rhodes had improved. They
had worked with him on his "legislative agenda" and on several other issues.
Furthermore, as the memory of the 1974 elections faded, the RSC's need to
gain stature by meeting with the President was reduced.
Several important items were discussed at the October meeting: the
first of these was the Buckley-Michel Food Stamp Reform Bill discussed by
Congressman Burgener. The President responded that the Administration
would be coming out with its food stamp reform proposals very soon and
that they would incorporate much of the Buckley-Michel bill.^ This was
an encouraging response for all of the members who had been working hard
on this bill.
The second item concerned the Common Situs bill and the Dunlop
"compromise." Former Chairman Del Clawson stressed that members of the
RSC were strongly opposed to the so-called compromise. The response from
the President was that Secretary Duniop had consulted with some people in
corporate management who had indicated that they could live with his two-
part package. Ciawson noted that RSC contacts within the business community
indicated that grave reservations about the bill remained. Ford assured that
he would take a further look at the situation as it evolved and keep his
options open. This was one of the first signs of presidential flexibility on this
major bill.^
On the subject of postcard voter registration, Bill Dickinson supported
the President's position in opposition to the bill and pledged RSC help to
sustain a veto if necessary.
Mrs. Holt ended the meeting by expressing the hope that the Republicans
in the House and Senate would not be confronted by any "surprises" during
the time from then until the November 1976 election. Her specific reference
was to some of President Ford's activities before the 1974 election when
the President introduced his "Whip Inflation Now" (WIN) policy. 69 7he
Administration's 'policy had been a negative factor for the House Republicans
in their re-election efforts. The RSC wished to avoid the electoral trend
observed by Morris Fiorina:
"As the electoral fates of congressmen and their president have
diverged, their incentives to cooperate have diverged as well."'^
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Mrs. Holt expressed the hope that they could work together with the. President.
At this time, the RSC's relationship with the White House was cordial although
the White House considered the input from the RSC to be secondary to that
which it received from the formal leadership, an understandable view consid¬
ering the President's former position as House Minority Leader. Ford chose
to emphasize the more formal relationship, rather than work through new and
unofficial channels.
As 1975 moved into 1976 and election activities increased, the RSC
membership was divided on the presidential race. Some members of the
Executive Committee were active supporters of Ford, while others supported
Reagan. At several meetings of the Executive Committee, the staff was
directed not to take a position and to provide its material to both candidates
and their staffs.
While it might seem that the RSC membership would have supported
Governor Reagan unanimously, this was not the case. Ed Derwinski pointed
out:
"I'm a practical politician. I don't throw away the incum¬
bency and ail of the advantages that gives to us for a further
degree of ideological purity."' *
The pragmatism of Derwinski was offset by the ideological conviction of
Phil Crane who strongly supported Governor Reagan. With these strong
feelings, the requirement for the staff to maintain neutrality was confirmed.
If the membership could be held together on RSC issues and in support of
its commitments to the RSC, the group could work together. Like the
Watergate battle of two years earlier, the best role for the RSC was to
maintain strict neutrality in the presidential race.
Several of the senior members of the staff participated in the drafting
of the 1976 Republican Platform at Kansas City. In fact, the staff was
selected on such a basis that either candidates' representative could veto any
of the proposed staff, evidence of the truly neutral role of the RSC at this
time.
With the work of the Platform Committee, policy relationships between
the RSC and the White House decreased after 1975, but political contacts
both with pro-Ford supporters and pro-Reagan supporters increased. The RSC
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Executive Committee had directed the staff to stay away from presidential
politics and concentrate on areas where RSC members could agree. Thus,
the role of the RSC staff on the Platform Committee was one which would
help to enhance the role of the RSC, no matter which candidate would win
the nomination.
F. Vote Justifications and Response to Vote Ratings of Campaign Groups
Anti-war groups in the late 60s and early 70s began a trend toward
single issue politics. In addition to the Vietnam issue, political activists
were concerned about the environment. Later, areas such as consumer
activism and education also emerged.
As organizations developed around these issue areas, they established
political committees. One of the ways for the political committees to obtain
instant media attention was to "rate the Congressmen." As Mayhew points
out, the concept of vote ratings is not new, going back at least to the
ratings of the "drys" through their Anti-Saloon League.Ideological groups
of both the right and the left — Americans for Constitutional Action and
Americans for Democratic Action — began rating the Congress in 1959 and
1947 respectively, and the newer political groups began with the Environ¬
mental Action rating in the 1970 elections, better known as the "dirty
dozen rating." This was an attempt to pick selected individuals who combined
an unacceptable environmental record with particular vulnerability in their
re-election campaigns. Additional resources could be invested in these races
in the form of money and volunteers, and pressure through the media could
be applied to them for their "anti-environmental" stand.
Members of the Republican Study Committee worried about these ratings.
Bill Armstrong, for example, indicated that one of his priorities when he
came back to Washington after his 1974 election, would be to organize the
conservatives to establish counter rating groups throughout the United States.
Armstrong was receiving hostile media attention in Colorado because he was
portrayed as being opposed to senior citizens and a clean environment. The
problem was becoming serious for the conservatives because as Charles
Lincfblom notes: "Almost every interest has its watchdog."73
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Prior to the 1974 election, the RSC staff issued a set of "Vote Justifica¬
tions." The purpose of these Vote Justifications was to supply specific infor¬
mation in a convenient format to the RSC members who traveled through
their districts facing hostile questions. The response to the Vote Justifications
from the members in 1974 was very positive, and they were expanded sub¬
stantially by the time of the 1976 elections. The first 1976 set appeared in
May containing 46 key bills or amendments from January 1975 to May 1976,
and was later updated at the close of the second session in September 1976,
to include 82 key votes and amendments from the 94th Congress.
Both volumes included justifications for supporting the most important
of the President's vetoes. It was noted in the cover letter from Marjorie
Holt to her Republican Study Committee colleagues that:
"Not every member will agree with all the positions defended
here; many will not agree with all of the particular reasons cited.
This booklet is an effort on the part of our staff to supply useful
information to members who may use and adjust these facts and
arguments to fit their own particular needs. In several cases, the
members of the RSC were split down the middle. Because conser¬
vatives could regard these bills from differing points of view, we
have supplied justifications for voting either way."'7-'
Because of the underlying need for accountability to one's own constituents,
neither the RSC staff nor the key members of it ever expected their mem¬
bers to vote against their constituents' interests on a bill. Of course, the
members tended to be on the same side of issues, or they would not have
voluntarily joined the organization. Yet, their immediate objective was re¬
election. Mayhew put it well:
"The electoral role has an attractive universality to it. It
has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be
achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained."'6
While the disclaimer and the presentation of both sides of certain bills
showed that the RSC membership was not completely unified on all of the
issues, this deviation was relatively small. Only seven of the 82 individual
vote justifications found the RSC membership substantially divided. The full
range of arguments for the pro-RSC position stretched from philosophical
arguments to parochial concerns, with the knowledge that all of the members
could tailor the arguments to their own style and their own district concerns.
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However, while these volumes were useful in giving an overview to the
campaigning incumbent and his key volunteers, they were not the timely
response which Armstrong was looking for to offset the accusations that he
or his colleagues were anti-environment, or against senior citizens.
The single issue groups were issuing their ratings on an irregular basis,
but the response had to be almost instantaneous to be effective. Therefore,
in 1976, the RSC undertook a companion project to respond immediately to
ratings from different pressure groups.
As Chairwoman Holt said later:
"The RSC had to make the effort to destroy their [the liberal
rating group's] credibility. We were excelling in a certain set of
areas — the budget and economics and national defense -- but not
in social policy. We had to fight back." '
The RSC's Vote Responses were an effort to "fight back."
The first Vote Response was published on February 4, 1976. In it the
ten votes used by the National Council of Senior Citizens were analyzed.
The RSC position, usually against the National Council of Senior Citizens,
was justified for the use of members of the RSC. Billed as a "rebuttal
or response," this brief document was made available to members within
three days of the release of the National Council's rating.^8
Similarly, when the liberal Consumer Federation of America published
its ratings on 13 votes, the RSC responded with its own rebuttal.^ And,
when the Environmental Action Committee published its ratings, the RSC
rebuttal contained editorial comments on the methodology of the Environ¬
mental Action tabulation:
"It is striking to note that approximately 1200 environment-
related measures were introduced in the 94th Congress and only
14 of them were examined by the Environmental Action group.
Ratings such as this, which are long on rhetoric and short on
fact, add little to the political debate so necessary to solving the
problems we face today not only in the environment, but in energy,
jobs, defense, inflation and government growth."
The RSC introduction reminded members that their political response should
include reference to the impossibility of looking at environmental issues in
a vacuum.
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While these RSC justifications were useful in home districts, ratings
like those of the dirty dozen had a national impact. The counterratings
from other business organizations,^ or from conservative political action
committees,did not have the press appeal which the "dirty dozen" and
other ratings had attained from the news media.
In all of these activities, Vote Justifications and Responses, the staff
of the RSC was fighting defensive battles. The agenda was established by
the liberal organizations, and the conservative activity within the Congress
was still basically responsive rather than initiatory.
G. Republican Study Committee Campaign Activities
At this point we consider the activities of the Republican Study Com¬
mittee in the electoral arena. The prior section illustrated the concerns of
the members regarding their own election prospects. Since they had seen a
number of their colleagues defeated in the 1974 election, they were particu¬
larly concerned about their own electoral prospects in 1976. The Republican
party was still recovering from Watergate, and the party was divided between
Ford and Reagan as its standard-bearer. This caused many members
who had formerly taken their re-election bids for granted, to be more person¬
ally involved in this re-election bid.
These considerations were shared by the members with the staff of the
Republican Study Committee. Once again, the RSC staff had a model to
follow in the form of the DSG's campaign activities. An early activity of
the Democratic Study Group had been the establishment of its Campaign
Fund. The DSG's campaign organization raised campaign funds which were
subsequently disbursed to both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates.
While the RSC Campaign Fund was modeled after the DSG counterpart, it
would come to play a very different role for the RSC in the short-term
future. The RSC Campaign Fund would serve as a publishing vehicle, and
an information disseminating service, but it would never really function as
a political action committee dispensing campaign funds to candidates. A
summary of how the Republican Study Committee decided to follow the lead
of their Democratic colleagues in establishing a campaign organization for
the RSC follows.
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Congressman Melvin Laird edited a voiume of essays entitied Conser-
vative Papers in 196^.^ This voiume provided a major source of the intel¬
lectual framework for the 1964 Goldwater election effort. In 1968,
Laird served as Chairman of the Republican National Platform Committee,
he edited a second volume entitled Republican Papers.^ Laird had brought
a number of prominent academics together with Republican House, members
to produce these volumes. They were released by a major New York publisher,
and widely reviewed in the national news media. This second volume concen¬
trated solely on domestic policy and included chapters which eventually found
their way into Nixon's legislative agenda and became law. Ed Feulner, the
RSC executive director, had worked for Laird during the production of
Republican Papers so, with models like these in mind, he suggested to the
members that the Republican Study Committee publish a book of its own in
anticipation of the 1976 election. If a new volume could be as successful, it
would make a major contribution toward the national legislative agenda and
would help identify the Republican Study Committee as the best source for
new conservative ideas and initiatives.
The volume would include chapters on major public policy issues, both
foreign and domestic. Additionally, Feulner's proposal suggested that the
book include positive legislative proposals which had been introduced by RSC
members and a full listing of key votes for every member of the House. These
positive proposals included RSC legislative goals like welfare and food stamp
reform, and in addition to discussing these issues in the text of the book,
the co-sponsors of the bills would be indicated in a table at the back of the
book. Among the reasons put forth for the publications was the idea that
the conservative congressional candidates should run on a common theme:
"It will provide the common theme that is needed by our
conservative Republican candidates running throughout the nation.
Voters will be made aware that their congressmen, working with
like-minded Members ail around the country, can make a differ¬
ence and get things done." **
The financial attractiveness of this venture was outlined in a memo to the
members which noted how a member-participant could use 3,000 copies within
his district, at the modest cost of $1,500. It was also pointed out that if all
3,000 copies were sold at the suggested price of $2.00 each, the candidate
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would earn $^,500 for his re-election campaign fund. It was suggested that
the book be distributed to campaign workers, donors of $25.00 or more,
district media, and to various interest groups, as well as to individual sup¬
porters.
An additional advantage to the book, which had been tentatively nego¬
tiated between the RSC staff and the publisher, related to the book cover.
While the books would all have the same copy content, they would feature
individualized banner headlines on the front cover with the name and title
of the chapter of each individual member on his own front cover and his
picture on the back. Thus, the chapter on "Welfare Reform Featuring
Clair Burgener" would be purchased by Burgener and distributed in his
California district. The memo regarding the book was initially distributed
to several members of the RSC who then tentatively committed themselves
to participate in the project. Among these members was the chairwoman,
Marjorie Holt, who would write the foreword to the book and whose name
would appear on the cover of every copy.
The subject of the book consumed the entire meeting of the Executive
Committee on December 17, 1975. Several members of the House expressed
strong reservations about the viability and benefits of the project, as well as
the propriety of the Republican Study Committee, per se, publishing the
book.^ It was decided at this meeting that the title had to be more
provocative than "The Republican Study Committee Papers." Congressman
Ed Derwinski made the suggestion of "The Case Against the Reckless
Congress" as an alternative title. Derwinski specifically warned against using
the word "conservative" in the title for fear that it would offend some
potential readers who considered themselves "liberal." This point was accepted
by both the other members and the RSC staff. An objective of the book was
to reach beyond the districts of the participants into non-incumbent districts,
and any tactics which would ensure greater exposure in these new areas were
encouraged.
After the Executive Committee gave its approval, additional participants
were enlisted by the RSC staff. Their chapters were chosen during the next
several months, and the writing of the chapters began. The actual writing
was done by the RSC in some cases, but by the members and their staffs in
most cases. The other Executive Committee members were approached by
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the staff as well as members whose interests in particular subjects were
known to the staff and who might be interested in participating in the
project. This was a delicate process, because some of the non-Executive
Committee members who were not approached might resent being excluded
from the project. The negotiations among the publisher, the various co¬
authors, and the editor occupied several members of the RSC staff for the
next several months. Because this was a new project each potential
participant had to be approached individually with a detailed presentation
of the package.
Several members insisted that a disclaimer be inserted in the front of
the book so that the coauthors were not bound by what each other stated.
While the staff was concerned that this would dilute the impact of the book,
it was agreed that such a statement would be made.
The disclaimer proved a useful mechanism for several reasons. Some
of the members would not agree with all of the reasons cited by their
colleagues for taking a specific position on an issue. The disclaimer gave
them an easy way out of collective responsibility. In addition, occasionally,
a member would have taken a public position which was out of step with
his colleagues.^ Actually, the members agreed completely with each other
on more than 95% of the votes cited. These were areas of general agree¬
ment and the staff was concerned that by having the disclaimer, the reader's
impression would be that there was more division than was really the case.
However, without the disclaimer, the participants would be open to media
and Democratic criticism with charges of inconsistency. Broad agreement
on most issues bound the RSC together, but the added disclaimer accepted
occasional deviation for local or special interests. In any event, the dis¬
claimer never became a major issue with the members.^
The decision to publish The Case Against the Reckless Congress through
the mechanism of a newly created campaign fund was made on December 17.
The coauthors were enlisted, and the new venture was undertaken. As
John Rousselot said later:
"The Study Committee did it, first, because we thought of
it; and second, because the Republican National Committee and
the Republican Campaign Committee would have to make too
many compromises to produce anything like it."°y
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The campaign fund idea had previously been raised by the RSC staff
with several members of the Executive Committee, however, for others it
was a new concept, and one that required considerable elaboration. The
executive director explained the concept of the RSC Campaign Fund to the
members reiying heavily on the DSG model. This in effect gave the new
RSC venture instant credibility, since it was not a totally new concept within
the informal congressional structure.
The first role of the RSC Campaign Fund was to be the publishing of
the book The Case Against the Reckless Congress. Chairwoman Holt and
Feulner were enthujastic about the book. They both believed, however, that
it would be inappropriate for Lhe RSC itself to publish the book. The RSC
was a legislative organization serving all of its members, not an electoral
organization, and the book had an acknowledged electoral purpose. Because
the book would be used extensively during the 1976 political campaigns as a
political tool by the incumbent members, as well as by challengers, the
executive director advised against co-mingling funds from the sale of the
book with funds that the RSC would receive from dues or subscriptions.
Once this argument was accepted, it became clear that an alternative
publishing and financing vehicle had to be devised. This was particularly
critical because of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971. The RSC Campaign Fund was advocated by Crane, Holt, and
several others. They argued that any profits which might accrue to the
RSC Campaign Fund should not go to the participants in the book project.
As Congressman Phil Crane mentioned, "If it were to happen, it would look
like we were feathering our own nest."^® In lieu of that, the staff suggested
that each of the contributing authors would be able to designate a proportion¬
ate share of any profits to a non-incumbent candidate of his choice. The
coauthor's share would be determined by the number of books which he and
his campaign committee purchased. Thus, incentives were established for
members to increase the number of books which they purchased so that they
could allocate more funds to their allies. In addition, the non-incumbent
candidates would appreciate the active support which they were receiving
from the RSC's campaign arm, and it was hoped that this would encourage
them to become actively involved in the RSC after their election. This
suggestion was adopted by the members, and the staff was directed to estab¬
lish the RSC Campaign Fund.
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With the adoption of these suggestions, the challenge became one of
technical preparation of the book which was carried out by the RSC senior
staff with the assistance of the outside editor and publisher. This was
especially important because of the very short deadline for publication of
the book and the complications arising from producing different quantities
of books with each of the 19 member's own covers. Most of the chapters
as well as the key votes and positive programs section were edited by the
staff of the Republican Study Committee. Then, these sections were ail
submitted to an independent editor, under contract to the publisher, to
examine the continuity and style of the work.
The voting section was to be of special interest to the members. They
knew that the Democrats had been embarrassed by a number of record votes
which the conservatives had demanded. In fact, Democratic members of the
House had complained about the ability of the Republicans to demand roll
call votes on politically sensitive issues. The Republican members of the
House, usually led by RSC stalwarts like Rousselot and Bauman, would obtain
record votes in increasing the federal debt ceiling, congressional pay raises,
and other measures which could have a negative political impact in the
Democrat's home district. The political implications of these votes were
realized by several liberal members of the House who circulated a "Dear
Colleague" letter in dune 1975 which stated:
"There should be a decision prior to each day's session as to
those votes on which the Democrats will demand a roll call vote
(in addition to any roll call requested by a Member). The Repub¬
licans seem to know exactly the issues on which to call for a roll
call, and those are generally geared to future political use. We
should do the same.
The Case Against the Reckless Congress provided a good opportunity to make
these votes more readily available to the general public.
The book was written, edited, type-set and printed in less than three
months. On March 16, a major press conference was held for the book's
publication. All of the coauthors participated. Extensive press coverage
resulted, including television network news coverage and a four-column
story in the Washington Post together with a large picture of Chairwoman
Holt and Treasurer Rousselot holding up a copy of the book.92 Other stories
concerning the book appeared by nationally syndicated columnists John
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Chamberlain and Jeffrey St. John. The staff of the RSC made an intensive
effort to both market specific chapters geographically, and trade publica¬
tions dealing with the specific issue area. For example, several gun maga¬
zines ran reviews or excerpts from the chapter entitled "The Disarming of
the Citizens" by William F. Goodling (R-Pennsyivania). The Rocky Mountain
News in Denver, Colorado carried a wire service story about Congressman
Bill Armstrong stressing the local theme of Armstrong's involvement in the
book. Although the book was conceived and produced in Washington, its
success would be determined by its acceptance and use throughout the
country as the fall elections approached.
The book proved to play a role in the 1976 congressional campaigns.
This can be confirmed from several perspectives. In the first place, the
Democratic Study Group bought 300 copies of the book for distribution to
their members presumably so they could counter the arguments. A number
of Republican challengers bought large quantities of the book for distribution
in their own districts.^3 Yet, as the final memo on the subject said:
"It was disappointing that more single copies of the book
were not purchased as a result of the coupon in the back, and
because of the individual appearances and advertisements that
we generated on behalf of the book."-^
Based on advance orders from the members and from conservative political
action committees, one hundred and sixty thousand copies of the book were
printed. The majority of these copies was distributed for a fee or free by
the contributing authors. Only a small number was sold individually, although
Congressman Rousseiot indicated that he had sold his copies whenever possible
"in order to try to recoup the costs.The financial returns never became
as attractive as first projected because single copy sales were small. Occasional
radio-talk show appearances or mentions in trade publications would result in a
flurry of orders. In all, however, only 2,700 single copies were sold by the
RSC Campaign Fund.
After the election, the National Conservative Political Action Committee
bought five thousand copies of the book. This enabled the RSC Campaign
Fund to make its final payment to the publisher, and thus eliminate its debts.
The RSC Campaign Fund ended with a surplus of less than $1,000 and several
boxes of books. The NCPAC staff distributed copies to their donors in
December 1976 as a token of the appreciation for their support during the
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campaign. And, the 2,700 individual donors who purchased the book became
the mailing list for the RSC Campaign Fund.
In retrospect, the idea was considered successful by the participating
members. The first book in 1976 has been succeeded by Can We Afford
This House?-^ and View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right.The
majority of the authors has participated in all three volumes, and the format
has remained basically unchanged. The Case Against the Reckless Congress
was a new ingredient on the congressional election scene, and it has been
useful in some races. However, the initial volume required a great deal of
time and effort from the staff and a major commitment from each of the
coauthors. While the volume was circulated extensively within the partici¬
pants' districts, its audience was still limited. It was a useful device for
reminding the conservative campaign workers that their congressman was
part of the conservative movement in the Congress, but it never successfully
reached beyond the already converted to a wider audience. Congressional
candidates were selected either in district caucuses or primary elections,
therefore, the RSC could not play a role in their selection. However, when
incumbent members made the staff aware of conservative candidates, the
candidates were contacted and RSC assistance was offered.
During the campaign, the RSC Campaign Fund issued nineteen packages
of material for the non-incumbent candidates on pending issues on the House.
These weekly packets between May and late October included specific refer¬
ences to votes which occurred the previous week on the House floor. The
research for these "Campaign Memorandums" was done by the staff of
the RSC. There are restrictions on the use of government facilities for
partisan political activities, therefore, the printing and mailing portion of the
project was carried out in volunteer quarters located near the federal building
complex in order to avoid accusations that it was an improper activity.
These packets of material differed substantially from those distributed
by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee and other campaign
organizations. The RSC Campaign Memorandums were useful to candidates
because they specifically included House votes on particular issues immediately
after they occurred. The official party material was less specific and was
not tailored to specific votes.
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An additional advantage of the RSC Campaign Fund in the election
process of potential members was that it would introduce them to the
activities of the RSC. The staff hoped that the candidates would join the
group if they were elected. Another means of introduction was to meet
with candidates when they visited Washington. Incumbent RSC members were
helpful in arranging these sessions. The information packets and meetings
prepared the successful candidates for the RSC involvement in member
briefing sessions after their election and before their installation as members
of the House.^
The potential impact of the RSC Campaign Fund can be shown by the
success of the DSG and its related campaign fund. The 1974 elections
resulted in a number of Democratic successes in what traditionally had been
Republican seats. Both the Democratic leadership and the leadership of the
DSG realized this. Therefore, in 1976 they launched a "get re-elected"
campaign. The DSG's campaign committee sponsored seminars for the newly-
elected members which would be used for workshops on how to produce
newsletters, along with media coverage and other self-promotion.
"The DSG's Chairman, Rep. Bob Eckhardt (D-Texas) and Execu¬
tive Director John (sic) Conian emphasized that the Congressmen not
only work hard but appear to do so. This might mean that they must
show up for as many of the 1800 votes per session as possible."
Measured on a financial basis, the activities of the RSC Campaign Fund
were not as successful as the members wished. While the Campaign Fund did
not end up in debt to the publisher for the cost of producing the books, its
goal of distributing funds to non-incumbent challengers was never met, and
the amount of funds which was carried forward to 1977 was not enough to
make the RSC a credible force in the election process. But, a number of
newly-elected members expressed their appreciation for the information
packages and for the copies of the book which the Campaign Fund had sent
them.
In a structural sense, the Campaign Fund was successful because it was
established after three years of the RSC's existence, while it took the Dem¬
ocratic Study Group eight years to establish its campaign committee.
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H. Relations with Outside Organizations
After the 1974 election, the role of the RSC with regard to outside
organizations changed. In 1973-74, the RSC had worked on individual legis¬
lative battles with specific lobbying groups, but its contacts with outside
organizations had never been formalized.
Now that the RSC had received some press attention for its activities,
it also received inquiries from outside organizations and companies about
its activities and publications. Outside lobbyists were encouraged to learn
that there was an organization within the Congress which shared their views
on many of the issues. Because of the setbacks which the pro-business
representatives had suffered in the 1974 elections, these lobbyists welcomed
any opportunities to cooperate with the depleted ranks of their allies in the
Congress. The staff perceived that there was a need to formalize the RSC
relationship with outside organizations. Until early 1973, the RSC's relation¬
ship with outside organizations had been casual.
Based on these earlier contacts, an exchange of publications with sev¬
eral organizations in Washington was arranged. For example, the major bus¬
iness lobbying groups — including the National Association of Manufacturers
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce — made their material available to the
staff of the RSC. In turn, they received the RSC publications. Regular
meetings were established between the RSC senior staff and the NAM and
Chamber's staff. These meetings took place in the downtown headquarters of
the business groups. Priority lists of legislative goals were discussed, and
specific strategy was worked out where interests coincided with these groups.
During these meetings, the business representatives learned of the members'
concerns, and the RSC staff explained the amendment strategy which was
being considered in the House by the RSC members. Target lists of non-
RSC members were also examined to determine where additional votes might
be gained for the pro-business viewpoint.
Based on these casual attempts to reach out to the business representa¬
tives, several Washington representatives of major companies asked to buy a
subscription to the RSC publications. After brief discussions on two occasions,
it was decided by the Executive Committee to allow these outside subscriptions.
As the Treasurer of the RSC stated later, "As long as we don't have to sub-
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sidize them, and as long as they don't try to order us around, I don't see any¬
thing wrong with it."102 The adoption of this policy gave the staff clear
guidelines to follow when requests came in. By the end of 1976, about 65
subscriptions had been sold at $100 per year to private companies, trade
associations, and former members. This list of "outside subscribers" was kept
separate from the main membership list. The subscribers were not included
in meeting invitations, nor were they given any voice in the operations of the
RSC. Their financial support was helpful but it did not play a major role in
the Executive Committee's thinking. Rather, the RSC's objective was to share
its members' strategy and outlook with others who might cooperate with the
RSC in the legislative arena.
The RSC was interacting with its outside allies. While the group might
be criticized for accepting business subscriptions, it was viewed as a routine
method of cooperation in areas where there was common agreement. In
addition, the RSC members were already allied with the business community
on most issues. They were not changing their position to suit the business
community. As Edith Green, a former Democratic member of the House,
said in this context:
"It's popular to say a Member of Congress is owned by a
corporation, but this isn't the real problem. If the welfare or
legal services people get organized they can swing a congres¬
sional election. There are enough of them in every congressional
district to swing it."^^
I. Higher Public Profile
At the time of its founding, the RSC was characterized by both
mystery and secrecy. The fear existed that the Republican leadership might
consider the members of the Executive Committee as upstarts who were dis¬
satisfied with the status quo. Thus, the RSC Executive Committee specifically
prohibited the staff of the RSC from discussing the organization, its officers
or related questions with the news media. This policy became impractical
after the major involvement of the RSC in legislative issues in 1974, such as
the land use battle. In addition, by that time, the RSC had become more
respectable enjoying the tacit acceptance of Minority Leader Rhodes and
several others. The national media attention which discussed the losses of
the RSC in the 1974 elections made it clear that the group could not continue
to operate within these media constraints. Therefore, the Executive Committee
decided that it was time for the group to seek a higher public profile.
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At the member level, almost every individual member of the RSC
maintains a staff aide either in his Washington office or district office for
relations with the press. This "press assistant" usually works with local
media outlets in the congressman's home district on items of local concern.
They are seldom involved with national political issues, unless the member
has a specific role of influence or importance in the legislative process or
is an expert on a pending critical issue. Thus, a Keith Sebelius (R-Kansas)
would frequently be quoted in the Kansas media on issues relating to his
senior position on the Agriculture Committee. His district was composed of
wheat farmers. However, seldom did the Kansas media ask about the land
use issue in which Sebelius was also involved because of his position on the
Interior Committee. Michael Robinson has described the elements of the
press which confront a member of the House as follows:
"...One must remember that the congressional media are a
mixture of the national, local and regional press, an in-house press,
and an ever growing campaign media." ^
The majority of the members focused on the local press, which left the
national and regional media untended. It was this role which the RSC tried
to carve out for itself. This could provide helpful local publicity to individual
members as leading authorities on national issues. More importantly to the
RSC, it would encourage members to run on a common theme and to stand
together on some of these issues so as not to be isolated by local opposition.
By early 1975, some national conservative publications were paying atten¬
tion to the Republican Study Committee as an entity in its own right, as well
as to its individual members. For example, The Right Report is a biweekly
conservative newsletter. A 1975 issue featured an article on the Republican
Study Committee and the Senate Steering Committee outlining the history
of the two groups. ^5 Articles like this enabled the RSC to build a reputation
with outside organizations who would be aware of this availability to work with
them on matters of mutual concern. In addition, favorable press attention
like this tended to make the members less skeptical about the desirability of
increasing the press visibility of the organization as a whole.
The staff of the RSC attempted to convince the members of the desir¬
ability of adding a full-time press aide to the staff of the RSC. They argued
that legislative initiatives such as the National Food Stamp Reform Act and
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the National Welfare Reform Act required coordinated press attention to
publicize the work which senior research aides such as David Swoap were
carrying out. After several favorable articles about her early tenure at the
RSC, Mrs. Holt became convinced that this might be a good direction in
which to move. One of these articles was a feature piece on Mrs. Holt
entitled "an area legislator emerging as conservative spokesman."106
Other members continued to take a more traditional view. They had
seen a number of their conservative colleagues defeated in 197^ on the
"national issue" of Watergate. Most of them had been exempt from
criticism by the national news media. Robinson conducted a survey of the House
members and the results are apropos:
"In my mail survey of the House, I asked members how fairly
they had been treated by the New York Times, the Washington Post,
newsweekiies, the wires and the networks. The over¬
whelming majority, about 75%, said that the national media never
seemed to cover them at all."^'
Thus, they perceived that there would be political costs if they were to be
linked with other members in ideological issues. Robinson concurs with this
evaluation:
"With no news about members getting through other than that
which the members themselves control or influence — with no un¬
favorable information reaching the public — House members stay
safe." ^
Paul Weyrich, who was instrumental in forming the RSC, has little sympathy
with this viewpoint:
"Those members are not good at playing for high stakes.
They didn't push for an RSC press man. Thus, they missed
opportunity after opportunity to drive their message home. They
don't have a positive mental attitude."
The favorable press attention surrounding the introduction of the National
Welfare Reform Act and other legislative initiatives also assisted in convincing
the members of the desirability of moving in this direction. A press person
was finally added in June 1975. However, after missing several deadlines, the
aide was relieved of his duties.He was not immediately replaced because
it was difficult to locate qualified individuals for this position. Persons with
extensive experience required too great a salary. Those without experience
were hard to sell to the members as possessing an unique set of qualifications.
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In May 1976, the press aide issue was again raised by the staff to the
members. At that time, the staff suggested that press conferences be held
in the House press gallery whenever members had items of interest to the
press. Thus, if Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and "Judge" Richard Kelly (R-
Florida) would be interested in meeting with the press on the New York
City "bail-out" legislation, the RSC staff would be in a position to help make
arrangements for them to meet with the press in the House press gallery.
Several press conferences like this were arranged with mixed results. The
members' staff aides remained unconvinced, particularly because they were
unfamiliar with these facilities. The facilities were used by a relatively
small number of House members who made themselves available to the
electronic media, usually congressmen from major urban areas who had local
radio and television crews permanently stationed in Washington. Furthermore,
because these were urban stations, they were usually represented by Demo¬
cratic members of the House.
Of course, the Senate press aides had a different situation. Any senator
is news for several reasons: there are fewer of them, areas of expertise are
more readily identified, and they are better known nationally. As Senator /
Jim McClure (R-Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Steering Committee
points out:
"The press doesn't bother to identify the important people
in the minority. They decide 'who is news.' This rules out the
House and especially the House minority members."m
While the primary objective of these efforts was to build credibility in
the news media for conservative legislative initiatives, occasional feature
stories appeared about the RSC itself. One of these was a major feature
article in Congressional Quarterly entitled "Right Wing Power." It drew some
of the internal Republican differences to the attention of the public. RSC
members like Bill Armstrong said, "The Republican Study Committee is the
Republican regulars; we are the essence of the party."Several others
agreed with Armstrong but their view was countered by other Republicans
who strongly disagreed with the RSC's ideological emphasis. One of these
was Albert Quie (R-Minnesota) who said, "They're out tilting at windmills."113
A leading Republican moderate, Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York), said:
"Our right wing is generally the most negative group.
They're the party's ideological hard core and nowhere near as
large as many people think." ^
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This was a telling comment because Conable was a senior member on the
Ways and Means Committee and because he had been elected as Rhodes'
successor to chair the Policy Committee. Yet, Conable's view contrasted
with that of another unnamed source:
"The RSG's (sic) members weren't depleted as seriously
as some thought two years ago....It's ironic but the group that's
getting hardest hit now is the Wednesday Group, the antithesis
of the RSG. They've lost 9 of their 36 members to retirements
so far this year. ^
Thus, in grudging comments by some of the liberals in the party, the expand¬
ing role of the R5C was admitted. More importantly, none of the RSC
members were as concerned about the appearance of news articles about the
RSC as they would have been three years earlier.
Efforts to build press relations were constantly frustrated. As the RSC
has continued to grow and expand, it has never developed a coordinated press
role for its members. The RSC members have continued to pay primary
media attention to their local outlets in their home districts.This is
partially explained by the large number of House members. In addition,
however, it is caused by the strong ties of the member to his congressional
district. The member of Congress is primarily a representative of his con¬
stituents rather than a representative of an ideological group. As Professor
\
Burnham notes:
"American political parties are essentially constituent
parties. That is to say, the political party subsystem is sited
in a socio-economic system of very great heterogenity and
diversity....[The American parties are] not a mass movement
in the European sense.
These problems reinforced each other. While a House member might
have greater detailed knowledge about the fiscal affairs of New York City,
the television interviewer is not looking for great detail. Rather, as
Jeffrey St. John said, "I want an expert who can paint with broad brush
strokes and make a convincing case without too many numbers which will
confuse the viewer."H8 This definition tended to exclude most rank and file
members of the House. Senator James McClure, chairman of the Senate
Steering Committee, summarized the problem for the RSC with less charity:
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"The press is basically lazy and they don't ferret out
the good people in the House who are experts. House mem¬
bers have to make an extraordinary effort to get press
attention compared to the senators." ^
McClure's perspective is telling because he served three terms in the House
before his election to the Senate in 1972. Even the House Minority Leader
finds press coverage difficult to obtain:
"It's a matter of the free press choosing what's news.
It's very frustrating for me even now in the leadership."*^
It was even more frustrating for the rank and file members of the minority
party who had to be encouraged to seek out the national media, but then
received minimal attention once the effort was made.
3. Respectability as an Institution with its Own Niche Carved Out
The staff of the Republican Study Committee was concerned with the
organization's role in the House. While some of its members primarily viewed
it as an occasionally helpful speech-writing service, the staff's primary working
relationship was with the more active members who believed that the RSC
had a substantial role to play in the legislative process. While these members
remained a relatively small nucleus of the entire RSC membership, it was
their vision and their willingness to cooperate with the staff that would enable
the RSC to be viewed as a serious participant in the legislative arena. This
search for legislative influence was achieved only slowly. One of the standard
reference works on the Congress, Congress: Process and Policy by Professor
Ripley,*2* did not even mention the Republican Study Committee in 1975.
However, by 1977, Hammond and Fox***2 listed the Republican Study Committee
as a counterpart organization to the Democratic Study Group and the
Wednesday Group.
In order to be viewed as a part of the House's institutional structure,
the RSC staff sought to perform services which other groups had not already
undertaken. Thus, the RSC instituted a series of service programs to other
Republican members such as offering cosponsorship opportunities on major
RSC legislative initiatives like the RSC food stamp reform bill. Since this
bill had Minority Whip Michel as its primary House sponsor, it couid draw
cosponsors from all elements within the party. Of course, the cosponsorship
of the RSC's food stamp reform bill not only helped the individual members.
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It helped mark the RSC as a participant in the legislative process, since it
enjoyed the active participation of the. second most senior member of the
party's House leadership.
Besides working with the party on common objectives, the RSC con¬
ducted staff seminars. These efforts were undertaken both for their intrinsic
merit and because they helped the RSC gain a credible identity in the legis¬
lative process. This was an important step toward recognition for the
Republican Study Committee. It was a continuing process which attracted
the attention of the senior staff and members when press relations, officer
selection and many other questions arose. Mrs. Holt, the RSC's chairwoman
from 1975 to 1976, said in retrospect:
"When I started as chairwoman, there seemed to be a need
to provide respectability. By the end of my two-years [as chair¬
woman], the RSC was probably the strongest force in the Repub¬
lican party."
While this may be an overstatement, there is substantial evidence that the
RSC was stronger in late 1976 than in early 1975. Some of the steps in the
movement seemed small when viewed in isolation. However, as a pattern,
they showed the many efforts which were undertaken to make the RSC a
"respectable" organization within the framework of the highly structured
House of Representatives.
Budget Process Seminar
The implementation of the Congressional Budget Reform Act was to give
the Congress a new mechanism of control over federal spending. The law
provided for a new Congressional Budget Office and for new Budget committees
in both the House and the Senate. A new set of procedures was imposed on
the Congress with specific target dates set by the law and a complicated set
of relationships with the other congressional committees. With the enact¬
ment of these new procedures, it was important that both the Republican
members and their staff aides understand how the new process worked. As
the new process began, the RSC provided information to the staff in their
member offices.- On April 5, 1975, at the regular legislative briefing, Hyde
Murray, the Minority Counsel of the Committee on Agriculture, spoke on
"The Budget Process and How We Should be Using it."125 As a result of
that meeting and because of the positive response from staff aides, Murray
was invited to meet with the RSC's Executive Committee the following week.
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After that meeting several RSC members noted that neither they nor
their staff possessed the expertise for dealing with the new process. This
problem was discussed with the RSC senior staff who in turn spoke with
Murray and suggested that he conduct a series of meetings for the benefit
of minority staff aides both in RSC member offices and in the formal
committees.
After making phone calls to leadership offices, it was determined that
no element of the official party structure was willing to sponsor and organ¬
ize such a series of meetings. The minority staff on the Budget Committee
was teaching the committee's own Republican members the process. No one
else in the leadership wanted to take the time to prepare a schedule, arrange
the speakers, and extend the invitations. Therefore, a senior research asso¬
ciate of the RSC, David Swoap, circulated a notice to the RSC member
offices and senior staff aides on the committee about a seminar series on
the budget process. This was to be:
"a course to be offered by the Republican Study Committee
for minority legislative assistants and committee personnel wishing
an in-depth understanding of the new budget process and its impli¬
cations for legislative decision making."J-2®
The four regular members of the "faculty" were Swoap, Murray, Meivin Miller,
the Legislative Counsel to Minority Leader Rhodes, and Tom McMurray, the
Legislative Director to the Minority Whip. In addition, a group of eight
visiting lecturers from the Budget Committee, the Congressional Budget Office,
the Library of Congress and other offices participated in the 10-day seminar.
The seminar was well-attended with 32 participants. Of these, only 12 were
from RSC member offices, 5 from the RSC staff, and 15 from minority com¬
mittee staffs. As the legislative director of the RSC noted later:
"We were pleased to offer the course to all of the Republican
offices within the House because it cast the RSC in a new role. We
were no longer invading their turf; we were now giving them practical
assistance."
The attendance at the weekly seminar sessions remained high, and the
entire series was well-received by the "students." At the conclusion of the
seminar in July 1975, the participants received certificates. Personal letters
from Chairwoman Holt were sent to each of the employers commending them
for having their staff aides participate in the program.
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Besides increasing the awareness of the budget process, this series aiso
increased the stature of the RSC's roie in dealing with the minority staff
counsels of the House committees.
Research Directory and Research Guide
During the congressional recesses, the senior staff of the Republican
Study Committee occasionally had time available to engage in longer-range
projects. Articles for general circulation magazines could be written, pre¬
liminary work on major issue papers for the next congressional session could
be instituted, or projects of a long-range nature could be undertaken for the
RSC. During the post-1974 election break the Republican Study Committee
published A Research Guide in Public Policy^S for -j-^g K5C member offices
and subscribers. In addition, key conservative media personnel and members
of the Executive Branch were given copies of the guide which included not
only a bibliography of articles, but also a listing of institutions, public policy
texts, and journals in politics, economics, and national security affairs. The
project was undertaken because of the critical role which outside documenta¬
tion could play in the legislative process. As Allen Schick wrote, "As the
most pluralistic of institutions, Congress must draw analytic sustenance from
many sources, most of which will continue to be non-legislative."^9 The
annotated bibliography, edited by senior research associate Robert Schuettinger,
took many months to prepare. The volume provided a useful introduction to
the scholarly literature with which most members and their staff aides were
not familiar. While this project was well received, it was never again updated.
The time constraints on the staff, together with other more immediate
projects, prohibited the RSC from revising it.
A related but more successful project was the Research Directory. ^0
Again, the RSC filled a need which had previously been unmet. The Directory
was designed to be a companion to the Research Guide. It contained the
names of 400 Washington-based individuals who had expertise in particular
areas. They were listed not only by their formal affiliations (place of employ¬
ment), but also cross-indexed according to subject. The names included
conservative congressional staff aides in the House and Senate, Washington
lobbyists, and academics in the Washington area. Because many members'
staff aides submitted a listing of their own areas of expertise, and because
some of these individuals were known to be modestly knowledgeable, these
listings were not entirely accurate. The Research Directory did prove to be
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a useful document though, and it was updated and expanded in June 1976.
The new version consisted of 31 pages with a more detailed index and an
additional number of experts listed. The areas of expertise were reviewed
more carefully and spurious claims were eliminated. A third edition appeared
in February 1977, with 50 additional names. Many changes were made between
each edition because of the high rate of personnel turnover in Washington.
Members' staff aides would frequently tell the RSC staff about additional per¬
sonnel who should be included in the Directory. This publication was useful
to the members and their key staff aides, as well as to the RSC staff in
arranging their Monday briefing series and in expanding contacts on specific
issues.
These occasional publications not only helped the RSC build an identity
as an unique source of information about people, books, and issues, it also
helped to enhance the credibility of the entire organization within Congress.
The Republican Platform Committee at the Republican National Convention
The Platform Committee of the Republican National Convention meets
one week before the formal opening of the convention. During that time,
a committee of the elected delegates to the national convention also serves
as members of the Platform Committee. They are designated as committee
members by their state delegations, and one man and woman from each state
and territory serve on the committee.
The 1976 Republican Platform was a new approach to writing a party
platform in several respects. Firstly, there was no working draft. The Plat¬
form Committee staff had prepared background papers for the subcommittees'
consideration, but there was no common base from which to start. Secondly,
all of the drafting in the subcommittees was held in open rather than closed
sessions. Finally, with both the incumbent President, Gerald Ford, and his
challenger, former Governor Ronald Reagan, in a close contest to lead the
Republican ticket, the make-up of the Platform Committee and the final
platform that would emerge were of concern to both factions.
The split within the Republican Study Committee between Reagan and
Ford supporters was not principally an ideological question. Both candidates
were at least moderate conservatives.*-^! Practical politics dictated the
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choice to some members. Ed Derwinski expressed the strong view that
you do not abandon an incumbent leader. Phil Crane actively campaigned
around the nation for Reagan. Bill Armstrong waited until the last minute
in Kansas City before he became the only Colorado delegate to support Ford.
Marjorie Holt and David Treen supported Ford, while Bob Bauman and Pill
Ketchum opted for Reagan. In all, the majority of the RSC members stood
with their former House colleague, Ford. Clearly, the Ford team was better
organized in Kansas City. For example, Platform Chairman Ray was a Ford
supporter as were the majority of subcommittee chairmen.
As a companion effort to The Case Against the Reckless Congress and
the RSC's activities with regard to the "Republican Legislative Agenda,"
several Republican Study Committee members attempted to make a major
input in the Platform Committee process. In prior years, the Platform
Committee has been chaired by House members. Melvin Laird (1964) and
John Rhodes (1972) preceded Governor Ray in 1976 as chairman. Active
involvement in the platform process was a prestigious national forum for
House Republican members.
Several members of the RSC were advised by the appointed chairman,
Ray, that they would be appointed to subcommittee chairmanships on the
Platform Committee. The RSC chairwoman, Marjorie Holt, was appointed
chairman of the "Subcommittee on Governmental Concerns and the Consent
of the Governed." This broad subcommittee considered general issues like
privacy legislation and federal-state relations, and was considered the closest
the committee came to dealing with philosophical issues. RSC Executive
Committee member David Treen was elected vice chairman of the Subcom¬
mittee on Peace, Security and Foreign Policy, and several other RSC members
served on economic and social subcommittees.
At Platform Committee meetings early in 1976, Mrs. Holt and other RSC
members volunteered the services of senior staff of the RSC to participate in
drafting the platform. This offer was made with the concurrence of other
members of the RSC who realized that much of the critical work on the
party platform would be done by staff, who would prepare working papers on
behalf of the subcommittees.
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Thus, both Ed Feuiner, the executive director, and David Swoap, the
senior research associate in welfare issues, were officially designated as
staff members of the Republican Platform Committee. Swoap served as
the assistant director of the Human Resources Subcommittee, while Feuiner
served as staff director for the Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy and
Environment. A third subcommittee staff director was Richard Prendergast
who served as Mrs. Holt's administrative assistant. He served as the staff
director of her Subcommittee on Governmental Concerns. As a result, the
RSC had substantial direct input into three of the seven platform subcommittees.
The staff was responsible for drafting the final document as well as arranging
for witnesses to testify, insuring that press contact for the subcommittee was
maintained and that a unified document would be hammered out.
Publication of the Republican Platform followed the Democratic Platform
by several weeks. It was to be presented as a contrast to the Democratic
document. The Republican Platform was generally more pro-development and
more free-market oriented than the Democrats' platform. The impact of the
RSC staff was evident throughout the platform. The environment and natural
resources section included statements referring specifically to land use planning
directly attributable to the involvement of the RSC executive director and his
knowledge of this matter. The Human Resources section endorsed the basic
premises of the Curtis-Duncan Welfare Reform measure, a bill drafted by RSC
staff aide David Swoap. In addition, planks in favor of tax reduction rather
than tax increases to eliminate the federal deficit — the Kemp bill — were
key to the platform, again largely as a result of initiatives brought about
either through the Rhodes package of alternatives, or by earlier RSC members'
proposals.
The platform was written and adopted before the delegates made their
decision between Ford and Reagan and consequently had to be acceptable to
both groups within the party. This did not mean major compromise to special
interest pressure groups. As Jeffrey Pressman notes in his discussion of the
1976 Republican Convention, "The Republican Party is not an interest group
party."132 the accommodations which had to be made or the trade¬
offs which had to be exchanged were relatively minor. As another observer
said, the 1976 platform "was a fairly conservative document, quite representa-
tive of the conservative leanings of the convention delegates." The RSC
staff was among the sources of input for the platform, but their roie did
not make the document conservative. As Professor Weinberg points out,
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the platform was a reflection of the delegates themselves. However, the
activities of the RSC staff in support of its members at Kansas City were
helpful in two ways. Firstly, it showed the members the professional caliber
of the staff. That the RSC staff members were placed in key positions of
responsibility for this major effort when the RSC was an unofficial organ¬
ization, helped enhance the organization's stature within the House. Secondly,
it helped make other Republicans from ail over the United States aware of
the RSC.*^ The staff moved to further reinforce this by sending a copy
of The Case Against the Reckless Congress to each delegate after the con¬
vention closed.
K. Attempts to Establish the National Security Research Group
One of the projects which the staff of the RSC and several of its mem¬
bers attempted to develop was to establish a counter group to the Members
of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL).
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law had been established as
an ad hoc group of liberal members interested in national security affairs.
MCPL members actively opposed U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, favored
cutbacks in military spending, and generally supported positions opposite those
of the members of the Republican Study Committee. Since MCPL was both
bi-camerai and bi-partisan, it played an unique role which neither the
Republican Study Committee nor the Senate Steering Committee could play.
A number of senior staff aides and members hoped to emulate the success
of the MCPL by establishing their own counter group among conservative
members. Such a group would coordinate the efforts of the conservative
members in this arena who were in disarray since the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.
Modelled after MCPL, such a group would be constructed on a bi-partisan
basis. While domestic issues were frequently fought along partisan lines, foreign
policy concerns were primarily ideological rather than partisan. Thus, the
members believed that their activities in this regard would more appropriately
be conducted in a bi-partisan organization.
The preliminary discussions took place among the staff and the Executive
Committee members of the RSC at a meeting on March 26, 1976.^^5 When
the groundwork had been laid by Mrs. Holt and the senior staff, Robert
Schuettinger of the RSC staff contacted appropriate House Republican and
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Democratic members to determine their interest in joining such a group.
Among those interested were Congressmen Jack Kemp and Sam Stratton
(D-New York). These two members of the House jointly signed a Dear
Colleague letter, together with Mrs. Holt and Congressmen Ed Derwinski,
David Satterfield (D-Virginia) and Joe Waggonner (D-Louisiana). This was
an invitation to a group of members of the House to participate in an
informal breakfast meeting with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
The invitation list included members of the Republican Study Committee
and the Democratic Research Organization, the ad hoc group of conservative
Democrats. Congressman Satterfield was the current chairman of the DRO,
and Congressman Waggonner was its past chairman.
The meeting with Secretary Schlesinger was scheduled to take place on
April 6, 1976. However, at the last minute, his attendance was cancelled.
Since the members were already assembled, Kemp and Stratton took this
opportunity to discuss their plans for the National Security Research Group.
They informed the members of the extent of MCPL activities, and indicated
their desire to coalesce in a counterpart group. There was generally a pos¬
itive response from the members, although they did not elect officers, offer
salary support or otherwise commit themselves to participate in this meeting.
Kemp and the RSC staff decided to move ahead with the basic requirements
for the new group.
The RSC staff paid for letterhead to be printed, and loaned the NSRG
a staff person and office space in the House Office Building Annex. The
embryonic organization began by preparing fact sheets on the defense budget.
Stratton and Kemp agreed to serve as co-chairmen of the group which "hoped
to fill a role similar to, though different from, Members of Congress for
Peace Through Law."^6 Areas of concern included the size of the defense
budget, U.S.-Soviet relations, especially in the strategic arena, and the future
of the NATO alliances.
Early publications from the NSRG included those published by outside
organizations. For example, the first was Arms, Men and Military Budgets,
Issues for Fiscal Year 1977, edited by William Schneider, Jr. and Francis P.
Hoeber.137 Included with this publication was the announcement:
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"The NSRG hopes to alert members and their staffs to
the variety and nature of studies from experts who share our
concern with recent trends in U.S. and foreign defense policies.
Other smaller scale meetings were held on subjects such as an analysis
of the Italian elections by an Italian newspaper correspondent. And later,
Secretary Schlesinger appeared before members of the organization with more
than 40 members of Congress participating in the meeting. In addition to
its meetings, the NSRG began to publish a newsletter each week when the
Congress was in session. It included a section on current foreign policy and
another section analyzing the major long-range studies being issued by various
groups.
The NSRG issued its own series of vote justifications on 34 key bills
in the 94th Congress. This volume was distributed on September 26, 1976,
to each "member" of the NSRG and to every member of the RSC and DRO
who had not yet attended an NSRG meeting or briefing. A "member" of the
NSRG was considered to be any congressman who signed a sheet indicating
his interest in the group and no obligation was incurred by receiving the
NSRG material. Despite the lack of any bylaws, dues, or formal structure,
the NSRG staff was in place with the NSRG staff director still being funded
through the Republican Study Committee.
However, during the course of 1976, both Kemp and Stratton lost interest
in the NSRG activities, and the other members did not rank it as a high
priority in their range of activities. Their own re-election efforts, together
with an emphasis on domestic issues, combined to cause interest in the NSRG
to wane. In addition, personality issues were a frequent source of tension.
As Ed Derwinski said:
"The Democrats just didn't want to take a strong stand. On
our side, Kemp wanted to be the quarterback on every play....We
had a few temporary alliances but it just didn't stick."139
Derwinski further noted that "MCPL was more active because it was easier
to organize the liberals.
Retrospectively, the NSRG was formed two years too early. By 1978,
a new group was formed, the "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" with
the support of the American Security Council. The ASC is a private non-
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governmental organization which advocates a strong national defense to its
several million voluntary members. With the support of the ASC, the Coalition
quickly enlisted 240 congressmen and 35 senators from both parties as its
members. Structured even more loosely than the NSRG had been, the
Coalition issues occasional press releases but does little to influence members
directly.
L. Briefing Sessions for Newly-Elected Members
The 1976 elections did not mark a major comeback for the House
Republicans. Waiter Dean Burnham recounts:
"Of the 74 supposedly vulnerable Democratic freshmen
elected in the Watergate landslide of 1974, only 3 lost their
seats. Indeed, of all 267 incumbents in the non-Southern
states, only 11 (4.1%) lost their seats.
However, with new Republicans replacing the Republican retirees and the
handful of Republicans who succeeded Democrats, the decision was made to
conduct another orientation for the newly-elected members. Under the leader¬
ship of Paul Weyrich's Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, a con¬
servative political action committee, a two-day program was planned for
November 30-December 1, 1976. All of the new members were invited by
the heads of a number of conservative organizations both inside the Congress
and outside to attend and participate in the program. A joint telegram of
invitation was dispatched on the day after the elections. The two principal
signers of the telegram were Marjorie Holt, chairwoman of the Republican
Study Committee and James McClure, chairman of the Senate Steering
Committee. The RSC portion of the program was to be a key element
including the principal discussion on "How the Hill Really Operates."
The program was designed to precede the official Freshmen Republican
Orientation Conference which was being held immediately following the con¬
servative conference. The original agenda for the official Republican confer¬
ence had included a brief opportunity for the RSC and the Wednesday Group
to make a presentation to the newly-elected members. However, after the
election, the Wednesday Group declined to participate. Its staff director
noted that membership in the Wednesday Group was by invitation only, and
that the organization did not need to solicit members in the same manner
as the Republican Study Committee. Because the Minority Leadership did
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not want to give the conservative RSC an "unfair advantage" over the liberal
Wednesday Group, this part of the program was cancelled. Thus, the inde¬
pendent conservative program became even more important. It would provide
the only opportunity to emphasize the importance of the ad hoc ideological
legislative groups within the House to the new members.
The RSC staff was concerned that the Freshmen Republican Orientation
Conference would include only heavy messages from the leadership which
still tended to be somewhat skeptical of the overall value of factions
such as the RSC. It could be expected that the leadership meeting would
encourage party loyalty among the new members rather than ideological
activity through the RSC.
The invitations which the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress,
extended were sent to all 22 newly-elected House Republicans. Even though
three of them were liberals who undoubtedly would not come, it was thought
that they should be offered the opportunity to participate in this program if
they desired to do so. The conference attracted half of the new members.
Both the chairwoman and the executive director of the Republican Study
Committee gave presentations and met informally with the newly-elected
House members.
In related activities, a joint letter was sent to all of the newly-elected
Republican members of the House and Senate from Senator McClure and
Congresswoman Holt urging them to use the facilities of the Senate Steering
Committee and the Republican Study Committee to interview potential
employees for their staffs and to take advantage of the prescreened resumes
which the RSC staff had available. Since these groups depended on the good
will of the member offices for their existence and payroll funding, it was
particularly important that the groups have friends in the member offices who
were sympathetic to their objectives. As a companion effort, a memorandum
was addressed to existing members of the RSC alerting them to the availability
of these prescreened resumes for filling staff vacancies. A difficulty in hiring
staff was that the constant flow of job seekers possessed uneven skill levels
and held varying philosophical beliefs. By interviewing candidates, and verifying
office skills such as typing, the RSC staff made the preliminary sorting process
much easier for both the members-elect and the incumbents. Both competence
and philosophy were examined in these interviews. While the selection process
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of the political structure meant that liberal staff aides tended to seek
employment with liberal members, it was not unheard of for individuals to
de-emphasize their political preference if they were seriously seeking employ¬
ment in an office with a different orientation.
The personnel services were used to different degrees by the member
offices. The RSC senior staff attempted to make contact through current
members who were likely to be in contact with the newly-elected members.
All other means to assure that the staffs of the new members would be
sympathetic to the objectives of the RSC were also used. Individuals who
had been referred by the RSC were hired by nine of the new members. This
attention to staff detail would help recruit the new members as dues-paying
members of the RSC as soon as they were sworn in early in 1977.
M. The RSC as a Stepping-Stone
With the conclusion of the 94th Congress, Marjorie Holt announced her
intention to retire as chairwoman and instead to run for chairwoman of the
Republican Research Committee.
The Republican Research Committee is the lowest ranking group of the
official House Republican party structure. The election of its chairman was
held as part of the other party leadership elections which were held on
Monday, December 8, 1976, immediately following the leadership's formal
orientation conference for new members. The importance of the ad hoc
conservative briefing was significant to maximize Mrs. Holt's exposure to
the new members. Her efforts to gain this position included the circulation
of two "Dear Colleague" letters by her RSC colleagues on her behalf.
Mrs. Holt was defeated in her efforts by William Frenzel (R-Minnesota),
a moderate member of the Republican party. While Frenzel had occasionally
worked with the RSC on specific issues, his voting record was not as conser¬
vative as Mrs. Holt's. The reason put forth for the Holt defeat was "the
need for balanced leadership."1^3 majority of the House leadership
positions were occupied by conservatives, and the only other moderate or
liberal in the party leadership was John Anderson who served as chairman
of the Republican Conference. It was understandable that the leadership
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preferred Frenzel to Holt. Frenzel was a team player within the Republican
party who had led the House party on several issues relating to the election
process. Mrs. Holt, on the other hand, was a renegade who had served as
the leader of the group which occasionally was an annoyance to the formal
leadership. For her to use the RSC as a stepping stone to gain entry into
the formal leadership would have been unacceptable to Minority Leader
Rhodes. Holt's coming to power through an "unofficial route," the RSC, did
not involve working with the current leadership, and this path to a formal
leadership position would have established a dangerous precedent. With these
factors in mind, it was not surprising that the leadership informally expressed
their preference for Frenzel. But when Bob Michel, a dues-paying, salary-
supporting member of the RSC's Executive Committee, took the rostrum of
the Republican Conference to second Frenzel's nomination, the intensity of
the leadership's viewpoint became apparent to ail of the members.
The Holt-Frenzel election was reminiscent of the 1962 battle between
Carl Albert (D-Oklahoma) and Richard Boiling (D-Missouri) for the position
of Majority Leader. In that race, Boiling had a more liberal voting record
than Albert. Yet, many members of the DSG supported Albert for other
reasons. As Mark Ferber states:
"It is fairly clear that in this instance the Study Group did
not relate the outcome of the race for Majority Leader to its
own power position within the House nor to the possibilities for
moving legislation favored by the Group.
The result of the Holt-Frenzel election and Bob Michel's role in it was
a setback to Mrs. Holt. Michel minimized the ideological factor in his pro-
Frenzel speech:
"Margie [Mrs. Holt] never asked for my help. She never even
asked me to vote for her. I believe every candidate for party
office should make a pitch to everyone. Besides, Frenzel called
and asked both for my vote and for me to support him with a
seconding speech.
Some Republican members had viewed the RSC as helpful to the leadership.
One member said:
"We play a useful role for Rhodes and Michel in their dealings
with the White House. It gives them an out for taking a more con¬
servative line, especially on social issues."^6
While Michel discounted the philosophical split by noting that "Frenzel wasn't
that bad...,"^^ his activity gave the RSC members a signal that they were
not completely accepted by the party establishment.
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N. Conclusion
The years 1975 and 1976 were difficult ones for the Republican Study
Committee. Membership had decreased because of the 1974 elections, and
the members who did return tended to be more concerned with constituent
problems. This was understandable considering that the members who
returned did so with reduced electoral support. This was combined with the
member's own view that the House Republicans, in general, had been
rendered less effective by the election results. With regard to the RSC,
Ed Derwinski expressed the universal view of its members and staff aides
when he said, "The RSC would have done a lot better in 1975 and '76, if
we had done better in November 1974. ^ The re-election of individual
House members was not separated from the top of the ticket in 1974.
The impeachment of the Republican President, Richard M. Nixon, was a
major issue for the conservative Republican candidates in many of their
races. The addition of this negative factor caused those members facing a
re-election bid to concentrate on their electoral activities and to treat the
party's policy activities with a great deal of skepticism. Schick says that
the "Congress is not a natural habitat for policy analysis."1-^ This view¬
point is reinforced by other political scientists who emphasize the concern
of the incumbent on re-election even when considering legislative issues.
For example, Mayhew believes that:
"re-election underlies everything else, as indeed it should
if we are to expect that the relation between politicians and
public will be one of accountability."1-5 1
Yet the RSC's role was not primarily electoral, but was rather policy-related.
If the momentum which the young organization had established in 1973-
1974 was not to be lost, it became clear to the staff and the handful of
involved members that the RSC had to change the psychological perception
which faced the Republican House members. This was done on a multi-
track basis. Closer relations were established with the formal leadership
and the Republican White House. New services were provided, and new
contacts were developed with outside organizations. Interest groups play
an important role in the U.S. political process,15^ and the ability of the
Republican Study Committee to relate more directly to these groups expanded




While the legislative agenda was being established to an even greater
extent by the Democratic leadership, the threat of a presidential veto made
the House Republicans into a credible force. The pressures which the RSC
provided on both the House Republican leadership and their own President
enabled the Republicans to act cohesively to thwart many of the legislative
goals of the liberals. This was the same role which the Democratic Study
Group had played for the liberal ideology in the Kennedy era:
"By articulating liberal goals in the most forceful manner
possible, they [the DSG members] provided leverage for the
President and Speaker when those two were negotiating with
more conservative forces."
At the same time that the RSC worked with the Republican President,
House leadership and party, it also had to carve out its own unique niche.
This involved a delicate act of probing, filling vacuums when they appeared,
and cooperating. Some of the efforts succeeded; others did not. As one of
the founders of the RSC noted:
"Every group pulls for its own interests and marshals what¬
ever support it can at whatever cost. The RSC didn't establish
this or even contribute to it — rather the RSC recognized the
current reality." 7
In many of these non-legislative activities, the staff of the Republican
Study Committee was attempting to build a base of support among its mem¬
bers. This would be helpful when a commitment was required by the RSC
in a legislative battle. This role is discussed by Professors Jewell and
Patterson when they note that "the responsiveness of the legislature to
demands is likely to be in some measure proportional to the support offered
or expected.The RSC's assistance was only one form of support which
the members received, but it was designed to be a significant one. The
rise of the Republican Study Committee from the setback of 1974 did not
gain the approval of all elements within the Republican party:
"The growing size and assertiveness of the Study Committee
worry some moderate Republicans, who believe that some of its
members place greater pride in their conservative credentials than
their Republican label." 57
As one reporter commented:
"House and Senate conservatives are unquestionably far
better organized on an extra-party basis than they have been
in the past, but they face a situation in which the liberals are
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also well organized on a extra-party basis and in which, with
the passing of the senior Southern Democrats from the scene,
doctrinaire liberalism has seized the ideological ascendency with¬
in the Democratic Caucus." ^
In conjunction with the services and activities discussed in this chapter, the
RSC also carried out a full-scale legislative agenda in 1975-1976 as detailed
in Chapter VII. Despite their organizational efforts and legislative activities,
by the 1976 elections, the RSC was facing an even more formidable chal¬
lenge than it had when it was formed. Although the Democrats had gained
only one seat in the House, the liberals remained in control of the House
Democrats, and the Republican President, Gerald Ford, had been defeated
by the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. By this time, the RSC had
passed beyond the stage of an experiment and become a part of the
institutional framework of the House of Representatives.
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VII. CASE STUDIES (1975-1976)
A. Introduction
The legislative activities of the Republican Study Committee during the
94th Congress were primarily limited and primarily defensive. Having suf¬
fered substantial losses in the 1974 general elections, the legislative strategy
was no longer an objective of assembling a coalition of 218 votes (218 is
the majority of the House's 435 members). Instead, holding actions were
required. These often depended on Presidential vetoes and close work with
the Republican White House which usually meant a close relationship with
the Republican leadership in the House. As has been shown in Chapter VI,
the relationship of the new group to the leadership was slowly evolving.
This was exhibited on projects of mutual interest to both groups.
For several reasons, the tensions between the Republican leadership and
the RSC exhibited in 1973-1974 were largely gone. Firstly, the RSC had
proven that it could work responsibly with the leadership on issues and
projects of mutual interest. Secondly, the leadership was generally on the
same side of the issue as the RSC's Executive Committee. This "pressure
from the right" was helpful in offsetting the more vocal but less representa¬
tive pressure from the Wednesday Group on the left. Thirdly, the Ford
Administration was less likely to propose major programs of a radical nature —
like the Family Assistance Plan — which had been the hallmark of much of the
Nixon Administration. And finally, with Republican numbers so depleted, it
was clear that efforts had to be undertaken for the good of all the minority
members.
Despite these circumstances, the Republican Study Committee did attempt
to carry out positive legislative activities when it could develop the expertise
to do so. Specifically, the National Welfare Reform and Food Stamp Acts of
1975 were trend-setting measures which the RSC's staff capability enabled it
to carry out effectively. These positive alternative legislative programs were
an indication that the RSC was maturing. Specifically, the shared staff was
developing what Michael Malbin has called "entrepreneurial" characteristics:
"The entrepreneurial staff is partisan by definition....[Its purpose
is] to seek new legislative issues, or new approaches to old issues....
[They are entrepreneurial] suggesting that they develop a 'product,'
which is then 'marketed' to a potential 'buyer'."1
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As will be shown in this chapter, the addition of a senior staff aide to wofk
on food stamp and welfare reform measures injected, a heavy emphasis of
entrepreneurial activity into the Republican Study Committee's operation.
That the years 1975-1976 did not bring major legislative victories to the
RSC should not be a surprise. On the contrary, what is noteworthy is that
the RSC did play a major role in a number of legislative battles which
stopped "bad" legislation from being enacted. This negative role was caused
by the smaller number and limited capabilities of the RSC, yet it was an
important role for the embryonic group which had managed not only to sur¬
vive its severe losses in 1974, but also to rebound in 1975 and 1976.
B. National Welfare Reform Act of 1975
The introduction of the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 highlighted
the positive programs of the Republican Study Committee during the 94th
Congress. This represented coordinated activities between the House and
Senate, and marked the emergence of the RSC as a serious legislative resource
with new ideas and credible staff expertise. It provided the membership with
services which none of them could have performed on their own. Finally, it
enabled the membership to be "in favor of something," rather than being cast
in the role of opposition to virtually every pending bill. All of these were
justifications for a major RSC initiative at any time. But none were achieved
as successfully in other legislative efforts as they were in the National
Welfare Reform Act of 1975.
The first necessary ingredient in the process of introducing the National
Welfare Reform Act of 1975 was the addition of the right staff person to
the RSC to carry out the appropriate research. This was made possible
through a meeting which Congressman Clair Burgener (R-California) arranged
between Ed Feuiner, the executive director of the RSC, and David Swoap.
Swoap had previously served as the Director of Benefit Payments in the
State of California's Welfare Department under Governor Ronald Reagan.
Following Reagan's retirement in January 1975, Swoap was offered several
opportunities to pursue his specific area of expertise. With the Republican
White House, and with Reagan having been succeeded by a Democrat in
California, he decided to leave Sacramento and come to Washington. While
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looking in Washington, he had interviews with and was eventually offered
jobs from both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government.
Swoap was the personification of the entrepreneurial staff member. As
David Price has introduced the term, it involves a shared set of interests
between the member and the staff aide. The role of the entrepreneurial
staff aide is to work with well-chosen issues which key members can make
"their own" in the legislative process. Swoap's expertise made him an ideal
entrepreneurial staff member for the Republican Study Committee.^
In discussions among the executive director and several senior members
of the RSC, the possibility of adding Swoap to the staff was considered.
Swoap would bring the RSC recognized expertise in specific areas. Clair
Burgener was among the most enthusiastic members for hiring Swoap. As
Swoap later recounted, "The RSC wanted to gain recognition in a specific
issue area where the members would be in substantial agreement. I thought
I could help.Indeed, he would help. As Malbin points out in his recent
book on congressional staff: "The trick around here is (1) hiring good people
and (2) unleashing them."^
Despite Swoap's large salary requirement, and with the encouragement
of Congressmen Burgener, Rousselot (R-Caiifornia) and Goldwater (R-California)
who had worked with him during his Reagan administration days, the RSC
offered Swoap the position of senior research associate. Although he had
received several other offers, he accepted the RSC position because "I hoped
it would give me the flexibility to work on specific projects, and I would not
have to track too many bills of only marginal significance.He joined the
staff of the RSC in late January 1975. In meetings with the staff of the
RSC and the Executive Committee, it was decided that Swoap's first activity
should be to prepare a complementary bill which would achieve significant
savings and reallocation of welfare to the truly needy. This bill, once pre¬
sented on a federal level, would complement the work which had already been
done by Ronald Reagan in California, Nelson Rockefeller in New York, Arch
Moore in West Virginia and others on the state-wide level.
Savings and program improvement could be achieved in a number of
different programs, including AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children), the Food
Stamp Program, Medicaid, and Supplementary Security Income. Swoap was
assigned the task of developing alternatives in these four broad areas.
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Swoap began working on the first measure — AFDC — before he arrived
permanently in Washington on February 18, 1975. He met with the Executive
Committee at its regular weekly meeting to give a status report on his wel¬
fare reform suggestions on February 24.^ By February 26, draft legislation
was being prepared in the Office of Legislative Counsel, based on Swoap's
specific recommendations. On that same date, a letter was sent from the
chairwoman, Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland), to all of the RSC members enclosing
a basic information packet about the "National Welfare Reform Act of 1975."^
She also invited the members and their staff aides to a series of four briefings
in late February and early March on the provisions of the bill.
The basic objectives of the legislation were as follows:
1. To provide assistance only to those entitled by need to receive it.
This was to be determined by a specific "means test" which would be
more stringent than the existing standards.
2. To provide sufficient aid to the truly needy by reallocating funds
to those at the lowest end of the income scale.
3. To operate the system within the limits of public resources by
cutting back the total level of expenditures.
4. To prevent fraudulent abuse of the system.
5. To implement a work program which would provide incentives
Q
for recipients to find employment and leave the system.
Swoap held the four briefing sessions, and more than 50 Republican
Q
members were in attendance; more than 25 became co-sponsors of the bill.
The specific language of the bill was made available to the members on
March 10 at the legislative briefing and at the Executive Committee meeting.
By March 13, a meeting of the members' press aides was held in order to
encourage their active participation in the forthcoming major press conference.^®
At the Executive Committee meeting on March 10, 1975, the executive
director was asked to arrange a meeting between Mrs. Holt and the leading
conservative Democrats, including Joe Waggonner (D-Louisiana) and David
Satterfield (D-Virginia). As a result of their meeting on March 12, 1975, both
Waggonner and Satterfield joined as co-sponsors of the National Welfare
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Reform Act. They directed Bob Pitner, the staff director of the Democratic
Research Organization of which Satterfield was the chairman, to send out
briefing notices for a special Friday, March 14, meeting for the DRO members
and staff on the National Welfare Reform Act. It was the hope of the
Republican members that with two leading conservative Democrats already
signed up, a number of others would follow.
At this same time, a meeting between Governor Reagan and the Senate
Finance Committee was held. This meeting held on March 10 drew 13 senators,
including the chairman, Russell Long (D-Louisiana). Swoap and HEW Welfare
Commissioner Robert Carleson, who formerly held a comparable position in
Reagan's California administration, accompanied Reagan for the technical
briefing of the committee on the California approach to welfare reform.
The objective of this briefing was to interest some members of the Senate
in introducing a companion bill in the Senate. By a mutual decision of the
Executive Committees of the Senate Steering Committee and the House
Republican Study Committee, it was decided that the March 18 press confer¬
ence would include only House members, rather than include members from
both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Executive Committee decided that the March 18 press meeting would
have as its primary speakers co-sponsoring members from the Ways and Means
Committee including John Duncan (R-Tennessee), Skip Bafalis (R-Florida),
Philip Crane (R-Illinois), James Martin (R-North Carolina) and Joe Waggonner,
along with Marjorie Holt, chairwoman of the RSC, and David Satterfield,
chairman of the Democratic Research Organization. Also participating was
Clair Burgener who was familiar with the subject from his days as floor
manager for Reagan's state proposal in theCalifornia legislature.
On March 18, 1975, thirteen House members met with representatives of
the press to unveil the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975. The press
conference was well-attended including radio, television and both the AP and
UPI wire services.In addition, foliow-up press packets were hand-delivered
to the House and Senate press galleries. These included press releases, bill
summaries and other explanatory material. By this time, the co-sponsorship
had increased to 62 members of the House. This included 8 Democrats and
54 Republicans. Duncan, as the senior Republican^member of the Ways and
Means Committee, became the primary House co-sponsor of the bill, which
was designated H.R. 5133.12
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Among the material given to the member offices was a draft press
release which could be amended when appropriate and issued on the member's
own press release letterhead. This was in addition to a general press
release distributed by the RSC staff at the press conference. That release
included statements from all of the principal speakers. With this, one of •
the objectives of Swoap's employment had already been achieved. A major
bill was introduced to solve a substantial problem, and all of the RSC mem¬
bers were in full accord with it.
Shortly afterwards, news stories began to be received, and related
activities were mounted. On March 21, 1975, Philip Crane led a Special
Order on the House floor to discuss the National Welfare Reform Act.
After the introduction of the bill, Swoap began preparing a series of specific
state analyses for each of the co-sponsors on how much the bill would save
in their own state. Because of the complex nature of U.S. welfare legislation,
portions of each of the welfare laws include both federal and state funds in
different ratios. Thus, while one title of a specific law could be amended to
save a state a small amount of money, the next title might save a state a
much larger sum, or vice versa. In an attempt to strengthen the support
for the bill, particularly in the local area, Swoap began his special series of
studies with the state of Tennessee, since this included the main co-sponsor
of the House bill, John Duncan. The saving estimate for Tennessee ranged
from $5-$9 million per year.^
Duncan circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter to all of the other members
of the House and Senate inviting them to join in co-sponsoring the National
Welfare Reform Act of 1975.^ The effects of that letter resulted in an
additional I'f co-sponsors of the bill in 1975.
Swoap also continued meeting with the staff and members of the Senate
Finance Committee. His long and patient work paid off. On May 18, 1975,
the chairman (Russell Long), ranking Republican (Carl Curtis, R-Nebraska), and
seven additional members of the Senate Finance Committee introduced an
identical bill, S.~ 1719, in the Senate. Swoap worked closely with the Senate
Finance Committee's staff to explain provisions of the bill, provide floor
speeches, and meet with staff aides on the measure.
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During the ensuing months, under Swoap's guidance with the use of the
RSC facilities, letters were sent to trade associations in Washington, inviting
their endorsement of the bill. Speeches were prepared for members' use in
their own districts, briefings were arranged on specific aspects of the issue
such as the one by Bennett Moe of the Los Angeles County Committee to
Review Public Social Services, and lectures were given by Congressmen
Duncan and Burgener on the bill in order to win over various groups.
The activities continued through 1975, utilizing all available opportunities,
including meetings with the President, to stress the seriousness with which
the RSC members viewed their welfare reform initiatives. By mid-1976,
the RSC Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income bills had not been
introduced because of the burden of the welfare reform and the food stamp
reform measures on Swoap's time. While SSI received committee and floor
attention,^ welfare reform did not. The Duncan-Curtis bill set the frame¬
work for the public discussion of welfare reform. While officials at the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare would have preferred to lib¬
eralize the federal welfare program, the concerted opposition of a substantial
body of Republicans in the House, together with the united position of the
Senate Finance Committee, made a liberalized measure unlikely to succeed.
Additionally, by this time, the major impetus for a guaranteed income pro¬
gram had passed. Moynihan was no longer at the White House and the
Senate Finance Committee remained opposed to this approach. While it has
been the customary view of the American legislative process that "the
executive proposes and the Congress disposes,"^ the RSC was now contrib¬
uting to the national agenda with a positive proposal. The Duncan-Curtis
approach was basically an incremental one, rather than an entirely different
program. This incremental approach would later be adopted by academic
experts on social policy.^ In fact, some observers believed that Nixon and
Ford had achieved a modicum of success in their efforts to trim and adjust
the welfare bureaucracy.^
Swoap's activities on welfare stood him in good stead for his role on
90
the staff of the* Republican Platform Committee in Kansas City in 1976.
His ability to argue persuasively and to present the case as to why the
current welfare system should be reformed rather than replaced with a
guaranteed annual income, had an impact on the public policy process. It
resulted in the Republican Platform endorsing a Duncan-Curtis type welfare
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reform approach as opposed to a Family Assistance type approach as had
earlier been proposed by President Nixon and some of his advisers.^ By
the closing days of the 94th Congress, most co-sponsors of the National
Welfare Reform Act were more concerned about winning their own re-election.
Consequently, the prospects of passage of the National Welfare Reform Act
were not too bright.
In these closing days of Congress, Russell Long did manage to take
several of the key provisions of the National Welfare Reform Act and enact
them into law. This was done with the assistance of David Swoap working
closely with the staff of the Senate Finance Committee with whom he had
worked the year before on the introduction of these concepts.
Because of the Democratic control of the Congress, the bill never had
committee hearings and was not completely enacted into law. Nonetheless,
it was significant because it represented a positive proposal from the RSC.
It also showed that the group could bounce back after having suffered the
serious defeats it did in the 1974 elections, and it attracted bi-partisan
support in both the House and Senate. This case again proved the need for
having highly professional, well-trained senior staff aides available to work
with member offices and their staffs. Swoap clearly fell into this category
and quickly gained the reputation among his new congressional staff colleagues
as one of the most knowledgeable experts in this area. In fact, during his
tenure at the RSC, he had the luxury of turning down offers from several
senior members of the House to join their personal or committee staffs to
work for them. Finally, he did succumb to a more lucrative position, and
in October 1976, he joined the staff of the Senate Finance Committee under
the patronage of the senior Republican, Carl Curtis. He occupied the position
of the senior Republican staff member working in the public assistance arena
on the Senate Finance Committee. By that time, both the National Welfare
Reform Act and the National Food Stamp Reform Act served as monuments
to his legislative creativity. In addition, because he was working for Curtis,
who also served as the chairman of the Senate Steering Committee, he was
able to work closely with the RSC staff.
The Republican Study Committee's role in this welfare effort was
substantially more than merely providing Swoap's payroll. The RSC provided
clerical support and college students who acted as research assistants to
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Swoap. The senior staff supported Swoap in his dealings with members, and
arranged for him to make speeches and presentations, to give briefings and
to meet members, staff aides, lobbyists and academics who were involved
in aspects of welfare reform. The RSC staff expanded press relations, made
calls to member offices, and generally provided support for all of Swoap's
efforts.
Swoap's activities marked a new role for the RSC's staff. The cred¬
ibility of the staff was enhanced. The availability of Swoap to take a major
role at this time was an important asset for the RSC. The earlier mistrust
of staff had given way to a new perception of the usefulness of staff. As
Malbin says in a broader context:
"The new role of the staff results from the interests of the
members and does not initiate, ex nihilo, from the staff itself.
The original impetus for significant activity in this area had come from
Congressman Clair Burgener, who had made the contact with Swoap. However,
it was the joint activity of the RSC which enlisted its own staff resources as
well as member support for the effort. Swoap's role was much more effective
as an RSC staff member than it would have been working for an individual
member. And, the RSC had built an initiative in a major public policy issue
of interest to many of its members.
C. Reform of the Food Stamp Program
The first national Food Stamp Program was initiated as a war-time
measure from 1939-44. In 1964, the current program was enacted on a national
basis as part of President Johnson's "Great Society" program. At that time,
two major justifications were offered for the program. The first goal was
to alleviate the alleged hunger and malnutrition in the United States and the
second was to reduce the mounting surpluses of agricultural products. Each
of these elements could be used to solve the other. According to the mem¬
bers of the Republican Study Committee, these objectives had been distorted
to other purposes which were far from the intent of the original sponsors, or
of sensible public policy. For example, the eligibility requirements for food
stamps had been broadened to include such categories as college students,
striking workers and other groups which were "voluntarily unemployed." The
minimum income requirement of food stamp recipients was raised so that
256
many lower middle-class individuals were eligible for food stamps. A black
market in food stamp coupons flourished in some cities, and the coupons had
taken on the characteristics of alternative currency.
An attempt to draft a comprehensive food stamp reform bill by the
Republican Study Committee had to await the arrival of staff expertise.
Prior to that time, the only individuals who understood the intricacies of
the food stamp program were a few staff aides and a small number of mem¬
bers of the House Agriculture Committee. Members of the Agriculture Com¬
mittee almost exclusively represent rural congressional districts. Their
interests were served by extending food stamp eligibility since this increased
demand for farm products and consequently increased farm income which
helped their constituents. Thus, rural interests would not have been served by
reducing the size of the food stamp program. Some of these members were
expected to join with their conservative colleagues in opposing food stamp
excesses such as food stamp availability to striking workers and college
students. But, they were not about to lend their staff experts to other
members to reduce the scale of the program.
Until David Swoap^ joined the staff of the RSC, there was no resource
person available for the conservatives to develop an alternative program to
reform the food stamp program. Swoap's objective was to introduce the
food stamp reform bill as a companion to his welfare reform bill. The two
bills were to be thought of in tandem, although the actual introduction of
the food stamp program was delayed for a substantial period of time. While
food stamp reform occupied the agenda of the RSC as early as January 27,
1975, the first date scheduled for its introduction as a specific bill was May
13. This date slipped further. Swoap kept the members of the Executive
Committee informed of his progress. At a meeting of the Executive Com¬
mittee, the members decided to ask Congressman Bob Michel (R-Illinois) to
be the primary co-sponsor of the bill. Michel would be particularly helpful
as the principal co-sponsor of the bill since he was the Minority Whip in the
House and because he was a senior member of the Appropriations Committee
where he was a vigilant watchdog of excesses in government programs.
Michel later commented on his role in the food stamp effort:
"I had watched food stamps begin as a pilot program which
just grew out of control. I thought it was an important effort to
get involved in."^
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The RSC staff arranged with the Senate Steering Committee for a
companion bill to be introduced in the Senate at the same time under the
primary sponsorship of James L. Buckley (R-Cons.-New York).
The bill which Swoap drafted included not only reform of the existing
system as outlined in his comprehensive paper,^ but also included a prohibi¬
tion of food stamps for strikers, a long-time project of conservative members
of the House.^ The bill included a block grant rebate to states to cover
their administrative expenses. Presumably, thus would give the states an
incentive to cut their administration because the savings could go into the
state's treasury. Identification cards would be issued to food stamp recipients,
the coupons would require countersignatures both at the time they were issued
and when they were used, and strikers, college students and other "voluntarily
unemployed" groups would not be eligible for the program. This outline of
the provisions was agreed upon by Mrs. Holt and David Swoap of the RSC,
Bob Michel and his staff, and Senator Buckley and his staff. Following
the meeting of these individuals on May 5, 1975, 7 Swoap noted that technical
problems would create a delay in drafting the master bill. For example, if
the wrong method for computing the "Poverty Index" were used, it couid
result in the addition of thousands of new persons being eligible for food
stamps and other welfare programs. This first delay prevented the bill from
being introduced until the week of June 2.
The legislative briefing for staff aides to the RSC members was scheduled
for May 12, 1975. The RSC staff prepared a draft press release for use by
possible co-sponsors. The date of the introduction slipped again, and the bill
was the primary subject of the June 9, 1975 meeting of the Executive Com¬
mittee. A week later, on June 16, the bill again was the only item on the
agenda.
As in the case of the National Welfare Reform Act, Swoap conducted
a series of briefings for members and their key staff to explain the 41
specific proposals contained within the bill. A summary of the provisions
of the bill, together with a detailed analysis of it, were distributed at these
meetings.
258
The press conference concerning Food Stamp Reform and introduction
of the bill took place on Monday, June 23, 1975, with Congressman Bob Michel
and Senator Jim Buckley as the principal sponsors. The House Food Stamp
Reform Bill, H.R. 814-5, was co-sponsored by 59 House members, and Buckley
attracted 14 co-sponsors to his bill in the Senate. Among the co-sponsors
were a number of moderate to liberal members of the House and Senate,
including Paul Findley (R-Illinois), Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York) and
Senator Bill Roth (R-Delaware). In his "Dear Colleague" letter of June 24,
1975, Bob Michel indicated that the proposed Food Stamp Reform Act had
two basic purposes. The first was to put a cap on the program and save
the taxpayers $2-2.5 billion per year. Additionally, he noted:
"[B]y weeding out Lhose with high incomes, the bill generates
savings which will allow us to base the food stamp allocation on
the Tow-cost diet plan,' which is 29% higher than the 'economy
plan,' currently being used and which should meet recent court
criticisms.
The provisions of the Michel-Buckley bill were advocated in the Senate
by the Senate Steering Committee. When Senator Herman Talmadge (D-
Georgia), chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, and Jamie Whitten
(D-Mississippi), chairman of the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcom¬
mittee, called for meaningful food stamp reform, Talmadge specifically com¬
mended the sponsors of the Michel-Buckley bill for introducing a "very
thorough, carefully considered reform bill."29
On July 25, President Ford asked the Congress to hold hearings at the
earliest possible date on the legislation. The support of Ford was helpful,
but not surprising, since he and Michel had been long-time House colleagues,
serving on the House Appropriations Committee together for many years,^
and the White House staff became concerned about the rapidly escalating
costs of the food stamp program. However, like other bills, "nothing in
Washington happens by accident." The White House endorsement was the
result of continual pressure from Michel and from members of the Repub¬
lican Study Committee for such an endorsement. Because Michel was the
Minority Whip, he persuaded the Republican Policy Committee in the House
to adopt a position in favor of the comprehensive reform bill. Both Michel
and Swoap met with this committee, and on the Senate side, Senator Buckley
received a commitment from Senator Talmadge, the chairman of the Agriculture
Committee, for hearings to be held on October 7-10.
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In addition, Swoap wrote to the co-sponsors of the National Food Stamp
Reform Act that the Administration was moving swiftly to adopt changes
in the food stamp program. He noted that:
"President Ford met two weeks ago with the task force headed
by Jack Venneman (Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare)
and discussed four options. Of these, the President chose #3, which
was the Buckley-Michel approach of tightening the existing program."-^*
While the Domestic Council inside the White House and certain segments of
the Department of Agriculture continued to press for watering down the
measure "in order to present a bill that would pass in Congress," this was
viewed by Swoap and his colleagues as being premature. They thought that
negotiations like this shouldn't take place before the committee hearings, but
after the hearing stage when bill drafting would take place and compromises
might have to be made.
Swoap also noted that Senators McGovern (D-South Dakota) and Dole
(R-Kansas) were planning to introduce a food stamp reform bill in the first
week of October. This would prove to develop into one of the major problems
confronting the co-sponsors of the Michel-Buckley bill during 1976.
Following considerable negotiations between the Republican Study Com¬
mittee and the White House, Congresswoman Holt was invited to meet with
President Ford on Friday, October 3, to discuss the President's position on
food stamp reform and the influence of the Domestic Council in the White
House over the pending Administration bill. Prior to that meeting, Holt was
briefed intensively by Swoap and other RSC staff aides. By the second week
in October, the White House finally introduced the Administration's bill. It
contained 12 provisions which were identical to the Michel-Buckley bill. The
President further endorsed 8 other provisions of Michel-Buckley which could
be implemented by executive fiat. However, 8 specific provisions among
the 35 reforms introduced in the comprehensive Food Stamp Reform Bill
were totally omitted by the President, and 7 others were substantially altered.
In the meantime, Swoap continued a series of meetings with groups as
diverse as the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Conference of Catholic Charities. By the beginning of
the Second session of the 94th Congress in 1976, the forum moved to the
Senate Agriculture Committee where mark-up would proceed on four alterna-
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tive food stamp bills, including Michel-Buckley, the Administration bill,
McGovern-Dole, and a fourth minor bill introduced by Lawton Chiles (D-
Florida). By March, 1976, the Senate had voted out of committee its own
comprehensive reform bill. Although there were substantial references to
Michel-Buckley provisions within it, a spread sheet between the final reported
bill and the original Michel-Buckley bill showed that in the majority of cases,
the Michel-Buckley provisions were violated.
While the RSC staff, particularly Swoap, was working closely with the
Talmadge staff on the Senate Agriculture Committee during these mark-up
sessions, it was the McGovern-Doie reform bill, modified and reintroduced on
the floor of the Senate on April 6, 1976, which caught the RSC and its allies
off-guard. Swoap was able to analyze the costs of the McGovern-Dole bill
within 24 hours pointing out that this alternative, instead of saving taxpayer
funds as the co-sponsors had claimed, would cost $1.4 billion in additional
expenditures, figures which were later used extensively in debate. Both
Senators Dole and McGovern were from leading agricultural producing states;
Dole was considered a conservative and McGovern a liberal. So, although
the McGovern-Dole bill did contain phrases which were identical to the Michel-
Buckley bill, complex changes in the technical formulae effectively increased,
rather than reduced, expenditures on the food stamp program. And, because
the bill was labeled "Food Stamp Reform" it received substantial bi-partisan
support on the Senate floor. Passage of a Senate bill was further insured
by Senator Talmadge's agreement with Dole and McGovern to support the
basic provisions of their bill. The House Agriculture Committee finally
reported its companion bill (H.R. 13613) on September 1, 1976, following three
months of mark-up sessions and more than 20 committee roll call votes on
individual provisions.^
On September 10, the threat of a Presidential veto and a full legisla¬
tive calendar caused the Majority Leadership to drop the committee's food
stamp reform bill until the 95th Congress.
The ability- of the minority party to take a major initiative like this
was recognized by their political opponents. For example, Arnold Meyer,
Legislative Director of the Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen
of North America and coordinator of the union drive to liberalize the food
stamp bill, commented, "the program's proponents had been caught off base
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by the Republican campaign against the food stamp program."3^ While the
Republican Study Committee did not manage to enact its own version of
food stamp reform in the 94th Congress, neither did their opponents manage
to pass their McGovern-Dole bill. David Swoap played a crucial role for
the RSC in the reform of the food stamp program. His efforts on the House
program included a review of the Minority Views of the committee report
and the writing of major sections on "fiscal implications," "purchase require¬
ments," and "fraud" of the report. Swoap's role had been critical not only
in the consideration of the bill, but also in the establishment of the RSC as
a source of meaningful legislative material.
As Morris Fiorina commented, food stamp reform "had no easy time of
it in the 94th Congress."33 The Republican Study Committee was responsible
for this in both a negative and a positive way.
D. The Consumer Protection Agency
The battle between liberals and conservatives over the establishment of
an independent Consumer Protection Agency predates the formation of the
Republican Study Committee by several years. The first vote on establishing
this unit as an independent agency of government took place in 1971. At
that time, the Consumer Protection Act passed by a vote of 74-4 in the
Senate, however, the House bill died in the House Rules Committee. By
the 92nd Congress, a similar bill was able to pass the House, but this time
it failed to survive a filibuster in the Senate. The House vote on that bill
was significant because it carried by a majority of 344-44. In the 93rd
Congress, the House bill carried by a slightly smaller margin of 293-94.
Thus, while the opposition had doubled its vote, it was still significantly out¬
numbered. Some of the credit for the increased opposition could be taken
by the Republican Study Committee.
The RSC Executive Committee met with opposition leader, Congressman
Clarence 3. Brown (R-Ohio), on April 1, 1974, to hear about the bill and its
serious implications. The bill had been reported from the House Government
Relations Committee and would soon be on the House floor. RSC members
were urged to speak and vote against it. However, they realized that the
likelihood of a straight defeat was remote. Thus, the RSC Executive Com¬
mittee decided that their chairman, LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), should
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check with the White House on the possibility of a Presidential veto.^ Mixed
signals were received from the White House, but by the end of the Congress,
the bill had been stopped by the Senate filibuster.
The newly-organized Senate Steering Committee led the opposition to
the bill and coordinated the successful filibuster. These activities helped
insure the success of the Senate filibuster and the defeat of the cloture votes
to close the debate. The organized opposition to the Consumer Protection
Agency in the Senate in 1974- was particularly aroused when the Majority
Leadership called for a fourth cloture vote on the bill. That is, on a fourth
occasion, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) asked his
colleagues to vote on stopping the debate on the pending issue. Traditional
senatorial procedures had limited cloture votes to three per major bill. So,
the calling for a fourth vote was highly unusual.
The primary advocate of the Consumer Protection Agency was Ralph
Nader who had been actively supporting a new independent federal agency
since the idea was first introduced in the 91st Congress. The agency's initial
role was to "represent the consumer" before other government agencies. This
was the most narrow interpretation of the agency's role and was subsequently
expanded in later versions of the bill. The opponents of the bill pointed out
that the government agencies which were to be overseen by the Consumer .
Protection Agency were originally established to protect the consumer. So,
for one agency to watch another agency was to admit the failure of the
original agency and to admit that there was no logical reason why a new
agency would better represent the consumer than the prior ones had.-^
With the substantial House Republican losses in 1974, the pro-Consumer
Protection Agency forces assumed they would have a much easier time enacting
their bill in the new 94th Congress.
The primary sponsors of the new bill were Benjamin Rosenthal (D-New
York) and Frank Horton (R-New York). Horton, a member of the Wednesday
Group, served as-the senior Republican member and Rosenthal was chairman
of the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern¬
ment Operations. This committee would have initial jurisdiction over the
proposed agency. The support of these two members made the committee
vote a mere formality on the way to floor consideration of the bill. The
263
House version of the bill (H.R. 7575) was reported out of the House Govern¬
ment Operations Committee on July 18, 1975, by a vote of 30-10,38 ancj
was then scheduled to go to the House floor in September 1975.
The second ranking Republican on the House Government Operations
Committee was John Erlenborn (R-Illinois). Erlenborn was a member of the
Republican Study Committee and was willing to work with the RSC and
others who opposed the bill. President Ford indicated to Erlenborn and
other minority members of the committee that he opposed the bill: "It is
my conviction that the best way to protect the consumer is to improve the
existing institutions of the government, not to add more government."39
In order to maintain the credibility of Ford's veto threat, 145 votes against
the bill on final passage would be the minimal requirement.'1®
In opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency, the carefully coordin¬
ated work of outside interest groups, including the. U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and The Business Roundtable, relied heavily on the Republican Study Com¬
mittee and its membership in coordinating the battle on the House floor.
The RSC provided the business lobbyists with the names of members whose
positions might be changing so that the lobby groups could apply pressure to
these members. Another more specific tool which the Chamber of Commerce
developed at the RSC's suggestion was a collection of local newspaper
editorials on the CPA bill. These editorials were divided by congressional
districts and distributed by local Chamber of Commerce members to their
own members of Congress. At the same time, the RSC worked closely with
the Senate Steering Committee on this issue.
Because of the loss of Senate Republicans in the 1974 elections, the
Senate was unable to maintain its filibuster, and the Consumer Protection
Agency Act was passed by a vote of 61-28 on Thursday, May 15, 1975. The
following Monday, Senator James McClure (R-Idaho), vice chairman of the
Senate Steering Committee, met with the RSC Executive Committee to
discuss how the Consumer Protection Agency Act might be stopped in the
House. This meeting with McClure was held immediately after the Senate
defeat because it was anticipated that the bill_would reach the House floor
by early June. However, with the delay in reporting the bill from committee
until mid-July, it became clear that no action would transpire on it until
after the August recess.
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Also during this time, the RSC issued several publications on the bill.
Their early 1975 Fact Sheet^ was followed by a summary talking paper
entitled "Arguments Against the Consumer Protection Agency.in addition,
after the Senate action, the RSC updated its fact sheet on the Consumer
Protection Agency quoting extensively from the Minority Views of the com¬
mittee and from the President's letter in opposition to the Consumer Protec¬
tion Agency. ^
The Republican Study Committee then arranged for Congressman Erienborn
to meet with the legislative staff of the RSC member offices to discuss the
bill immediately before it was voted on in the House. This meeting, as well
as a discussion in the Executive Committee meeting, took place on Monday,
November 3, 1975. The Executive Committee stood in opposition to the bill
and the RSC staff moved to implement this stand. For example, background
material and speeches were prepared for members of the RSC, many of whom
used them during the course of the floor debate. The RSC staff made a
whip call on the bill and reported to its chairman that the membership was
unified in their opposition to it. The final vote in the House on November
6, 1975, was 208-199. Of that number, no members of the Republican Study
Committee supported the bill, although 18 non-RSC Republicans did support
it. ^ Eventually, the sponsors of the bill decided not to go to a Joint House-
Senate Conference to resolve their differences because of the substantial
opposition vote and the continuing threat of President Ford's veto of the
measure. Thus, with the combined effectiveness of the business community's
lobbying against the bill and the growing public resentment at government
bureaucracies, passage of the measure was deferred once again.
The RSC's work on this particular issue proved to the Minority Leader,
John Rhodes (R-Arizona), the value of having the RSC in place when his
Republican troops were divided on an issue. While Congressman Horton and
some of his more liberal Republican colleagues in the House could pressure
Rhodes, the RSC could also provide pressure in the opposite direction by
pointing out to Rhodes that only 18 Republicans had supported his bill. Thus,
Rhodes could support his own President and the majority position of the party
without having to yield to pressures exerted from those members who held
the minority viewpoint within the party. The RSC had become a spokesman
for the majority of the party, and it was also cooperating closely with the
business community on a major bill of mutual interest.
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E. Common Situs Picketing Bili
The classic confrontation between business and organized labor in the
94th Congress occurred over the Common Situs Picketing Bill. The bill,
H.R. 5900, would have permitted unions to picket an entire construction
site even though their dispute was with only one of the contractors working
on that site. Thus, H.R. 5900 would have overturned the 1951 Supreme
Court ruling which held that such picketing constituted an illegal secondary
boycott. The Supreme Court ruling had rankled the building trades unions
since the Court handed down this decision. However, the AFL-CIO did not
push for its repeal by specific legislation until 1975. In the 1974 elections,
the liberal Democrats received substantial support from the unions. So, with
many newly-elected Democrats, it was believed that the 94th Congress would
be the ideal time to achieve their objective/*"' Furthermore, President Ford
had promised to sign a common situs picketing bill if it incorporated certain
safeguards which he and his Labor Secretary, John Dunlop, wanted.
The primary opposition to common situs picketing legislation did not
develop in the House of Representatives. While the Executive Committee
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of the Republican Study Committee discussed it, and the staff issued a
fact sheet in opposition to it, the House passed the bili on July 25, 1975,
by a vote of 230-178. This was a substantial victory for the trade unions.
After House passage, the bill moved to the Senate. There, the conservatives,
through the activity of the Senate Steering Committee, mounted an aggres¬
sive filibuster against it. While the vote in the Senate was close, the bill
passed on November 19 by a vote of 52-45.
At that point, the bill went to a Joint House-Senate Conference. It
was at this time that a coordinated program began among the opposition
forces to the Common Situs Picketing Bill. Both the House and the Senate
had enough votes to sustain a President veto. The problem was that the
President had indicated his intention to sign the bill, if it were accompanied
by certain changes in the body of labor law regarding construction companies
and union relations. Those provisions had been met in this bill.
Pressure on the President to veto the bill began to mount after the
Senate passage of the bill in November. A letter writing campaign organ¬
ized largely by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the contractors'
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associations, deluged the White House with an estimated 750,000 pieces of
mail opposing the bill. This contrasted with 26,000 letters in support of
the bill-^^
Members of the House Republican Study Committee and the Senate
Steering Committee met with the President and assured him of their opposi¬
tion to the bill and their support should he choose to veto the bill. At the
same time, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan came out strongly against
the bill which applied still further pressure on Gerald Ford. In December,
both Houses of the Congress cleared the Conference Report which had ironed
out the minor differences between the two bills. The House vote in favor
of the Conference Report on December 11 was 229-189, and on December 15,
the Senate followed suit on a 52-43 vote. These two votes again indicated
to President Ford that both Houses would be willing to sustain a veto. In
the House, Minority Leader Rhodes indicated that the President had not
promised to sign H.R. 5900 unless it had the support of both labor and
management. This warning signal was read by the bill's opponents, and the
outside pressure mounted from grassroots lobbying. In announcing his decision
to veto the bill on December 22, President Ford said "Unfortunately, my
earlier optimism that this bill provided a resolution which would have the
support of all parties was unfounded.
Shortly after the Christmas recess, when the House reconvened on
January 2, 1976, the Democratic leadership determined that attempts to over¬
turn the President's veto would be fruitless, and, therefore, no attempt was
made to override the veto.
Thus, the Common Situs Picketing Bill defeat represented a victory for
conservative forces. While the role of the RSC in the House was useful, it
was not a vital factor. The RSC served as strategic advisers to the bill's
main opponents in the business community. By providing those opponents
with advice and by keeping the Minority Leadership and the White House
informed of their views, the RSC helped gain a Presidential veto on the
Common Situs Picketing Bill.
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F. National Security Concerns
Most members of the House realize that their constituents are much
more concerned with domestic and economic issues than they are with foreign
policy questions. As Manley notes:
"Members of the House and Senate have a host of pressing
parochial demands with which they must cope, demands they see
as far more pressing than abstruse foreign policy questions."^
Nonetheless, every member of Congress is interested in foreign policy. It is
understandable then that the staff of the Republican Study Committee con¬
cerned itself with a number of foreign policy questions. Concern with these
questions, however, is a long way from effective action with regard to them.
Foreign policy expertise is often lacking among House members, but more
prevalent among senators, and the relevant Executive Branch officials. As
liberal representative Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) explains:
"Rarely, however, does a member of Congress turn into an
expert on defense or foreign policy, much of which is either highly
technical, or exotic or both....The Congress is painfully aware that
the 'experts' (scientists, economists, generals) are working for the
executive branch." ^
The following selective incidents relating to foreign policy reflect these
limitations. The RSC's role primarily evolved around one activist member
on the International Relations Committee — Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois).
The RSC members were further restricted because their opposition was fre¬
quently directed toward "their" Republican Administration which was in power.
The foreign policy activity of the RSC did occupy a considerable amount of
their attention and resources, however, and did result in some victories.
Military Assistance to Korea
Following the fall of Vietnam, several liberal members of the House,
led by Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota), began an intensive attack on the U.S.
alliance with the Republic of Korea. Their hope was that our economic
and military aid to that country would be substantially reduced, and that
eventually we would withdraw our troops from Korea.
Fraser operated from a key position as chairman of the International
Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations. However, with
Ed Derwinski as its ranking minority member, his actions were monitored
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carefully. Fraser, a former chairman of the Americans for Democratic
Action, was recognized as a national liberal leader. During the course of
1975-1976, his subcommittee held hearings on the question of human rights in
South Korea and the Philippines. The majority of the witnesses had been
anti-government Koreans, retired U.S. officers supporting Fraser's position,
and professors and clergymen opposing the governments in Korea and the
Philippines. During this process, the RSC staff suggested two additional
names to Congressman Derwinski: Professor Richard L. Walker, Dean of
the School of International Relations at the University of South Carolina,
and Professor Franz Michel, Director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies
at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Both of these scholars
asked to testify and did so ably, although their statements received virtually
no press attention.
During this time, various liberal organizations began supporting Fraser's
call to cut aid to Korea. While Fraser had been rebuffed several times by
his colleagues in the International Relations Committee, he introduced an
amendment for a vote when a number of pro-Korean members of the Inter¬
national Relations Committee were absent. In this way, his amendment
became part of the committee bill by a vote of 11-9.
Derwinski and his colleagues countered Fraser's position with strong
minority views in the House Report.^* U.S. relations with Korea were
particularly sensitive at this time not only because Korea held a strategic
location near Japan but also because of the low credibility of the United
States deterrent in Asia after the fall of Vietnam. Derwinski was able to
call on staff resources of the RSC who were not only intellectually committed
to his side of the battle, but also had firsthand knowledge of the situation
from their earlier visits and meetings with Korean leaders.
Working in tandem with several senior members of the House, including
Charles Wilson (D-California) and John Murphy (D-New York), Derwinski took
the lead in the debate while stressing that vital interests of the United States
were involved in 'preserving our relationships with Korea. This was expressed
in a number of Congressional Record inserts which were prepared by the staff
of the RSC prior to the actual floor debate and supported by an amendment
sponsored by Derwinski. This amendment was designed to lift the International
Relations Committee's $290 million fiscal 1976-1977 ceiling on military assistance
to Korea to $488 million, the level requested by the Ford Administration.
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On June 2, 1976, the Derwinski Amendment to restore full funding to
Korea carried 241-159. Chairwoman Holt, Vice Chairman Crane and several
members of the Executive Committee strongly supported Derwinski during
the floor debate. Of the 73 members of the RSC, only 1 voted against
Derwinski, 7 did not vote and 65 supported him. It was a bi-partisan vote;
118 Republicans and 122 Democrats supported Derwinski. The success of
this amendment was due not only to the leadership of the RSC's former
chairman, but also to senior Democrats on the International Relations Com¬
mittee (Chairman Morgan of Pennsylvania, and members Zablocki of Wiscon¬
sin and Hayes of Ohio) who strongly supported the Derwinski Amendment.
Members of the House in both the Republican and Democratic parties took
part in the RSC's activities to express the House's will in this matter.
The aid of the RSC in preparing statements,-52 holding strategy sessions
and being involved from start to finish was an integral element in supporting
Derwinski and leading to the success on his amendment. This assistance was
valuable to Derwinski even though he was the second most senior Republican
on the International Relations Committee. His access to minority committee
staff was limited because they had to work on ail of the sections of this
omnibus bill which involved many issues and different countries. Robert
Schuettinger, the RSC senior research associate who was handling this issue,
noted that:
"The RSC staff kept in close touch with Everett Biermann,
Minority Counsel of the International Relations Committee,
throughout the evolution of the bill. On the date of the vote
he requested a few pro-Korea speeches in case any members
requested them from him."-^
These speeches were used as part of the floor discussion. In the case of
Korea, the RSC staff worked in close harmony with its own former chairman
the committee staff and its Executive Committee to support their position
and increase military assistance.
Military Assistance to Turkey
When Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974, her military forces used
weapons supplied in violation of U.S. foreign aid laws. Consequently, the
Congress ordered a cut-off of military aid to Turkey. This was imposed on
February 5, 1975, in accord with the requirements of the 1974 Foreign Aid
Act.^
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The aid cut-off was viewed as a setback to Secretary of State Kissinger
who had relied on Turkey to protect the southern flank of NATO. Addition¬
ally, the U.S. had installed a number of intelligence listening posts close to
the Soviet border in Turkey, and a U.S. aid cut-off could lead to Turkish
demands that the U.S. posts be closed.
The Turkish aid question was a major issue of national security policy
for President Ford. The national interest was implicit, but U.S. political
forces made the Ford-Kissinger position more difficult to advocate on
Capitol Hill. This was a manifestation of an old conflict of priorities, as
Professor Dahl stated a generation earlier:
"Modern international politics is a rigorous testing ground
for the survival of the classic instruments for securing consent
in a democratic society."56
Both Korea and Turkey were major tests. Korea, however, was decided on
its inherent strategic merits, while the question of Turkey became embroiled
in domestic politics.
Derwinski who had led the Administration's battle on behalf of Korean
aid opposed the Administration on this issue. Derwinski was a successful
ethnic politician who pointed out that "there are a lot more Greek-Americans
than Turkish-Americans."57 This domestic political issue was unusual for a
foreign aid issue. Publicly Derwinski argued that opposition to Turkish aid
would be a chastisement for Henry Kissinger with whom he disagreed on
detente, African policy, the Helsinki accords, and the Panama Canal Treaty
negotiations.
The Ford Administration lobbied intensively to repeal the cut-off of
military aid. The Senate approved lifting the ban in a 41-40 vote on May
19, 1975. By July 16, the House International Relations Committee
reported a companion bill after amending it to make it more acceptable to
Turkish aid opponents. Despite these amendments which were designed to
placate the so-called "Greek lobby," the House rejected the Administration's
position on July 24 by a vote of 206-223. This vote came after major
White House lobbying in favor of the bill and included approaches by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs to the staff
and members of the RSC.
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Despite the State Department piea that a continuation of the cut-off
would result in a weakened NATO, a number of members of the Republican
Study Committee repudiated their own President and voted with Derwinski
against the repeal of the aid ban. Thus, while Kissinger assiduously courted
the Democratic freshmen, 39 Republicans voted in opposition to their own
Administration and 27 of those were conservatives. Evans and Novak stated
in the Washington Post:
"Voting against the President was the vanguard of the right
wing, including Reps. John Ashbrook of Ohio, Robert Bauman and
Marjorie Holt of Maryland, John Rousseiot of California, and Philip
Crane of Illinois."58
The leader of the conservative Republican opposition was Ed Derwinski.
The vote was not a permanent setback to the Administration because
on October 2, the House reversed itself and voted 229-187 to partially lift
the embargo.59 This was achieved with a shift of 17 votes of the RSC
members who had opposed the action in July. Because of the divided opinion
in the RSC, the staff refrained from publishing analyses of the issue. Sim¬
ilarly, the Executive Committee did not discuss the issue because of its
divisiveness. The RSC staff tended to support the Administration because
of the European security dimension of the issue. Of course, the RSC staff
was less inclined to be responsive to local political pressures than were some
of the members. After ail, the RSC staff did not have to run for re-election,
nor did they have to face angry constituents of Greek descent. The White
House and the State Department lobbied intensively and changed the RSC
members' votes.
The Turkish aid votes served as a warning to the White House that the
base of support of the Administration in the House of Representatives would
not continue to support those foreign policy objectives with which they were
in disagreement. As Allen Schick has stated with regard to some liberal
Democrats:
"An independent supply of analysis can stimulate members to
diverge from the policies of their leaders, which is precisely what
has happened on defense legislation.'60
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Kissinger's African Policy
As we have seen in Chapter V,6i the importation of Rhodesian chrome
had been an issue of significance to the members of the Republican Study
Committee. After the conservative defeat in the 1974 election, it was
expected that liberal members like Donald Fraser would again attempt to
repeal the Byrd Amendment in the new 94th Congress.
The repeal bill was jointly referred to both the International Relations
and the Armed Services Committee by the Speaker. On July 15, 1975, it
was passed by the International Relations Committee as H.R. 1287, but on
July 26, the Armed Services Committee reported the bill unfavorably.
The bill was carried over during the summer recess. When the Congress
reconvened, the RSC issued a fact sheet^ which brought the situation up
to date and restated the pro and con arguments on the repeal of the Byrd
Amendment.
Opposition to the bill was led by Ed Derwinski of the RSC. The RSC
staff prepared speeches for members of the House; the issue was discussed
at two meetings of the Executive Committee; and more than twenty RSC
members participated in the fifty pages of Congressional Record debate. In
the vote on final passage, no member of the RSC voted in favor of reimposing
the ban; only 22 Republicans supported the bill and 108 (including the entire
RSC membership) opposed it.63 The bill was rejected by the House in a
187-209 vote.
In April 1976, Henry Kissinger made a tour through Africa, including a
stop in Lusaka. While in Lusaka, he called on the Congress to repeal the
Byrd Amendment, and he offered economic assistance of $12.5 million to
Mozambique which had recently installed a Marxist government. Kissinger
knew, even if his audience did not, that the American process meant that
a pledge made by a Secretary of State would have to be implemented by
the Congress. But, convincing the Congress would prove to be a formidable
task for Kissinger. Professor Zeidenstein has elaborated the formal restric¬
tions which the Congress has placed on the Executive Branch's conduct of
foreign policy. 64 Beyond these formal restrictions such as the War Powers
Act, Congress has the opportunity to vote on specific pledges, like those of
Kissinger made in Lusaka.
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It did not take long for the RSC leadership to express its opinion on
Kissinger's proposals. On May 6, 1976, both Marjorie Holt, the chairwoman
of the Republican Study Committee, and Steve Symms (R-Idaho), one of its
vice chairmen, took the floor of the House to denounce Secretary Kissinger's
plans.65 Both of these statements were prepared by the RSC staff. They
signaled the opening salvo of a counter-offensive against Kissinger's new
African policy. The first element of this was an amendment offered by
Philip Crane, another RSC vice chairman. The RSC staff prepared the amend¬
ment and supporting floor speeches. His amendment would apply to both the
foreign military assistance bill and the foreign economic assistance bill. It
prohibited the use of any funds in the bill to aid Angola or Mozambique. The
Crane amendment for the two countries carried by voice votes.
The RSC staff continued to monitor the status of the Byrd Amendment.
The staff prepared speeches in opposition to its repeal, maintained a current
headcount, and supported the proponents of the status quo. Despite Kissinger's
pledge and the International Relations Committee's action, the final bill was
not brought before the House in 1976. The RSC's efforts had insured the
defeat of the repeal once again.
Relationship with Secretary Kissinger
It should be apparent from these specific cases that members of the
RSC disagreed with the foreign policy positions of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in several significant instances. While some of the RSC members
could express their grievances to Secretary Kissinger through the formal
House committee structure, most of them could not because they did not
serve on the International Relations Committee. To these members, Kissinger
remained as much of an enigma as he was to many of the American people.
For many RSC members, the first opportunity to voice their concerns to
Secretary Kissinger arose on March 25, 1976, when he met with 39 members
of the RSC at a breakfast meeting at the Capitol Hill Club.
The meeting was arranged by the RSC staff, and an information packet
including several critical articles about Kissinger and his performance as
Secretary of State was sent to all members. The research staff was excluded
from the breakfast meeting, and only the members and the executive director
of the RSC were able to participate in it.
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Mrs. Holt chaired the meeting and called on a number of her colleagues
who had asked to be recognized on specific subjects. These included Phil
Crane on Taiwan, Jack Kemp (R-New York) on Salt II, Bill Ketchum (R-
California) on southern Africa, Ed Derwinski on detente and the Sonnenfeldt
Doctrine, and Henson Moore (R-Louisiana) on the Panama Canal. The meeting
was conducted in a question and answer format, in order to avoid long
harangues either by the members or by Kissinger. Despite this format, the
lengthy exchange between Kissinger and Kemp on Salt II consumed so much
time that many of the later questions were unanswered.
The most newsworthy question asked that morning was by Ed Derwinski
regarding the "Sonnenfeidt Doctrine." State Department official Helmut
Sonnenfeldt had given a private, off-the-record briefing in London to the U.S.
Ambassadors posted to various nations in Europe. The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine
held that Soviet control over the nations of Eastern Europe was not only a
recognition of the status quo, but also that it gave stability to the area.
Sonnenfeldt also argued that the United States should avoid any actions
which might be interpreted as encouraging independence or movements away
from Soviet hegemony in the region. Copies of the notes of the briefing had
reached Kissinger's Capitol Hill critics including Derwinski and they were
ready to advise Ford that he "might seriously consider firing Kissinger or at
least putting greater distance between the President and his beleaguered
Secretary of State." At the breakfast meeting, Kissinger vigorously defended
Sonnenfeldt and claimed that his remarks had been misinterpreted in the
press. Derwinski remained unconvinced, and he told Kissinger so.
Shortly after the meeting, Sonnenfeldt attempted to repair the State
Department's relationship with Derwinski by visiting him in his office. From
the Korean aid battle, the State Department realized that Derwinski could be
a valuable ally. Similarly, they recognized him as a formidable foe from
some of his other activities. Evans and Novak reported:
"After Sonnenfeldt claimed his remarks were misinterpreted,
Derwinski asked to see the official State Department account of
his London briefing. But Sonnenfeidt demurred with an astonishing
claim of executive privilege." '
This was not only astonishing, but also ironic since Derwinski, at that time,
had his own copy of the Sonnenfeidt Doctrine in his desk.^ He did not tell
Sonnenfeldt this, but instead later used his copy of the notes in meetings with
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Ford to convince him that Kissinger's interests and Ford's did not necessarily
coincide. Kissinger was generally popular in the nation, although not with
most conservatives. Although President Ford had placed high confidence in
him, because Derwinski had been an early Ford delegate to the Kansas City
convention, he also had to take Ed Derwinski's criticism seriously.
The RSC staff role on foreign policy issues was clearly circumscribed by
the wishes of the members. There was no room for legislative initiatives
(such as food stamp and welfare reform), nor was there an opportunity to
counsel the members when they saw foreign policy questions in domestic
political terms. Because the House has always had a subordinate role to
the Senate in treaty matters, the members of the House tend to be ignored
in other foreign policy questions. This, combined with the problem of fighting
a Republican Administration, meant that considerable efforts were expended
on foreign policy issues but with a minor return for the time and effort
expended.
G. Surface Mining Bill
A bill closely related to the land use bill in 1974-75 was the bill to
regulate surface mining. It came before the same House and Senate com¬
mittees, and had as its principal House sponsor the same Morris Udall (D-
Arizona) who was the primary advocate of the land use bill. And, his principal
antagonist was again Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), an active member of the Repub¬
lican Study Committee.
The bill would have set minimum federal standards to be followed by
the states for surface mining control and reclamation programs. If the states
did not adopt the standards, a compulsory federal program would be imposed.
One of the primary objections from the coal mine operators was the reclama¬
tion provision. The bill specifically provided that land which had been surface
mined had to be returned to its original contour. Mine operators and their
allies argued that often this was not the best use of the land: to take rocky
mountains and return them to that contour would be far less desirable than
converting them into rolling wooded and grass covered pasture lands. Other
areas of dispute involved the tax level to be imposed on mined coal, and the
effect that the new bill would have on the production of coal in the United
States. The Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Administration
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estimated that the bill would reduce coal production as much as 187 million
tons in 1975. By 1980, a loss of up to 271 tons per year was projected.69
This compares with the total U.S. coal production of 600 million tons per
year. Thus, the lines were drawn between those who opposed the surface
mining of coal without extensive mandatory federal standards being set for
the reclamation of the land, and those whose primary concern was meeting
the energy needs of the country. The first version of the Surface Mining
Bill passed both Houses of the Congress in 1974. However, that bill was
"pocket vetoed" by President Ford.70
In 1975, a new bill was introduced which was identical to the previously
vetoed bill. The environmental lobby strongly supported the new bill.71
Following one day of hearings in the House committee on February 27, 1975,
and several minor changes, the new bill passed the committee.
Under Steiger's direction, the RSC staff had helped prepare the Minority
Views for Steiger and his 5 Republican and 5 Democratic conservative colleagues.
Despite their opposition, it appeared virtually certain that the bill would pass
due to the changed composition of the House after the 1974 elections. The
only way of stopping the measure would be a presidential veto.
When the bill came to the House floor, the RSC staff emphasized the
veto strategy. However, the Steiger-led opposition to the bill was not well
organized as they fought seemingly overwhelming odds. In fact, Steiger
indicated this when he said:
"I have no illusions about trying to defeat this bill on the
floor. Sustaining the veto — that's the only way we can go now."72
Steiger's analysis was correct. The bill passed on the House floor on March
18, 1975 by a vote of 338-86. And, its companion bill passed the Senate on
March 12, 1975 by a comfortable vote of 84-13. This opposition vote was
not enough to ensure that the presidential veto could be sustained.
Following the bill's passage, surface mining was one of the subjects
discussed at the RSC meeting with President Ford at the White House on
April 22, 1975. Steiger argued that major changes had not been made to the
bill. He also pointed out that the majority of the states which were involved
in the surface mining had already taken action to deal with this problem at
the local level, and a federal bill would simply add an extra layer of bureau-
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cracy and retard the quality of coal produced domestically. Ford had also
met with mineowners and energy officials who agreed with the RSC's evalua¬
tion. Following these discussions, the President decided to veto the bill. In
gathering support for the veto, the President and the White House staff con¬
centrated on House Republican members who were personal friends of the
President. If the President were to veto the bill, a number of his Republican
supporters would have to change their vote from supporting the bill to
opposing it.
Besides preparing background material for their members, the RSC staff
worked closely with Steiger in taking a headcount of members who might
switch their positions. While this was not a regular RSC "whip call," it pro¬
vided useful leads both for Steiger and for the White House staff to target
their efforts.
Steiger led the battle both against the bill and for the veto. His June
efforts to stop the surface mining bill were more successful than the attempts
in March for three reasons: In March, the conservatives in the House were
still reeling from their November 1974 electoral defeat. Because of their
reduced numbers, some of them believed that its passage was inevitable.
Secondly, the Administration was not opposed to the bill until after it passed
and the full implications of it were realized. And thirdly, the RSC became
actively involved in the battle only after the veto strategy had been decided
upon. Steiger again made extensive use of the RSC staff, since the minority
staff of the Interior Committee was committed to the bill. But again, this
did not happen until after the bill passed the House and White House support
for the veto was certain.
As a result of their efforts, 24 Republican members who originally had
supported Udall on final passage of the bill reversed their position and sup¬
ported the President's veto three months later. Of these 24 switches, 16
were members of the RSC. On the veto override vote, only 10 RSC members
voted to override the President's veto.73
H. The Continuing Battle Over Federal Land Use
The June 1974 floor vote to defeat the rule on the land use bill was not
the end of that issue. Following the 1974 election setback for Republicans,
Morris Udall again introduced a land use bill in 1975.74 Senator Henry Jackson
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(D-Washington), the chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, indicated that
since the Senate had passed bills on several occasions only to have them
either ignored or rebuffed in the House, he would not take any action in the
Senate until the House had passed its own land use bill.
With the changed makeup of the Congress in 1975, Sam Steiger and the
Republican Study Committee's Phil Truluck held an early strategy session.
They decided that the best chance to defeat the bill in the new Congress was
in the Interior Committee. Steiger and Truluck then met with the outside
lobbying groups with which they had worked in the past. This group compiled
a target list of members of the committee who might be convinced to oppose
the bill. While only 11 members of the 43 members of the full committee
had voted against the bill in 1974, some of the new members on the committee
might have reservations about supporting a federal land use bill. If these
individuals could be targeted early, the lobbyists couid appiy pressure from
their constituencies and Steiger could work on them in committee.
In March and April of 1975, the House Interior Committee's Environment
Subcommittee chaired by Udall again held hearings on the Udall bill. The RSC
staff called on several of its academic contacts to testify in opposition to the
bill. Among these was Dr. Bruce Johnson of the University of Caiifornia.
Because of Steiger's senior position on the committee, he was able to obtain
committee funds to pay Johnson's travel expenses to testify. This action repre¬
sented one of the practical advantages of the staff's efforts to contact and
establish working reiationships with academics on behaif of the RSC member¬
ship. While Johnson was in Washington, he also addressed the RSC legislative
briefing on March 24, 1975, and later, a fact sheet and a detailed background
paper were written by Truluck to be distributed to the RSC membership.^
The lead witness before the Udall committee was Secretary of the Interior,
Rogers C.B. Morton, who stated that the Ford Administration now opposed the
land use planning bill despite their support for it in earlier years.
Another new eiement in the land use battle was the publication of a
study entitled "J'he Current Status of Land Use Policy,which was published
as a result of Truluck's efforts. He had discussed the issue with representa¬
tives of several research institutions in Washington. He noted that the
majority of states had already taken action on land use planning and that the
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claim of the Udall supporters that the states were inactive was false. When
he discussed the subject with Mark Tanger, the research director of The
Heritage Foundation, that group agreed to analyze the regulations and iaws in
the states and publish the results. The publication was based on a survey of
all 50 states and included 12 separate categories of land use planning such as
power plant siting, surface mining regulation, flood plain regulation, authoriza¬
tion of the counties to engage in comprehensive land use planning, and others.
The publication filled a research need of those opponents of the Udall bill who
maintained that federal action was unnecessary and redundant. The study,
which effectively refuted one of Udall's key arguments, was sent to every
member of the committee and the key committee staff aides during the
hearings.
After a series of other witnesses was heard, the subcommittee began
marking up the legislation in May. The subcommittee approved the bill and
sent it to the full committee. Steiger and Truiuck were uncertain about the
effect of their concerted efforts to move the swing votes. Therefore, they
decided to call for a test vote, and at the first meeting of the full committee,
Steiger demanded a record vote to determine the accuracy of his headcount.
On May 14, 1975, Steiger moved to table the bill losing by two votes, 20-22.
While this was nominally a loss for Steiger, it was a substantial increase
from the 11 votes he had received for a similar motion a year earlier. More
importantly, the vote gave both sides a small target group which might be
swayed by political pressure from their constituents. The RSC staff and its
key members had learned to work closely with outside lobby organizations.
If the Washington representatives of these groups could mobilize public opinion
back home in the member's district to support the RSC position, the conser¬
vatives would be operating in an effective manner, much as the liberals had
been doing for many years. If a swing member could be convinced that his
district opposed a specific bill, such as federal land use planning, it would be
much easier for him to oppose his own chairman and vote against the bill.
Steiger and Truiuck drew up a list with five prime targets. The outside
groups began to apply pressure from the home districts, and Steiger reinforced
this effort in the committee. When specific technical questions were raised,
Steiger called on Truiuck of the RSC staff to provide the answers. Of the
five targets who voted against the Steiger tabling motion in May, three
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Democrats switched and voted with Steiger on Monday, July 14, 1975, when
the vote on the bill was taken/'7 Thus, the bill was defeated in the Interior
Committee by a vote of 19-23. The effort to articulate grassroots opposition
to the measure was successful, and the bill languished in committee for the
remainder of the Congress. The Steiger-Truluck combination had effectively
mobilized the outside forces who pressured the swing members into switching
their votes/^ The 1975 land use victory was very important for the RSC for
several reasons:
1. The group had built a reputation on this issue in 1974. And, by
winning on it again in 1975, the committee emphasized its effective¬
ness to the Republican leadership, and to the Administration.
2. It was assumed that victories would be scarce in 1975 and 1976
because of the decreased number of Republicans in the House, and
a victory on a major issue like this would be a boost to the morale
of the RSC membership and staff. The membership's commitment
was still a worthwhile investment, even though many RSC members
had lost in 1974. The members also were reminded that the staff
was still of a high professional caliber, capable of winning major
legislative battles.
I. Concerns with the Federal Budget
Again "in the 94th Congress, questions concerning the federal budget
received considerable attention from the members of the Republican Study
Committee.
For example, Republican Study Committee staff prepared a comparison
of the different economic programs proposed by President Ford and by the
Jim Wright (D-Texas) Task Force (on behalf of the Democratic House leader¬
ship) as well as other economic alternatives/"* This comparison enabled the
members to see the major provisions side-by-side, and it provided for a ready
reference. However, the primary activities of the RSC remained major Special
Orders on specific fiscal subjects/^ as well as the "battle of the budget."
The first of these activities took the form of a Special Order on the
floor of the House led by Congressman Jack Kemp. The discussion covered
economic issues including budget control, wage and price controls, indexation
of the tax system and energy. The Kemp Special Order developed from a
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meeting which he had arranged with a group of economists at the American
Enterprise Institute, a public policy research organization in Washington, D.C.
That meeting took place on January 15 and 16, 1975, and included nine of the
senior economists from AEI. They were making recommendations and sugges¬
tions over a broad range of issues, including health care, social security,
government regulation and federal expenditures.
Two members of the RSC senior staff participated in the meeting. The
AEI presentations were directed at the six members of Congress who attended
the meeting and who were cooperating with Kemp to speak out on these
economic issues. The role of the RSC on this project was directed by Kemp.
He asked the Executive Committee for staff help in preparing the Special
Order, and four of the nine statements used by RSC members in the Special
Order were written by the staff. While this specific effort was not a contin¬
uing one, the staff helped Kemp, a member of the RSC's Executive Committee,
R 1
exert his leadership on this issue.
Another RSC Special Order was led by Congressman Bill Armstrong (R-
Colorado), a member of the Executive Committee of the Republican Study
Committee, and supported by 17 other members of the RSC. This Special
Order was entirely coordinated by the staff of the RSC and largely based on
a recent study entitled An Other Budget Toward a Reordering of National
Priorities by Professor Charles Moser .^2 Moser maintained that claims
that the federal budget was uncontrollable were overstated. Moser indicated
that substantial cuts could be made in the federal budget, and he showed
where and how he would do it. Among the participants in this Special Order
was Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) who pointed out that this study was help¬
ful to him because it made references to a legislative proposal he had intro¬
duced,^ namely, his own constitutional amendment to balance the federal
budget. Other members took up specific areas of the budget, including
specific cuts which might be made in each cabinet-level department, and
wage and price controls.
The role of "the RSC in this endeavor was to permit its members to
speak with a coordinated voice on these subjects of national concern by pro¬
ducing raw material for the speeches, and coordinating these arrangements.
Armstrong's Special Order was put on the Executive Committee agenda the
day before the Special Order was scheduled to take place so that as many
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members as possible would hear about his plans and be encouraged to partici¬
pate with him in the Special Order. The RSC staff was available to provide
additional speeches and to tailor specific research projects to the needs of
individual members with their own particular styles and forms.
While the Kemp and Armstrong Special Orders were efforts at raising
public awareness of the issue, John Rousselot, treasurer of the RSC, took the
lead in proposing actual cuts in the budget. This began in the Spring of 1975
when he received 94 -votes in favor of his position, as opposed to 31 who voted
against him. The Washington Star noted, "The vote was a chapter meeting of
the Congressional equivalent of the Flat Earth Society.Rousselot responded
in a "letter to the editor" by stating that:
"It would appear to me to be more appropriate to equate the
vote on my amendment with a chapter meeting of the Round Earth
Society. When Columbus first returned from his 1492 voyage, only
a few recognized the truth and were willing to let go of false be¬
liefs and superstitions that had been tested and were proven wrong.
Rousseiot gained votes on the second budget resolution garnering a total of
127 supporters. But, by the Spring of 1976, the vote for Rousselot's position
had declined to 105.
Rousselot's interest in this amendment was outside any decision of the
RSC. But as an active member of its Executive Committee, he was eager to
utilize the facilities of the RSC to implement his objectives. For example,
he appeared before a number of Executive Committee meetings to explain his
amendments in detail and presented briefings to the staff members at their
Monday morning legislative sessions. The RSC staff supported him indirectly
as well. Among the fact sheets published by the RSC was "The Economic
Impact of the FY1976 Budget"^ and analyses of the various budget resolutions.
Rousselot's continuing involvement in the battle over the budget resulted in
O7his chapter of The Case Against the Reckless Congress.
In a related effort, the Republican Study Committee attempted to reach
out on a bi-partisan basis on this issue. Carl Nowler, staff counsel of the
conservative Democratic Research Organization, was invited by the executive
director of the RSC to speak on Monday, May 16, 1976, to both the Executive
Committee and the Monday briefing participants about a balanced federal
budget and the hearings which the DRO had been conducting. The meetings,
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chaired by conservative Congressman Richard Ichord (D-Missouri), investigated
the probiems which were faced in balancing the federal budget. Ichord com¬
mented later that:
"The balanced budget hearings were the most important thing
DRO ever did. We heard from everybody who was anybody in the
field of government finance.""**
Efforts to mobilize the arguments and the concerns of the members on
these broad issues were a significant part of the RSC's activity. If the mem¬
bers could be brought together to express their concerns in a unified way,
they might be more effective than a single voice calling in the wilderness.
The RSC helped to mobilize this coordinated effort. However, the quality of
the floor spe&hes was not always high. Full of technical jargon, charts, and
numbers, frequently prepared by staff aides, and delivered to an empty chamber
after the day's legislative calendar, they were a far cry from the great debates
of old. As Gerhart Loewenberg stated:
"When complex twentieth-century political issues appeared on
the agenda of parliaments, and the burden of work moved to spec¬
ialized committees, observers criticized the declining^ frequency and
quality of great debates on the floor of the House. "
Nonetheless, they did provide a concerted voice on these issues. In years to
come, they would disprove Congressman Ichord's view at that time, "I didn't
used to think balancing the budget had much political mileage.
3. Kemp-McClure Jobs Creation Act of 1975
Jack Kemp was an active member of the Republican Study Committee
and its Executive Committee who had been fascinated with economic issues.
9 1His concern about budget balancing can be seen from his earlier activities. 1
In the Special Order referred to in Section I above, Kemp indicated his inten¬
tion to "propose the enactment of capital formation inducing laws at the
earliest opportunity."^^ Kemp's opportunity occurred on May 21, 1975, when
he and 47 colleagues, including 42 members of the RSC, introduced the "Jobs
Creation Act of 1975."^ This bill was significant because it moved the House
Republicans away from the traditional position of cutting federal spending in
order to cut taxes. While the original Kemp Jobs Creation Act included sev¬
eral different concepts, its primary thrust was a substantial tax reduction for
both individuals and businesses in order to encourage savings and create jobs
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in the private sector of the economy. It was offered as an alternative to
various federal job programs which were being advocated by the liberals. At
the same time, a companion bill was introduced in the Senate by James McClure.
While Kemp was an active member of the RSC who utilized the services
of the RSC staff to advance his measure, the bill itself was drafted in his
office and by outside academic experts with whom he had made direct contact.
Kemp's bill was publicized to the members of the Republican Study Committee
both via the printed "BULLetin"*^ and the meetings of the Executive Committee
where it was discussed extensively. Most importantly, the RSC staff solicited
co-sponsors for his bill and assisted other members in preparing their speeches
for Kemp's Special Order to introduce the bill.
As the 95th Congress continued, Kemp introduced new data which amplified
his original statements.^ The RSC staff continued to solicit their members
to support the bill, which by May 1975, had 80 co-sponsors. Of these, 69 were
members of the Republican Study Committee. The bill became a useful
rallying point for conservatives, but its impact in 1975-76 as an alternative to
either public employment jobs or to the liberal Humphrey-Hawkins bill, was
minimal.
The Humphrey-Hawkins bill received major media attention, and fairly
broad support throughout the Congress. The RSC analyzed the Humphrey-
Hawkins bill in detail.By the time the Education and Labor Subcommittee
on Manpower Compensation, Health and Safety reported out the Humphrey-
Hawkins bill in April 1976, the RSC held a special Executive Committee
meeting to discuss their response to this bill. The leading speakers at the
session were John Erlenborn, a senior Republican on the Education and Labor
Committee, to which the Humphrey-Hawkins bill had been referred, and Jack
Kemp the principal sponsor of the conservative alternative.
The Republican Study Committee played a useful role in extending the
efforts of Kemp's activities on his bill. It also helped to establish Kemp
and his conservative allies in a more positive light in the national news media.
RSC press releases on the Kemp bill, and his chapter in The Case Against the
Reckless Congress helped portray Kemp as one of the positive influences on
the national conservative scene. Kemp was a national figure because of his
prior position as quarterback on the Buffalo Bills football team. He was young,
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handsome and articulate, and thus an effective media spokesman for his view¬
point. As Michael Malbin writes,
"New-styled conservatives, raised in the age of media politics,
are every bit as active as their liberal colleagues in the pursuit of
their legislative ends.""'
The Kemp bill and Kemp's personal leadership gave the RSC members a pos¬
itive alternative to the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill.
During the 94th Congress, neither the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment
Bill nor the Kemp Jobs Creation Act passed. The Kemp Act was reintroduced
in 1976 as the Kemp-Roth bill and eventually became the basis of President
Reagan's tax program in 1981.
K. Task Force on Regulatory Reform
Congressman William Ketchum pointed out the problem of the growth of
the independent regulatory agencies in his chapter in The Case Against the
Reckless Congress:
"Over time, increasing power has been usurped by what has
become known as the fourth branch of government. While Congress
turned its back, the regulatory agencies — a power group unforeseen
by our nation's founders — came to occupy a position of unparalleled
power and influence in the United States. With a work force of
over 63,000 employees, in 30 agencies, and with literally trillions of
rules and regulations in its control, this fourth branch of government
has largely become a sad fact of the American way of life."-^
While Ketchum may have overstated the number of specific regulations, the
RSC membership shared a perspective that the independent regulatory agencies
were not under the control of either the Legislative or the Executive Branch.
A number of RSC members had expressed their concern over these develop¬
ments, but the RSC member activities were uncoordinated.
Congressman Bill Archer (R-Texas) approached the chairwoman of the
Republican Study Committee, Marjorie Holt, about the possibility of estab¬
lishing a task force on regulatory reform within the structure of the RSC.
The matter was discussed at Executive Committee meetings in June and July
of 1975. The RSC had never had an ad hoc task force on a particular subject
before. Archer committed salary support to a task force staff director, who
would report to the RSC's executive director. The task force would use the
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RSC offices, secretarial help, and support capability. The Executive Committee
agreed to the idea and Mrs. Holt announced Archer's appointment as chairman
in a press release dated July 31, 1975.-^ Archer's background was appropriate
to this role as he had previously served on President Ford's White House
Commission on Regulatory Reform, and had seen how executive action would
not be enough to curb the abuses of most of the regulatory agencies. Archer's
commitment to fund a staff director resulted in the hiring of attorney Terry
Reed in August 1975.
In the meantime, Archer and Holt jointly selected the members of the
task force based on their expressions of interest, as well as their salary com¬
mitments to the Republican Study Committee. Appointment to a task force
like this could be a useful device to a member in his own district. It would
give him "instant credibility" with the local media as an expert on an important
area of constituent concern. Thus, the membership was dispensed as a favor
as well as on an interest basis. In effect, the task force gave the RSC a
series of patronage-like positions which it could dispense to its members.
While the task force was being formed, the RSC continued to issue papers
on aspects of regulatory reform. These included "Amendments to FDA Limiting
Power to Regulate Vitamins,"^0 ancj 0t(-,er fact sheets which dealt with trans¬
portation regulatory agencies, including the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the environmental and social regulatory
agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
It should be noted that the task force structure was not an unique idea
to the Republican Study Committee. The Republican Research Committee, a
formal part of the party structure in the House of Representatives, had used
task forces in the mid-1960s on subjects such as East-West trade, crime and
education. These party task forces were also of the ad hoc variety and their
chairmen were given complete independence by the chairman of the Repub¬
lican Research Committee. Archer, on the other hand, coordinated his task
force's activities closely with the RSC and Reed functioned both as the staff
director of the task force and a regular member of the staff of the Repub¬
lican Study Committee.
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The task force also worked closely with the Republican White House.
Archer and other Republicans were involved in various Administration initiatives
on regulatory reform which Archer could then carry through via the task force.
Within the House, Reed prepared Special Orders including a general overview
on regulatory reform,energy development,^^ and occupational safety and
health.Bills relating to increased congressional oversight and reform of
specific agencies such as OSHA and the CAB were drafted by Reed and
introduced by Archer. Co-sponsors were solicited from the RSC. All of the
staff work involved in both the Special Orders and the bills was implemented
by Reed working with other members of the RSC staff. Members were
repeatedly advised that "an adequate supply of speech material is available
for your use."*^
The task force enabled the members who became involved to speak in a
coordinated way on important issues. Because of the formal committee
structure in the House, regulatory reform crossed the committee's jurisdictional
lines. Thus, without an instrument like the RSC task force, no vehicle existed
to take a broad view of the issue in a coordinated fashion. Additionally, the
task force provided the members with a public relations outlet in their home
districts. By raising these issues, the members were also finding fault with
big government, at a time when many of their colleagues in the Democratic
party were advocating more governmental programs. Although the task force
did not achieve any specific legislative goals, it did serve to focus efforts and
provide the concerned members support in the many aspects of this issue.
L. Other Domestic Issues
The interests of the members in constituent concerns, or in concerns of
major issues not on the RSC agenda, presented the staff with difficult choices.
Clearly, it was in their own interest to be helpful to the members. Simul¬
taneously, they could not become so involved in parochial tasks that their work
on major projects for the group was neglected. Several of these domestic
issues are mentioned in this section.
Civil Rights Regulations
Occasionally during the course of the 94th Congress, a member of the
Executive Committee would utilize the resources of the Republican Study
Committee for a narrow project which became of interest to the entire group.
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The question of civil rights regulations regarding primary school inspections
from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was a case in point.
As with other legislative enactments, the Congress had left the original legis¬
lative language vague. Thus, it was up to the Executive Branch to interpret
and implement it. Malbin has argued that this vagueness is intentional
"...because specificity might have endangered the chances for getting any thing
through Congress."105 This vagueness gave HEW the opportunity to conduct
what was considered "harassing" interviews with administrators, teachers, and in
some cases, students, over allegations of discrimination. In a District Court
decision, the presiding judge directed the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare to review their procedures and use appropriate due process in the
future.
The HEW procedures which were sent down, however, were objectionable
to Marjorie Holt, whose district includes Anne Arundel County, Maryland,
where the original case was first tried. Thus, she circulated a letter to the
President among the members of the RSC for signatures which stressed their
objection to the proposed draft regulations.^'7 The letter was eventually signed
by 25 members of the Republican Study Committee who shared her concerns.
Upon receipt of that letter, President Ford referred it to David Mathews,
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The RSC Executive Committee
met with Mathews on October 7, 1975. Mathews was accompanied by Peter
Holmes, the Director of the Office for Civil Rights in HEW. As a result of
that meeting, Mathews suggested that Holmes meet with a staff group from
the RSC to discuss the concerns of the RSC members. A subsequent meeting
was held with Holmes on October 30, 1975 to submit a proposed set of minimum
standards for HEW to follow.
The second set of regulations handed down by HEW in the Spring of
1976 were less restrictive, but still far from perfect according to the RSC
members. So, on dune 22, 1976, Congresswoman Holt again circulated a letter
to the membership of the RSC giving Secretary Mathews six basic premises
for due process in HEW's dealings with the local agencies. More than 30
members of the RSC signed this letter which was dispatched in late dune,
and the RSC staff met with Holmes again to reiterate the conservative pos¬
ition on this question. After this RSC effort the new regulations, released
several months later, proved to be more acceptable to the members of the
RSC than the initial regulations of 1975.
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Social Security
Some major issues which confronted the Congress were of such magnitude
and importance that the staff attempted to generate member interest in them.
This type of staff initiative was used occasionally because the members had
not expressed an interest in leading an initiative on a certain issue. Some
major issues intimidated the members, either because of their complexity, or
because of the seeming intractability of the problems. Staff initiatives to
the members did not occur often because the staff was still sensitive to the
possible charge that members should direct staff rather than vice versa, but
an instance of staff initiative was the question of social security. Robert L.
Schuettinger, a senior staff member of the RSC, completed an RSC background
paper on the social security system.This was later expanded into a book
entitled Saving Social Security.
Social Security has always been considered to be a tax, and has come
under the jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee. The vice chairman of the RSC, Philip Crane, joined the
Ways and Means Committee in 1975 after giving up his membership on the
Banking and Currency Committee. Thus, Schuettinger sent a memorandum to
Crane detailing his study and alternative proposals on February 18, 1975.
This memo included copies of the Schuettinger study and references to other
major studies which had been published on this subject. Proposals were made
to Crane on how the study might be publicized and on which academic experts
might be brought in to meet with members of the. RSC. If these meetings
were successful, Schuettinger argued that the academics could be invited to
testify before the Subcommittee on Social Security on which Crane served.
The RSC arranged several informal meetings, and two academic experts were
invited to testify. But, because of the party ratio on the Ways and Means
Committee, the impact of the RSC meeting was insignificant. This also
meant that the Republicans had very little input into the committee in the
94th Congress. ^ ^ ^
In addition, Crane had long considered national health insurance and
income tax reduction of greater interest to him than social security, which
"never won political points for anyone." Crane's reluctance to deal forth-
rightly with social security was not a politically unique situation for a con¬
servative Republican. The problems of the social security system had been
exposed in the academic press for many years, but no politician, of any
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ideological hue, had been willing to confront it because of its explosive nature
in the constituency. As a result of these circumstances, the social security
issue was not one in which the members of the RSC were actively involved.
This pointed up a general limitation which the staff of the RSC faced. That
is, the members were clearly in charge. Since the RSC staff did not have
access to the House floor (like their formal House committee counterparts and
their counterparts on the staff of the Senate Steering Committee), they had
to depend on the members to take initiatives. Consequently, even if the best
package of data were assembled, with all of the arguments put forth in salient
fashion, if no member were willing to use it, the whole exercise would be
wasted. As Dick Dingman said later:
"In the final analysis, we are here to do the members' bidding.
They sign our payroll checks, they vote in committee and on the
floor, and they are responsible to their constituencies. We aren't.^
Dingman's comments recall the limitations under which even entrepreneurial
staffs must work. The staff itself could encourage the members to act
within the RSC, but ultimately it was up to the members to act on an issue.
M. Conclusion
The House Democratic leadership assumed that the 94th Congress would
be a major move forward for their liberal members. Having greatly increased
their numbers, they were going to enact many legislative programs which the
conservatives had long thwarted. However, actions proved otherwise. This
can be attributed to several factors:
1. The liberal members who had been elected to represent conserva¬
tive constituencies did not vote for all of the liberal bills. If they
had, they might have suffered retribution at the polls in 1976.
2. The presence of a Republican in the White House gave the
Democratic leadership serious problems. If the Democrats passed
bills, President Ford could veto them.
3. The Republican Study Committee in the House and the Senate
Steering Committee in the Senate were in place and reasonably
effective. They had learned to work with outside pressure groups
on issues of common concern. In addition, the RSC and SSC pro¬
vided pressure on both President Ford and the Republican leader¬
ship in the House and Senate to move in a conservative direction.
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k. The conservatives had introduced major bills which were gathering
media attention and which were becoming an alternative part of the
national agenda.
As the RSC operated during this period, it learned several lessons
concerning the legislative process. On a number of bills like the Consumer
Protection Agency, the common situs picketing measure, land use planning
and surface mining control, they learned that they were fighting the same
battle over again. This confirmed Professor Ripley's perspective:
"It should be noted that successful defensive lobbying in one
year does not necessarily remove an item from the congressional
agenda for future years."
The RSC also became more sophisticated in its operations within the
House committee system. When Sam Steiger decided to push for a vote in
the Interior Committee on federal land use, he worked effectively with the
external pressure groups on the bill. Steiger knew that some of his col¬
leagues on the committee might be swayed by pressure from their home
districts.
In other legislative battles the presence of the RSC staff gave the
Republican conservatives a new role in the House. The RSC staff was
basically what Malbin describes as an "innovative" staff. That is, they
had no assigned responsibility for either deliberation or oversight. While
this could create problems for the system as a whole, for the RSC member¬
ship it meant new opportunities and new vistas. John Rhodes had proposed
a general Republican legislative agenda, and with the addition of professional
staff aides of the caliber of David Swoap, the RSC could help set that
agenda. This positive input was seen in the RSC initiatives regarding both
welfare reform and food stamp reform. As Allen Schick has said, "An
independent supply of analysis can stimulate members to diverge from their
leaders.Malbi'n's entrepreneurial theory extends this argument further.
He argues that staff entrepreneurs result in:
"not only more work but increased decentralization, as non-
chairmen have the resources to pursue their interests in not letting
committee or party leaders set the terms of floor debate.
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In effect, the RSC became an independent base for positive legisla¬
tive proposals. With these bills, admittedly in limited areas, it was "leading
the leaders." In addition, the RSC's legislative activities had established the
RSC as a center with which members would freely associate on legislative
projects. Frantzich points out:
"For the congressman, the decision to expend effort pro¬
posing and promoting legislation stands as a resource allocation
problem. The time and effort required of the congressman and
his staff must be balanced against the expected personal, political
and public relations payoffs. Numerous other activities subsumed
under the multi-faceted congressional job title may well assure
more rewards.
For RSC members, the staff tried to demonstrate that their involvement led
to a positive, political payoff, both in the House and in their home districts.
Despite this caveat, the RSC staff did lead its members in these specific
issue areas. A positive incentive for conservative Republican members of
the House to follow the lead of the RSC was the maturing of the RSC's
issue leadership. Its primary spokesmen were perceived by their colleagues
as credible cue-givers in their areas of specialization. Professors Milnor
and Franklin comment on this vital role:
[Tjhere is evidence that MPs will trust the judgment of
certain members to the extent that particular signatures will
legitimate a motion for other members. The groundwork is
laid for a highly specialized form of intra-elite opposition
capable of building a network of linkages within the political »
system."*20
It was just such a role which the RSC, as an integral part of the House of
Representatives was developing. The credibility which the RSC had developed
with regard to a carefully defined set of issues had earned the confidence
of the members to lead them in those areas.
On a practical level, the RSC staff also dealt more effectively with
different types of members. As the late Professor John Mackintosh said
about his colleagues in the British Parliament:
"...most Members of Parliament, ambitious or not, are very
jealous lest any colleague should steal a march on them." 21
The individual sensibilities and idiosyncracies of individual members sometimes
became overriding factors in who would support whose bill, or who would
participate in whose Special Order. These individual characteristics
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are not open to quantification or even to specific description. But, they
are key factors in the individual relationships which were established
between the members and the RSC staff and among the members them¬
selves. The members of the RSC also made effective, use of external
academic resources. In the case of land use, one study was commissioned,
and several others formed the basis of Special Orders about major public
issues.
The majority of the major issues of concern to the RSC were of
broad ideological interest. Again, because of the numerous access points
to the legislative process, the Republican Study Committee enabled its
members to fill a specific role. Norman Ornstein had commented on the
increasing ideological input into the legislative process, especially in the
House:
"During the floor debate and amendment process, making
ideological points for national groups or constituencies, pro¬
tecting the interests of particular groups, asserting an individual
prerogative, or altering a broader policy direction (without deep
regard for the specific piece of legislation under consideration)
are all competing priorities of significant rank."^2
The RSC staff enabled its members to contribute to the national debate in
each of the ways Ornstein mentions. Other major items occupied the
attention of the House. For example, the Congress passed an Emergency Farm
Bill, tax cuts, an increase of the debt limits and other measures. In these
cases, the RSC provided information to its members and their staffs, and
held briefing sessions about the bills. However, the RSC's primary emphasis
was on a limited number of bills. By concentrating their scarce resources,
they had the opportunity to mobilize their influence in an effective way.
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VIII. POSTSCRIPT AND CONCLUSION
A. Introduction
The analysis of the Republican Study Committee in this thesis con¬
cludes with the 1976 elections. In the House of Representatives, the
Republicans lost only one seat, and in the Senate, the partisan ratio was
unchanged. A major partisan change did occur, however, with the presi¬
dential election. Republican President Gerald Ford was defeated by the
former Georgia Governor, Democrat Jimmy Carter. The election of a
Democrat to the presidency caused an ideological shift to take place among
the Republicans. The party united now in a formal opposition to the new
Democratic Administration.
The results of the 1976 elections also brought about a change in the
Republican Study Committee's legislative objectives. The successful develop¬
ment of the RSC up to the time of the 1976 elections was partially attributable
to the presence of an ally in the White House: by working with the Admin¬
istration, the members of the RSC had exerted conservative pressure within
the Republican party, influenced the legislative process within Congress, and
established their own ad hoc faction within the framework of the U.S. House
of Representatives. But, with Carter's defeat of Ford the opportunity to
work with the Administration was lost. The entire Republican membership
in the House of Representatives united in opposition to the Democratic
Administration, and the RSC now moved to service this opposition. The new
Administration soon began working closely with the Democratic leadership in
the Congress to enact its own legislative programs, a situation not unlike the
pattern of events which marked the earlier Democratic Administration of
Lyndon Johnson.
The next section of this chapter presents an overview of the RSC's
activities from 1977-1980. This overview includes a discussion of the
personnel, programs, legislative activities, and leadership of the group during
that time period. Following this "Postscript," conclusions are drawn from
this study of the evolution of the Republican Study Committee. Finally,




The accession of Jimmy Carter to the presidency in January 1977 led
to a number of changes in the RSC. Congresswoman Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland)
announced that she did not intend to stand for re-election as chairwoman of
the Republican Study Committee, and in January 1977, Congressman Clair
Burgener (R-California) was elected chairman. Burgener had played an active
role in the RSC, particularly through the hiring of David Swoap and through
his participation in the RSC's welfare reform activities. Burgener's member¬
ship on the House Appropriations Committee gave him a broad perspective
of the legislative concerns which would be of interest to the RSC. The
remainder of the Executive Committee was essentially unchanged: the vice
chairmen and treasurer were re-elected and several retiring members of the
Executive Committee were replaced by newly-elected members.*
In March of 1977, a major change confronted the RSC. Ed Feulner,
the executive director, announced that he was leaving the Republican Study
Committee to become the president of The Heritage Foundation. Feulner's
entrepreneurial leadership together with his intimate knowledge of the House
and many RSC members had been "one of the glues that held the RSC to¬
gether. Because of his role as the principal staff aide for the Republican
Study Committee since its founding, Feulner had a personal as well as a
professional interest in selecting a suitable successor. Philip Crane (R-Illinois)
and a number of other RSC members emphasized that the new executive
director should perform two roles: (1) he should keep the organization
functioning; and (2) he should stress an innovative and substantive approach
toward the legislative process in the period ahead. In other words, "The RSC
had become important as a service organization and as a provider of
legislative initiatives,and the new executive director should keep both
objectives in mind.
Chairman Burgener established a selection committee to fill the
executive director's position. This committee included Philip Crane, John
Rousselot (R-California), Bill Armstrong (R-Colorado), Marjorie Holt, Edwin
Feulner, and Burgener. After several weeks of meetings and interviews with
three candidates, the selection committee reported to the Executive Committee
which offered the position of executive director to Richard B. Dingman,
former administrative assistant to John Conlan (R-Arizona) and Edward
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Forsythe (R-New Jersey). Dingman accepted the position in March, and he
and Feuiner then worked together to ensure a smooth transition.
With a new executive director and a Democratic Administration in
power, it was inevitable that the Republican Study Committee would also
undergo a change. The RSC became oriented toward servicing the requests
of members and producing fact sheets rather than initiating new and innovative
legislative programs. Richard Dingman noted:
"(Feuiner) left a very full agenda for us to follow. We had
a paperback book to produce every two years, a campaign com¬
mittee to try and push ahead, and a membership base which needed
substantial broadening particularly in view of the fact that we
no longer had an ally in the White House.
During subsequent years, the Republican Study Committee moved to expand
its membership base.^ By 1981, the RSC encompassed 80% of the Republican
membership in the U.S. House of Representatives. Two additional paperback
books were produced through the RSC Campaign Fund, Can You Afford This
House^ and View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right.? But, the most
notable of the changes in the operations of the RSC after 1976 were its
diminished direct leadership of major legislative initiatives during the period
1977-1980 and its active role in the development of the "New Right."
Although the RSC staff and members took the lead on several key
issues in Congress including opposition to postcard voter registration, to the
National Consumer Cooperative Bank, to the common situs picketing bill,
and to a Consumer Protection Agency, "the RSC just (wasn't) at the cutting
edge anymore of the major issues which confronted conservative Republicans
in the House.The RSC was no longer presenting positive legislative pro¬
posals, such as its earlier food stamp and welfare reform bills.
One of the factors which contributed to the movement of the RSC away
from the "cutting edge" of legislative issues in the House was the increased
number of Republican members in the House who joined the RSC. A number
of individuals were now welcomed not only as dues-paying members of the
RSC, but also as occasional salary contributors and active members of the
group. A desirable increase in membership can also bring about unfortunate
side-effects, however, including: a dilution of principles to achieve a consensus
among the larger number of members, and even an ideological split within
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the group. Such a dilution occurred when Bill Frenzel (R-Minnesota), Tom
Railsback (R-Illinois), and Barber Conable (R-New York) joined the RSC in
1978. The addition of Railsback to the RSC was of particular note because
of his active membership in the liberal Wednesday Group since his election
to the House in 1966 and because of his opposition to the RSC on a number
of major initiatives including public financing of congressional campaigns.
Railsback and liberal David Obey (D-Wisconsin) were the two principal co-
sponsors of the Obey-Railsback Bill which would have provided such public
financing. However, the presence of Railsback as a dues-paying member did
not stop the RSC from becoming actively involved in the battle against the
bill, as Dingman pointed out:
"We were happy to receive his dues money, but he was
certainly not going to call the shots for the more conservative
members who wer.e our primary constituency."^
The voluntary nature of the RSC became vital to its effectiveness. Railsback
and others who joined the RSC did so on a voluntary basis; they received its
publications but participated only in those activities with which they agreed.
The post-1976 RSC began to emphasize new areas of interest. The
four major areas of interest to the evolving RSC were detailed in Chapter I.
RSC involvement was continued in these areas of legislative activities,
academic outreach, electoral activities, and Executive Branch relationships,
but with a different emphasis on programs which was compatible with the new
RSC legislative approach.
During the 1977-1980 period the congressional legislative program re¬
mained the heart of the RSC's activities. As the production of legislative
fact sheets, bulletins, and backgrounders occupied the attention of the RSC
staff members, major legislative intitiatives declined in number. The basic
pattern of publications, staff assignments and activities which had been im¬
plemented by the Executive Committee under the chairmanships of LaMar
Baker (R-Tennessee) and Marjorie Holt, and executive director Feulner was
continued.
The academic outreach program of the RSC declined into disuse after
the departure of Feulner as the RSC executive director. In part, this decline
was caused by the increasing number of outside organizations which provided
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this service after 1977. Data, speakers, and academic programs were provided
to the Congress by organizations such as The Heritage Foundation, the
Institute for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco, the American Enterprise
Institute, and the Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation. If
other groups were supplying this service, the RSC reasoned that their
limited resources could be used in other activities. A new emphasis on
external relations, particularly Richard Dingman's involvement with the con¬
servative Kingston Group, helped to offset the lack of an academic outreach
program under the post-1976 Republican Study Committee.
The electoral activities of the RSC did not develop beyond their 1976
level. The RSC Campaign Fund continued to publish biennial paperback books
co-authored by RSC members. Packets of voting data were distributed to non-
incumbent challengers, vote justifications were issued, and companion publications
were also produced. Because of the growth of many other political action
committees (PACs), the RSC Campaign Fund never became an effective
PAC. Other conservative organizations made direct financial contributions,
provided volunteer training programs, polling assistance and other "in-kind"
services to the campaigns of conservative candidates.
The Executive Branch relation program which had been implemented
prior to the 1976 elections was not used during the Carter Administration.
This was a predictable result of the election of a Democratic President
who had virtually no common objectives with an ad hoc group of conserva¬
tive Republicans. However, with the accession of Ronald Reagan to the
presidency in 1981, relations between the Republican Study Committee and
members of the Executive Branch were renewed. RSC meetings with the
President, the Vice President, Secretaries of the Cabinet departments, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other key Reagan
aides became integral parts of the 1981 RSC agenda.
This brief overview outlines the general thrust of the RSC's activity
during the period 1977-1980. A recurring theme of this thesis has been
that the House of Representatives and its institutional organizations undergo
a continuing process of change and adaptation. Because of this change, it
is essential to examine an organization within Congress to determine if it
has met the objectives of its founders. The changes in Congress and their
implications for the RSC, and the evolving role of the RSC are examined
in the next section of this chapter.
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C. Conclusions
The basic structure of American politics has tended to be non-ideolog¬
ical. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have developed as broad
umbrellas which embraced differing perspectives. The rise of a conservative
ideological movement within the Republican party in the Congress has been
the theme of this thesis.
The RSC was formed as a counter to a liberal ideological group, at a
time when conservatism in the United States was re-emerging as a national
political force, and the formation of the Republican Study Committee as a
vehicle for the elected conservative members in the House of Representatives
to express their viewpoint was a relatively new idea.
In the words of Russell Kirk, "The American intellectual renewal of
conservative ideas...[had been] perfectly unorganized and undirected."^
Work was done by isolated individual scholars and men of letters. Kirk
further stated:
"So far as we conservative writers had anything in common,
it was this: we were social critics, innocent of any design for
assuming personal power. For one thing, we set our faces against
political centralization, so that a cushy appointment in Washington
would have been a repudiating of our own convictions....Of course
this haphazard intellectual revival of conservative thought affected
American elections only a little. In this land...it takes a long
while for a new or revived political concept to supplant in citizens'
conscious and subconscious minds accustomed political loyalties and
prejudices."^ ^
The ideological factions such as the DSG and the RSC in the House of
Representatives play several unique roles in the political process: (1) they
serve as a catalyst for "new" or "revived" political concepts within Con¬
gress, (2) they give the members themselves an outlet to express their ideo¬
logical viewpoint and (3) they keep pressure on the party leadership to move
the party in the ideological direction of the group. Both the past Minority
Leader, John Rhodes, and the current Minority Leader, Bob Michel, have
expressed this view. Organizations like the Wednesday Group and special
interest groups which are affected by specific government programs provide
counter-pressures. These liberal groups, according to Michel and Rhodes, are
offset by the internal and external pressures from the conservatives.
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The successful application of political pressure depends on two key
ingredients: (1) staff to perform the research work and prepare the material
and (2) members of the House willing to take the lead on the ideological
issues.
The staff has continued to function as a collection center for conser¬
vative ideas, some of which have been formulated into conservative pro¬
posals. The RSC professional staff has remained at a constant size from
1973 to 1981. This staff has been large enough to monitor most issue areas
and to consider those questions which have been of major concern to the
members themselves. The maximum size of the staff was determined in
part by a number of external factors: availability of office space for
additional staff, supervision of a larger staff, salary support for the larger
staff, and to some degree by the desires of the members. But, this staff
limitation has not limited the RSC's research input in the policy arena. The
RSC staff is used as a conservative filter to digest and analyze policy
materials and information from various sources, a role which becomes even
more important as conservative ideology becomes more central to the national
political scene.
Ths issues on which the RSC concentrated during the mid-1970s have
become more politically popular in recent years. For example, Milton
Friedman's concept of indexing the federal income tax brackets was reintro¬
duced in subsequent years by Senator William Armstrong (R-Colorado). The
Armstrong indexing measure passed both the Senate and the House in 1981.
The constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget which Floyd
Spence (R-South Carolina) had first introduced in the House of Representatives
in 1973, passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 1981.
The Republican Study Committee was a vehicle for bringing new ideas
into the legislative process. The RSC called these ideas to the attention
of the RSC members, refined them, and pursued them on behalf of the mem¬
bers. Michael Malbin says, "There is a connection between the world of
ideas, the size of the government's agenda, and the way Congress does its
work."13 The Republican Study Committee's staff served as a catalyst in
this regard.
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An examination of the areas of interest to the RSC permits one to
draw conclusions from the emerging patterns of earlier RSC activities. For
example, a clear pattern of success and failure exists among the RSC's
legislative initiatives. The RSC was often successful in supporting and
opposing legislation introduced by the other institutionalized power centers
in the House. However, it was seldom successful in advocating its own
legislative proposals.^ This pattern is not surprising for several reasons:
1. The RSC was a faction in the minority party of the Congress,
and therefore, it had virtually no influence on establishing the
legislative agenda.
2. Legislative initiatives have usually come from the Executive
Branch of the government, a situation which made RSC initiatives
even more difficult when the Democrats regained the presidency
in the 1976 election.^
3. It is easier to effectively oppose a bill in the House than to
pass one.^
It has been argued throughout this thesis that both creative staff pro¬
fessionals and involved members have been crucial elements in the evolution
of the Republican Study Committee. The role of the professional staff in
the Congress varies substantially, but a vital aspect of the staff role is to
assist in determining members' legislative agendas. Some members of Con¬
gress have given broad discretion to the staffs in this area. These creative
staffs provide items for legislative agendas and then fulfill these agendas
themselves. This role raises the issue of control of professional staff. The
Republican Study Committee staff has always been controlled by the RSC
Executive Committee. Because the RSC staff was "entrepreneurial" it did
proceed in substantive areas without day-to-day supervision from the mem¬
bers. However, this did not mean that the staff was able to act on its own.
The RSC members retained control over the staff not only via their payroll
support, but also through the regular reporting system which occurred at the
member meetings. As long as the members had confidence in the executive
director and his ability to direct the staff, the routine operations were left
in his hands. In the past, when conflicts arose among members themselves
over the use of staff resources, such as between Rousselot and Crane on
the gold ownership bill, 18 the members themselves have resolved these
differences.
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Although the RSC staff was hired to perform legislative research and
coordination for the RSC members, it tended to be more independent from
the members than was the staff in the members' individual offices. There
are two reasons for this: (1) individual members were not repaying political
obligations by hiring these RSC staff aides. That is, the staff had no home
or constituent connection with the members which would bind them to the
members or which would convince the members that they had a long-term
obligation to support the RSC staff. Consequently, the RSC staff could be
hired, and discharged, on the basis of merit, rather than political favor.
This also produced a high level of professionalism among staff aides employed
by the RSC. (2) Since the professional staff consisted of highly trained per¬
sonnel, individuals leaving the RSC staff found little difficulty in obtaining
positions elsewhere on Capitol Hill, or in Washington.
The role of the RSC as a starting point for talented professionals is
clear. For example, David Hoppe (research analyst at the RSC from 1976-
1978) is now the Executive Director of the Republican Policy Committee in
the House. Phil Truluck, a former senior research analyst of the RSC, has
become the Executive Vice President of The Heritage Foundation, a conser¬
vative think-tank in Washington, D.C.
As Michael Malbin notes, "congressional staffs increasingly have been
filled with people who see their jobs in Congress as stepping stones to some¬
where else."^ The "somewhere else" to which Malbin refers is frequently
elsewhere in the Washington political community. Certainly that has been
the case with the Republican Study Committee staff over the years. The
RSC was a conservative institution in place at the time of the 1980 election.
The new Reagan Administration had been encouraged to hire its political
appointees from among those who were both familiar with the Washington
scene, and who had conservative credentials. Thus, a number of former
Republican Study Committee staff professionals now serve in high-level
positions in the Reagan Administration:
. John Tierney, who served as senior research associate for
national security affairs, has been appointed Assistant Admin-
instrator of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
. David Swoap, who came to the Republican Study Committee
with outstanding professional and ideological credentials, has
since moved on to the most senior position of all former
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RSC staff aides. In 1981, he was appointed Under Secretary
of Health and Human Services, the second highest position
in the largest department of the federal government.
• Donald Senese, a RSC research analyst in educational and
social issues, was appointed the. Assistant Secretary of Educa¬
tion for Policy by President Reagan.
. Willa Johnson, who served on the professional staff of the
Republican Study Committee during 1976, was appointed
Deputy Director of Presidential Personnel in the White House.
It could be argued that these individuals would have been appointed to
these positions even if they had not worked for the RSC in the past. That
is possible, but it is fair to argue that their roles in developing conservative
policies in the Republican Study Committee in the House of Representatives
were a helpful stepping stone to them in moving into these new positions.
With regard to the leadership requirements for members on specific
issues, Richard Dingman believes that the RSC's task in meeting its legis¬
lative objective is "finding the leader among the members and then helping
the leader orchestrate the battle.Dingman cites the RSC work with
Congressman Bill Young (R-Florida), who led the RSC battle on the National
Consumer Cooperative Bank during 1979-1980, and Congressman Robert Dornan
(R-California), who led the battle on postcard voter registration during 1977-
1978.
A pattern of leadership began to emerge among the Republican Study
Committee members. In virtually every successful RSC legislative effort,
the pattern of leadership criteria included:
1. Appointment to the right committee. The conservative members
who later formed the RSC had an impact on the Family Assistance
Plan in the early 1970s without the participation of any members from
the Ways and Means Committee. However, by the time the RSC was
organized in 1973, its legislative initiatives were led by a member
who was familiar with the issue from his formal committee assign¬
ment. This was true across the board:
• On land use and surface mining, Sam Steiger led the
■ battle in the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee;
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. On mass transit and gold ownership, Crane was the
leader in the Banking and Currency Committee;
• On foreign policy issues, Derwinski was the leader
from the International Relations Committee.
2. Knowledge of the workings of the political system. This leader¬
ship was made up of members who wanted to take the lead on an
issue on the House floor, however, they lacked sufficient seniority
to direct their own staff resources from within the committee
structure or to rely on the minority committee staff for research
to buttress their position. The RSC staff filled this gap.
During the last several years, it is also noteworthy that a number of
members of the Republican Study Committee have moved to higher elected
positions. For example, David Treen (R-Louisiana), former chairman of the
RSC was elected Governor of Louisiana in 1978. William Armstrong (R-
Colorado) was elected to the Senate in 1978, and was followed by James
Abdnor (R-South Dakota), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), and Steve Symms (R-
Idaho) who were elected to the Senate in 1980. In the cases of Armstrong,
Abdnor, Grassley, and Symms, the House members defeated liberal Democrat
incumbents for these Senate seats.21 Within the House itself, several members
who had close associations with the Republican Study Committee, moved
into formal party leadership positions in 1981. Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) was
elected the Minority Whip and Jack Kemp (R-New York) was elected chairman
of the House Republican Conference. They joined Bob Michei (R-Illinois) who
succeeded the retiring John Rhodes (R-Arizona) as the Minority Leader at
the close of the 1980 session. Michel, Lott and Kemp had all served as
members of the RSC Executive Committee. All three were identified as
active RSC members who had coordinated various legislative initiatives
through the Republican Study Committee.^
Not all RSC members' quests either for re-election or for election to
higher office were successful, however. Philip Crane ran a spirited but
unsuccessful race for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1980.
Two members of the Republican Study Committee were not re-elected
to their House seats because of personal scandals: "Judge" Richard Kelly
(R-Florida) who was involved in the "Abscam" scandal in 1980 and Bob Bauman
(R-Maryland) who pleaded guilty to a charge of "sexual solicitation" in 1980.
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In 1976, Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), another RSC member, ran successfully
for the Republican nomination for senator, but lost in the general election
to Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona).
With regard to the members of the Republican Study Committee in
their races for higher office or return to the Congress, it can be said that
their involvement with the RSC did not determine their success or failure.
This is a positive factor for the RSC, ie., the involvement of members in
issues of national policy need not have a negative impact on their attempts
to run for higher office. Thus, there exists the opportunity for the RSC
to involve its members in major issues with little risk to the members in
their home constituencies.
The Republican Study Committee was established as a legislative infor¬
mation and coordination organization within the House of Representatives, and
since that time the RSC has succeeded remarkably well in this role. In July
of 1974, the RSC became the catalyst which successfully brought together
the opposition to a federal land use planning bill. This measure had already
passed the Senate and appeared headed toward certain victory in the House.
Also at that time, the RSC advanced the legislative proposal of one of its
key members which provided for the private ownership of gold; the RSC had
an impact on the liberals' attempt to repeal the Byrd Amendment regarding
the sale of Rhodesian chrome; and it was active in the issue of operating
subsidies for mass transit. The cumulative impact of these diverse efforts
helped the RSC to become a full participating faction within the U.S. House
of Representatives.^
In servicing the conservative members within Congress, the RSC has
become an established faction within the House of Representatives. This
group of House members is no longer seen as an ad hoc coalition, but instead
as an unique, self-consciously organized body which has persisted through
time advocating a broad range of conservative policies, attributes which ful¬
fill Richard Rose's description of a faction.^
Samuel Huntington has described the criteria of an institution: "Institu¬
tions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour."25 The rsc has
established itself as an existing stable organization, with a continuing volun¬
tary membership which values its services by supporting it financially, and
it has developed a recurring pattern of formal conservative behaviour.
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The RSC also possesses the faction's characteristics as described by
Neison Polsby:
1. It is differentiated from its environment. It has an independ¬
ent staff, governing board, budget and office.
2. It is relatively complex. Its meetings, briefings, publications,
and method of operation all combine to make it a complex organ¬
ization. And,
3. It tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria
for conducting internal business. Its agenda is prepared, officers
are elected, minutes are kept, and dues are collected according to
established procedures.26
The role of the Republican Study Committee within the Republican
party is not a formal one. In fact, its relationship to the formal institution
of the Republican party — the Republican National Committee — is marginal.27
Rather the RSC's role vis-a-vis the Republican party has been to move the
Republican party, particularly in the House of Representatives, in a more
conservative direction. Professor Norman Ornstein commenting on the House
of Representatives in 1981 says that:
"more and more the House is an ad hoc institution, with¬
out firm control over its own schedule or priorities — much like
the Senate....Leadership" on specific issues can come from any of
400 or more different sources.
Ornstein's comments on multiple decision centers, and the declining impor¬
tance of hierarchiai, formal positions is an accurate representation of the
House of Representatives today. In this context, the RSC performs a use¬
ful role for conservative Republicans. It brings together diversity within
the Republican conservative membership in the House, reconciles priorities
on the issues, and trades participation among the members for the different
issues being advocated by their colleagues. With power diffused, as Ornstein
notes, the RSC has to pull together diverse, smaller elements. This gives
the Republican Study Committee and other ideological factions the opportunity
to exercise additional influence over the legislative agenda. Of course, the
RSC is a different organization from the other ideological factions in the
Congress.
When speaking of the RSC's effectiveness, comparisons with both the
Democratic Study Group and the Senate Steering Committee are inevitable.
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The RSC is different from both the DSG and the Senate Steering Committee.
By the mid-1970s, some of the activist members of the DSG, such as Morris
Udail (D-Arizona), had become chairmen of major committees. At that point,
their involvement with the Democratic Study Group became less important
to their own efforts in launching major legislative initiatives. Similarly, the
conservative Senate Steering Committee became less relevant in 1981 when
the Republicans gained control of the Senate and early Steering Committee
members were now full committee chairmen.^9 The RSC has not found
itself in the same position as either of these groups. The Republicans in the
House are still in the minority and the Republican members have limited
access to committee staff, thus the role of the RSC's staff remains a vital
one to the House conservative Republicans.
There is a disadvantage in the RSC's role, particularly since conserva¬
tives are now perceived as being in control of the political agenda in Wash¬
ington. In the past, the RSC has been able to fashion political amendments
to embarrass the liberal majority in the House. Sinclair commented on this
ability:
"Given the skill of the right in fashioning politically
embarrassing amendments with considerable constituency appeal,
the 'safe' course for many members was to vote against the
[Democratic] leadership's position.
While the conservative Republicans could lead this activity in the past,
their success is now less likely, because conservatives are perceived by the
public as being in the majority in Congress.
The Republican conservatives in the House of Representatives have
come a long way toward making their own agenda the national political
agenda. But, this means that they will have to change their tactics with
regard to some of their floor activities, now that they, together with the
conservative Democrats, form an effective majority in the House.
Richard Dingman has stressed one of the RSC's new interests in
"framing the issues in a more conservative manner,"31 to provide a form
of conservative pressure. An example of this framing involved the 1981
congressional battle over reductions in the federal budget. President Reagan's
budget proposal called for cuts of $50 billion for fiscal year 1982, while the
Republican Study Committee's proposal called for cuts of almost $100 billion.
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When Reagan's budget cuts were compared to the RSC proposal, Reagan's
cuts were shown to be quite moderate. The lack of nation-wide press
attention, however, caused the impact of the RSC's more conservative option
on this issue to be relatively minor. With adequate media attention, the
RSC expects this type of action to prove more decisive in future issues.^
While the RSC's role has changed, it has helped the conservative move¬
ment evolve toward maturity. It has provided the vehicle through which
legislative battles have been waged by conservative elected officials. In
this context, the RSC has played a role in the rise of conservatism. Both
John Rhodes and Robert Michel have cited the RSC's role in countering the
pressures from the liberal factions in Congress.^ Yet, most recently as
Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican President, negotiated with mem¬
bers of the House over legislative issues, several conservative Republican
members of the House grumbled that "he takes us for granted,and "we
don't get the attention that the conservative Democrats get because they
are the marginal people that he has to win over. I wonder if he is really
worried about his base of support."^ In the process of functioning as
President of the United States, Ronald Reagan has had to expand his base
from that of a factional leader to a coalition leader.36 As this is done,
the RSC will find itself in a difficult position since on the one hand, the
RSC should support its ideological and partisan ally in the White House,
but on the other hand, some of the RSC members think that in building
this coalition, various policies will lose their basic conservatism. These
complaints are reminiscent of the same problems which the RSC faced in its
dealings with former Presidents Nixon and Ford: allies of the President
tend to be taken for granted while the President and his staff reach out to
build a majority coalition.
According to Philip Crane, the function of a group like the Republican
Study Committee is to introduce new and dramatic ideas into the policy
process. After they are introduced, one of the major parties will co-opt
the idea and bring it into the mainstream of political thought. This is
Crane's definition of how the RSC should be functioning at the "cutting edge"
of the congressional public policy process. He points to the RSC-led initia¬
tives on tax indexing and balanced federal budgets which were later adopted
as policy by the Republicans and finally by the majority of the • Congress.
Crane believes that the RSC is now overly concerned with "legitimacy within
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the Republican structure." To take the lead on a "cutting edge" initiative
is to risk that it will find no support on the floor and possibly lose respect¬
ability for the organization or the leader. In this context, Newt Gingrich
(R-Georgia) expresses the viewpoint that "the RSC can't take risks; it has
more to lose than to gain if it gets too far out front.He asserts that
the RSC now spends 90% of its resources on managerial or maintenance
functions rather than on entrepreneurial ones. Gingrich notes that the RSC
lacks strategic drive, but admits that the RSC does play a useful role. It
has "hygienic effects" on the party. It pressures the leadership to keep the
party broadly conservative. This pressure role is an important one — "It
makes it easier for the leadership to do the right thing," according to
Gingrich. 7 He has also noted, "If the organization were not in existence,
we would probably have to invent it."^®
Richard Dingman's view of the RSC differs substantially from both
Philip Crane and Newt Gingrich. Dingman maintains that the RSC is certainly
"not just a service bureau. Ask any moderate or liberal and they'll tell you
that the Republican Study Committee is still very conservative."^^ At the
same time, however, Dingman concedes that the RSC is now viewed more
as a support organization than as an entrepreneurial vehicle through which
the members will accomplish their legislative agenda. This is a substantial
shift in emphasis from the RSC's earlier role as an entrepreneurial organ¬
ization which brought conservative alternatives into the public policy arena.
In this different role, the RSC is still an important legislative participant
in the House of Representatives. It provides voting cues to its members
through its publications, whip calls and briefings; pressures the Republican
leadership from the right; and presents the conservative option as an alter¬
native. Its leadership on specific major legislative agenda items has de¬
creased substantially. Of these positive roles, none could be performed with¬
out an RSC-type organization as a distinct faction with an ideological per¬
spective in the House. In summary, the RSC has maintained a separate
identity in the House, and has exerted a conservative influence on the Repub¬
lican party.
The Republican Study Committee has begun to play a new role as a
coalition leader for organizations of the so-called "New Right."^2 In its
earlier days, 1973-1976, the allies of the Republican Study Committee were
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most frequently representatives of the business community. Coalitions were
formed on subjects like federal land use and the Consumer Protection
Agency with lobbyists from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and other business organizations. During the
19.77-1980 period, it was more likely that the Republican Study Committee's
allies would be formed from among the politically active organizations of
the New Right, particularly considering Richard Dingman's chairmanship of
the Kingston Group whose primary participants have been the leaders of
the New Right. Groups such as the Moral Majority, the Committee for the
Survival of a Free Congress, and Coalitions for America, many of which were
not in existence five years earlier, frequently worked with the RSC on
specific bills during the 1977-1980 period. The business community continues
to hold meetings and strategy sessions for their own members, and a few
business representatives also participate in the Kingston Group. But, the
Kingston Group is an action coalition with its own agenda:
"Action items are discussed, assignments are made and the
participants are expected to report both on their recent activities
and on the assignments they have undertaken for past Kingston
agenda items.
John Lees notes the legitimate role which interest groups play in the
political process: "In a pluralistic society with a diffuse political system
dependent on popular control, interest group activity has become a neces¬
sary part of political activity.It is not unusual that these interest
groups which share broad common values meet together and build coalitions
toward common objectives. However, it is unusual that the chairman of
the coalition is an employee of a significant group of the legislators who
will be subject to pressure on the issues. Professor Lees questions whether
these interest groups could become too institutionalized under certain cir¬
cumstances.^^ However, the diversity of their agenda and the presence of
countervailing liberal pressure groups which are organized in an analogous
manner makes this event unlikely.
An intriguing aspect of the election of Ronald Reagan as President
and the popularity of conservative alternatives in the public policy arena
is the rapidity with which they have been accepted by large blocs of the
electorate. This is due, in some measure, to the articulation of these
issues by various candidates. It is also due to the infrastructure of New
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Right organizations which have been established, and which have been co¬
ordinated through the Kingston Group chaired by Dingman. As Paul Weyrich
notes:
"Through the Kingston Group and other means of informal
exchange, we have helped many organizations become fully oper¬
ational in less time than it would have required without our
heip."^
Weyrich also noted the New Right organizations were patterned after the
liberal organizations of an earlier era:
"Just as the Study Committee copied much from the DSG,
many of our other organizations are also patterned after the
Common Cause, Ralph Nader complex of the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
Dingman plays a valuable role as the neutral chairman of the Kingston
Group. While he is a known conservative leader, as executive director of
the RSC, he represents the "inside" operation of Washington's Capitol Hill.
If he were a representative of only one of the pressure groups, the New
Right coalitions could run the risk of jealousy and rivalry from other "out¬
side" pressure groups. The range of organizations involved in these coali¬
tion building efforts is very broad. For example, the subsidiary coalition
which concentrates on national security issues is called the "Stanton Group."
Its membership ranges from a New Right organization called "The Com¬
mittee for a Free Afghanistan" to such sturdy pillars of the Washington
establishment as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion.
The role of the Kingston Group, then, is to act as the outside vehicle
for mobilizing grassroots support behind legislative initiatives generated
either within the Republican Study Committee (such as the 1980-1981 battle
against renewed funding for the Legal Services Corporation), or major co¬
ordinated strategies to defeat liberal initiatives in other areas such as the
1977 battle over the Panama Canal treaties, and the 1979-1980 opposition
to the Senate ratification of the SALT-II Treaty.
In this role, the Kingston Group brings together a network of pressure
groups which reinforces the internal efforts of the RSC and its members.
Since the Kingston Group has its own agenda which is different and distinct
from the RSC's agenda, clashes could occur if participants in the Kingston
meetings took positions which key members of the RSC consider extreme or
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politically unpalatable at home. This has not happened to date, although
not all Kingston Group agenda items are of high priority to the RSC.
Dingman asserts that "at no time have any of the chairmen under whom I
have served encouraged me to reduce my visible presence as head of the
Kingston Group.This role is a recent development for coalitions in the
U.S. Congress.
D. Prognostications
To a significant extent, the future of the Republican Study Committee
depends on the success of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. For many con¬
servatives, Ronald Reagan has personified the ideal President for more than
a decade. His political rhetoric and his ideology are closer to the RSC's
position on issues than any other President of recent times. This identity
of views brings both positive and negative aspects to the RSC's role. The
limiting factors include:
• It will be more difficult for the Republican Study Committee
to oppose President Reagan. Opposition efforts may be
mounted, for example, to "out-Reagan" Reagan by proposing
substantially greater budget cuts than the President himself
offers, thereby framing the issue in a more conservative man¬
ner. However, proposals like this will not be viewed as
serious alternatives by most other Republican members or
even most RSC members; these proposals could be perceived
as divisive by many RSC members who believe victory for
the President's own proposals is attainable.
• It will be more difficult for the RSC to take positions in
opposition to the Republican party. Because the results of
the 1980 congressional elections raised the possibility of a
Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 1982,
independence from the Republican party has been difficult to
maintain for groups such as the Republican Study Committee,
particularly considering the presence of three former RSC
Executive Committee members in the official House Repub¬
lican leadership.
The positive factors include:
• The election of conservative Ronald Reagan has unified the
Republican party and particularly the members of the RSC
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in a common conservative legislative agenda. If the Presi¬
dent's proposals are successful, the 1982 congressional elec¬
tions may mean victory for the Republicans which would
result in a Republican majority in the House of Representa¬
tives. In that event, senior Republicans including many RSC
members would assume formal committee and subcommittee
chairmanships in the House. This would enable the Congress
to pass still more conservative legislation.
• An original reason for organizing the Republican Study Com¬
mittee was that the Nixon Administration had been adopting
non-conservative positions on major issues. The Reagan
Administration is less likely to do this because Reagan and
his advisers are more conservative than Nixon and his advisers
were and because the Senate is controlled by the Republicans
who apply a conservative pressure on the Reagan Administra¬
tion.
Also, conservative groups outside of the Congress will continue to
lobby both the Republican Administration and the House Minority Leadership
from the right for their conservative political agenda. The RSC's broader
membership base means that it is less likely to take "extreme" or "cutting
edge" positions now than it did during either the Ford or Carter eras.
Various commentators, such as Charles Lindblom, have argued that, "Dem¬
ocracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjust¬
ments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds.The Crane view, on
the other hand, is that an ideological faction must be willing to take unpop¬
ular or "extreme" positions to make the smaller (and more realistic) changes
more politically palatable. The RSC's broader base, together with its desire,
as Richard Dingman says, to make "conservative ideas respectable in the
political process,"^ points to the likelihood that the RSC will continue to
emphasize its managerial function rather than its entrepreneurial function.
Given the legislative pattern which has been established thus far, the bulk
of the initiatives in the next several years is likely to be coming from the
Executive Branch rather than the Congress. This would lead to fewer major
RSC initiatives on public policy issues.
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If the Republican Study Committee maintains a modicum of independ¬
ence, it will continue to play a useful role as the conservatives' pressure
group on both the House Minority Leadership, and on the conservative Repub¬
lican President. The independence of the RSC would further serve as a re¬
minder to the conservative leaders of their basic conservative constituency
by channeling conservative input into the political system and exerting politi¬
cal pressure from the right.
If, on the other hand, the RSC's role becomes one of merely supporting
the President's legislative proposals without advocating its own alternatives,
and without objecting to the ideological deviations which inevitably occur
in recommendations from the Executive Branch, the Republican Study Com¬
mittee will sink into an ill-defined political posture where it will become
less relevant. If that were to happen, it is plausible that a new group of
ideologically-committed conservative House members and staff aides would
establish a new conservative ideological faction — similar to the original
















The Republican Study Committee is a group of conservative Republican
Congressmen who favor progressive measures within the framework of con¬
stitutional government and who have pooled their resources to provide
themselves with more effective research and legislative support.
•Our purpose is to persuade rather than to divide; we will continue, as
we have in the past, to cooperate closely with the Republican Leadership in
the House of Representatives. At the same time we want to ensure that
conservative alternatives are given a full and fair hearing both on the floor
of the House and in the councils of the Administration.
• We believe that the preservation of individual liberties is the purpose
of our constitutional system of government.
.We believe that our liberties are dependent upon a strong national
defense second to none and upon a foreign policy that always places the just
interests of the American people first.
•We believe that both spiritual and material prosperity are enhanced
when government intrusion in the social, political, and economic lives of our
citizens is strictly limited.
•We believe that the power of a strong central government, when
increased at the expense of state and local government, is a threat to
individual liberties.
•We believe that the American system of free, competitive, private
enterprise best energizes the creative talents of our people and best serves
the interests of consumers, workers, farmers and businessmen.
•We believe that unlimited government spending is the main cause of
inflation which erodes the savings of our citizens and levies on them a heavy
tax without their consent; accordingly, we believe in a balanced budget and
frugal, efficient public services.
•We believe that most of the federal government's social policies have
not significantly contributed to the general welfare of the people they were
intended to help, and accordingly, we believe that reforms are needed in our
domestic programs.
•We believe that the councils of "pragmatism" or "expediency" would set
us adrift on the political seas without a compass; we believe finally that
principle makes good politics.
To implement these principles in practice, we have combined our
resources to establish a research and information center with a shared staff
of specialists who will provide us with the facts we need to serve our
constituents as informed legislators, and who will aid us in coordinating
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2. Interviews
Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, former Republican Member of Congress (4th
District, Georgia), Washington, D.C., December 12, 1978.
Jack Cox, former Administrative Assistant to Honorable Barry Goldwater, Jr.
Republican Member of Congress (20th District, California), Washington,
D.C., May 14, 1980.
Honorable Daniel B. Crane, Republican Member of Congress (22nd District,
Illinois), Washington, D.C., June 15, 1981.
Honorable Philip M. Crane, Republican Member of Congress (12th District,
Illinois), Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980 and March 4, 1981.
Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Republican Member of Congress (4th District,
Illinois), Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.
Richard B. Dingman, Executive Director, The Republican Study Committee,
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Daphne Miller, Legislative Director, The Republican Study Committee,
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1980.
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Committee, Washington, D.C., January 3, 1979.
Michael O. Ware, former research associate, The Republican Study Com¬
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Paul M. Weyrich, former Assistant to Honorable Carl T. Curtis, former
Republican United States Senator (Nebraska) and to Honorable Gordon
Allott, former Republican United States Senator (Colorado), Washington,
D.C., October 16, 1979.
James Williams, former policy analyst, The Democratic Research Organization,
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